Case 1:18-cv-07143-JMF Document 103 Filed 07/15/21 Page 1 of 33
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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`IN RE NIELSEN HOLDINGS PLC
`SECURITIES LITIGATION
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`Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-07143-JMF
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`ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
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`PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW
`IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION, APPOINTMENT
`AS CLASS REPRESENTATIVES, AND APPOINTMENT OF CLASS COUNSEL
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`Case 1:18-cv-07143-JMF Document 103 Filed 07/15/21 Page 2 of 33
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iii 
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`I. 
`
`II. 
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 
`
`STATEMENT OF FACTS COMMON TO THE CLASS ..................................................4 
`
`A. 
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`
`D. 
`
`Nielsen’s Business ...................................................................................................4 
`
`Defendants Fail to Inform the Market That Discretionary Spending
`By Nielsen’s BDM Clients Was Declining .............................................................5 
`
`Defendants Misled Investors About the Value of the Company’s
`Goodwill ..................................................................................................................5 
`
`Defendants Misled Investors About the Effect of the GDPR on the
`Company ..................................................................................................................6 
`
`III. 
`
`THE PROPOSED CLASS SATISFIES RULE 23 AND SHOULD BE
`CERTIFIED .........................................................................................................................7 
`
`A. 
`
`The Proposed Class Satisfies the Requirements of Rule 23(a) ................................8 
`
`1. 
`
`2. 
`
`3. 
`
`4. 
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`The Class Is So Numerous That Joinder Is Impracticable ...........................8 
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`Questions of Law and Fact Are Common to the Class ................................9 
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`Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Typical of the Class Claims ...................................10 
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`Plaintiffs Will Fairly and Adequately Protect the Interests
`of the Class .................................................................................................11 
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`B. 
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`The Proposed Class Satisfies the Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) .........................13 
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`1. 
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`Common Factual and Legal Issues Predominate .......................................13 
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`(a) 
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`Plaintiffs Are Entitled to the Fraud-on-the-Market
`Presumption of Reliance ................................................................14 
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`(i) 
`
`(ii) 
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`Nielsen’s NYSE Listing Is Strong Evidence of
`Market Efficiency ............................................................. 15 
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`The Cammer and Krogman Factors Support a
`Finding of Market Efficiency ............................................ 16 
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`(iii)  Additional Factors Support Market Efficiency ................. 21 
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`(b) 
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`(c) 
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`Reliance Is Presumed Under Affiliate Ute .....................................22 
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`Damages May Be Calculated on a Class-Wide
`Basis, Supporting a Finding of Predominance ...............................22 
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`2. 
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`Superiority Is Established ..........................................................................24 
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`C. 
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`The Court Should Appoint Labaton Sucharow as Class Counsel..........................25 
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`IV. 
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`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................25 
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`Case 1:18-cv-07143-JMF Document 103 Filed 07/15/21 Page 4 of 33
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States,
`406 U.S. 128 (1972) ................................................................................................. 3, 13-14, 22
`
`In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig.,
`253 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) .............................................................................................21
`
`In re Am. Realty Cap. Props., Inc. Litig.,
`No. 15-mc-40-AKH, 2017 WL 3835881 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2017) ......................................20
`
`Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
`521 U.S. 591 (1997) .................................................................................................................13
`
`Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds,
`568 U.S. 455 (2013) .................................................................................................7, 13, 14, 22
`
`Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp.,
`222 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2000).................................................................................................11, 12
`
`In re Barrick Gold Sec. Litig.,
`314 F.R.D. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) ...............................................................................................11
`
`Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
`485 U.S. 224 (1988) .......................................................................................................3, 13, 14
`
`Billhofer v. Flamel Techs., S.A.,
`281 F.R.D. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ..................................................................................... passim
`
`Cammer v. Bloom,
`711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989) ..................................................................................... passim
`
`Carpenters Pension Tr. Fund of St. Louis v. Barclays PLC,
`310 F.R.D. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ....................................................................................... passim
`
`Cent. States SE & SW Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed
`Care, L.L.C.,
`504 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2007).......................................................................................................8
`
`City of Westland Police and Fire Ret. Sys. v. MetLife, Inc.,
`No. 12-cv-0256-LAK-ALP, 2017 WL 3608298 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2017) .............................9
