Case 1:17-cv-06493-RJS Document 52 Filed 08/05/20 Page 1 of 14
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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`AKILAH HUGHES,
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`CARL BENJAMIN a/k/a Sargon of Akkad, JOHN
`DOES 1–10, inclusive,
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`Plaintiff,
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`Defendants.
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`No. 17-cv-6493 (RJS)
`OPINION AND ORDER
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`RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge:
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`Defendant Carl Benjamin, also known as “Sargon of Akkad,” brings this motion for
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`attorneys’ fees pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505 following the Court’s dismissal of the copyright
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`infringement action brought by Plaintiff Akilah Hughes against Benjamin and ten “John Doe”
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`defendants. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Benjamin’s motion and concludes
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`that he is entitled to $38,911.89 in attorneys’ fees and costs.
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`I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
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`The Court presumes the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural
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`history of this case, which are set out more fully in the Court’s February 3, 2020 opinion and order
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`(Doc. No. 39 (the “Opinion”)), and offers only a short summary of each for purposes of this opinion
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`and order.1
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`1 In deciding this motion, the Court has considered Benjamin’s memorandum of law in support of his motion (Doc.
`No. 42 (“Def. Mem.”)), Hughes’s memorandum of law in opposition (Doc. No. 45 (“Pl. Mem.”)), Benjamin’s reply
`(Doc. No. 48 (“Reply”)), and the exhibits and declarations filed in connection with those submissions.
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`On November 18, 2016, Hughes, an internet commentator and filmmaker, posted a nine-
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`minute-and-fifty-second video titled We Thought She Would Win to her YouTube channel. (Id.
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`at 2; Doc. No. 32, Ex. A.) We Thought She Would Win consisted of footage of Hughes at Hillary
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`Clinton’s campaign party at the Jacob Javits Convention Center in Manhattan on November 8,
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`2016, the night of the 2016 presidential election. (Opinion at 2.) In the video, Hughes related the
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`night’s events and commented on the implications of Secretary Clinton’s defeat by now-President
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`Donald Trump. (Id.)
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`The next day, Hughes discovered that Benjamin, a fellow YouTuber but with a decidedly
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`conservative/libertarian bent, had posted a video titled SJW Levels of Awareness to one of his
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`YouTube channels. (Id.) Benjamin’s video consisted entirely of six clips from We Thought She
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`Would Win, totaling one minute and fifty-eight seconds, spliced together. (Id.) Hughes responded
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`by submitting a “takedown notice” to YouTube pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
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`(“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. § 512, which led to YouTube disabling public access to Benjamin’s video.
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`(Id. at 3.) Benjamin immediately emailed Hughes and requested that she withdraw the takedown
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`notice, asserting that his video fell within the fair use exception to the Copyright Act as parody or
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`satire. (Id.; Doc. No. 46-1 at 2.) Three days later, after Hughes refused to withdraw her notice,
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`Benjamin sent YouTube a DMCA counter notification, asserting that SJW Levels of Awareness
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`was “entirely transformative and intended for parody.” (Doc. No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 10 (internal
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`quotation marks omitted); Opinion at 3.) Thereafter, YouTube reinstated public access to
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`Benjamin’s video. (Opinion at 3.)
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`On August 25, 2017, Hughes initiated this action for damages and injunctive relief.
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`(Compl. at 11–12.) Hughes’s complaint alleged that Benjamin infringed on her copyright of We
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`Thought She Would Win through his public posting on YouTube and Twitter of SJW Levels of
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`Awareness. (Id. at 9–10.)
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`Throughout the course of this litigation, Hughes prominently referenced Benjamin and the
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`ongoing suit on Twitter. For instance, on December 8, 2016, Hughes tweeted that she had “a
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`[C]hristmas present on the way” for Benjamin, referring to the lawsuit. (Doc. No. 43 at 5.) On
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`October 28, 2018, Hughes tweeted that she was “currently suing [Benjamin’s] white supremacist
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`ass for stealing [her] content.” (Id. at 6.) Two months later, Hughes referred to Benjamin in a
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`tweet as a “carnival barker” and expressed a desire to convince the crowdfunding platform
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`GoFundMe to terminate Benjamin’s campaign to fund his legal costs for this action and to
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`“bankrupt” Benjamin with a libel suit. (Id. at 2.) And on February 12, 2019, Hughes replied to a
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`tweet predicting that she would lose her copyright lawsuit by declaring that she was “gonna take
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`hundreds of thousands of dollars USD” from Benjamin. (Id. at 7.)
