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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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`CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-cv-9879 (AJN)
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`MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT
`OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
`DISMISS
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`E.G., individually and as parent and natural
`guardian of A.I. and L.I., minor children;
`M.M., individually and as parent and natural
`guardian of E.H., L.H., Ev.P., and E.P.,
`minor children; O.M., individually and as
`parent and natural guardian of A.M., a minor
`child; and COALITION FOR THE
`HOMELESS, on behalf of themselves and
`all others similarly situated,
`
`
`
`
`
`THE CITY OF NEW YORK; NEW YORK
`CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION;
`RICHARD A. CARRANZA, as Chancellor of
`the New York City Department of Education;
`NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF
`SOCIAL SERVICES; STEVEN BANKS, as
`Commissioner of the New York City
`Department of Social Services; NEW YORK
`CITY DEPARTMENT OF HOMELESS
`SERVICES; JOSLYN CARTER, as
`Administrator of the New York City
`Department of Homeless Services; NEW
`YORK CITY HUMAN RESOURCES
`ADMINISTRATION; GARY JENKINS as
`Administrator of the New York City Human
`Resources Administration; NEW YORK
`CITY DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION
`TECHNOLOGY AND
`TELECOMMUNICATIONS; and JESSICA
`TISCH, as Commissioner of the New York
`City Department of Information Technology
`and Telecommunications,,
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`
`
`Defendants.
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`Case 1:20-cv-09879-AJN-DCF Document 61-1 Filed 01/24/21 Page 2 of 31
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`PRELIMINARY STATEMENT…………………………………………………...1
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` FACTS ....................................................................................................................... 3
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`
`I. The COVID-19 Pandemic Caused a Seismic Shift in Education in New York
`City From In- Person to Remote Learning Beginning March 2020……………3
`II. The Named Plaintiffs……………………………………………………………5
`
`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 5
`
`I. LEGAL STANDARD…………………………………………………………..5
`II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE GRANTED
`BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS’ FEDERAL CLAIMS FAIL AS A MATTER OF
`LAW AND THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO EXERCISE
`SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER THE STATE LAW CLAIMS…...5
`A. Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Clause Claim Fails As a Matter of Law .......... 6
`1. Plaintiffs Fail To Allege That Defendants Discriminate Between
`Different Classes of Citizens………………………………………….7
`2. Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged Any Definable Suspect Class…………...8
`3. Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged Violation of a Fundamental Right and
`Cannot Show That Heightened Standard of Review Applies……..…9
` 4. Plaintiffs' Claim Fails Under Either The Highly Deferential Rational
`Basis Review Or Heightened Scrutiny………………………………11
`B. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim Under the McKinney-Vento Act ..............12
`
` 1. Sections 11432(2) and 11432(d) Do Not Create Rights That Plaintiffs
`Can Enforce Either Through an Implied Private Right of Action or Through
`Section 1983………………………………………………………………..14
`2. The Amended Complaint Establishes That Defendants are Complying
`With the MVA………………………………………………………… 20
`C. The Court Should Decline to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over
`Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims ......................................................................21
` 1. The New York Education Law Section 3209 Claim Raises Novel and
`Complicated Issues of State Law That May Have Sweeping
`Implications for Local Governments and School Districts Across New
`York…………………………………………………………………22
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`- ii -
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`Case 1:20-cv-09879-AJN-DCF Document 61-1 Filed 01/24/21 Page 3 of 31
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`2. The Education Article Claim Should Be Dismissed, But at a Minimum
`Raises a Question of First Impression About the New York
`Constitution…………………………………………………………….23
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`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................26
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`- iii -
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Cases
`42 U.S.C. § 11432 ............................................................................................................. 13, 14, 16
`Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) .......................................................................... 16, 18
`Aristy-Farer v. State of New York, 29 N.Y.3d 501 (NY 2017)............................................... 23, 25
`Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673 (2012)..................................................................... 6
`Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320 (2015) ................................................. 19
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ........................................................................................... 5
`Backer ex rel. Freedman v. Shah, 788 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 2015) ................................................... 16
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) ................................................................... 5
`Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997) .................................................. 15, 16, 17, 18
`Bradway v. Gonzales, 26 F.3d 313, 317-18 (2d Cir. 1994) ............................................................ 6
`California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981) ........................................................................... 16
`Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307 (NY 1995) ................................................. 24
`Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York, 100 N.Y.2d 893 (NY 2003) ................. 24
`City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) ................................................... 12
`Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) ................................................................. 6
`Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African-American-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1015 (2020)
`................................................................................................................................................... 15
`Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) ............................................................................... 12
`Davis v. Shah, 821 F.3d 231, 246 (2d Cir. 2016) ......................................................................... 17
`Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) ........................... 9
`Edelman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 83 F.3d 68 (3d Cir. 1996) ........................................................ 12
`Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008) .................................................................... 8
`FCC v. Beach Comm'ns, 508 U.S. 307 (1993) ............................................................................. 11
`Franza v. Carey, 518 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ..................................................................... 7
`Fullwood v. Vosper, No. 9:99CV1586, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1840 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2007) .... 7
`Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002) ............................................................ 15, 16, 19
`Immaculate Heart Cent. Sch. v. N.Y. State Pub. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 797 F. Supp. 2d 204
`(N.D.N.Y. 2011) ....................................................................................................................... 12
`Jackson v. Roeman Real Estate Co., 787 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1986) ................................................ 7
`Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2000) ................................................................ 9
`Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988) ............................................................ 6, 10
`Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992) .......................................................... 9
`Lampkin v. District of Columbia, 27 F.3d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ............................................ 13, 17
`Maldonado v. George Weston Bakeries, 441 F. App’x 808 (2d Cir. 2011) ................................... 8
`Manbeck v. Katonah-Lewisboro Sch. Dist., 435 F. Supp. 2d 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ..................... 10
`McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2007) ............................................. 5
`McCoy v. Richards, 771 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1985) ........................................................................ 7
`McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) ................................................................................. 8
`Melrose Credit Union v. City of New York, 247 F. Supp. 3d 356 (S.D.N.Y. March 30, 2017).... 11
`Mo., K. & T. R. Co. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642 (1914) ......................................................................... 7
`Morse v. Univ. of Vt., 973 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1992) ...................................................................... 23
`New York Citizens’ Coal. for Children v. Poole, 922 F.3d 69, 78 (2d Cir. 2019) ........................ 15
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`- iv -
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`N.J. v. New York, 872 F. Supp. 2d 204 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) ............................................................. 18
`N.Y. Civ. Liberties Union v. State, 4 N.Y.3d 175 (NY 2005) ........................................... 23, 24, 25
`Nat’l Law Ctr. on Homelessness & Poverty v. New York, 224 F.R.D. 314 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) ...... 17
`National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty v. New York, 224 F.R.D. 314 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
`............................................................................................................................................. 10, 13
`Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2007) ................................................................................ 8
`Paynter v. State, 100 N.Y.2d 434 (2003) ................................................................................ 23, 24
`Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1981) ...................................... 15
`Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)........................................................................................... 6, 10
`Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today v. Cuomo, 86 N.Y.2d 279 (1995) ....................................... 23
`S.C. v. Riverview Gardens Sch. Dist., No. 18-cv-04162-NKL, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29282
`(W.D.Mo. Feb. 25, 2019), ......................................................................................................... 18
`San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973 .................................. 10
`Seabrook v. Jacobson, 153 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1998)....................................................................... 21
`Turner v. E. Meadow Sch. Dist., No. 07-CV-4318 (JS)(AKT), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29524
`(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009) ......................................................................................................... 10
`United States v. Williams, No. 02 C 4990, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9988(N.D. Ill. June 10, 2003) 7
`Valencia v. Sung M. Lee, 316 F.3d 299 (2d Cir. 2003) ............................................................ 6, 21
`Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) ................................ 9
`Wallace v. New York, 40 F. Supp. 3d 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) ........................................................... 9
`Wallers v. United States, 847 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1988) ................................................................ 8
`Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1985) ........................................................ 6
`Statutes
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1367 .................................................................................................................... passim
`42 U.S.C. § 1132-33 ..................................................................................................................... 13
`42 U.S.C. § 11431 ............................................................................................................... 6, 14, 16
`42 U.S.C. § 1983 ............................................................................................................. 2, 6, 15, 19
`Article XI § 1 of the New York Constitution ................................................................................. 6
`Equal Protection Clause .................................................................................................. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)……………………………………………………….1,5
`McKinney-Vento Act............................................................................................................. passim
`New York Constitution Education Article .................................................................... 2, 23, 24, 25
`New York Education Law § 3209 ................................................................................ 1, 2, 3, 6, 22
`
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`- v -
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`Case 1:20-cv-09879-AJN-DCF Document 61-1 Filed 01/24/21 Page 6 of 31
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`Defendants the City of New York (the “City”), the New York City Department of
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`Education (“DOE”), Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education Richard A.