`
`Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,
`569 U.S. 27 (2013) ...................................................................................................................22
`
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`
`
`Consol. Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park,
`47 F.3d 473 (2d Cir. 1995).........................................................................................................8
`
`Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.,
`563 U.S. 804 (2011) .................................................................................................................13
`
`In re Facebook, Inc., IPO & Sec. & Derivative Litig.,
`986 F. Supp. 2d 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ......................................................................................22
`
`In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Sec. Litig.,
`574 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2009).......................................................................................................11
`
`Fogarazzao v. Lehman Bros., Inc.,
`232 F.R.D. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) .............................................................................................22
`
`Fort Worth Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.,
`301 F.R.D. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) .............................................................................................10
`
`Gross v. GFI Grp., Inc.,
`No. 14-cv-9438, 2017 WL 3668844 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2017) ..............................................11
`
`Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.,
`573 U.S. 258 (2014) ........................................................................................................... 13-14
`
`Haw. Structural Ironworkers Pension Tr. v. AMC Ent. Holdings, Inc.,
`No. 18-cv-299-AJN, 2021 WL 1198799 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2021) .......................................22
`
`In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig.,
`471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006).........................................................................................................8
`
`In re JPMorgan Chase & Co. Sec. Litig.,
`No. 12-cv-3852-GBD, 2015 WL 10433433 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2015) ............... 7-8, 16, 23-24
`
`Kaplan v. S.A.C. Cap. Advisors, L.P,
`311 F.R.D. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) .............................................................................................10
`
`Katz v. Image Innovations Holdings, Inc.,
`No. 06-cv-3707-JGK, 2010 WL 2926196 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2010) ..................................2, 13
`
`Krogman v. Sterritt,
`202 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. Tex. 2001) .................................................................................... passim
`
`McIntire v. China MediaExpress Holdings, Inc.,
`38 F. Supp. 3d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ........................................................................9, 10, 20, 21
`
`Menaldi v. Och-Ziff Cap. Mgmt. Grp. LLC,
`328 F.R.D. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) ...............................................................................................19
`
`In re MF Glob. Holdings Ltd. Inv. Litig.,
`310 F.R.D. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) .............................................................................................24
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`
`Micholle v. Ophthotech Corp.,
`No. 17-cv-210-VSB, 2018 WL 1307285 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2018) .......................................12
`
`In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig.,
`260 F.R.D. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) .................................................................................................9
`
`In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.,
`No. 04-md-1653-LAK, 2008 WL 3895539 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008) ...................................12
`
`Pennsylvania Ave. Funds v. Inyx, Inc.,
`No. 08-cv-6857-PKC, 2011 WL 2732544 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2011) ..........................................9
`
`In re Petrobras Sec. Litig.,
`862 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2017)...................................................................................15, 16, 19, 25
`
`In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig.,
`282 F.R.D. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ...............................................................................................24
`
`Pirnik v. Fiat Chrysler Autos., N.V.,
`327 F.R.D. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (Furman, J.)................................................................... passim
`
`Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp.,
`778 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2015)............................................................................................... 22-23
`
`In re Sanofi-Aventis Sec. Litig.,
`293 F.R.D. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) .............................................................................................25
`
`In re SCOR Holding (Switz.) AG Litig.,
`537 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ................................................................................ 24-25
`
`In re Signet Jewelers Ltd. Sec. Litig.,
`No. 16-cv-6728-CM-RWL, 2019 WL 3001084 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2019) ..................... passim
`
`In re SLM Corp. Sec. Litig.,
`No. 08-cv-1029-WHP, 2012 WL 209095 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2012) .........................................1
`
`In re Smith Barney Transfer Agent Litig.,
`290 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ...............................................................................................10
`
`Spagnola v. Chubb Corp.,
`264 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ...............................................................................................12
`
`Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, Inc.,
`552 U.S. 148 (2008) .................................................................................................................13
`
`Strougo v. Barclays PLC,
`312 F.R.D. 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), aff’d, Waggoner, 875 F.3d 79 ......................................16, 20
`
`Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Assocs. LLC,
`780 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2015).......................................................................................................23
`
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`
`
`Vargas v. Howard,
`324 F.R.D. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) ...............................................................................................7
`
`In re Virtus Inv. Partners, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
`No. 15-cv-1249, 2017 WL 2062985 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2017) ................................1, 9, 10, 14
`
`In re Vivendi Universal, S.A.,
`242 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd sub nom. In re Vivendi, S.A. Sec. Litig.,
`838 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2016).......................................................................................................9
`
`Waggoner v. Barclays PLC,
