Case 1:22-cv-05183 Document 1 Filed 06/21/22 Page 1 of 22
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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`
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`Case No.:
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`COLLECTIVE AND CLASS ACTION
`COMPLAINT AND
`JURY TRIAL
`DEMAND
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`ELIZABETH BERRY, individually and on
`behalf of all similarly situated individuals,
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`
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`Plaintiff,
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`MEDIACOM COMMUNICATIONS
`CORPORATION,
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`
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`Defendant.
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`COMES NOW Plaintiff, ELIZABETH BERRY by and through her undersigned attorneys,
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`and hereby brings this Collective and Class Action Complaint against Defendant, MEDIACOM
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`COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, and states as follows:
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`INTRODUCTION
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`1.
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`This is a class and collective action brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and all
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`similarly situated current and/or former Customer Service Representative employees of Defendant
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`to recover for Defendant’s willful violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C.
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`§§ 201, et seq., Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law (“WPCL”), Iowa Code § 91a.1, et seq., and
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`alleged contractual obligations (or unjust enrichment if no contract is found), and other appropriate
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`rules, regulations, statutes, and ordinances.
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`2.
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`The U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) recognizes that call center jobs, like those
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`held by Plaintiff in Defendant’s call center locations, are homogenous and issued guidance to alert
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`and condemn an employer’s non-payment of an employee’s necessary boot-up activities. See DOL
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`Fact Sheet #64, attached hereto as Exhibit A at 2 (“An example of the first principal activity of
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`the day for agents/specialists/representatives working in call centers includes starting the computer
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`to download work instructions, computer applications and work-related emails.”) Additionally, the
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`FLSA requires that “[a] daily or weekly record of all hours worked, including time spent in pre-
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`shift and post-shift job-related activities must be kept.” Id.
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`3.
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`Defendant subjected Plaintiff, and those similarly situated, to Defendant’s policy
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`and practice of failing to compensate its call center employees for their necessary boot-up time,
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`which resulted in the failure to properly compensate them as required under applicable federal and
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`state laws.
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`4.
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`Plaintiff seeks a declaration that her rights, the rights of the FLSA Collective Class,
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`and the rights of the Rule 23 Classes were violated and seek to recover an award of unpaid wages
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`and overtime premiums, liquidated damages, penalties, injunctive and declaratory relief, attorneys’
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`fees and costs, pre- and post-judgment interest, and any other remedies to which they may be
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`entitled.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`5.
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`This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s FLSA claims pursuant to
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`28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiff’s claims arise under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq.
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`6.
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`This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s FLSA claim pursuant to
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`29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which provides that suits under the FLSA “may be maintained against any
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`employer . . . in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction.”
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`7.
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`This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant
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`to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because these claims arise from a common set of operative facts and are so
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`related to the claims within this Court’s original jurisdiction that they form a part of the same case
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`or controversy.
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`8.
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`Upon information and belief, Defendant’s annual sales exceed $500,000 and they
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`have more than two employees, so the FLSA applies in this case on an enterprise basis. See 29
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`U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A).
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`9.
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`Defendant’s employees, including Plaintiff, engage in interstate commerce—
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`including, but not limited to utilizing telephone lines and Internet—and therefore, they are also
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`covered by the FLSA on an individual basis.
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`10.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because it maintains offices in
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`the State of New York.
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`11.
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`Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because Defendant
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`resides within this District.
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`PARTIES
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`12.
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`Plaintiff is an individual who resides in the County of Polk, City of West Des
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`Moines, Iowa. Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a Customer Service Representative and executed
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`her Consent to Sue form, attached hereto as Exhibit B.
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`13.
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`Defendant is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New
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`York.
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`14.
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`Defendant operates customer service call center locations in Delaware, Florida,
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`Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, and Minnesota.
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`15.
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`Defendant is a national cable provider to residential and commercial customers. See
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`Job Postings, attached here to as Exhibit C.
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`16.
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`Defendant may accept service via its registered agent CT Corporation System, 28
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`Liberty Street, New York, NY 10005.
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`GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
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`17.
