Case 1:18-cv-07712-PAE Document 1 Filed 08/24/18 Page 1 of 29
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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`AIRBNB, INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
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`THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-cv-_______
`
`
`
`COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
`AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
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`
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`Plaintiff Airbnb, Inc. (“Airbnb”), by and through its undersigned counsel, for its
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`Complaint against Defendant the City of New York (the “City”), alleges as follows:
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`INTRODUCTION
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`1.
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`Local Law 2018/146, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-2101–4 (the “Homesharing
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`Surveillance Ordinance” or the “Ordinance”) is an extraordinary act of government overreach. It
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`is also the product of a multi-million dollar campaign funded by the City’s powerful hotel lobby,
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`which is intent on intimidating New Yorkers into abandoning homesharing.
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`2.
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`The Homesharing Surveillance Ordinance requires homesharing platforms to turn
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`over an unprecedented amount of intimate personal data about their New York City hosts and
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`whom they invite into their homes each month to a government enforcement agency—the Mayor’s
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`Office of Special Enforcement—that works shoulder to shoulder with private investigators hired
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`and paid by the hotel lobby. No probable cause, notice, or legal review is contemplated in
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`connection with the bulk collection of this data, and no real restrictions are placed on its use or
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`dissemination. As such, the Ordinance is an unlawful end-run around established restraints on
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`governmental action and violates core constitutional rights under the First and Fourth Amendments
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`to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the New York Constitution, as well as the
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`federal Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq.
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`

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`3.
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`Under normal circumstances, government agencies may obtain private information
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`about citizens only by following the strict legal processes that protect constitutional rights and
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`provide for review and challenge. The Homesharing Surveillance Ordinance evades those
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`protections by mandating—under threat of newly-created legal liability—that Internet platforms
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`holding the sought-after data obtain blanket, advance “consent” from their users and then
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`automatically surrender the demanded data to the City’s enforcement agency every month.
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`Because users of these platforms have no opportunity to challenge this turnover of data to the
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`Office of Special Enforcement, the City is betting that they will walk away from homesharing.
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`4.
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`More specifically, the Ordinance targets data concerning New Yorkers who share
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`their homes with travelers on a short-term basis using an Internet homesharing platform like
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`Airbnb. For each instance in which a New York City residence is rented on a short-term basis
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`using such a platform, the Homesharing Surveillance Ordinance requires that the platform turn
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`over to the City’s enforcement agency on a monthly basis:
`
`a.
`
`b.
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`the address of the residence;
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`the full legal name, address, telephone number, and email
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`address of the host;
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`c.
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`the specific identifiers (name, number, and URL) of both the
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`home and the host on the homesharing platform;
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`a statement of when and how the residence was occupied;
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`the total number of days the residence was rented;
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`the fees received by the platform; and
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`if the platform collects rent, the amount paid and host bank
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`d.
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`e.
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`f.
`
`g.
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`account information.
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`5.
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`Thus, the Ordinance requires Internet homesharing platforms to turn over personal
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`information about their hosts, much of which is not made public through the platforms. The
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`Ordinance also requires homesharing platforms to turn over their own non-public and
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`commercially sensitive information, including detailed breakdowns of revenues and technical
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`information about listings. To the extent a platform collects rent, it is also required to hand over
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`highly sensitive bank account information about how guests choose to pay and how much. All of
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`this is data the Office of Special Enforcement could not otherwise obtain without precompliance
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`review, and the Ordinance permits that agency to use and share the data however and whenever it
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`chooses, without any meaningful limitation. In so doing, the Ordinance breaches critical privacy
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`protections both for homesharing platforms like Airbnb and for the New Yorkers who share their
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`homes on these platforms.
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`6.
`
`Put another way, the Homesharing Surveillance Ordinance requires Airbnb to
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`report on a monthly basis volumes of otherwise private information about who New Yorkers
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`choose to invite into their homes, where those homes are located, when and for how long the guests
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`stay, and what the guests are doing there.