`875 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2017)............................................................................................... passim
`
`In re Warner Chilcott Ltd. Sec. Litig.,
`No. 06-cv-11515-WHP, 2008 WL 344715 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4. 2008) ......................................24
`
`Wilson v. LSB Indus., Inc.,
`No. 15-cv-7614-RA-GWG, 2018 WL 3913115 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2018) ................17, 18, 21
`
`In re Winstar Commc’ns Sec. Litig.,
`290 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) .................................................................................16, 17, 18
`
`Statutes
`
`Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) ..................................... passim
`
`Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Section 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) ...................................1, 10, 11
`
`Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 .........................................................................12
`
`17 C.F.R. §239.13 ..........................................................................................................................18
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ................................................................................................................... passim
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) .............................................................................................................. passim
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) .............................................................................................................. passim
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g) ..................................................................................................................3, 25
`
`H.R. Rep. No. 104-369 (1995) .......................................................................................................12
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`Lead Plaintiff Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi (“MissPERS”) and
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`additionally named Plaintiff Monroe County Employees’ Retirement System (“Monroe”)
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`(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) respectfully submit this memorandum of law in support of their
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`Motion for Class Certification, requesting that, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
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`(“Rules”) 23(a), 23(b)(3), and 23(g), the Court: (i) certify this case as a class action; (ii) appoint
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`Plaintiffs as Class Representatives; and (iii) appoint Labaton Sucharow LLP as Class Counsel.
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`This is a federal securities action against Nielsen Holdings plc (“Nielsen” or the
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`“Company”), former CEO Dwight Mitchell Barns (“Barns”), former CFO Jamere Jackson
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`(“Jackson”), and Senior Vice President of Product Leadership Kelly Abcarian (“Abcarian”)
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`(collectively, the “Defendants”)1 for violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
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`Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§78j(b) and 78t(a).
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`As courts in this Circuit have recognized, “claims alleging violations of Sections 10(b)
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`and 20(a) of the Exchange Act are especially amenable to class certification.” In re SLM Corp.
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`Sec. Litig., 2012 WL 209095, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2012); In re Virtus Inv. Partners, Inc. Sec.
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`Litig., 2017 WL 2062985, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2017) (securities fraud claims are “especially
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`amenable to class certification”) (citation omitted).
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`This case is no exception—and it is well-suited for class treatment. Plaintiffs therefore
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`respectfully request certification pursuant to Rule 23 on behalf of a class (the “Class”) consisting
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`of: all persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Nielsen publicly traded common
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`stock during the period from July 26, 2016 through July 25, 2018, inclusive (the “Class Period”),
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`and were damaged thereby, except as excluded below (the “Class”).2 Excluded from the Class
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`1 Barns, Jackson, and Abcarian are referred to herein collectively as the “Individual Defendants.”
`2 The proposed Class Period, as defined herein, is consistent with the claims sustained in the Court’s motion to
`dismiss order. ECF No. 85. Should discovery produced in this case support a claim for the dismissed statements
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`are: (i) Defendants; (ii) members of the immediate family of any Individual Defendant; (iii) any
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`person who was an officer or director of Nielsen during the Class Period; (iv) any firm, trust,
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`corporation, or other entity in which any Defendant has or had a controlling interest; (v) affiliates
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`of Nielsen, including its employee retirement and benefit plan(s) and their participants or
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`beneficiaries, to the extent they made purchases through such plan(s); and (vi) the legal
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`representatives, affiliates, heirs, successors-in-interest, or assigns of any such excluded person in
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`(i)-(iv) of this paragraph.
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`For a class to be certified, “the Court must determine that the party seeking certification
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`has satisfied the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
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`adequacy of representation.” Katz v. Image Innovations Holdings, Inc., 2010 WL 2926196, at *1
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`(S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2010). The Court must also find that the party qualifies under one of the three
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`sets of criteria set forth in Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3). See id. Rule 23(b)(3), in particular, permits
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`certification if “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members
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`predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
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`superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed.
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`R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Each of these requirements is met here.
