Case 1:18-cv-09052-PAC Document 67 Filed 03/10/21 Page 1 of 14
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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`Plaintiff,
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`18-CV-9052 (PAC)
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`OPINION & ORDER
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`TYESHA WASHINGTON,
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`Defendants,
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`------------------------------------------------------------X
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`-against-
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`NYC MEDICAL PRACTICE, P.C., SERGEY
`VOSKIN, and ANTHONY RAY PERKINS,
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`The resolution of this medical malpractice case turns on the application of the sensible
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`(but often overlooked) aphorism: read the fine print before signing a contract. Plaintiff Tyesha
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`Washington (“Plaintiff” or “Washington”) is an Ohio resident who received a buttock
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`augmentation procedure at NYC Medical Practice, P.C. (“Goals”), a medical corporation located
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`in New York City. Following her cosmetic surgery, Washington experienced bleeding and
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`infection at the operative site, requiring her to undergo additional medical treatment and remedial
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`surgery.
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`As a result of her injuries, Washington contacted Goals to request a refund of her surgical
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`procedure. Goals promptly obliged. But in consideration for the refund payment, Goals
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`requested that Washington sign a one-page agreement releasing Goals, Dr. Anthony Ray Perkins
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`(the operating surgeon), and Goals’ owner, Dr. Sergey Voskin (collectively “Defendants”) from
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`any potential liability related to the buttock augmentation procedure. Washington signed that
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`general release. But shortly thereafter, she filed this medical malpractice suit against the
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`1
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`Case 1:18-cv-09052-PAC Document 67 Filed 03/10/21 Page 2 of 14
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`Defendants for their alleged negligence in performing her cosmetic surgery.1
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`Defendants now move for summary judgment, contending that the general release
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`agreement precludes the present lawsuit.2 Washington opposes the summary judgment motion.
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`She raises several objections to the validity of the general release agreement, but the nub of her
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`arguments comes down to this: that she neither read nor adequately comprehended the legal
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`implications of the general release agreement and therefore that this Court should not enforce it.
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`Washington’s failure to read the fine print before signing on the dotted line cannot
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`preclude summary judgment. Because the Court must enforce the general release agreement as
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`written, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
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`BACKGROUND
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`I.
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`The Lift Procedure
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`Most of the facts underlying this motion are simple enough and uncontroverted. Goals is
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`a medical company based in New York City that offers a menu of cosmetic medical services,
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`including cosmetic plastic surgery, body contouring, anti-aging techniques, and facial
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`rejuvenation procedures. (Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 16, ECF 14; Pls.’ Opp. Br. at 4, ECF 50.) Dr.
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`Voskin is the sole owner of Goals. (Amend. Compl. ¶ 8.) One of the surgical procedures that
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`Goals offers is the Liposuction 360/Brazilian Butt Lift (the “Lift Procedure”). (Pls.’ Opp. Br. at
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`4.) The Lift Procedure, which seeks to enhance the silhouette of an individual, involves (1)
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`1 The Court has diversity jurisdiction over this case because there is complete diversity between the parties and the
`amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
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`2 The Defendants filed separate moving papers in support of summary judgment. (ECF 40, 45.) Dr. Perkins’
`motion, however, appears to have been made under Rules 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
`Procedure. (Perkins Mot. at 1, ECF 45.) Because Dr. Perkins’ motion “relies on matters outside the pleadings, the
`Court may convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. P.”
`Muhammad v. Schriro, No. 13-CV-1962 PKC, 2014 WL 4652564, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2014) (cleaned up).
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`2
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`Case 1:18-cv-09052-PAC Document 67 Filed 03/10/21 Page 3 of 14
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`removing excess fat from parts of the patient’s body by liposuction; (2) purifying that fat; and (3)
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`re-injecting the purified fat into the buttocks of the patient. (Id.)
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`In February 2018, Washington entered into an agreement with Goals to receive the Lift
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`Procedure at a total cost of $5,850.3 (Cruz Decl. Ex. 1 (“Lift Procedure Contract”), ECF 43-1.)
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`On May 22, 2018, Washington traveled to the Goals facility in New York City to undergo the
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`Lift Procedure. (Pls.’ Opp. Br. at 4; Goals Br. at 2, ECF 41.) Dr. Perkins, a duly licensed
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`physician in the state of New York and an employee of Goals, performed the operation.
