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`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 1 of 84
`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 1 of 84
`
`Affidavit in Support of Application for
`Order Authorizing the Interception of Wire
`and Electronic Communications over
`Cellular Telephones
`
`.Sealed
`
`' UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`
`In the Matter of the Application of the
`United 1 States of America
`for
`(a)
`Authorization for Continued Interception
`of Wire Communications Over Cellular
`Telephones initially identified as 929-
`247—6909, 201—887-7880, and 347-571-
`1345,
`(b)
`the Initial
`Interception Of
`Electronic Communications Over 201—
`
`887—7880 and 347—571—1345; and (c) the
`Initial
`Interception
`of
`Wire
`Communications Occurring over
`the
`Cellular Telephones Initially Identified
`as 551—574—7774 and 929-355—2477,
`
`
`USAO Reference No. 2014R01259.
`
`Contents
`
`I. Specifications .......................................................................................................................... 4
`A. Affiant .‘............................................................................................................................... 4
`B. Purpose ofAffidavit ........................................................................................................... 5
`C. Target Subj ects.'........................:.........................................................................................i. 6
`D. Target Offenses .................................................................................................................. 6
`E. Objectives of the Interception............................................................................................. 7
`
`F. Target Cellphones and Service Provider ............................................................................ 8
`
`1. Target Cellphones and Successor Target Cellphones Identifiers ................................... 8
`
`a. The SHULAYA 6909 PHONE ................................................................................... 8
`
`b. The SHULAYA 7880 PHONE ................................................................,................... 9
`
`c. The SHULAYA 7774 PHONE ................................................................................... 9
`
`d. The SHULAYA 2477 PHONE ................................................................................. 10
`
`e. The ZURA PHONE ................................................................................................. '. 11
`
`2. Successor Target Cellphones ........................................................................................ 11
`
`3. Successor Service Provider ........................................................................................... 12
`
`4. Application to Successor Target Cellphones and Successor Service Provider. ........... 12
`
`G. Communications Features of Target Cellphones ............................................................. 12
`
`US_001275
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`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 2 of 84
`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 2 of 84
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`1. Wire Communications Capabilities .............................................................................. 12
`
`H. Background Conversations .............................................................................................. 13
`
`I. Territorial Scope and Jurisdiction...................................................................................... 13
`
`I . Period of Interception ........................................................................................................ 13
`
`K. Monitoring Agents and Personnel .................................................................................... 14
`
`L. Minimization of Wire and Electronic Communications ................................................... 14
`
`M. Prior Applications ............................................................................................................ 16
`II. The Investigation and Probable Cause ................................................................................. 17
`A. Probable Cause ................................................................................................................. 17
`
`B. Basis and Scope of Declarations ...................................................................................... 17
`
`C. Details ofthe Investigation .....'
`
`..........; ................................................... 19
`
`1. Background to the Investigation ................................................................................... 19
`
`2. Razhden Shulaya is a Vor ......................................................................................‘....... 20
`
`3. The Shulaya Enterprise’s Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property and Contraband
`Cigarettes .......................................................................................................................... 21
`
`4. The Shulaya Enterprise’s Plot to Defraud Atlantic City Casinos ................................. 28
`
`5. The Shulaya Enterprise’s Extortion and Gambling Operation ..................................... 31
`
`6. Use of the Target Cellphones in furtherance of the Target Offenses ........................... 37
`
`a. The SHULAYA 6909 PHONE ................................................................................. 37
`
`b. The SHULAYA 7880 PHONE ...........................................‘...................................... 40 .