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`Carranza, the New York City Department of Social Services (“DSS”), Commissioner of DSS
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`Steven Banks, the New York City Department of Homeless Services (“DHS”), Administrator of
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`DHS Joslyn Carter, the New York City Human Resources Administration (“HRA”),
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`Administrator of HRA Gary Jenkins, the New York City Department of Information Technology
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`and Telecommunications (“DoITT”), and Commissioner of DoITT Jessica Tisch (collectively
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`“Defendants”) move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter
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`jurisdiction and failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
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`PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
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`Through this class action complaint, Plaintiffs, who include three parents of school-aged
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`children who currently reside in City shelters, claim Defendants are legally obligated to provide
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`them with a WiFi connection in their residences in order for their children to participate in
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`remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic. This Court’s Order dated December 30, 2020
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`(the “Order”) held that Plaintiffs had stated a claim that Defendants’ failure to provide reliable
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`internet access to date violates New York Education Law § 3209, but did not address the
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`sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ federal law claims. Those federal law claims fail as a matter of law and,
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`pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) and (c)(3), the Court should decline to exercise supplemental
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`jurisdiction over the remaining claims, which raise novel and complicated issues of state law.
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`First, Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United
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`Stated Constitution must be dismissed because Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to establish that
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`Defendants’ actions have created any classification. Although Plaintiffs allege that homeless
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`children are not receiving the same access to free public education as non-homeless children,
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`they do not allege that Defendants are providing WiFi or internet access to non-homeless
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`children or have otherwise treated homeless students differently from non-homeless students.
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`Indeed the Amended Complaint acknowledges Defendants’ delivery of technology and services
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`to provide all students – including students in shelter – access to remote learning, including by
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`providing cellular internet service-enabled iPads and hotline support for technical assistance.
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`Further, for students residing in shelter, as the Amended Complaint concedes, Defendants are
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`currently installing WiFi in shelters, which Plaintiffs do not allege Defendants are providing to
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`non-homeless children. Recognizing an equal protection claim under these circumstances would
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`stretch the case law beyond recognition. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim also
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`fails because the Amended Complaint does not establish that Defendants are discriminating
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`against a suspect class or burdening a fundamental right, and Defendants actions satisfy the
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`highly deferential rational basis review (or even heightened scrutiny).
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`Second, Plaintiffs’ other claim under federal law—that Defendants violate provisions of
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`the McKinney-Vento Act (“MVA”) —fares no better. Plaintiffs have no right of action to
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`enforce the provisions of the MVA they allege Defendants violate, either directly under the
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`statute or under Section 1983. In any event, Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants provided
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`Plaintiffs with iPads equipped with unlimited cellular data service and are in the process of
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`installing WiFi in shelters demonstrate that Defendants are in compliance with the MVA.
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`Because both federal claims should be dismissed, the Court should decline to exercise
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`supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims under § 1367(c)(3). The Court should
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`also decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to § 1367(c)(1) because both claims
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`raise complex and novel questions of state law. Neither the New York Constitution Education
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`Article (“Education Article”) nor New York Education Law (“NYEL”) § 3209 references WiFi
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`or internet access. Furthermore, first, the potential broadening of NYEL § 3209(6)(b) and (7) to
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`2
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`Case 1:20-cv-09879-AJN-DCF Document 61-1 Filed 01/24/21 Page 8 of 31
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`require local school districts across New York to provide WiFi or internet access not only to
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`students in shelter but to “all indigent children;” second, the prospective expansion of a state
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`constitutional claim, beyond the contours of the claim developed through existing Court of
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`Appeals case law; and third, principles of federalism and comity all dictate declining
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`supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.1
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`FACTS2
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`The COVID-19 Pandemic Caused a Seismic Shift in Education in New York
`City From In-Person to Remote Learning Beginning March 2020
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`In or around December 2019, the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 began spreading an
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`I.