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`(Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 21.) In the days following her surgery, Washington received follow-up
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`medical care and treatment at Goals. (Pls.’ Opp. Br. at 4.)
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`On or about May 27, 2018, Washington returned home to Ohio, at which point she began
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`to feel serious pain in and around the operative site. (Id.; Goals Br. at 2.) On May 30, she was
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`diagnosed with Liposuction burn at the Good Samaritan Hospital in Dayton, Ohio. (Pls.’ Opp.
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`Br. at 4; Goals Br. at 2.) And in the ensuing days, Washington’s condition worsened as the
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`operative site became infected.4 (Washington Dep. 18:15–18, ECF 51-7.) Finally, on June 20,
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`Washington was re-hospitalized at the Miami Valley Hospital, where she underwent remedial
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`3 The agreement contained a “Results & Complications” section, which read:
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`The practice of medicine and surgery is not an exact science. Although good results are anticipated, there
`can be no guarantee or warranty, expressed or implied, by anyone as to the actual results of the
`Procedure. Revisions and or other medical treatments or management of problems or complications
`may be required. These may result in additional charges for which you are responsible.
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`(Cruz Decl. Ex. 1 (“Lift Procedure Contract”), ECF 43-1.)
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`4 According to Washington, the operative site grew infected after she had applied a medicinal cream prescribed by
`Goals. (Washington Dep. 18:1–9, ECF 51-7.)
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`3
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`Case 1:18-cv-09052-PAC Document 67 Filed 03/10/21 Page 4 of 14
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`surgery. (Pls.’ Opp. Br. at 4; Goal Br. at 2.)
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`II.
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`The General Release Agreement
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`Following her June 20 remedial surgery, Washington was prescribed oxycodone to help
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`alleviate her post-surgical pains. (Pls.’ Opp. Br. at 4; Blau Decl. Ex. J (“Oxycodone
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`Prescription”), ECF 51-10.) Around the same time, Washington reached out to Goals with
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`updates on her condition and to request a full refund of the Lift Procedure. (Pls.’ Opp. Br. at 5.)
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`While the parties dispute the extent to which Washington was under the influence of prescription
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`drugs during these exchanges, it is undisputed that (1) Plaintiff initiated contact with Goals (Pls.’
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`Stmt. 56.1 ¶ 4, ECF 52) and (2) Plaintiff provided Goals with specific details about her
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`condition—including scanned photographs of the infection site—in support of her claim for a
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`refund. (Washington Dep. 19:3; Cruz Decl. Ex. 3 (“Call Logs”), ECF 43-3.)
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`Goals promptly agreed to refund Washington a total of $6,095.00. (Goals Br. at 2.) But
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`in exchange for the payment, Goals asked Washington to sign a one-page general release
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`agreement (the “General Release”). (Id.) The General Release, in relevant part, provided:
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`1. Release: Tyesha Washington . . . . hereby voluntarily, irrevocably and
`unconditionally releases and forever discharges NYC Medical Practice, P.C. d/b/a
`Goals Aesthetics and Plastic Surgery from any claims she has, or may have, against it
`. . . . [or its] trustees, agents, insurers, representatives, attorneys, fiduciaries,
`administrators, directors, supervisors, doctors, nurses, medical assistants, physician’s
`assistants, independent contractors, managers and employees (hereafter, collectively,
`as the “Releasees”), from any and all rights, manner of action and actions . . . . which
`Tyesha Washington now has, or has ever had, against NYC Medical Practice, P.C.
`d/b/a Goals Aesthetics and Plastic Surgery and its associated Releasees, for, upon or
`by reason of any matter, cause or claim of whatsoever kind, including any
`malpractice claims, existing on or prior to the time of the execution of this
`Agreement, whether known or unknown, for the following:
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`Related to the procedure you received from NYC Medical Practice, P.C. d/b/a
`Goals Aesthetics and Plastic Surgery on June 22, 2018 and your care thereafter
`or any complications therefrom
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`Any claims not specifically related to the procedure you received from NYC Medical
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`4
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`Case 1:18-cv-09052-PAC Document 67 Filed 03/10/21 Page 5 of 14
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`Practice, P.C. d/b/a Goals Aesthetics and Plastic Surgery on June 22, 2018 and your
`care thereafter or any complications therefrom, or not logically the natural result
`thereof, are not subject to the within release.
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`(Cruz Decl. Ex. 4 (“General Release”), ECF 43-4.) (emphasis in original).