`
`c. The ZURA PHONE .................................................................................................. 48
`
`d. The SHULAYA 7774 PHONE and the SHULAYA 2477 PHONE ......................... 55
`
`7. Analysis of Communications Records for Target Cellphones ...................................... 64
`a. Wire and Electronic Communications for the SHULAYA 6909 PHONE ............... 64
`
`b. Wire and Electronic Communications for the SHULAYA 7880 PHONE ............... 65
`
`c. Wire and Electronic Communications for the ZURA PHONE .......... ’...................... 67
`
`d. Wire Communications for the SHULAYA 7774 PHONE ....................................... 68
`
`e. Wire Communications for the SHULAYA 2477 PHONE ....................................... 69
`
`III. Normal Investigative Techniques ....................................................................................... 70
`
`A. Insufficiency of Alternative Investigative Techniques .................................................... 70
`
`1. Cooperating Witnesses/Confidential Sources ........‘....................................................... 7O
`
`2015.12.04
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`US_001276
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`US_001276
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`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 3 of 84
`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 3 of 84
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`2. Undercover Officers ...................................................................................................... 71
`
`3. Physical Surveillance .................................................................................................... 72
`
`4. Pole Camera .................................................................................................................. 73
`
`5. Geolocation Information ............................................................................................... 74
`
`6. Telephone Records and Pen Registers .......................................................................... 74
`
`7. Grand Jury Process and Witness Interviews ................................................................. 75
`
`8. Search Warrants ............................................................................................................ 76
`
`9. Arrests .............................................................................................................. ‘. ............ 77
`
`10. Trash Searches ............................................................................................................ 77
`
`1 1. Financial Investigation ................................................................................................ 77
`12. Prior Wire Interceptions.............................................................................................. 78
`IV. Ancillary Investigative Orders............................................................................................ 79 ‘
`' A. Order to Service Providers ............................................................................................... 79
`
`1. Technical Assistance to Accomplish the Interception .................................................. 79
`2. Pen Register and Trap and Trace Information ......................... .................................... 80
`3. Geolocation Information and Delayed Notice and Return ........................................... 80
`
`4. Non-Disclosure ............................................................................................................. 82
`
`5. Successor Service Provider ........................................................................................... 82
`
`B. Order for Expedited Provision of Information Concerning Communications Devices
`Related to the Interception .................................................................................................... 83
`
`V. Sealing .................................................................................................................................. 84
`
`2015.12.04
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`3
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`US_001277
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`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 4 of 84
`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 4 of 84
`
`State of New York
`County of New York
`Southern District of New York
`
`)
`) ss.:
`)
`
`ROBERT J. HANRATTY, a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigations
`
`(“FBI”), being duly sworn, deposes and states:
`
`.
`
`I. Specifications
`
`A. Affiant
`
`I am an investigative or law enforcement officer of the United States within the meaning
`
`of 18 U.S.C. .§ 2510(7)—that is, an officer of the United States who is empowered by law to
`
`conduct investigations of and to make arrests for offenses enumerated in 1.8 U.S.C. § 2516. Ihave
`
`been a Special Agent with the FBI since 2009, and I have been personally involved in the
`
`investigation of this matter. I am currently assigned to the Eurasian Organized Crime Task Force,
`
`a squad that investigates, among other things, racketeering and organized crime. During my time
`
`with the FBI, I have participated in investigations of racketeering enterprises, illegal gambling
`
`operations, extortion, unlawful drug trafficking, firearms trafficking, firearms offenses, and violent
`
`crimes, including robbery and murder, and, among other things, have conducted or participated in
`
`surveillance,
`
`the execution of search warrants, debriefings of informants, reviews of taped
`
`conversations, and have participated in investigations that included the interception of wire
`
`communications. Through my training, education and experience, I have become familiar with
`
`the structure, hierarchies, and organization of Eurasian organized crime enterprises, and the
`
`manner in which such organizations operate to engage in extortion of Victim-businesses, illegal
`
`gambling, narcotics distribution, and interstate transportation and sale of stolen property, among
`
`2015.12.04
`
`US_001278
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 5 of 84
`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 5 of 84
`
`other criminal activities, and the “lingo” and coded language used by the members and associates
`
`of such enterprises.
`
`B. Purpose of Affidavit
`
`Irespectfully submit this Affidavit in support of the Application of Assistant United States
`
`Attorney Andrew C. Adams pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 119 of Title 18, United States
`
`Code (“Title III”), for an Order of Interception authorizing the interception and recording of wire
`
`communications by the Target Subjects specified below over the Target Cellphones specified
`
`below, as well as of electronic communications by the Target Subjects over certain of the Target
`
`Cellphones as described below. I further submit this Affidavit in support of the Government’s
`
`Application for ancillary orders and warrants (a) to the Service Providers, and any Successor
`
`Service Providers, for (i) necessary technical support to accomplish the interception, pursuant to
`
`18 U.S.C. § 2518(4); (ii) pen register and trap and trace information for the Target Cellphones
`
`pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121 et seq; and (iii) geolocation information for the Target Cellphones,
`
`pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, with delayed notification to the person affected pursuant to Rule
`
`41(f)(3) & 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b); and (b) to any wire and electronic communications service
`
`provider, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2703(d) for expedited provision of subscriber, toll and service
`
`records for telephones and communications devices in communication with the Target Cellphones.