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`First, with over 350 million shares of Nielsen common stock outstanding throughout the
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`Class Period, during which time the average weekly trading volume for Nielsen common stock
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`was 15.3 million shares, there are likely thousands of Class members, satisfying numerosity. See
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`In re Signet Jewelers Ltd. Sec. Litig., 2019 WL 3001084, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2019) (finding
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`numerosity satisfied where defendant corporation had between 60.5 and 80.5 million shares
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`outstanding and an average of 1.34 million shares traded daily).
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`from early 2016, Plaintiffs may seek leave to file a motion to expand or modify the class definition to include claims
`for purchasers of Nielsen publicly traded common stock during that period.
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`2
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`Case 1:18-cv-07143-JMF Document 103 Filed 07/15/21 Page 10 of 33
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`Second, the commonality prerequisite is met because this action involves several class-
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`wide questions of law and fact, including whether: (1) Defendants made material
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`misrepresentations and omissions in the Company’s Securities and Exchange Commission
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`(“SEC”) filings and other public disclosures during the Class Period; (2) Defendants acted with
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`scienter; (3) the price of Nielsen’s common stock was artificially inflated and/or artificially
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`maintained during the Class Period by Defendants’ fraudulent conduct; (4) Class members
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`suffered damages; and (5) the Individual Defendants were control persons of Nielsen.
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`Third, the typicality prerequisite is met because Plaintiffs’ injuries and those of Class
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`members arise from the same alleged fraudulent conduct. Plaintiffs and Class members
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`purchased Nielsen common stock at prices that had been artificially inflated and/or artificially
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`maintained by Defendants’ material misrepresentations and omissions. When the true condition
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`of Nielsen—which Defendants concealed from investors during the Class Period—was finally
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`revealed, the price of Nielsen’s common stock dropped, injuring Plaintiffs and the Class.
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`Fourth, the adequacy requirement is met here because Plaintiffs have demonstrated that
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`they will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class by vigorously prosecuting this
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`case and because no antagonism exists between Plaintiffs and the Class. Additionally, Plaintiffs’
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`choice of counsel, Labaton Sucharow LLP (“Labaton Sucharow”), are highly experienced in
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`securities class actions and are well-suited for appointment as Class Counsel under Rule 23(g).
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`Fifth, this action satisfies the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). Several issues
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`of fact and law—including falsity, materiality, scienter, loss causation, and damages—are
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`subject to common proof and predominate over any individual issues. The same is true with the
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`issue of reliance, which may be presumed under the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption, see
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`Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), or the presumption of reliance for omissions under
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`Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). Indeed, Basic
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`3
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`permits the presumption in this case because, as established in the accompanying Expert Report
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`of Chad Coffman, CFA, the market for Nielsen common stock, which traded on the New York
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`Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), was efficient throughout the Class Period. See Declaration of
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`Christine M. Fox (“Fox Decl.”), Ex. A (“Coffman Report” or “Coffman Rpt.”), ¶25. Further,
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`Affiliated Ute permits a presumption of reliance since Plaintiffs allege material omissions.
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`Sixth, the superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied because: (1) thousands of
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`geographically dispersed investors who purchased Nielsen stock during the Class Period were
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`harmed by Defendants’ misconduct; (2) due to litigation costs, it is highly unlikely that investors
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`who lost small amounts of money would file individual actions; (3) it is desirable to hear all such
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`claims in one court; and (4) there is no difficulty in maintaining this case as a class action.
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`II.
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`STATEMENT OF FACTS COMMON TO THE CLASS
`A.
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`Nielsen’s Business
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`Nielsen is a data analytics company that provides its customers with information about
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`consumer preferences and the programming consumers watch and listen to. ¶61.3 Nielsen’s
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`business is divided into two main reporting segments: (1) Buy, and (2) Watch. Id. The Buy
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`segment tracks retail transactions and transforms this data into products that assist companies in
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`their marketing. ¶67. The Buy segment is reported in two main geographic groups, Buy
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`Developed Markets (“BDM”) and Buy Emerging Markets (“BEM”). ¶69. The Watch segment
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`provides viewership and listening data and analytics primarily to the media and advertising
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`industries across the television, radio, print, online, digital, mobile viewing and listening
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`platforms. ¶70. The Watch segment included the Watch Marketing Effectiveness (“WME”)
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`business, which analyzed the effectiveness of advertising campaigns. ¶¶70-71. Nielsen’s
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`business relies on the collection of data, some of which is obtained from third parties. ¶63.
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`3 The Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 72) is referred to herein as the “Complaint,” (cited as “¶__”).