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`On February 3, 2020, the Court concluded that SJW Levels of Awareness plainly fell within
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`the fair use exception to the Copyright Act and dismissed Hughes’s complaint. In particular, the
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`Court determined that “a reasonable observer who came across [Benjamin’s video] would quickly
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`grasp its critical purpose” (Opinion at 7), that “Benjamin’s target audience (generally political
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`conservatives and libertarians) is obviously not the same as Hughes’s target audience (generally
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`political liberals)” (id. at 9), and that “the fair use defense clearly applies based on the face of
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`Hughes’s complaint and a review of the videos themselves” (id.).
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`Approximately two weeks later, Benjamin moved for attorneys’ fees and costs under 17
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`U.S.C. § 505 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). (Doc. No. 41.) Hughes opposes his
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`request, arguing that she had a “good faith belief” that Benjamin violated her copyright, that her
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`only motivation for commencing this action was to protect her copyrighted work, that she “litigated
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`her claims reasonably” by attempting to reach a settlement, that Benjamin has already received
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`adequate compensation through his crowdsource campaign to pay his legal fees, and that an award
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`would not deter similar litigation in the future because “widespread public criticism as a result of
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`losing this lawsuit” has already provided a sufficient deterrent.2 (Pl. Mem. at 3–5.)
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`II. JURISDICTION AND APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
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`The Court has jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a).
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`Section 505 of the Copyright Act allows district courts to “award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the
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`prevailing party” in a copyright action. 17 U.S.C. § 505. Although courts possess “broad leeway”
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`to award fees under § 505, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1985 (2016),
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`that discretion should be exercised with an eye towards furthering the Copyright Act’s purpose:
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`“enriching the general public through access to creative works,” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S.
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`517, 527 (1994).
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`While this is necessarily a holistic inquiry, the Supreme Court has identified several factors
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`– termed the Fogerty factors – that help guide the analysis: “frivolousness, motivation, objective
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`unreasonableness[,] and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of
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`compensation and deterrence.” Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1985 (quoting Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534
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`n.19). Of those factors, the objective unreasonableness of the losing party’s position carries the
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`most “weight.” Id. at 1989. But no one factor is necessarily dispositive. Id. Indeed, a court may
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`award fees even where the losing party put forward reasonable arguments, so long as an award
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`would further the Copyright Act’s goal of ensuring public access to new creative works. See id.
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`2 On June 11, 2020, Benjamin submitted a supplemental letter to the Court, asserting that Hughes has made several
`additional public statements since the Court issued its Opinion that “further justif[y] the requested award” of attorneys’
`fees. (Doc. No. 50 at 1.) Hughes responded by asserting that the Court should “strik[e]” the supplemental letter “from
`the record” or, alternatively, grant Hughes the opportunity to submit a reply. (Doc. No. 51 at 1.) The Court has not
`considered or relied on either of these letters in resolving Benjamin’s motion. As a result, Hughes’s motion is denied.
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`at 1988–89; see also Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534. Consequently, courts should not award fees and
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`costs “as a matter of course; rather, a court must make a more particularized, case-by-case
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`assessment.” Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1985 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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`Should a court determine that an award of fees is warranted, that does not end its inquiry.
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`It must then assess the prevailing party’s requested fees to ensure that they are reasonable. See
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`Crescent Publ’g Grp., Inc. v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 246 F.3d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 2001).
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`III. DISCUSSION
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`A.
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`The Fogerty Factors Favor a Fee Award
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`1.
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`Objective Unreasonableness
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`Objective unreasonableness, which should be given “substantial weight” when determining
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`whether to award fees, Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1989, “is generally used to describe claims that
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`have no legal or factual support,” Viva Video, Inc. v. Cabrera, 9 F. App’x 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2001);
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`see also Muller v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., No. 08-cv-2550 (DC), 2011 WL 3678712,
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`at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011) (Chin, J.) (“A copyright infringement claim is objectively
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`unreasonable when the claim is clearly without merit or otherwise patently devoid of legal or
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`factual basis.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Notably, however, a position is not
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`unreasonable merely because it is weak. See Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. 94-cv-
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`9144 (LAP), 2000 WL 1010830, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2000). In addition, though the finding
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`that a plaintiff advanced an objectively unreasonable claim can be sufficient grounds on which to
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`award fees to the prevailing defendant, the Supreme Court has made clear that such a finding does
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`not automatically trigger an award. As a result, “in any given case a court may award fees even
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`though the losing party offered reasonable arguments (or, conversely, deny fees even though the
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`losing party made unreasonable ones).” Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1988; see also Matthew Bender
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`& Co. v. W. Publ’g Co., 240 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that “a finding of objective
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`reasonableness [does not] necessarily preclude[] the award of fees”).