`
`This application is submitted following the entry of a prior order of interception signed on
`
`December 12, 2016, by the Hon. Katherine Polk Failla (the “December 12 Order”). The December
`
`12 Order permitted the interception of wire communications only, without authorizing the
`
`interception of electronic communications. This application seeks to add additional Target
`
`2015.12.04
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`
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`US_001279
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`

`

`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 6 of 84
`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 6 of 84
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`Cellphones over which wire communications will be intercepted, and the authorization of both
`
`wire and electronic communications over two Target Cellphones, the SHULAYA 7880 PHONE,
`
`and the ZURA PHONE as described in more detail below.
`
`C. Target Subjects.
`
`As also set forth in the Application, the Target Subjects whose communications are sought
`
`to be intercepted are: (a) MAMUKA CHAGANAVA, (b) ALEXANDER DZI IANASHVILI, a/k/a
`
`“Ako,” (c) ZURAB DZHANASHVILI, a/k/a “Zura,” (d) NAZO GAPRTNDASHVILI, a/k/a
`
`“Anna,” (e) KHVICHA GEGELIA, (t) AVTANDIL KHURTSIDZE, a/k/a “The Kickboxer,” (g)
`
`ZURAB NATCHKEPIA,
`
`(h) RAFAEL OHANES YAN a/k/a “Raffik,”
`
`(i) RAZHDEN
`
`SHULAYA, a/k/a “Roma,” a/k/a “The Brother,” (j) MIKHEIL TORADZE, a/k/a “Misha,” (k)
`
`HAMLET UGLAVA, a/k/a “Gamlet,” (l) ARTUR VTNOKUROV a/k/a “Rizhy,” (m) AKO LNU,
`(n) KOBA LNU, (o) ISACE LANDAU, (p) GIORGI LOMISHVILI, (q) YESSO LNU, (r) YOSSE
`
`LNU, (s) AZER ARSLANOUK, (t) MARIK ZOLOTOREV, a/k/a “Mara,” (u) FNU LNU—l
`
`(“UM-3”), (V) FNU LN U-2 (“UF-2”), and others unknown.
`
`D. Target Offenses
`
`As also set forth in the Application, the Target Offenses that are the subject of this
`Application, each of which is predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2516, are: offenses involving
`
`interference with commerce by threats or violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951; involving the
`
`interstate or foreign travel or transportation in aid of a racketeering enterprise, in violation of 18
`
`U.S.C. § 1952; involving the conduct of an illegal gambling enterprise, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
`
`§ 1955; involving the commission and conspiracy to commit Violent crimes in aid of racketeering,
`
`2015.12.04
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`US_001280
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`US_001280
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`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 7 of 84
`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 7 of 84
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`in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959; involving participation in an enterprise engaged in a pattern of
`
`racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (see
`
`18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(C) (listing 18 U.S.C § 1963, which in turn incorporates § 1962, as a predicate
`
`offense); involving the interstate transportation of stolen property, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
`
`§ 2314;
`
`involving the unauthorized access of protected computers with the intent to defraud, in
`
`violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030; and involving the distribution, and possession with intent to
`
`distribute, of controlled substances, the use of wire facilities to facilitate the same, conspiracy to
`
`do the same, and attempts to do the same, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 843(b), and 846.
`
`E. Objectives of the Interception
`
`As also set forth in the Application, the objectives of the interception sought herein are to
`
`reveal to the greatest extent possible: (i) the nature, extent and methods of the Target Subjects’
`
`commission ofthe Target Offenses; (ii) the identities ofthe Target Subjects, to the extent currently
`
`‘ unknown, as well as their accomplices, aiders and abettors, co-conspirators, and participants in
`
`their illegal activities; (iii) the source, receipt, and distribution of contraband, and money involved
`
`in those activities; (iv) the locations and items used in furtherance of those activities; (v) the
`
`existence and locations of records; (vi) the locations and sources of resources used to finance their
`
`illegal activities; (vii) the locations and disposition of the proceeds from and relating to those
`
`activities; and (viii) the location and other information necessary to seize and or forfeit contraband,
`
`money and items of value, and other evidence of or proceeds of the commission of the Target
`
`Offenses. In addition, these interceptions are expected to constitute admissible evidence of the
`
`commission of the Target Offenses.