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`B.
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`Defendants Fail to Inform the Market That Discretionary Spending By
`Nielsen’s BDM Clients Was Declining
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`Throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and misleading
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`statements and omissions about Nielsen’s Buy business. ¶¶285–99. In 2016, Defendants
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`repeatedly represented that discretionary spending by BDM clients was “stable,” that some
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`softness in discretionary spending was not uncommon, and that Nielsen would report 1.5%-3.5%
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`growth in BDM revenues. Id. However, this business was in a steady decline due to falling
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`demand for Nielsen’s analytics products as customers were choosing not to purchase the
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`Company’s complicated and expensive analytics, opting instead for “raw data” from Nielsen
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`they could crunch themselves. ¶¶7, 299–300. In fact, on October 25, 2016, Defendants revealed
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`they knew discretionary spending had been declining since 2015, that the decline was permanent,
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`and that it caused BDM revenues to fall 2.5% in 3Q16. ¶¶414, 419.
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`The Company’s stock price plummeted nearly 17% on October 25, 2016 in response to
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`this unexpected negative news. ¶464. Moreover, Defendants continued to mislead investors by
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`failing to disclose the known negative trends in the BDM business. ¶¶364–371. As a result,
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`Nielsen stock continued to trade at artificially inflated prices, and investors were injured when
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`the truth was revealed and the Company’s stock fell precipitously.
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`C.
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`Defendants Misled Investors About the Value of the Company’s Goodwill
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`Nielsen’s goodwill—which is an asset that represents the future economic benefits that
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`arise from the other assets acquired in a business combination that are not otherwise individually
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`identified or separately recognized—was important to investors as it represented nearly 50% of
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`the total assets of $15.7 billion carried on Nielsen’s balance sheet as of December 31, 2016.
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`¶374. Specifically, the Buy reporting unit’s goodwill totaled $2.696 billion, representing 35% of
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`total goodwill and nearly 17% of total assets. Id.
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`5
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`Case 1:18-cv-07143-JMF Document 103 Filed 07/15/21 Page 13 of 33
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`Defendants misrepresented, in Nielsen’s Forms 10-K for the years ending December 31,
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`2016 and December 31, 2017, the value of the Company’s Buy Segment goodwill, by, among
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`other things, asserting that it was not impaired and that the fair value of Buy Segment goodwill
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`was actually 20% higher than the $2.844 billion carry value as of December 31, 2017. ¶¶187,
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`372–411. Defendants concealed that unreasonable and baseless cash flow assumptions were
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`utilized in Nielsen’s goodwill impairment model. ¶¶381-402. As a result, Nielsen reported
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`inflated earnings, assets, and capital in violation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
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`(“GAAP”). ¶372, 403-11. Defendants also falsely represented that any downward revisions in
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`the fair value of the Company’s reporting units “could” result in impairment charges for
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`goodwill that “could” materially affect Nielsen’s financial performance. ¶187.
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`On February 28, 2019, after Defendants Barns and Jackson had left the Company,
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`Nielsen reported that it had recorded a $1.4 billion impairment charge, which reduced the
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`carrying value of the Buy reporting unit’s goodwill by 54% to $1.34 billion. ¶279. On February
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`27, 2020, Nielsen reported that it had recorded an additional $1.0 billion impairment charge for
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`2019, which reduced the carrying value of the Buy reporting unit’s goodwill to just $331 million.
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`See Nielsen Holdings plc, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2020).
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`D.
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`Defendants Misled Investors About the Effect of the GDPR on the Company
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`Nielsen’s business, especially, its WME business, is dependent upon access to data from
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`third-party data providers, such as Facebook and Twitter. ¶¶63, 205. In 2018, the European
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`Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) was going into effect, and it was the
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`general consensus that GDPR would have major implications for data collection and sharing.
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`¶¶202-05. However, in 2018, Defendants repeatedly represented that WME revenues would
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`increase 15%-20% in 2018 (¶¶206-09); that the GDPR would not have “any major impact” on
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`Nielsen’s business (¶207); and that the Company was “ready” for the GDPR and in “good shape”
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`6
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`Case 1:18-cv-07143-JMF Document 103 Filed 07/15/21 Page 14 of 33
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`because Nielsen would have “access to all the data needed for [its] products” (id.). Moreover,
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`Defendants affirmatively represented that GDPR was “a net positive” for the Company. ¶218.