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`Without having read its terms or understanding its legal implications, Washington signed
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`the General Release on June 29, 2018 before an Ohio notary.5 (Pls.’ Opp. Br. at 5; Washington
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`Dep. 29:1.) The notary certified that Washington had appeared and signed the General Release
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`“as her voluntary act and deed.”6 (General Release at 2.)
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`III.
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`Procedural History
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`Washington initiated this lawsuit on October 3, 2018 (ECF 1) and amended her complaint
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`on November 14. (ECF 12.) Following a pre-motion conference on January 30, 2019, the Court
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`by written order directed the parties to conduct limited discovery on the issue of whether the
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`General Release was legitimately executed. (Order, ECF 23 (“2019 Order”).) However, because
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`of several disputes that delayed the production of discovery, the Court convened the parties for
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`another conference on January 8, 2020. (2020 Conf. Tr., ECF 30.) During that conference, the
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`Court provided tailored discovery instructions to the parties, namely that Washington be deposed
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`and that the parties produce limited discovery regarding the validity of the General Release. (Id.
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`at 10–14.) The parties subsequently conducted that discovery and this summary judgment
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`5 Because she was allegedly under the heavy influence of medication, Washington’s friend, LaDonna Miller, helped
`“her understand what she was signing and ensure that all documents were executed to obtain a refund.” (Pls.’ Stmt.
`56.1 ¶ 4, ECF 52.)
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`6 To date, Washington has received only $5,750 of the $6,095 that was promised by Goals in consideration for
`signing the General Release. (Perkins Br. at 14.)
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`5
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`Case 1:18-cv-09052-PAC Document 67 Filed 03/10/21 Page 6 of 14
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`motion followed. (ECF 40, 45.)
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`LEGAL STANDARD
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`A party may move for (and a court will grant) summary judgment where “the movant
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`shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
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`judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate where
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`“after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,” the non-moving party has “fail[ed] to make
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`a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
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`which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
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`322 (1986). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the district court must “resolve all
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`ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
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`party.” Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 123 (2d Cir. 2013).
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`“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat
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`an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be
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`no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48
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`(1986). “[T]he substantive law . . . identif[ies] which facts are material,” and “[o]nly disputes
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`over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly prelude
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`the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at 248. “[A] material fact is ‘genuine’ . . . if the evidence
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`is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. If “the record
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`taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is
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`no “genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
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`574, 587 (1986) (citing First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).
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`Thus “a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient [to defeat a
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`motion for summary judgment] . . . .” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
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`6
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`Case 1:18-cv-09052-PAC Document 67 Filed 03/10/21 Page 7 of 14
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`I.
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`Procedural Objections
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`ANALYSIS
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`As a preliminary matter, Washington contends that the Court should defer ruling on this
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`summary judgment motion because there has been insufficient discovery produced between the
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`parties on the issue of the General Release’s enforceability. (Pls.’ Opp. Br. at 6–8.) Because the
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`enforceability of the General Release is a “fact-intensive determination,” Washington argues that
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`she should be allowed to (1) depose the Defendants and a related party; (2) have the Defendants
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`file an answer to her Amended Complaint; and (3) receive production of additional discovery
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`that may be pertinent to this summary judgment motion. (Id.)
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`The Court, however, has already resolved these discovery issues. On January 30, 2019,
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`the Court by written order directed the parties to conduct limited discovery on the issue of
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`whether the General Release was properly executed. (See 2019 Order.) On January 8, 2020,
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`during a follow-up conference with the parties, the Court expounded upon its initial order, going
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`so far as to provide specific instructions on which documents were to be produced and who were
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`to be deposed in connection with the issue of the General Release’s validity. (2020 Conf. Tr. at
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`10–14.) Because the parties subsequently conducted that discovery pursuant to the Court’s
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`instructions, the Court sees no reason to revisit its prior rulings on these discovery issues.
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`Moreover, the Court is unpersuaded by Washington’s suggestion that the present factual
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`record is too slender a reed upon which to decide this summary judgment motion. (Pls.’ Opp.
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`Br. at 6–8.) The record, as it stands, presents more than enough evidence to dispose of this
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`motion: Washington has been deposed, pertinent documents regarding the General Release have
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`been produced, and most, if not all, the disputes in this motion arise from application of law to
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`7
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`Case 1:18-cv-09052-PAC Document 67 Filed 03/10/21 Page 8 of 14
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`fact. Therefore, the Court concludes that the summary judgment motion may be adjudicated.7
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`II.