`
`2015.12.04
`
`«awrwv—wm—w—mmm-wwvw-mm
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`US_00128
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`US_001281
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`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 8 of 84
`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 8 of 84
`
`,F. Target Cellphones and Service Providers
`
`1. Target Cellphones and Successor Target Cellphones Identifiers
`
`This Application applies to communications occurring over the following five cellular
`
`telephones: the cellular telephone currently assigned call number 929-247-6909 (the “SHULAYA
`
`6909 PHONE”);
`
`the cellular telephone currently assigned call number 201—887—7880 (the
`
`“SHULAYA 7880 PHONE”); the cellular telephone currently assigned call number 551—574—7774
`
`(the “SHULAYA 7774 PHONE”); the cellular telephone currently assigned call number 929—355-
`
`2477 (the “SHULAYA 2477 PHONE”): and the cellular telephone currently assigned call number
`
`347—571—1345 (the “ZURA PHONE”) (collectively, the “Target Cellphones”).1
`
`a. The SHULAYA 6909 PHONE
`
`The SHULAYA 6909 PHONE is subscribed to in the name of “Johny None Depp” with
`
`no identified subscriber address. Service to the SHULAYA 6909 PHONE is provided by T-Mobile
`
`US, Inc. (“T—Mobile”). The SHULAYA 6909 PHONE also includes a removable SIM (Subscriber
`
`Information Module) card. The SIM card is a memory chip where certain information, such as
`
`subscriber information, is stored. Among the information stored on a SIM card is a serial number,
`
`somewhat the equivalent of a customer account number, called, variously, the International Mobile
`
`Subscriber Identity (or Identification or Identifier)—the IMSI number. The IMSI for the
`
`
`
`1 The December 12 Order authorized wire interceptions over the cellular telephone assigned call
`number 941—224—8643 (defined as the “ANNA PHONE” in the application in support of the
`December 12 Order).
`The present application does not seek reauthorization to intercept
`communications over the ANNA PHONE insofar as wire interceptions over the SHUALYA 7774
`PHONE and the SHULAYA 2477 PHONE are expected to render interceptions over the ANNA
`PHONE redundant.
`
`2015.12.04
`
`US_001282
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`

`

`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 9 of 84
`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 9 of 84
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`SHULAYA 6909 PHONE’s SIM card is 310260124344081. At this time, the key identifier for
`
`the SHULAYA 6909 PHONE, and the means by which it will be identified to the Service Provider ‘
`
`for installation of the intercept, is the telephone number; As described in further detail below, the
`
`SHULAYA 6909 PHONE is used by RAZHDEN SHULAYA, a/k/a “Roma,” a/k/a “The Brother,”
`
`a Target Subject.
`
`b. The SHULAYA 7880 PHONE
`
`The SHULAYA 7880 PHONE is subscribed to in the name of “None, Prepaid” and has no
`
`identified subscriber address. Service to the SHULAYA 7880 PHONE is provided by T—Mobile.
`
`The SHULAYA 7880 PHONE also includes a removable SIM (Subscriber Information Module)
`
`card. The SIM card is a memory chip where certain information, such as subscriber information,
`
`is stored. Among the information stored on a SIM card is a serial number, somewhat the equivalent
`
`of a customer account number, called, variously, the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (or
`
`'
`
`Identification or Identifier)—the IMSI number. The IMSI for the SHULAYA 7880 PHONE’S SIM
`
`card is 310260574081101. At this time, the key identifier for the SHULAYA 7880 PHONE, and
`
`the means by which it will be identified to the Service Provider for installation of the intercept, is
`
`I the telephone number. As described in further detail below, the SHULAYA 7880 PHONE is used
`
`by RAZHDEN SHULAYA, a/k/a “Roma,” a/k/a “The Brother,” a Target Subject.
`
`0. The SHULAYA 7774 PHONE
`
`The SHULAYA 7774 PHONE is subscribed to in the name of “Razhden Shulaya” and a
`
`subscriber address of “100 Alexander Way, Edgewater, New Jersey 07020.” Service to the
`
`SHULAYA 7774 PHONE is provided by Cingular Wireless/AT&T. The SHULAYA 7774
`
`2015.12.04
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`US_00128
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`US_001283
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`

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`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 10 of 84
`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 10 of 84
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`PHONE also includes a removable SIM (Subscriber Information Module) card. The SIM card is a
`
`memory chip where certain information, such as subscriber information, is stored. Among the
`
`information stored on a SIM card is a serial number, somewhat the equivalent of a customer
`
`account number, called, variously, the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (or Identification
`
`or Identifier)—the IMSI number. The IMSI for the SHULAYA 7774 PHONE’s SIM card is
`
`310410848055269. At this time, the key identifier for the SHULAYA 7774 PHONE, and the
`
`means by which it will be identified to the Service Provider for installation of the intercept, is the
`
`telephone number. As described in further detail below, the SHULAYA 7774 PHONE is used by
`
`RAZHDEN SHULAYA, a/k/a “Roma,” a/k/a “The Brother,” a Target Subject.