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`Defendant employed Plaintiff as an hourly call center Customer Service
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`Representative (“CSR”). Defendant assigns CSRs, like Plaintiff, to answer customer calls from
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`Defendant’s clients.
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`18.
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`Plaintiff’s primary job duties included answering calls from Defendant’s clients,
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`retaining customers, providing troubleshooting guidance, and resolving customer issues and
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`billing inquiries.
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`19.
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`Throughout Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Plaintiff regularly worked at
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`least 40 hours per workweek.
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`20.
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`Regardless of whether Defendant scheduled Plaintiff to work a workweek totaling
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`under 40 hours, a workweek totaling 40 hours, or a workweek totaling in excess of 40 hours,
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`Plaintiff regularly worked a substantial amount of time off-the-clock as part of her job duties as a
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`CSR. Defendant never compensated Plaintiff for this time worked off-the-clock.
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`21.
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`29 C.F.R. § 553.221 provides:
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`Compensable hours of work generally include all of the time during which an
`employee is on duty on the employer’s premises or at a prescribed workplace, as
`well as all other time during which the employee is suffered or permitted to work
`for the employer. Such time includes all pre-shift and post-shift activities which are
`an integral part of the employee’s principal activity or which are closely related to
`the performance of the principal activity, such as attending roll call, writing up and
`completing tickets or reports, and washing and re-racking fire hoses.
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`22.
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`29 C.F.R. § 790.8 states “[a]mong activities included as an integral part of a
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`principal activity are those closely related activities which are indispensable to its performance.”
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`A.
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`23.
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`Off-the-Clock Boot-up Work.
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`Defendant tasked Plaintiff with providing customer service to Defendant’s clients
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`by use of Defendant’s telephones, Defendant’s computers, and the programs accessible from
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`Defendant’s computers.
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`24.
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`To access Defendant’s systems, Plaintiff, and all other current and/or former CSRs,
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`must boot up their computers and log in to the various computer programs, servers, and
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`applications, and log in to Defendant’s phone systems in order to take their first call at their
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`scheduled shift start time prior to being paid. This boot-up procedure regularly takes up to 10
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`minutes per shift, or more if technical issues arise. Defendant did not compensate Plaintiff for this
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`time.
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`25.
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`Regardless of how long the boot-up and log-in process takes, Defendant did not
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`allow Plaintiff, and all other current and/or former CSRs, to clock in before the start of their
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`scheduled shift—and only after they completed the boot-up and log-in process.
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`26.
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`The boot-up procedure Plaintiff, and all other current and/or former CSRs, must
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`complete before they begin being compensated is the same regardless of which call center location
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`they worked at. The boot-up and log-in procedure is integral and indispensable to the performance
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`of Plaintiff’s principal job duties and integral and indispensable to Defendant’s business.
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`27.
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`Thus, the unpaid off-the-clock work performed by Plaintiff, and all other current
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`and/or former CSRs, directly benefits Defendant.
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`B.
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`Defendant’s Policy and Practice of Off-the-Clock Work Violates Federal and
`State Laws.
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`28.
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`At all times relevant, Defendant suffered or permitted Plaintiff, and all other current
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`and/or former CSRs, to routinely perform off-the-clock boot-up work by not compensating its
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`employees until after they completed the boot-up and login procedure.
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`29.
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`Defendant knew or should have known that it must pay its employees for all
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`compensable time throughout the workweek. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 553.221, 790.8, 785.19(a).
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`30.
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`Despite this, Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff, and all other current and/or
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`former CSRs, for their off-the-clock, compensable, boot-up work performed in any amount.
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`31.
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`Defendant knew, or should have known, that the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, requires
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`Defendant to compensate non-exempt employees who work in excess of 40 hours in a workweek
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`at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay—including the compensable, off-the-
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`clock, boot-up work performed.
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`32.
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`Despite this, Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff, and all other current and/or
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`former CSRs, for their off-the-clock compensable work performed in excess of 40 hours in a
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`workweek at one and one-half times their regular rates of pay.
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`33.