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`The General Release’s Enforceability
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`Turning to the merits, the dispositive issue underlying this motion is the enforceability of
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`the General Release under New York law.8 “It is well established in New York that a valid
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`release which is clear and unambiguous on its face and which is knowingly and voluntarily
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`entered into will be enforced as a private agreement between parties.” DuFort v. Aetna Life Ins.
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`Co., 818 F. Supp. 578, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (cleaned up); see Centro Empresarial Cempresa
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`S.A. v. Am. Movil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 N.Y.3d 269, 276 (2011) (stating that “a valid release
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`constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim which is the subject of the release”). “Thus, a
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`release will be binding on the parties absent a showing of fraud, duress, undue influence, or some
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`other valid legal defense.” DuFort, 818 F. Supp. at 581. The issue of whether an agreement is
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`ambiguous is a question of law to be decided by the court. See W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v.
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`Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162 (1990).
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`Washington lodges two arguments against the validity of the General Release. First, she
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`contends that the General Release is ambiguous because it lists June 22, 2018 as the date of the
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`Lift Procedure (for which liability is waived), when in fact the Lift Procedure occurred a month
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`7 Washington’s fleeting argument that the summary judgment motion is unripe because Defendants “never answered
`the Complaint” must also be rejected for two reasons. (Pls.’ Opp. Br. at 1, ECF 50.) First, Washington waived this
`argument when the parties initially agreed to the bifurcated discovery schedule whence this case has proceeded.
`(See Order, ECF 23 (“2019 Order”).) Second, “a court need not postpone ruling on a motion for summary judgment
`where the moving defendant has failed to file an answer if the answer would not clarify the issues raised by the
`motion nor aid the court in determining whether there are any genuine issues of material fact that would preclude
`granting summary judgment.” Oakley v. Dolan, No. 17-CV-6903 (RJS), 2021 WL 92623, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11,
`2021) (cleaned up). Accordingly, because Defendants’ Answer would not clarify or aid the resolution of the issues
`raised in this motion, especially where discovery has already been conducted, Washington’s argument must be
`rejected. See id.
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`8 The General Release has a choice of law provision, which states that any disputes arising from the General Release
`will be governed by New York law. (See Cruz Decl. Ex. 4 (“General Release”), ECF 43-4.) Accordingly, New
`York law governs this summary judgment motion.
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`8
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`Case 1:18-cv-09052-PAC Document 67 Filed 03/10/21 Page 9 of 14
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`earlier, on May 22, 2018. (Pls.’ Opp. Br. at 13–15; see General Release at 1.) Second,
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`Washington asserts that the General Release is voidable because she was mentally incapacitated
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`when she signed the agreement. (Id. at 11–12.) For the reasons that follow, both arguments
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`must be rejected.
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`A. Ambiguity (or Scrivener’s Error)
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`Given that the Lift Procedure took place on May 22, 2018 but the General Release
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`reflects June 22, 2018 as the date of operation, the parties dispute whether this presents (a)
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`ambiguity (thereby defeating summary judgment) or (b) a scrivener’s error (which lends itself to
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`equitable reformation). The Court concludes scrivener’s error.
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`“In contract law, a scrivener’s error, like a mutual mistake, occurs when the intention of
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`the parties is identical at the time of the transaction but the written agreement does not express
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`that intention because of that error; this permits a court acting in equity to reform an agreement.”
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`Wilton Reassurance Life Co. of New York v. Smith, No. 12-CV-5131 SLT VMS, 2015 WL
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`631973, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2015) (cleaned up). “Where there is no mistake about the
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`agreement and the only mistake alleged is in the reduction of that agreement to writing, such
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`mistake of the scrivener, or of either party, no matter how it occurred, may be corrected.” Born
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`v. Schrenkeisen, 17 N.E. 339, 341 (1888); see 82-90 Broadway Realty Corp. v. New York
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`Supermarket, Inc., 62 N.Y.S.3d 186, 188 (2017) (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2017).