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`7.
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`As the Supreme Court has recognized, “when it comes to the Fourth Amendment,
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`the home is first among equals. At the Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands ‘the right of a man to
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`retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’” Florida
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`v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
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`Indeed, “the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home . . . has been embedded in our traditions
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`since the origins of the Republic.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). The
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`Homesharing Surveillance Ordinance is inconsistent with these fundamental principles.
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`-3-
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`8.
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`City Council members and other State and City officials claim that this extreme
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`governmental surveillance is somehow necessary because housing is being taken off the market
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`illegally for use as short-term rentals and thereby driving up housing costs. As of June 1, 2018,
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`however, there are only about 28,000 “entire home” Airbnb listings spread across New York
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`City—approximately 0.8 percent of New York City homes. Moreover, 95% of hosts listing an
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`entire home on Airbnb have only a single home offered—hardly a threat to the City’s housing
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`stock.
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`9.
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`City officials also claim that the Homesharing Surveillance Ordinance was
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`designed to combat illegal hotel operators, but the Ordinance makes no distinction between
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`commercial operators and the ordinary New Yorkers who use Airbnb’s homesharing platform to
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`supplement their income so they can afford to remain in their homes and support their families.
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`10.
`
`The reality is the Ordinance is the product of a lobbying campaign funded by the
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`hotel industry, which believes it is being threatened by homesharing and has co-opted the very
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`agency—the Office of Special Enforcement—that will receive and exploit the data.
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`11.
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`The Homesharing Surveillance Ordinance provides that enforcement agency with
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`a complete picture into New York homesharing without the need for probable cause, notice, legal
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`process, or review. The Office of Special Enforcement will be able to use the compelled
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`information for whatever nefarious purpose it desires without a need to articulate a reasonable
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`relation to any particular investigation. Office of Special Enforcement agents already are using
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`data from servers purchased from data-mining company Palantir—including data collected and
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`supplied to the agency by the hotel lobby’s private investigators—to turn up unannounced at New
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`Yorkers’ private homes to harass homesharing hosts and guests and issue citations for alleged
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`violations (many of which are subsequently dismissed upon challenge).
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`12.
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`Even worse, nothing in the Homesharing Surveillance Ordinance secures the data.
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`For example, nothing in the Ordinance prevents the Office of Special Enforcement from sharing
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`the data with other agencies or turning the data over to any member of the public—including
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`individuals associated with the hotel lobby—who files a request under the Freedom of Information
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`Law.
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`13.
`
`Given the above, it should come as no surprise that this surveillance regime far
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`exceeds in scope and severity the regulations imposed on any other industry in New York City.
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`New York City hotels are not required to disclose this same information about all of their patrons’
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`stays.
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`14.
`
`In sum, the systematic, ongoing, bulk surveillance mandated by the Homesharing
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`Surveillance Ordinance is illegal. The Ordinance requires Airbnb and other homesharing
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`platforms to communicate a chilling message to their users under the guise of obtaining “consent”
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`and then to surrender to the City an extraordinary amount of commercially sensitive and personal
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`information about their hosts without cause or protection. This unprecedented end-run around
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`restraints on governmental action warrants this Court’s intervention.
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`OVERVIEW OF CLAIMS
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`15.
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`Plaintiff Airbnb brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 2707 and
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`28 U.S.C. § 2201 to declare unlawful Chapter 21 of Title 26 of the New York City Administrative
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`Code and to enjoin its enforcement.
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`16.
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`The Homesharing Surveillance Ordinance violates the Fourth Amendment to the
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`U.S. Constitution because it authorizes warrantless searches of Airbnb’s private business records
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`without any opportunity for precompliance review. The information sought under the Ordinance
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`is highly sensitive and proprietary commercial and personal data in which Airbnb has a reasonable
`
`expectation of privacy.
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`17.
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`For the same reasons, the Homesharing Surveillance Ordinance also violates
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`Article I, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution.