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`Plaintiff recalls regularly working at least 40 hours per week, if not over 40 hours
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`per week, throughout her employment with Defendant. However, the hours Defendant paid
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`Plaintiff did not include the boot-up work as alleged herein. Had Defendant properly paid Plaintiff
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`for all hours worked during this pay period, then it would have paid Plaintiff additional overtime
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`wages equal to the uncompensated boot-up work.
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`34.
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`Defendant is aware of each and every workweek Plaintiff was scheduled and
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`worked for more than 40 hours because Defendant’s own payroll records reflect the number of
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`hours it paid Plaintiff.
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`35.
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`Defendant is aware of Plaintiff’s regular hourly rate for each and every workweek
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`Plaintiff worked because Defendant’s own payroll records reflect the hourly rate it paid Plaintiff.
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`Plaintiff recalls her hourly rate at the end of her employment to be around $19.30 per hour.
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`36.
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`Defendant knew or should have known that Iowa wage and hour laws require an
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`employer to pay employees wages for each hour worked. See Iowa Code § 91A.8.
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`37.
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`Despite this, Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff, and all other current and/or
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`former hourly CSRs working in Defendant’s call center locations in Iowa for their compensable,
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`off-the-clock boot-up work performed in workweeks totaling less than 40 hours and in workweeks
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`totaling in excess of 40 hours at the proper legal rates, including overtime premiums.
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`38.
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`Defendant knew or should have known that Iowa wage and hour laws require an
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`employer to promptly pay employees for their earned wages. See Iowa Code § 91A.3.
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`39.
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`In reckless disregard of the FLSA and Iowa wage and hour laws, Defendant adopted
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`and then adhered to its policy, plan, or practice of employing Plaintiff, and all other current and/or
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`former CRSs, to perform compensable boot-up work off-the-clock. This illegal policy, plan, or
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`practice caused incorrect payments for all straight time and overtime performed by Plaintiff, and
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`all other current and/or former CSRs, in violation of the FLSA and Iowa wage and hour laws.
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`C.
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`40.
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`Recordkeeping.
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`The Iowa wage and hour laws require that “[o]n each regular payday, the employer
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`shall provide to each employee a statement showing the hours the employee worked, the wages
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`earned by the employee, and deductions made for the employee.” See Iowa Code § 91A.6.
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`41.
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`Further, 29 C.F.R § 516.1 subjects “every employer subject to any provisions of
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`the Fair Labor Standards Act” to maintain employee records.
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`42.
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`Federal regulations mandate each employer to maintain and preserve payroll or
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`other records containing, without limitation, the total hours worked by each employee each
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`workday and total hours worked by each employee each workweek. See 29 C.F.R § 516.2.
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`43.
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`Upon information and belief, Defendant failed to establish, maintain, and preserve
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`accurate timesheet and payroll records for all hours worked by Plaintiff as required by the FLSA
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`and Iowa wage and hour laws because it failed to include the off-the-clock boot-up time on
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`Plaintiff’s and all other current and/or former CSRs’ payroll records.
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`44. When the employer fails to keep accurate records of the hours worked by its
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`employees, the rule in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687–88 (1946)
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`controls. That rule states:
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`[w]here the employer’s records are inaccurate or inadequate . . . an employee has
`carried out his burden if he proves that he has in fact performed work for which he
`was improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the
`amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference. The
`burden then shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence of the precise
`amount of work performed or with evidence to negative the reasonableness of the
`inference to be drawn from the employee’s evidence. If the employer fails to
`produce such evidence, the court may then award damages to the employee, even
`though the result be only approximate.
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`45.
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`The Supreme Court set forth this test to avoid placing a premium on an employer’s
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`failure to keep proper records in conformity with its statutory duty, thereby allowing the employer
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`to reap the benefits of the employees’ labors without proper compensation as required by the
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`FLSA. Where damages are awarded pursuant to this test, “[t]he employer cannot be heard to
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`complain that the damages lack the exactness and precision of measurement that would be possible
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`had he kept records in accordance with . . . the Act.” Id.
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`COLLECTIVE ACTION ALLEGATIONS
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`46.
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`Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) individually
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`and on behalf of:
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`All current and former Customer Service Representative employees, and/or other
`job titles performing the same or similar job duties, who worked for Mediacom
`Communications Corporation at any time in the last three years.