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`
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`acute respiratory disease, COVID-19, in various locations around the world. Am. Compl. ¶ 31.
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`COVID-19 has spread to hundreds of countries and territories; millions have contracted the
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`disease, and more than 550,000 people globally have died. Id. On January 31, 2020, the United
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`States government declared the COVID-19 outbreak a public emergency. Am. Compl. ¶ 32.
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`On March 15, 2020, Mayor de Blasio announced the closure of New York City public
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`school buildings in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Am. Compl. ¶ 34. More than one
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`million students in the City’s public schools were required to continue their education remotely
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`because of the virus. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 34. In March 2020, DOE distributed over 300,000
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`devices to New York City students, including those residing in shelters, who did not have a
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`device at home to allow them to attend class virtually. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37, 44, 47, 51-52. DOE
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`1Both state law claims should also be dismissed on the merits. Although the Court held in its
`Order that Plaintiffs sufficiently state a claim under NYEL § 3209 to proceed to a preliminary
`injunction hearing, discussed more fully below, infra at Section II.C, Defendants incorporate
`their arguments made in their Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction Motion (Dkt. No.
`32) that this claim fails as a matter of law to preserve the issue for appeal.
`2 These facts are the allegations of the Amended Complaint. Defendants do not concede that the
`allegations are true and reserve their right to dispute the facts.
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`3
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`also contracted with T-Mobile, a provider of cellular technology services, to equip the devices
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`with cellular plans that would enable them to connect to the internet. Am. Compl. ¶ 38.
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`Plaintiffs allege that reports emerged that children residing in shelters were unable to
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`access remote classes because of T-Mobile cellular service “dead zones” or insufficiently robust
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`T-Mobile cellular coverage resulting in spotty internet service and difficulty accessing existing
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`WiFi networks at the shelters. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 41-42. To assist students and parents with
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`technical support, DOE arranged for a support hotline. Am. Compl. ¶ 42.
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`In July 2020, Mayor de Blasio announced that the City’s public schools would not fully
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`open for the 2020-2021 school year, but there would instead be a “blended” learning option. Am.
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`Compl. ¶ 66. Families could choose whether their children would attend fully remote learning or
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`a blended program where the children would spend one to three days a week at school and attend
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`remotely for the rest of the week. Id. On September 16, 2020, the school year began remotely for
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`all children. Am. Compl.¶ 74. On October 1, 2020, all public school students who opted for the
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`blended program were able to attend in-person classes. Am. Compl. ¶ 74. The City’s blended
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`learning program was subject to a caveat – if the percentage of positive COVID-19 tests in New
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`York City exceeded 3% using a 7-day rolling average, schools would close and return to fully
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`remote learning. Am. Compl. ¶ 70. On November 18, 2020, this threshold was reached; New
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`York City public schools switched to fully remote learning the next day. Id.
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`
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` On October 26, 2020, weeks before the return to all remote learning, the Mayor
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`instructed City agencies to install WiFi at the City’s homeless shelters. Am. Compl. ¶ 81. Forty-
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`eight hours later, Defendants outlined the City’s plan for installing WiFi at shelters, with the
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`aggressive goal of completing 27 priority sites in the winter and the entire WiFi installation
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`project by the summer of 2021. Am. Compl. ¶ 83.
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`4
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`II.
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`The Named Plaintiffs
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`
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`Plaintiffs E.G., M.M., and O.M. are the parents of children who attend DOE schools, and
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`they and their children live in shelters in the City (the “Named Plaintiffs”). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14-
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`16. All of the school aged children of the Named Plaintiffs are attending school remotely
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`because of family health concerns related to COVID-19. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14-16, 43, 48, 50. All
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`of Named Plaintiffs’ children have received cellular internet service-enabled iPads from DOE.