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`Here, Hughes’s claims were objectively unreasonable – a fact that was clear from the face
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`of the complaint and the videos at the heart of the dispute. See Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1987
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`(noting that “[a] district court that has ruled on the merits of a copyright case can easily assess
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`whether the losing party advanced an unreasonable claim or defense”). Tellingly, the complaint
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`describes Benjamin’s video as an effort to mock and discredit Hughes, two strong indicators that
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`the work constituted fair use as criticism. (E.g., Compl. at 2, 5.) As the Court noted in its Opinion,
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`“it is clear from the face of Hughes’s [c]omplaint that Benjamin copied portions of We Thought
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`She Would Win for the transformative purposes of criticism and commentary.” (Opinion at 6.)
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`The Court highlighted that “[b]eginning with the title of Benjamin’s work, SJW Levels of
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`Awareness, Hughes herself acknowledges that ‘SJW’ or ‘social justice warrior’ is a term ‘routinely
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`used by Benjamin in a demeaning context to belittle proponents of perceived liberal social policies
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`and stances.’” (Id. (quoting Compl. at 5).) It was therefore unmistakable that the edited video was
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`designed to highlight and critique Hughes’s alleged lack of self-awareness, not to pass off her work
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`as Benjamin’s. Furthermore, the fact that Benjamin’s video naturally targeted a completely
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`different audience than Hughes’s video (id. at 9), and thus did not pose a threat to the copyrighted
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`work’s market value, also demonstrated that Benjamin’s video constituted fair use. The objective
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`unreasonableness of Hughes’s claims thus weighs strongly in favor of awarding costs and fees to
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`Benjamin.
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`2.
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`Improper Motivation
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`Benjamin argues that Hughes brought this suit to silence her political opponents and critics
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`and to generate publicity for herself. Motivation, like all the Fogerty factors, is not dispositive,
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`but “the presence of improper motivation in bringing a lawsuit or other bad faith conduct weighs
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`heavily in favor of an award of costs and fees.” Baker v. Urb. Outfitters, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d
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`351, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 249 F. App’x 845 (2d Cir. 2007). Here, the Court has little
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`difficulty concluding that Hughes’s dual goals in bringing her baseless suit were to inflict financial
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`harm on Benjamin and to raise her own profile in the process.
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`Improper or bad faith motivations are generally difficult to discern, as litigants often have
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`a variety of objectives and may obscure their baser ones behind a veil of legitimate-sounding
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`claims. In this case, however, Hughes openly discussed her improper motivations on both Twitter
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`and her website. Indeed, Hughes admitted to potentially hundreds of thousands of followers that
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`she intended to (i) “bankrupt” Benjamin (Doc. No. 43 at 2), (ii) stymy his attempts to crowdfund
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`his legal costs (id. at 2–3), and (iii) use copyright laws to silence her political opponents and critics
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`(id. at 4). Other posts, including her public boasting about the legal dispute on her social media
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`accounts (even describing her complaint as a “[C]hristmas present” for Benjamin) and her public
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`belittlement and celebrity-style feuding with Benjamin (id. at 5–7), strongly suggest that Hughes
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`intended to sensationalize the litigation to elevate her own public profile and achieve a secondary
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`financial gain. Together, then, Hughes’s public comments reveal an intent to abuse the legal
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`system in order to further a personal agenda that had little to do with the Copyright Act.
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`Of course, evidence of respectful conduct and efforts to efficiently and inexpensively
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`resolve a dispute can sometimes neutralize evidence of improper motive and bad faith. Magnum
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`Photos Int’l v. Houk Gallery, Inc., No. 16-cv-7030 (VSB), 2019 WL 4686498, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
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`Sept. 26, 2019) (finding no improper motive or bad faith where the plaintiff engaged in settlement
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`negotiations and agreed to streamline the litigation by limiting the scope of both discovery and
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`summary judgment briefing). But while it is true that Hughes did make a settlement offer in this
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`case, the offer hardly constituted a reasonable effort to efficiently resolve the dispute. Hughes’s
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`lone offer – to settle this baseless case for $46,000 – came on April 10, 2018. (Doc. No. 47 at 1.)