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`(hereinafter referred to as the “FLSA Collective”). Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this
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`definition as necessary.
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`47.
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`Plaintiff does not bring this action on behalf of any executive, administrative, or
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`professional employees exempt from coverage under the FLSA.
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`48.
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`29 U.S.C. § 216(b) Conditional Certification “Similarly Situated” Standard: With
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`respect to the claims set forth in this action, a collective action under the FLSA is appropriate
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`because, under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), the call center employees described are “similarly situated” to
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`Plaintiff. The class of employees on behalf of whom Plaintiff brings this collective action are
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`similarly situated because (a) they have been or are employed in the same or similar positions; (b)
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`they were or are subject to the same or similar unlawful practices, policies, or plan (namely,
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`Defendant’s practices, policies, or plan of not paying their CSR employees for their compensable
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`work performed in excess of 40 hours per workweek at an overtime premium of at least one and
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`one-half times their regular rates of pay); (c) their claims are based upon the same legal theories;
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`and (d) the employment relationship between Defendant and every putative FLSA Collective
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`member is exactly the same, and differs only by name, location, and rate of pay.
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`49.
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`Upon information and belief, Plaintiff estimates the FLSA Collective, including
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`both current and former call center employees over the relevant period, will include several
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`hundred members who would benefit from the issuance of court-supervised notice of this action
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`and the opportunity to join it. The precise number of the FLSA Collective members should be
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`readily available from a review of Defendant’s personnel, scheduling, time, and payroll records;
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`and from input received from the FLSA Collective members as part of the notice and “opt-in”
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`process provided by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
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`50.
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`Plaintiff shares the same interests as the FLSA Collective members in that the
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`outcome of this action will determine whether they are entitled to unpaid overtime compensation,
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`interest, attorneys’ fees and costs owed under the FLSA. Because the facts in this case are similar,
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`if not altogether identical, and the factual assessment and legal standards lend themselves to a
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`collective action.
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`THE IOWA WAGE AND HOUR LAW CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
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`51.
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`Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of a putative
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`Class defined to include:
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`All current and former Customer Service Representative employees in Iowa, and/or
`other job titles performing the same or similar job duties, who worked for
`Mediacom Communications Corporation at any time in the last two years.
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`(hereinafter referred to as the “Iowa Class”). Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as
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`necessary.
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`52.
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`Numerosity: The members of the Iowa Class are so numerous that joinder of all
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`members in the case would be impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a Class will
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`benefit the parties and the Court. The precise number of Class members should be readily available
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`from a review of Defendant’s personnel and payroll records.
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`53.
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`Commonality/Predominance: There is a well-defined community of interest among
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`Iowa Class members and common questions of both law and fact predominate in the action over
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`any questions affecting individual members. These common legal and factual questions include,
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`but are not limited to, the following:
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`a.
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`b.
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`c.
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`Whether Defendant violated Iowa Code § 91A.3 by failing to pay current
`and former employees for all wages earned;
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`The proper measure of damages sustained by the proposed Iowa Class; and
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`Whether Defendant violated Iowa Code § 91A.6 by failing to make, keep,
`and preserve true and accurate payroll records.
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`54.
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`Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Iowa Class in that Plaintiff
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`and all other members suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s common
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`and systemic payroll policies and practices. Plaintiff’s claims arise from Defendant’s same
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`policies, practices, and course of conduct as all other Iowa members’ claims and Plaintiff’s legal
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`theories are based on the same legal theories as all other Iowa Class members: whether all Iowa
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`Class members were employed by Defendant on an hourly basis without receiving compensation
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`for all wages earned.
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`55.
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`Adequacy: Plaintiff will fully and adequately protect the interests of the Iowa Class
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`and Plaintiff retained national counsel who are qualified and experienced in the prosecution of
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`nationwide wage-and-hour class actions. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel have interests that are
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`contrary to, or conflicting with, the interests of the Iowa Class.
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`56.