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`Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44, 47, 51. Plaintiff E.G. lives at a shelter that has WiFi, but the service does not
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`consistently cover the needs in the family’s living space. Am. Compl. ¶ 44. Plaintiffs M.M. and
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`O.M. allege that they live at shelters that do not have WiFi. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47, 51. The Named
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`Plaintiffs all assert that they have not been able to consistently connect to the internet using the
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`DOE-provided iPads. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45, 47, 51-52.
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`ARGUMENT
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`I.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
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`On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint are accepted as
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`true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor. McCarthy v. Dun &
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`Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). A complaint “must contain sufficient factual
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`matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
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`556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
`
`II.
`
`DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE
`PLAINTIFFS’ FEDERAL CLAIMS FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW AND THE
`COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL
`JURISDICTION OVER THE STATE LAW CLAIMS
`
`Plaintiffs allege that by failing to provide internet access to homeless students,
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`Defendants have violated the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (1) the Equal
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`Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; (2) the MVA, 42
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`5
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`Case 1:20-cv-09879-AJN-DCF Document 61-1 Filed 01/24/21 Page 11 of 31
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`U.S.C. 11431 et seq; (3) New York State Education Law § 3209; and (4) Article XI § 1 of the
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`New York Constitution.3 Because the federal claims fail as a matter of law, the Court should
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`decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over both state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. §
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`1367(c)(1) and (c)(3); see also Valencia v. Sung M. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 305-308 (2d Cir. 2003).
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`
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`A. Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Clause Claim Fails As a Matter of Law
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`The Equal Protection Clause provides that “no State shall ‘deny to any person within its
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`jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons
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`similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
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`432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)); see also Yale Auto Parts, Inc.
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`v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1985) (“[a]bsent a claim that the [policy or practice] is
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`unconstitutional on its face . . . plaintiffs must allege and show that the defendants intentionally
`
`treated the[m] . . . differently from other[s] [that are] similar[ly situated]”). “Unless
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`governmental action provokes ‘strict judicial scrutiny’ because it interferes with a ‘fundamental
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`right’ or discriminates against a ‘suspect class,’ it will ordinarily survive an equal protection
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`attack so long as the challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental
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`purpose.” Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1988).
`
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`3 Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim, premised on Defendants’ alleged violations of the Equal
`Protection Clause and the MVA, must be dismissed because those federal claims fail as a matter
`of law. See infra Section II.A-B. Additionally, the individually named defendants are entitled to
`qualified immunity because they committed no violations of any “clearly established” rights, and
`“it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that their acts did not violate [any alleged]
`rights.” Bradway v. Gonzales, 26 F.3d 313, 317-18 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal citations and
`quotations omitted). Reliable access to WiFi or internet is not delineated in the MVA, and it was
`certainly reasonable for the individually named defendants to believe their actions, including
`providing cellular internet service and installing WiFi, did not violate any law. See infra Section
`II.B. Additionally, Plaintiffs request declaratory judgment stating that Defendants have violated
`these laws. Because these substantive constitutional and statutory claims should be dismissed,
`the request for declaratory relief should be denied.
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`6
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`Here, the Equal Protection claim must be dismissed because Plaintiffs fail to allege that
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`Defendants have created a classification by intentionally treating them differently from others
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`that are similarly situated. This failure is fatal. The Amended Complaint also fails to establish
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`that Defendants discriminate against a suspect class or violate a fundamental right, and
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`Defendants’ actions easily satisfy the highly deferential rational basis review that must be
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`applied to Defendants’ policies regarding remote learning and the provision of benefits during a
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`pandemic. Thus, Defendant's motion to dismiss the Equal Protection claim must be granted.
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`1. Plaintiffs Fail To Allege That Defendants Discriminate Between Different
`Classes of Citizens
`
`An equal protection claim requires Plaintiffs to allege that a defendant discriminates
`
`
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`between different classes of citizens; without such a classification, there is no claim. See Mo., K.