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`18.
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`In addition, the Homesharing Surveillance Ordinance directly conflicts with, and is
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`preempted by, the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq. (the “SCA”), because it
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`compels Airbnb to disclose host information to the City without the legal process or consent
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`required by the SCA. Indeed, one of Congress’ goals in enacting the SCA was to protect the
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`privacy of data belonging to customers of electronic communication service providers like Airbnb.
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`See S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986). The Ordinance squarely conflicts with that Congressional
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`objective.
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`19.
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`Finally, the Homesharing Surveillance Ordinance violates the First Amendment
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`insofar as it “compel[s] [Airbnb] to speak a particular message.” Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life
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`Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018). Airbnb will be forced to communicate a City-
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`mandated message that users of Airbnb’s homesharing platform must consent to the production of
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`their sensitive personal and financial information, that their mere use of the platform will constitute
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`consent to the disclosure of that information, and that their information will be turned over to a
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`special government agency that targets New Yorkers who participate in homesharing.
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`THE PARTIES
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`20.
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`Plaintiff Airbnb is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state
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`of Delaware, with its principal place of business in San Francisco, California. Airbnb is a
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`homesharing platform; it maintains a website and mobile applications that provide access to an
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`online marketplace for people to list, explore, and book both short-term and long-term housing
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`accommodations.
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`21.
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`Defendant the City of New York is an incorporated municipality within the State
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`of New York.
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`-6-
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`22.
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`This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42
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`U.S.C. § 1983 because Airbnb alleges violation of its rights under the Constitution and laws of the
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`United States.
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`23.
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`Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over
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`Airbnb’s claims arising under the New York State Constitution because they are so related to the
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`federal claims asserted in this action that they form part of the same case or controversy under
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`Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
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`24.
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`The Court may declare the legal rights and obligations of the parties in this action
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`pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 because the action presents an actual controversy within the Court’s
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`jurisdiction.
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`25.
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`Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because the defendant is located and
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`resides in this judicial district and in the State of New York, and because a substantial part of the
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`events giving rise to the claims for relief occurred in this judicial district, or in the alternative,
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`because the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in this district.
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`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
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`Homesharing and Airbnb
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`26.
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`“Homesharing” is the renting of one’s own home to travelers. This is not a new
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`concept, but the Internet has made it easier and more accessible for people around the globe.
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`Websites and Internet applications provide a platform that facilitates the matching of travelers
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`looking for a place to stay (guests) with local people looking to share their spaces (hosts) and then
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`provides the means to enter into an agreement, securely communicate, and pay for the stay.
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`-7-
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`27.
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`Founded in 2008, Airbnb is a homesharing platform with the mission of creating a
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`world where people can belong when they travel by being connected to local cultures and having
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`unique travel experiences.
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`28.
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`As of June 1, 2018, there were approximately 27,500 “entire home” Airbnb listings
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`spread across New York City. In terms of the overall housing stock, that amounts to approximately
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`0.8 percent of New York City homes.
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`29.
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`The overwhelming majority of Airbnb hosts in New York City are individuals who
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`have only one listing on the platform. Indeed, as of June 1, 2018, 95% of hosts who rent out full
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`homes in New York City are individuals with just one listing.
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`30.
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`Often Airbnb listings are outside of the typical tourist zones and offer more
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`affordable accommodations than traditional commercial options.
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`31.
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`Publicly-available data shows that Airbnb has a significantly positive impact on
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`local communities, including those within New York City.
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`32. More than 700,000 short-term rental bookings were made through Airbnb’s
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`platform in New York City in 2016, generating roughly $2.8 billion in economic activity and
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`supporting approximately 30,000 jobs in New York City.
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`33.
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`In many cases, the supplemental income hosts earn is what enables them to afford
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`to remain in their homes. Indeed, in an annual survey, 77% of Airbnb hosts in New York reported
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`that they use the money they earn sharing their homes to remain in their homes, 28% of hosts
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`reported that homesharing has helped them avoid eviction, and another 18% reported that
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`homesharing has helped them avoid foreclosure.