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`Superiority: A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
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`efficient adjudication of the controversy, because, inter alia, it is economically infeasible for Iowa
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`Class members to prosecute individual actions of their own given the relatively small amount of
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`damages at stake for each individual along with the fear of reprisal by their employer. Given the
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`material similarity of the Iowa Class members’ claims, even if each Class member could afford to
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`litigate a separate claim, this Court should not countenance or require the filing of hundreds, or
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`thousands, of identical actions. Individual litigation of the legal and factual issues raised by
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`Defendant’s conduct would cause unavoidable delay, a significant duplication of efforts, and an
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`extreme waste of resources. Alternatively, proceeding by way of a class action would permit the
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`efficient supervision of the putative Iowa Class’ claims, create significant economies of scale for
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`the Court and the parties, and result in a binding, uniform adjudication on all issues.
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`57.
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`The case will be manageable as a class action. This class action can be efficiently
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`and effectively managed by sending the same FLSA opt-in notice to all employees similarly
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`situated and adding for the Iowa Class within that group a separate opt-out notice pertaining to
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`their rights under the Iowa state law. Plaintiff and their counsel know of no unusual difficulties in
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`the case and Defendant has payroll systems that will allow the class, wage, and damages issues in
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`the case to be resolved with relative ease. Because the elements of Rule 23(b)(3), or in the
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`alternative (c)(4), are satisfied in the case, class certification is appropriate. Shady Grove
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`Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010) (“[b]y its terms [Rule 23]
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`creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue her
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`claim as a class action”).
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`BREACH OF CONTRACT CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS1
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`58.
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`Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of a putative
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`Class defined to include:
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`All current and former Customer Service Representative employees, and/or other
`job titles performing the same or similar job duties, who worked for Mediacom
`Communications Corporation at any time in the last five years.
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`(hereinafter referred to as the “Nationwide Class”). Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this
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`definition as necessary.
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`59.
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`Numerosity: The members of the Nationwide Class are so numerous that joinder of
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`all members in the case would be impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a Class will
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`benefit the parties and the Court. The precise number of Class members should be readily available
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`from a review of Defendant’s personnel and payroll records.
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`60.
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`Commonality/Predominance: There is a well-defined community of interest among
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`Nationwide Class members and common questions of both law and fact predominate in the action
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`over any questions affecting individual members. These common legal and factual questions
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`include, but are not limited to, the following:
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`1 To the extent the Court finds, or Defendant argues, the employment relationship between itself
`and its CSRs did not form a contract, Plaintiff reserves the right to seek Rule 23 class certification
`under Plaintiff’s and the Nationwide Class’ quasi-contract claims (Count IV).
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`Case 1:22-cv-05183 Document 1 Filed 06/21/22 Page 13 of 22
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`a.
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`b.
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`c.
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`d.
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`Whether Defendant offered to pay Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class
`certain rates (depending on the technical job titles) per hour for each hour
`worked as call center employees;
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`Whether Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class accepted Defendant’s offer by
`performing the essential functions of the job;
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`Whether Defendant breached the contract by failing to pay Plaintiff and the
`Nationwide Class for each and every hour worked; and
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`Whether Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class were damaged.
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`61.
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`Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Nationwide Class in that
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`Plaintiff and all other members suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s
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`common and systemic payroll policies and practices. Plaintiff’s claims arise from Defendant’s
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`same policies, practices, and course of conduct as all other Nationwide Class members’ claims and
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`Plaintiff’s legal theories are based on the same legal theories as all other Nationwide Class
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`members: whether Defendant and the Nationwide Class members were employed under an implied
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`contract to be paid for each and every hour worked by Defendant.
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`62.
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`Adequacy: Plaintiff will fully and adequately protect the interests of the Nationwide
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`Class and Plaintiff retained national counsel who are qualified and experienced in the prosecution
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`of nationwide wage-and-hour class actions. Neither Plaintiff nor their counsel have interests that
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`are contrary to, or conflicting with, the interests of the Nationwide Class.
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`63.
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`Superiority: A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
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`efficient adjudication of the controversy, because, inter alia, it is economically infeasible for
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`Nationwide Class members to prosecute individual actions of their own given the relatively small
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`amount of damages at stake for each individual along with the fear of reprisal by their employer.