`
`& T. R. Co. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642, 649-50 (1914) (“There is here no classification . . . ; the act
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`bears equally against individuals and against corporations of any class doing business in the State
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`. . . [without] discrimination between different citizens or classes of citizens” and “does not
`
`render the statute repugnant to the ‘equal protection’ clause.”); Jackson v. Roeman Real Estate
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`Co., 787 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1986) (“[the law] makes no classification, and, therefore, the court
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`[action] under that section does not violate the Equal Protection Clause”); Franza v. Carey, 518
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`F. Supp. 324, 330 n.10. (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same result)4. Plaintiffs must allege a class that is
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`treated differently from and “disfavored in comparison with similarly situated [persons].”
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`4 See also Fullwood v. Vosper, No. 9:99CV1586, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1840, at *18 (N.D.N.Y.
`Jan. 9, 2007) (where plaintiff “not only fails to identify a protected classification, [but] fails to
`identify any classification . . . [the] complaint does not state a cognizable equal protection claim .
`. . [and] this claim will be dismissed”); United States v. Williams, No. 02 C 4990, 2003 U.S. Dist.
`LEXIS 9988, at *12 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 2003) (“Even the deferential ‘rational basis’ scrutiny that
`is applied to ordinary government classifications is not appropriate when the challenged law
`creates no classifications.”) (citing McCoy v. Richards, 771 F.2d 1108, 1112 (7th Cir. 1985)).
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`7
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`
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`Case 1:20-cv-09879-AJN-DCF Document 61-1 Filed 01/24/21 Page 13 of 31
`
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`Wallers v. United States, 847 F.2d 1279, 1281-82 (7th Cir. 1988) (the court was “not persuaded
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`that [the group denied tax exemption] suffer[ed] a real disadvantage in relation to [another group
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`receiving the tax exemption]); see also Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008)
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`(quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961)) (“Our equal protection jurisprudence
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`has typically been concerned with governmental classifications that ‘affect some groups of
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`citizens differently than others.’”).
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`Plaintiffs acknowledge that Defendants have provided students in shelters several
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`benefits and services to enable them to access remote learning that are similar to the benefits and
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`services provided to students who are not residing in shelters, including providing students in
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`shelters with internet-enabled iPads with unlimited data service and hotline technology support
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`to address technology issues. Plaintiffs also acknowledge that Defendants have embarked on a
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`project to install WiFi at shelters. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 60. Defendants cannot be disfavoring
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`plaintiffs by providing them the same services and benefits provided to other students, and, in
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`addition, providing them the further benefit of WiFi installation. To the extent that Plaintiffs
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`allege that Defendants should have installed WiFi at shelters sooner or more quickly,
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`Defendants’ actions have not created a classification within the meaning of equal protection
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`jurisdiction and Plaintiffs do not state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Thus,
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`“dismissal is . . . appropriate [because] the plaintiffs ‘fail[ ] to allege even the basic elements of a
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`discriminatory action claim[.]’” Maldonado v. George Weston Bakeries, 441 F. App’x 808, 809
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`(2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 & n.3 (2d Cir. 2007)).
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`
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`2. Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged Any Definable Suspect Class.
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`Even if the Court found that Defendants’ actions create a classification, Plaintiffs have
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`not alleged any definable suspect class. The Supreme Court has held that wealth is not a suspect
`
`8
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`
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`Case 1:20-cv-09879-AJN-DCF Document 61-1 Filed 01/24/21 Page 14 of 31
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`class. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 458 (declining to define suspect classification based on wealth).
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`Neither is homelessness. See Wallace v. New York, 40 F. Supp. 3d 278, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)
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`(“homeless sex offenders[]do not constitute a suspect classification”) (emphasis in original); see
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`also Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Homeless persons are not a
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`suspect class”); Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1269 n.36 (3d Cir. 1992) (same).To
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`the extent Plaintiffs attempt to allege a disparate impact theory, as where they allege that Black
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`and Hispanic/LatinX students are disproportionately represented in the City’s shelter system,
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`Am. Compl. ¶ 69, overrepresentation of a protected class in a population on its own is
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`insufficient to state an equal protection claim. See Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ.
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`of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1915-16 (2020) (“Were this fact [that a racial or ethnic group makes up