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`Applying these principles, the Court finds the June 22, 2018 date on the General Release
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`to be a scrivener’s error subject to equitable reformation. Born, 17 N.E. at 341; 82-90
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`Broadway, 62 N.Y.S.3d at 188. There is no dispute that when the General Release was executed,
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`the parties intended the Lift Procedure to be the subject of the release agreement. (See
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`Washington Dep. 26:3–28:5; Perkins Br. at 8–9, ECF 65.) Moreover, there is no dispute that the
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`9
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`Case 1:18-cv-09052-PAC Document 67 Filed 03/10/21 Page 10 of 14
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`parties, at the time, understood the Lift Procedure to have occurred on May 22, 2018, not June
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`22, 2018. (Pls.’ Stmt. 56.1 ¶ 13.) Plaintiff’s amended complaint dated November 13, 2018
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`alleges “On or about May 22, 2018, Perkins performed buttox” surgery. (Amended Complaint p.
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`21.) Accordingly, the parties made no mistake about the nature of their agreement; “the only
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`mistake [was] in the reduction of that agreement to writing,” Born, 17 N.E. at 341, which is the
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`common law definition of a scrivener’s error. See id.; see also 82-90 Broadway, 62 N.Y.S.3d at
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`188. Hence, because New York law permits scrivener’s errors to be equitably reformed to honor
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`the original intentions of the contracting parties, the Court concludes that reformation is
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`appropriate. Born, 17 N.E. at 341. The General Release’s date term shall be reformed to read:
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`May 22, 2018.9
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`B.
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`Mental Incapacitation
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`Washington raises one other argument against the General Release’s validity: that she
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`was mentally incapacitated when she signed the General Release. Recall that Washington
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`underwent remedial surgery at Miami Valley Hospital in Ohio on June 20, 2018—around the
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`same time she contacted Goals about a refund and shortly before the General Release was
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`executed on June 29. See supra 3-4. Following her remedial surgery, Washington alleges that
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`she was under the heavy influence of prescription drugs and therefore mentally incompetent to
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`9 As a fallback position, Washington argues that the General Release is unambiguous and so, extrinsic evidence
`demonstrating the existence of a scrivener’s error cannot be considered. (Pls.’ Opp. Br. at 14–15.) The Court is
`unpersuaded. First, this argument entirely contradicts Washington’s main position that the General Release is
`ambiguous and therefore that the enforceability of the General Release should not be resolved on summary
`judgment. (Pls.’ Opp. Br. at 13.) Second, New York law erects no barrier to the consideration of extrinsic evidence
`in identifying a scrivener’s error. See 82-90 Broadway Realty Corp. v. New York Supermarket, Inc., 62 N.Y.S.3d
`186, 188 (2017) (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2017) (“Where there is no mistake about the agreement and the only
`mistake alleged is in the reduction of that agreement to writing, such mistake of the scrivener, or of either party, no
`matter how it occurred, may be corrected.”). Accordingly, this alternative position must be rejected.
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`10
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`Case 1:18-cv-09052-PAC Document 67 Filed 03/10/21 Page 11 of 14
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`sign the General Release.
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`In New York, “[C]ontracts of a mentally incompetent person who has not been
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`adjudicated insane are voidable.” Ortelere v. Teachers' Ret. Bd. of City of New York, 25 N.Y.2d
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`196, 202 (1969). But, prima facie, the “capacity to contract is presumed.” DuFort, 818 F. Supp.
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`at 583 (discussing New York law). Accordingly, the burden is on the “party asserting
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`incompetence [to] prove that status at the time of the disputed transaction,” which is an
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`“extremely heavy burden.” Id. (cleaned up). To meet that burden, a party must prove (1) that
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`“the mind was so affected as to render him wholly and absolutely incompetent to comprehend
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`and understand the nature of the transaction,” Ortelere, 25 N.Y.2d at 202–03, and (2) that the
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`other contracting party “knew or should have known of his condition.” Id. at 205; see DuFort,
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`818 F. Supp. at 582.
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`Applying the summary judgment standard, the Court concludes that no reasonable jury
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`“could return a verdict” for Washington on either of these elements. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–
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`48. First, Plaintiff comes forward with scant proof that her “mind was so affected” as to render
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`her “wholly and absolutely incompetent to comprehend and understand the nature of the”
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`General Release. Ortelere, 25 N.Y.2d at 202–03. The following captures the entirety of
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`Washington’s factual allegations on this element:
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`Plaintiff testified that on June 29th that she was heavily medicated with narcotics and
`could not drive. She does not remember signing the release or being in the presence of a
`notary while signing the instrument. Plaintiff’s understanding of the document is that she
`was “getting my money refunded.” She did not have an understanding that by signing the
`document, she was giving up her right to file any lawsuit against GOALS. Plaintiff did
`not read the release until she consulted an attorney six [6] months later. Simply,
`plaintiff’s injuries were grewsome and extremely painful requiring mind-altering
`narcotics.