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`34.
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`The beneficial effects of the Airbnb platform are even more pronounced in low-
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`income neighborhoods. The median supplemental income of an Airbnb host in New York City’s
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`-8-
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`low-income neighborhoods was more than $4,500 for the year ending July 1, 2016—the equivalent
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`of a 13% boost to median household income in these communities. A typical family in these
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`communities can increase its median monthly income by 10% by renting out its apartment for a
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`single three-day weekend.
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`35.
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`The beneficial effects of Airbnb are likewise more pronounced in minority
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`communities. Homesharing through the Airbnb platform generated nearly $60 million in income
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`for hosts in predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods in 2016, more than $70 million in income for
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`hosts in predominantly African American neighborhoods in 2017 (which was up 63% from 2016),
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`and more than $20 million in income for hosts in predominantly Chinese American neighborhoods.
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`36.
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`A National Bureau of Economic Research working paper published earlier this year
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`estimated that in ten major U.S. cities, “consumer surplus would decrease by $276 million” in one
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`year if not for Airbnb. Indeed, the working paper found an average of “a consumer surplus of $41
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`per night for every Airbnb booking,” with New York City gaining a consumer surplus of $42 per
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`night for every Airbnb booking.1
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`Hosts and Guests Provide Sensitive Personal Information to Airbnb
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`37.
`
`In using the Airbnb platform, hosts and guests input sensitive personal information
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`into Airbnb’s systems.
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`38.
`
`Before anyone can use the Airbnb platform, as a host or guest, they must first
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`become a member of Airbnb. To sign up as a member on the Airbnb website, a user clicks the
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`“Sign up” link at the top right of the homepage, www.airbnb.com. Users can also sign up using
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`Airbnb’s mobile app.
`
`
`1 Chiarra Farronato & Andrey Fradkin, The Welfare Effects of Peer Entry in the Accommodation Market: The Case
`of Airbnb, National Bureau of Economic Research (February 2018) at 6, 50, http://www.nber.org/papers/w24361.
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`-9-
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`39.
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`In signing up, the user then submits certain identifying information (or enters their
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`Facebook or Google credentials) and clicks “Sign up”:
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`40.
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`After clicking “Sign up,” the user is prompted to accept Airbnb’s Community
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`Commitment, Terms of Service, Payments Terms of Service, Privacy Policy, and
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`Nondiscrimination Policy, all of which are mandatory to use the platform. A user can read each
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`of those documents by clicking the appropriate link.
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`41.
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`To become a “host,” a user creates a listing for their accommodation on the
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`platform, and provides descriptions, images and videos, prices, and dates of availability for the
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`space:
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`42.
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`A typical Airbnb listing shows the general location, basic description, and the host’s
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`first name. Listings do not include a host’s full name, email address, or telephone number, nor do
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`they disclose the listing address. All of that information is kept by Airbnb in its non-public
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`
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`systems.
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`43.
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`Thus, while guests can search listings by location, dates, or other criteria, in order
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`to protect the privacy and security of the hosts, the platform does not disclose full host names or
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`listing addresses in search results.
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`44.
`
`Once guests have identified accommodations in which they may be interested,
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`guests and hosts can use the platform to securely and privately message each other. Such
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`communications may contain terms or conditions of the stay or other aspects of the agreement
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`between the host and the guest.
`
`45.
`
`If a guest and a host reach an agreement, the platform then (and only then) securely
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`discloses the listing address to the guest.
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`46.
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`The Airbnb platform also provides a secure payment-processing service through
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`which the guest pays the host electronically.
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`47.
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`Airbnb keeps users’ sensitive personal information private and uses it for purposes
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`of facilitating Airbnb transactions, such as to provide customer service, enable communications
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`between users, and monitor for fraud. Airbnb discloses sensitive personal information to
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`governmental entities only in response to valid legal requests. Given the above, Airbnb hosts and
`
`guests have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the non-public information they share with
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`Airbnb.