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`By then, the Court had already laid bare the weaknesses of Hughes’s claims during the parties’
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`pre-motion conference in early March. (Doc No. 25 at 13 (“It seems to me you concede [in the
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`complaint] that [the video is] mocking and anybody who goes to [Benjamin’s] site would
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`understand it to be mocking. . . . [So] whether this case is decided in a motion to dismiss or on
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`summary judgment, this is likely to be fair use.”).) As a result, the Court finds that Hughes litigated
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`with an improper motive and that she never endeavored to efficiently and fairly resolve the
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`litigation.
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`3.
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`Compensation and Deterrence
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`Compensation and deterrence, two equitable considerations that courts must also assess,
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`exist for the dual purposes of incentivizing parties with strong claims to litigate them and deterring
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`parties with weak claims from embarking on wasteful litigation. See Baker, 431 F. Supp. 2d
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`at 359–60.
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`Hughes makes much of the fact that Benjamin’s GoFundMe campaign raised over
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`$120,000 – much more than the approximately $40,000 he expended to defend this case. (Pl.
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`Mem. at 3–4.) But that fact alone does not preclude an award of attorneys’ fees. Indeed, courts
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`frequently allow recovery even where the prevailing party did not actually suffer financial harm,
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`as in cases where a third party provided or paid for the prevailing party’s legal services. See, e.g.,
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`Latin American Music Co. v. Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc., No. 13-cv-1526 (RJS), 2020 WL 2848232,
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`at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2020) (“The fact that a prevailing party’s legal fees are paid by a third
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`party should not deprive it of the ability to recover fees for the total amount spent on successfully
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`litigating a case.”); Radin v. Hunt, No. CV10-08838 (JAK), 2012 WL 13006187, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
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`Feb. 27, 2012) (holding that “there is nothing in [§ 505] that precludes [a prevailing party] from
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`receiving reasonable attorney’s fees, even though they were indemnified”), aff’d, 499 F.
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`App’x 684 (9th Cir. 2012); ABC, Inc. v. Primetime 24, Joint Venture, 67 F. Supp. 2d 558, 562
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`(M.D.N.C. 1999) (“[T]he fact that [a prevailing party’s] legal fees and expenses have been paid
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`by [a third party] may be a factor which the court considers in deciding whether to exercise its
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`discretion in awarding fees, that fact does not bar [the prevailing party] from recovering such
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`fees.”), aff’d, 232 F.3d 886 (4th Cir. 2000). Put simply, a litigant’s good luck in having the
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`financial wherewithal to defend against a frivolous suit – whether because of insurance, a
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`GoFundMe campaign, a rich uncle, or a pro bono lawyer – does not automatically immunize the
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`losing party from the consequences of her actions.3
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`And compensation aside, the Court must also consider deterrence. Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct.
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`at 1987 (“Fee awards are a double-edged sword: They increase the reward for a victory – but also
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`enhance the penalty for a defeat.”). While Benjamin may not be out of pocket any money,
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`awarding fees will still further the important goal of deterring Hughes and other would-be litigants
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`from engaging in similarly abusive conduct in the future – an outcome that is tightly aligned with
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`the Copyright Act’s goal of facilitating the general public’s access to creative works. Indeed,
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`because Hughes does not owe Benjamin any damages, a fee award is the only financial
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`3 To be sure, the Second Circuit has cautioned that a fee award should not “amount to a windfall for the prevailing
`party.” Crescent Publ’g Grp., 246 F.3d at 151. But in this context, a “windfall” refers to either an exorbitantly large
`award as a result of, among other things, an atypical billing arrangement between the prevailing party and her counsel,
`see id. at 150–51; In Design v. K-Mart Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 568–69 (2d Cir. 1994) (remanding to the trial
`court to “ensure that a contingent fee arrangement does not result in an unjustified windfall to plaintiff’s counsel”),
`overruled on other grounds by Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 533, or awarding fees to a prevailing plaintiff who has already
`received a large damages award that is sufficient to both compensate her and deter future copyright abuses, see, e.g.,
`Nat’l Football League v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 131 F. Supp. 2d 458, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (explaining that in
`light of a “$2.5 million statutory damage award,” the plaintiff had “been appropriately compensated,” and the
`defendant had been “sufficient[ly] deterre[d]”). In this case, Benjamin has neither received a damages award nor, as
`will be discussed momentarily, are the fees he seeks out-of-step with prevailing industry norms. Accordingly,
`awarding fees here will not result in the type of windfall about which the Second Circuit has cautioned.