`
`d. The SHULAYA 2477 PHONE
`
`The SHULAYA 2477 PHONE is subscribed without a subscriber name or address. Service
`
`to the SHULAYA 2477 PHONE is provided by T-Mobile. The SHULAYA 2477 PHONE also
`
`includes a removable SIM (Subscriber Information Module) card. The SIM card is a memory chip
`
`where certain information, such as subscriber information, is stored. Among the information stored
`
`on a SIM card is a serial number, somewhat the equivalent of a customer account number, called,
`
`variously, the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (or Identification or Identifier)—the IMSI
`
`number. The IMSI for the SHULAYA 2477 PHONE’s SIM card is 310260645145748. At this
`
`time, the key identifier for the SHULAYA 2477 PHONE, and the means by which it will be
`
`identified to the Service Provider for installation of the intercept, is the telephone number. As
`
`described in further detail below,
`
`the SHULAYA 2477 PHONE is used by RAZHDEN
`
`SHULAYA, a/lda “Roma,” a/lda “The Brother,” a Target Subject.
`
`2015.12.04
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`10
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`US_001 28:1
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`US_001284
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`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 11 of 84
`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 11 of 84
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`e. The ZURA PHONE
`
`The ZURA PHONE is subscribed to in the name of “Zurab Dzhanashvili” with an
`
`identified subscriber address of “1820 Avenue N., Apt. 6D, Brooklyn, New York 11230.” Service
`
`to the ZURA PHONE is provided by T-Mobile. The ZURA PHONE also includes a removable
`
`SIM (Subscriber Information Module) card. The SIM card is a memory chip where certain
`
`information, such as subscriber information, is stored. Among the information stored on a SIM
`
`card is a serial number, somewhat the equivalent of a customer account number, called, variously,
`
`the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (or Identification or Identifier)~—the IMSI number.
`
`The IMSI for the ZURA PHONE’s SIM card is 310260309038884. At this time, the key identifier
`
`for the ZURA PHONE, and the means by which it will be identified to the Service Provider for
`installation of the intercept, is the telephone number. As described in further detail below, the
`
`ZURA PHONE is used by ZURAB DZHANASHVILI, a/k/a “Zura,” a Target Subject.
`
`2. Successor Target Cellphones
`
`A user of cellphones like the Target Cellphones may switch the SIM card fi‘om one
`
`cellphone to another; may obtain a new SIM card (for ekaniple, a pre-paid card) for use with the
`
`same telephone number; or may request the seivice provider to port a new telephone number to
`
`the SIM card. It is to capture communications after certain such switches in customer service that
`
`authorization to intercept “Successor Target Cellphones” is also sought. By Successor Target
`
`Cellphones is meant any other telephone number or telephone accessed through the above-
`referenced IMSI numbers, and to any other IMSI numbers accessed through the target telephone
`
`numbers referenced above, within the thirty—day period.
`
`2015.12.04
`
`11
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`US_001285
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`US_001285
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`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 12 of 84
`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 12 of 84
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`3. Successor Service Providers
`
`I know from the foregoing that the user of such a cellphone can switch the provider of
`
`service to that cellphone from one service provider to another service provider (“Successor Service
`
`Provider”).
`
`' 4. Application to Successor Target Cellphones and Successor Service Providers.
`
`To avoid interruption in the execution of the Order of Interception, it is requested that the
`
`Order of Interception apply without further order of this Court to any Successor Target Cellphones,
`
`as well as to any Successor Service Providers for the Target Cellphones. Further, unless otherwise
`
`indicated, references herein to the “Target Cellphones” or “Service Providers” include any
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`successors thereto.
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`G. Communications Features of Target Cellphones
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`1. Wire Communications Capabilities
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`In addition to normal voice communications capabilities, the Service Providers for the
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`Target Cellphones have advised us that the Target Cellphones have voicemail capabilities. It is
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`requested that the Order of Interception also apply to messages left to, and retrieved from,
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`.