`
`The Hotel Industry Views Homesharing as a Threat and Has Launched an Aggressive
`Attack to Stop It
`
`
`48.
`
`The popularity of homesharing platforms like Airbnb is viewed as a threat by the
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`traditional hotel industry in New York City because homesharing provides travelers a unique and
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`often less expensive alternative to the City’s high-priced hotels. This limits the ability of hotels to
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`charge gouging rates at peak times and in areas of high concentration. In 2015, Jon Bortz, chief
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`executive of Pebblebrook Hotel Trust, which at the time owned Embassy Suites, Doubletree, and
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`other hotels, said that Airbnb limited the company’s “ability to price at what maybe the customer
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`would describe as sort of gouging rates.”2
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`49.
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`As a recent Forbes article explained, “Airbnb is revolutionizing the lodging market
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`by keeping hotel rates in check and making additional rooms available in the country’s hottest
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`travel spots during peak periods when hotel rooms often sell out and rates skyrocket.”3 “That’s
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`bad news for hotels . . . [a]nd it’s good news for travelers.”4
`
`50.
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`As a result, while hotels are having some of their best years on record, the hotel
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`lobby is spending millions to attack homesharing.
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`51.
`
`One of the hotel lobby’s main tools for thwarting homesharing is exerting influence
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`over the legislative process. In the hotel lobby’s own words: “Objective: Build on the success of
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`2016 efforts to ensure comprehensive legislation in key markets around the country and create a
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`receptive environment to launch a wave of strong bills at the state level while advancing a national
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`narrative.” 5
`
`The Hotel Lobby Uses New York City Officials to Thwart Airbnb
`
`52.
`
`In New York City, since at least 2013, the hotel lobby has mounted an aggressive
`
`campaign to stamp out the competitive threat posed by Airbnb, spending vast sums of money
`
`
`2 Elizabeth Dwoskin, Hotel CEO openly celebrates higher prices after anti-Airbnb law passes, THE WASHINGTON
`POST (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/10/26/hotel-executive-openly-
`celebrates-higher-prices-after-anti-airbnb-law-passes/.
`
`3 Dina Gerdeman, The Airbnb Effect: Cheaper rooms for Travelers, Less Revenue for Hotels, FORBES.COM (Feb. 27,
`2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2018/02/27/the-airbnb-effect-cheaper-rooms-for-
`travelers-less-revenue-for-hotels/.
`
`4 Id.
`
`5 The Hotel Industry’s Plans to Combat Airbnb, Pages from a 2016 American Hotel and Lodging Association
`document outlining plans to fend off Airbnb in the coming year, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2017),
`https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/16/technology/document-hotel-industry-plans-to-combat-airbnb-
`excerpt.html.
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`funding attacks against homesharing platforms, and supporting candidates for office whom it
`
`believes will push government efforts to obstruct homesharing. This powerful lobby has also
`
`focused its efforts on co-opting the Office of Special Enforcement.
`
`53.
`
`Created in 2006, the Office of Special Enforcement has responsibility for
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`“overseeing response to conditions at properties throughout the City that threaten quality of life
`
`and require a coordinated response from multiple agencies or otherwise demand special attention”
`
`including inspections, investigations and “implementation of other remedies by such agency staff
`
`for violation of the City’s Building, Fire Prevention and Health Codes.” Mayor’s Exec. Order No.
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`96 § 2 (NYC 2006).
`
`54.
`
`The Office of Special Enforcement originally was intended to be an expansion of a
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`decades-old effort to improve public safety and quality of life in midtown Manhattan through the
`
`Office of Midtown Enforcement. In its early years, the Office of Special Enforcement cracked
`
`down on counterfeit products, went after video piracy, and enforced the City’s noise code.
`
`55.