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`consequence that the Court may impose on Hughes to deter this conduct going forward. And
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`Hughes’s self-serving claim that the public backlash she has received from losing this suit is
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`sufficient deterrence is not persuasive, particularly since Hughes herself played an integral role in
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`publicizing the litigation. It also bears noting that Hughes has never claimed that she is unable to
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`pay Benjamin’s fees or that she will suffer extreme financial hardship if ordered to do so. (See
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`generally Pl. Mem. at 2–5; Reply at 5.)
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`In short, Hughes endeavored to profit from an objectively unreasonable and frivolous suit
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`by promoting her online profile while at the same time forcing Benjamin to wastefully devote time
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`and resources to defending a baseless action. Since the goals of the Copyright Act are more likely
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`to be advanced by an award of attorneys’ fees, the fact that Benjamin had the support of third-
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`party contributors through his GoFundMe campaign, though relevant, does not insulate Hughes
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`from paying an award. Accordingly, the Court will order Hughes to pay Benjamin’s fees and costs
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`for this litigation.
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`B.
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`Reasonableness of Attorneys’ Fees
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`Having determined that an award of attorneys’ fees is appropriate, the Court must still
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`assess whether the fees sought by Benjamin are reasonable. In this Circuit, courts calculate a
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`reasonable fee “by determining the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation
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`multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Crescent Publ’g Grp., 246 F.3d at 146 n.3 (internal
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`quotation marks omitted). This analysis “boils down to [asking] what a reasonable, paying client
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`would be willing to pay, given that such a party wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate
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`the case effectively.” Simmons v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 575 F.3d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal
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`quotation marks omitted). “In making [this determination], the district court does not play the role
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`of an uninformed arbiter but may look to its own familiarity with the case and its experience
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`generally as well as to the evidentiary submissions and arguments of the parties.” Tlacoapa v.
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`Carregal, 386 F. Supp. 2d 362, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). “[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of . . .
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`documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
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`424, 437 (1983).
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`Benjamin requests $33,419.35 for the attorneys’ fees expended in defending against
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`Hughes’s claims (Doc. No. 41 at 1),4 $5,366 for the fees spent on this motion (Doc. No. 49-1 at 2–
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`3), and $126.54 in costs, which are limited to the cost of the pre-motion conference transcript (Doc.
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`No. 41 at 1; Def. Mem. at 12).
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`Benjamin’s lawyers – Mullen P.C. – charged the following effective hourly rates for the
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`attorneys and law clerks who worked on this matter: $446.09 per hour for Wesley Mullen, the
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`principal attorney of the firm and an experienced litigator who graduated from Harvard Law
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`School in 2007 and was admitted to practice in New York in 2008; $300 per hour for Patrick Oh,
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`Of Counsel at Mullen P.C. and an experienced litigator who graduated from Columbia Law School
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`in 2006 and was admitted to practice in New York in 2007; $60.04 per hour for Johnny Nguyen,
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`a student at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law and a non-attorney law clerk; and $36.41 per
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`hour for Spencer Pearlman, a graduate of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law and a non-
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`attorney law clerk. (See Def. Mem. at 12; Doc. No. 43 at 8–10.) Notably, Mullen P.C. applied
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`various discounts and write-offs to its billing in this matter, particularly for work performed by its
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`law clerks. (Doc. No. 43 at 9–10.)
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`It is perhaps telling that Hughes does not challenge Mullen P.C.’s rates. In any event,
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`courts in this district have generally found hourly rates of $400 to $750 to be appropriate for
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`4 In fact, the invoices Benjamin submitted amount to $33,599.35. It appears that Benjamin has omitted from his
`request $180 billed in January 2018. (Doc. No. 43-3 at 6–8).
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`partners in copyright and intellectual property cases. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Pamdh
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`Enters., Inc., No. 13-cv-2255 (KMW), 2014 WL 2781846, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2014)
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`(approving hourly rate of $570 for partner with 15 years’ experience); Sub–Zero, Inc. v. Sub Zero
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`N.Y. Refrigeration & Appliances Servs., Inc., 13-cv-2548 (KMW), 2014 WL 1303434, at *8–9
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`(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2014) (collecting cases and approving rate of $785 for a partner who specializes
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`in copyright); Pyatt v. Raymond, 10-cv-8764 (CM), 2012 WL 1668248, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. May
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`10, 2012) (collecting cases approving rates ranging from $400 to $650 for partners in copyright
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`and trademark cases); Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of Am. v. Royal Food Distribs.