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`voicemail, that are otherwise subject to interception under Title III.
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`2. Electronic Communications Capabilities
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`The Target Cellphones also have certain electronic communications capabilities. With
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`respect to the SHULAYA 7880 PHONE and the ZURA PHONE, it is requested that the Order of
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`Interception also apply to electronic communications transmitted over those Target Cellphones,
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`including but not limited to, text messages and Internet traffic.
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`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 13 of 84
`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 13 of 84
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`H. Background Conversations
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`It is common practice that individuals using cellphones frequently speak in the presence of
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`and while personally communicating with other individuals on the subjects related to the cellphone
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`communication. It is accordingly requested that the Order ofInterception also apply to background
`conversations overheard over the Target Cellphones while the Target Cellphones are active or
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`otherwise in use, that are otherwise subject to interception under Title III.
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`I. Territorial Scope and Jurisdiction
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`This Court has territorial jurisdiction to authorize the interception of wire and electronic
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`communications sought in this application because, as a technical matter, all interceptions will
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`automatically be routed to, and first heard or otherwise reviewed in, the Southein District of New
`York even if the Target Cellphones are not physically located in the Southern District of New
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`York. (In the event the Target Cellphones leave the United States during the period of interception,
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`interceptions will continue to be routed to, and first heard or otherwise reviewed in, the Southern
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`District of New York, to the extent the Target Cellphones’ communications continue to be
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`transmitted via the Service Provider’s system.)
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`J. Period of Interception
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`As set forthin the Application, the FBI will execute the Order of Interception as soon as
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`practicable after it is signed. Inasmuch as the illegal operation described herein is a continuing
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`conspiracy involving numerous persons as yet unidentified and unknown, it is requested that
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`authorization to intercept not automatically terminate when the first communication described
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`herein has been obtained, but rather continue until the Objectives of the Interception are fully
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`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 14 of 84
`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 14 of 84
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`achieved, or for a period of thirty (30) days, whichever is earlier. For the continued interception of
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`of communications over the cellular telephones initially identified as 929-247—6909, 201-887—
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`7880, and 347—571-1345, the thirty days are measured from the date of the Order of Interception.
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`For the initial interception of communications over the cellular telephones initially identified as
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`551-574-7774 and 929-355—2477, the thirty days are measured from the earlier ofthe date on which
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`investigative or law enforcement officers begin to conduct interception under this Order of
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`Interception, or ten days from the date of this Order.
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`K. Monitoring Agents and Personnel
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`Consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5), the interceptions for which authorization is sought
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`will be conducted only by Government personnel, and by individuals operating under a contract
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`with the ‘ Government under the supervision of an investigative or law enforcement officer
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`authorized to conduct the interception.
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`L. Minimization of Wire and Electronic Communications
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`Consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5), monitoring agents and personnel will conduct the
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`interception in such a way as to minimize the interception ofwire communications not otherwise
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`subject to interception under Title III. Monitoring of conversations will terminate immediately
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`when it is determined that the conversation is unrelated to communications subject to interception
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`V under Title III. Interception will be suspended immediately when it is determined through voice
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`identification, physical surveillance, or otherwise, that none of the Target Subjects or any of their
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`oonfederates, when identified, are participants in the conversation, unless it is determined during
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`the portion of the conversation already overheard that the conversation is criminal in nature. If a
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`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 15 of 84
`Case 1:17-cr-00350-KBF Document 388-2 Filed 11/17/17 Page 15 of 84
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`conversation has been minimized, the monitoring agents will spot check to ensure that the
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`conversation has not turned to criminal matters. In the event the intercepted communications are
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`in a code or foreign language, and an expert in that code or foreign language is not reasonably
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`available during the interception period, minimization will be accomplished as soon as practicable
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`after such interception. Monitoring agents and personnel will also operate under specific
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`Minimization Instructions provided by the Assistant United States Attorney supervising the
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`interception.
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`Electronic communications, such as text messages, generally cannot be reviewed on a real—
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`time basis during transmission because service providers generally produce files containing the
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`electronic communications to the investigating agency in batches. The electronic communication
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`files will generally be separated by type, and the types of communications most likely to contain
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`pertinent information will be subjected to firrther review. Thereafter, based on factors such as the
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`identities of the sender and recipient, the content of the message, or the content/information
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`relating to electronic communications other than messages, monitoring personnel will determine
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`as soon as practicable after interception whether the electronic communication appears to be
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`rel