`
`Beginning in 2013, however, the mission, budget, and practices of the Office of
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`Special Enforcement changed dramatically, as the hotel lobby began to implement its strategy to
`
`have the agency target homesharing.
`
`56.
`
`Since 2013, the hotel lobby has given at least $460,217 to members of the New
`
`York City Council, as well as $235,404 to Mayor Bill de Blasio and $46,850 to Comptroller Scott
`
`Stringer. In the 2017 elections, the New York Hotel and Motel Trades Council (“HTC”) spent
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`$395,498 on seven City Council races through its Hotel Workers for Stronger Communities
`
`group—the most of any independent group.
`
`57.
`
`Not long after the 2013 elections, the mission of the Office of Special Enforcement
`
`began to shift toward a focus on targeting homesharing. The transition was overseen by the
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`agency’s Director at the time, Elan Parra. Under Parra’s leadership, the Office of Special
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`Enforcement in 2014 issued approximately 1,200 violations relating to homesharing.
`
`58.
`
`Also, shortly after Mayor de Blasio took office, the City purchased 24 “Gotham”
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`server cores from Palantir, Inc. (“Palantir”)—at a cost of nearly a million dollars. The Gotham
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`server cores include highly sophisticated technology that aggregates and synthesizes data from
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`various sources into a common format and a single database. The master Gotham database retains
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`this aggregated data even if the original source data is later removed or deleted.
`
`59.
`
`After the City purchased the Gotham server cores, it acquired licenses for a Palantir
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`mobile technology that allows users to access the master Gotham database from a smartphone.
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`That technology was quickly rolled out to Office of Special Enforcement agents. In the words of
`
`one press report, this mobile technology “connect[s] them to everything the City knows about
`
`every place within it.” Another press report explained that Office of Special Enforcement agents
`
`use the technology to “catch Airbnb hosts.”
`
`60.
`
`In mid-June 2015, with the focus of the Office of Special Enforcement shifted to
`
`homesharing and with the Palantir technology in place, Parra left the agency and went to work for
`
`the hotel lobby. On July 20, 2015, a consulting firm named Lemire LLC announced that Parra had
`
`joined as Managing Director. Lemire was retained by and works on behalf of the Hotel
`
`Association of New York City (“HANYC”). The day after the announcement of Parra’s move to
`
`Lemire, the City announced that it was doubling the Office of Special Enforcement’s budget, in
`
`an effort to transform the agency into an active investigation and enforcement unit with a proactive
`
`mission targeted at homesharing.
`
`61.
`
`Parra maintained close ties with Office of Special Enforcement personnel after his
`
`move to Lemire. And as early as August 2015, Parra and the Office of Special Enforcement began
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`Case 1:18-cv-07712-PAE Document 1 Filed 08/24/18 Page 17 of 29
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`coordinating their efforts to attack Airbnb and its homesharing hosts. For example, on August 10,
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`2015, an Office of Special Enforcement official forwarded an invitation to an Airbnb Happy Hour
`
`to Parra with the subject line “Great U/C [undercover] Opportunity.” The official suggested to
`
`Parra that they could “infiltrate, get some insight and then vacate the party.”
`
`62.
`
`In November 2015, Jason Ortiz—a managing director at another hotel-industry-
`
`affiliated consulting firm, Metropolitan Public Strategies (“MPS”)—left MPS and rejoined HTC
`
`as its deputy director. Almost immediately, HTC gave $100,000 to HANYC for what public
`
`disclosures called a “BNB Campaign”—an apparent reference to Airbnb. The close coordination
`
`between hotel groups and the Office of Special Enforcement escalated.
`
`63.
`
`Upon information and belief, by 2017, the Office of Special Enforcement had
`
`effectively outsourced a substantial portion of its investigatory work to private hotel groups,
`
`including Lemire. The agency was, at the very least, relying on “dossiers” that Lemire
`
`investigators provided to the agency “wrapped in a bow.”6 And the agency reported in mid-2017
`
`that it was spending 95% of its time on enforcement efforts related to homesharing.