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`Ltd. Liab. Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 434, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding partner’s rate of $735 to be
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`reasonable in copyright dispute); GAKM Res. LLC v. Jaylyn Sales Inc., 08-cv-6030 (GEL), 2009
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`WL 2150891, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2009) (approving hourly rates of $600 and $650 for partners
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`specializing in intellectual property litigation). Consequently, the Court finds that the rates
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`charged by Mullen and Oh are reasonable.
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`Regarding the rates charged by Mullen P.C. for its two law clerks – which, again, Hughes
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`does not challenge – courts in this district have generally found hourly rates of $150 to $200 to be
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`reasonable for paralegals in copyright cases. See, e.g., Broad. Music, 2014 WL 2781846, at *6–7
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`(approving hourly rates of $200 for paralegal with 13 years’ experience, and $160 for paralegal
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`with two years’ experience); Sub–Zero, Inc., 2014 WL 1303434, at *9 (collecting cases and
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`approving an hourly rate of $200 for a paralegal); GAKM Res. LLC, 2009 WL 2150891, at *8
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`(approving a $195 hourly rate for paralegals). Since, in the Court’s experience, the rates for law
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`clerks (who have legal training) tend to be higher than those for paralegals, the Court finds that the
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`rates charged for Pearlman and Nguyen, which fall well below even the range of $150 to $200 per
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`hour routinely awarded to paralegals, are reasonable.
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`Case 1:17-cv-06493-RJS Document 52 Filed 08/05/20 Page 13 of 14
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`The Court also finds that the hours expended in this case – 57.5 hours billed by Mullen,
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`16.5 hours billed by Oh, 43.4 hours billed by Pearlman, and 17.2 hours billed by Nguyen (Def.
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`Mem. at 12) – were reasonable, and Hughes does not argue otherwise. Given the nature of the
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`issues and the quality of Mullen P.C.’s work product, the Court finds that the time expended fell
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`within the range of “what a reasonable, paying client would . . . [deem] necessary to litigate the
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`case effectively.” Simmons, 575 F.3d at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted). For example,
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`Mullen P.C. billed approximately 37 hours in attorney time and 55 hours in law clerk time in
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`preparing the motion to dismiss, the memorandum of law in support of that motion, and the
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`subsequent reply. (E.g., Doc. No. 43-3 at 12, 15, 18, 23–25.) Additionally, the firm billed
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`approximately 14 hours in connection with this motion for attorneys’ fees (Doc. No. 49-1 at 2), an
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`expense which is compensable, Pig Newton, Inc. v. The Bds. of Dirs. of The Motion Picture Indus.
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`Pension Plan, No. 13-cv-7312 (KPF), 2016 WL 796840, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2016) (holding
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`that the fees incurred in preparing a motion for attorneys’ fees are compensable so long as they are
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`reasonable). The remaining approximately 28 hours were spent performing a variety of necessary
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`tasks, including conferencing with Benjamin, corresponding with Hughes’s counsel, and preparing
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`for and attending the pre-motion conference. (E.g., Doc. No. 43-3 at 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 18.) The
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`Court finds these amounts to be reasonable. Additionally, the Court finds that the invoices
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`provided by Benjamin are sufficiently detailed. See TufAm. Inc. v. Diamond, No. 12-cv-3529
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`(AJN), 2016 WL 1029553, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2016); Broad. Music, 2014 WL 2781846, at *6.
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`Thus, after examining the comprehensive billing receipts submitted by Benjamin, the Court
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`concludes, based on its own experience and the practice within this Circuit, that the fees requested
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`by Benjamin are reasonable. The $126.54 in costs he seeks for ordering a transcript are also
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`reasonable and compensable. See Sid Bernstein Presents, LLC v. Apple Corps Ltd., No. 16-cv-
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`13
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`Case 1:17-cv-06493-RJS Document 52 Filed 08/05/20 Page 14 of 14
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`7084 (GBD) (KNF), 2018 WL 3300688, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL
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`1587125 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2018).
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`In light of the findings set forth above, the Court agrees that full fees and costs should be
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`awarded. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Benjamin’s motion for attorneys’ fees
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`is GRANTED. Benjamin is awarded $38,785.35 in attorneys’ fees. Benjamin is also awarded
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`$126.54 in costs. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motions pending at
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`document numbers 41 and 51.
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`SO ORDERED.
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`Dated:
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`August 4, 2020
`New York, New York
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`___________________________
`____________________________ ___________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________
`RICHARD J. SULLIVAN
`RICHARD J. SULLIVAN
`UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE
`Sitting by Designation
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`14
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