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`In fact, as was revealed after the Class Period, Defendants knew that hundreds of data
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`providers had cut off Nielsen’s access to the data needed for its products – due to the GDPR –
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`with Nielsen’s President-Product Leadership, Megan Clarken stating, on the day GDPR
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`regulations were put into place, that 120 campaigns being measured were “literally switched
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`off.” ¶270. Despite this, Defendants referred to the GDPR as a “non-event” for Nielsen. ¶362.
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`Not until July 26, 2018 did Defendants admit that hundreds of data providers had cut off access
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`to the data and that it caused WME revenues to be “significantly below . . . expectations.” ¶250.
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`The Company’s stock price plummeted 25% on July 26, 2018 in response to this and other
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`unexpected negative news about the Buy business. ¶464.
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`III. THE PROPOSED CLASS SATISFIES RULE 23 AND SHOULD BE CERTIFIED
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`Certification is appropriate where a putative class meets all four requirements of Rule
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`23(a) and one requirement of Rule 23(b). See Carpenters Pension Tr. Fund of St. Louis v.
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`Barclays PLC, 310 F.R.D. 69, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Though “a court’s class-certification analysis
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`must be ‘rigorous’ . . . Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries
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`at the certification stage.” Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 465-66
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`(2013). For this reason, “[a] motion for class certification should not become a mini-trial on the
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`merits; the question before the Court is whether Plaintiff[s] meets Rule 23’s requirements, not
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`whether Plaintiff[s] will prevail on the merits.” Signet, 2019 WL 3001084, at *7; Vargas v.
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`Howard, 324 F.R.D. 319, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“The Second Circuit has emphasized that Rule
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`23 should be given liberal rather than restrictive construction.”).
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`“If the Court finds that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met, the Court may, in its
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`discretion, certify the [C]lass.” Signet, 2019 WL 3001084, at *7. “The Second Circuit has
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`Case 1:18-cv-07143-JMF Document 103 Filed 07/15/21 Page 15 of 33
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`construed Rule 23 liberally and directed district courts to err on the side of granting class
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`certification.” In re JPMorgan Chase & Co. Sec. Litig., 2015 WL 10433433, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
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`Sept. 29, 2015); see also In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41-42 (2d Cir. 2006)
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`(instructing courts to “assess all of the relevant evidence admitted at the class certification stage
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`and determine whether each Rule 23 requirement has been met,” but cautioning against
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`“assess[ing] any aspect of the merits unrelated to a Rule 23 requirement”); Pirnik v. Fiat
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`Chrysler Autos., N.V., 327 F.R.D. 38, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (Furman, J.) (“Rule 23 grants courts
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`no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage.”).
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`A.
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`The Proposed Class Satisfies the Requirements of Rule 23(a)
`1.
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`The Class Is So Numerous That Joinder Is Impracticable
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`Rule 23(a)(1) requires that a class be “so numerous that joinder of all members is
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`impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Numerosity “does not mandate that joinder of all parties
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`be impossible—only that the difficulty or inconvenience of joining all members of the class
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`make use of the class action appropriate.” Cent. States SE & SW Areas Health & Welfare Fund v.
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`Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 504 F.3d 229, 244-45 (2d Cir. 2007). The Second Circuit
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`has recognized that “numerosity is presumed at a level of 40 members.” See Consol. Rail Corp.
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`v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 1995). In securities class actions, “the
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`numerosity requirement may be satisfied by a showing that a large number of shares were
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`outstanding and traded during the relevant period.” Signet, 2019 WL 3001084, at *8.
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`Here, the Class is so numerous that joinder would be impracticable. During the Class
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`Period, there were over 350 million common shares of Nielsen stock outstanding, and the
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`average weekly trading volume of Nielsen stock on the NYSE was 15.3 million shares,
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`8
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`Case 1:18-cv-07143-JMF Document 103 Filed 07/15/21 Page 16 of 33
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`representing 4.30% of all outstanding shares. ¶474; Coffman Rpt. ¶25.4 The numerosity
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`requirement is therefore easily satisfied. See Signet, 2019 WL 3001084, at * 8 (finding
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`numerosity satisfied where defendant corporation had between 60.5 and 80.5 million shares
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`outstanding and an average of 1.34 million shares traded daily); Virtus, 2017 WL 2062985, at *2
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`(numerosity established where the daily