`
`64.
`
`The Office of Special Enforcement can and does serve subpoenas, warrants, and
`
`other legal process on Airbnb for information about hosts in connection with its enforcement
`
`efforts. As in all other cities in the United States, this general procedure is both constitutional and
`
`legal when done properly—it is targeted in nature, provides for precompliance review of such
`
`process, and generally allows notice to be provided to users who have the opportunity to object for
`
`themselves in advance of their information being produced.
`
`
`6 Josh Eidelson, Hotel Money Is Funding Anti-Airbnb Sting Operations, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 12,
`2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-12/hotel-money-is-funding-anti-airbnb-sting-operations
`
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`Case 1:18-cv-07712-PAE Document 1 Filed 08/24/18 Page 18 of 29
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`65.
`
`Airbnb complies with such legal process and provides information sufficient to
`
`meet the OSE’s investigative needs with appropriate precompliance review.
`
`66.
`
`Following legal process, however, apparently has not satisfied the Office of Special
`
`Enforcement and its hotel lobby allies.
`
`The Homesharing Surveillance Ordinance Threatens Private Information Without Cause
`or Protection
`
`
`67.
`
`The Homesharing Surveillance Ordinance is the latest chapter in the hotel lobby’s
`
`campaign against Airbnb and the everyday New Yorkers who use its platform. Indeed, the
`
`Ordinance is exactly the kind of “comprehensive legislation” that the hotel lobby identified as a
`
`priority in late 2016.
`
`68.
`
`The Homesharing Surveillance Ordinance was passed by the City Council on
`
`July 18, 2018, and signed into law by Mayor de Blasio on August 6, 2018. It is scheduled to go
`
`into effect in February 2019.
`
`69.
`
`Under the Ordinance, online homesharing platforms are required to “[s]ubmit to
`
`the [Office of Special Enforcement] . . . a report of transactions . . . on a monthly basis.” N.Y.C.
`
`Admin. Code § 26-2102(a). These monthly transaction reports must include, among other things,
`
`for every short-term rental through the platform:
`
`(1)
`
`(2)
`
`(3)
`
`(4)
`
`The physical address of the short-term rental associated with
`such transaction, including the street name, street number,
`apartment or unit number, borough or county, and zip code;
`
`The full legal name, physical address, phone number and
`email address of the host of such short-term rental and the
`uniform resource locator (URL) and the individualized name
`and number of such host on such booking service’s platform;
`
`The individualized name and number and the URL of such
`advertisement or listing;
`
`A statement as to whether such short-term rental transaction
`involved (i) short-term rental of the entirety of a dwelling
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`Case 1:18-cv-07712-PAE Document 1 Filed 08/24/18 Page 19 of 29
`
`(5)
`
`(6)
`
`(7)
`
`unit or housing accommodations in a building or (ii) short-
`term rental of part of such unit or housing accommodations;
`
`The total number of days that the dwelling unit, part thereof
`or housing accommodations in a building were rented as a
`short-term rental through such booking service’s platform;
`
`The total amount of fees received by such booking service
`for such short-term rental; and
`
`If such booking service collects rent for short-term rentals
`on behalf of such host, (i) the total amount of such rent
`received by such booking service and transmitted to such
`host and (ii) the account name and consistently anonymized
`identifier for the account number for the account used by
`such host to receive payments from such booking service or,
`if such booking service provides an explanation why such
`anonymized identifiers are unavailable, the account name
`and account number for such account.
`
`70.
`
`If allowed to go into effect, these provisions would require Airbnb to turn over
`
`personal information of its hosts that is not made publicly available through the platform, including
`
`the full legal names, home addresses, telephone numbers, and email addresses of hosts, as well as
`
`detailed information about how they use their private property and whether and when they invite
`
`others into their homes. To the extent a homesharing platform “collects rent,” the Ordinance also
`
`requires the production of sensitive bank account i