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`(Pls.’ Opp. Br. at 11.)
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`The Court finds these allegations fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact appropriate for
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`Case 1:18-cv-09052-PAC Document 67 Filed 03/10/21 Page 12 of 14
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`trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Put simply, these allegations are
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`bereft of factual support and amount to nothing more than Plaintiff’s bare claim that she does not
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`recall reading or signing the General Release. (Pls.’ Opp. Br. at 11.) That kind of proof cannot
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`overcome the evidentiary hurdle called for by summary judgment. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
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`322. The keys to a trial in federal court may be liberally given, but they are not free. Anderson,
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`477 U.S. at 252 (recognizing that “a scintilla of evidence” is insufficient to defeat summary
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`judgment).
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`Moreover, the Court finds at least three undisputed facts on the record that support the
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`contrary proposition that Washington was mentally competent when she signed the General
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`Release: (1) It was Washington who initiated contact with Goals about receiving a refund and
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`she who meticulously scanned photographs of her injuries and sent them to Goals in support of
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`her claim for a refund (see, e.g., Washington Dep. 19:3; Call Logs); (2) Before signing the
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`General Release, Washington was aided by a close friend who helped her “understand what she
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`was signing and ensure that all documents were executed to obtain a refund” (Pls.’ Stmt. 56.1 ¶
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`9); and (3) Washington executed the General Release before a notary public who certified that
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`her signature was “her voluntary act and deed.” (See id. ¶ 12; General Release at 2.) Thus, in
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`considering these facts in tandem, the Court is further persuaded that “no reasonable jury could
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`return a verdict” for Washington. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
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`at 587.
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`Second, even if a reasonable jury could find mental incapacitation, summary judgment
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`must still be granted because Washington is unable to meet the second element of her mental
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`incompetency defense: that the Defendants knew or should have known about her condition
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`when she signed the General Release. DuFort, 818 F. Supp. at 582. At her deposition, Plaintiff
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`Case 1:18-cv-09052-PAC Document 67 Filed 03/10/21 Page 13 of 14
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`conceded that she did not tell the Defendants that she was under the influence of prescription
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`drugs at any point. (Washington Dep. 23:3–6.) The Defendants were therefore not on actual
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`notice of her mental incapacity. DuFort, 818 F. Supp. at 582. Nor should they have known
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`about her condition, given the fact that it was Washington who initially reached out to them
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`about a refund and she who voluntarily agreed to sign the General Release. Id. All in all, the
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`Court concludes that Plaintiff’s mental incapacity defense must be rejected.10
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`C.
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`The General Release Is Enforceable
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`Because Plaintiff’s objections to the General Release are unavailing, the Court must
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`enforce the General Release as written. Centro Empresarial, 17 N.Y.3d at 276. The terms of the
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`General Release are pellucid: they release the Defendants from any potential liability arising
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`from the Lift Procedure. (See General Release at 1.) Accordingly, summary judgment must be
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`granted with respect to the Plaintiff’s lawsuit.
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`CONCLUSION
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`The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The remaining discovery motions in
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`this case are DISMISSED as moot.11
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`The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate this case.
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`10 In Ortelere v. Teachers’ Retirement Board of City of New York, 25 N.Y.2d at 196, the New York Court of
`Appeals did opine in dicta that the knowledge requirement of a mental incapacitation defense could be modified or
`done away with on equitable grounds. Id. at 370 (explaining that “a court may grant relief on such equitable terms
`as the situation requires”). The Court, however, does not find it appropriate to exercise this equitable authority in
`the present case. Nor does it find doing so would make any difference in view of the fact that Washington cannot
`meet the first requirement of her mental incompetency defense.
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`11 As recounted above, Washington has received only $5,750 of the $6,095 that was promised by Goals under the
`terms of the General Release. See supra 5 n. 6. Because Washington has not pled a breach of contract claim for the
`outstanding balance, the Court cannot sua sponte order the remaining amount to be paid. Nevertheless, the Court
`urges the Defendants to make good on their promise to remit the remaining amount to Washington.
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`Case 1:18-cv-09052-PAC Document 67 Filed 03/10/21 Page 14 of 14
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`Dated: New York, New York
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`March 10, 2021
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`SO ORDERED
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`________________________
`PAUL A. CROTTY
`United States District Judge
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