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`Given the material similarity of the Nationwide Class members’ claims, even if each Nationwide
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`Class member could afford to litigate a separate claim, this Court should not countenance or require
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`the filing of thousands of identical actions. Individual litigation of the legal and factual issues
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`Case 1:22-cv-05183 Document 1 Filed 06/21/22 Page 14 of 22
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`raised by Defendant’s conduct would cause unavoidable delay, a significant duplication of efforts,
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`and an extreme waste of resources. Alternatively, proceeding by way of a class action would permit
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`the efficient supervision of the putative Nationwide Class’ claims, create significant economies of
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`scale for the Court and the parties, and result in a binding, uniform adjudication on all issues.
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`64.
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`The case will be manageable as a class action. This class action can be efficiently
`
`and effectively managed by sending the same FLSA opt-in notice to all employees similarly
`
`situated and adding for the Nationwide Class within that group a separate opt-out notice pertaining
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`to their rights under the common law. Plaintiff and their counsel know of no unusual difficulties
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`in the case and Defendant has payroll systems that will allow the class, wage, and damages issues
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`in the case to be resolved with relative ease. Because the elements of Rule 23(b)(3), or in the
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`alternative (c)(4), are satisfied in the case, class certification is appropriate. Shady Grove
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`Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010) (“[b]y its terms [Rule 23]
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`creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue her
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`claim as a class action”).
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`COUNT I
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`VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT,
`U.S.C. § 201, et seq., FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES
`(FLSA Collective Class)
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`Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein.
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`At all times relevant to this action, Defendant was an “employer” under the FLSA,
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`65.
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`66.
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`29 U.S.C. § 203(d), subject to the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq.
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`67.
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`Defendant is engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for
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`commerce, as defined by the FLSA.
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`68.
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`At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was an “employee” of Defendant within
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`the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1).
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`69.
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`Plaintiff either (1) engaged in commerce; or (2) engaged in the production of goods
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`for commerce; or (3) was employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of
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`goods for commerce.
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`70.
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`71.
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`The position of Customer Service Representative is not exempt from the FLSA.
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`Defendant’s other job titles performing similar customer service representative job
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`duties are not exempt from the FLSA.
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`72.
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`At all times relevant to this action, Defendant “suffered or permitted” Plaintiff to
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`work and thus “employed” her within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
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`73.
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`The FLSA requires an employer to pay employees the federally mandated overtime
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`premium rate of one and a half times their regular rate of pay for every hour worked in excess of
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`40 hours per workweek. See 29 U.S.C. § 207.
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`74.
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`Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to pay Plaintiff the federally mandated
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`overtime premium for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek.
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`75.
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`Upon information and belief, Defendant has corporate policies of evading overtime
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`pay for its hourly workers.
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`76.
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`77.
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`Defendant’s violations of the FLSA were knowing and willful.
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`By failing to compensate its hourly workers at a rate not less than one and one-half
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`times their regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, Defendant
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`violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1) and 215(a). All
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`similarly situated CSRs, or other job titles performing the same or similar job duties, are victims
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`of a uniform and company-wide enterprise which operates to compensate employees at a rate less
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`Case 1:22-cv-05183 Document 1 Filed 06/21/22 Page 16 of 22
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`than the federally mandated overtime wage rate. This uniform policy, in violation of the FLSA,
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`has been, and continues to be, applied to CSRs, or other job titles performing the same or similar
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`job duties, who have worked or are working for Defendant in the same or similar position as
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`Plaintiff.
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`78.
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`None of the provisions of the FLSA can be contravened, set aside, abrogated, or
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`waived by Plaintiff or the Class.
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`79.
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`The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), provides that as a remedy for a violation of the Act,
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`an employee is entitled to his or her unpaid overtime wages plus an additional equal amount in
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`liquidated damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees.
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`COUNT II
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`VIOLATIONS OF THE IOWA WAGE PAYMENT COLLECTION LAW (“WPCL”),
`IOWA CODE § 91a.1, et seq.
`(Iowa Class)
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`80.
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`Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the proposed Iowa Class, re-alleges and
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`incorporates by reference the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
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`81.
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`Plaintiff and members of the Iowa Class are current and former employees of
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`Defendant within the meaning of Iowa Code § 91A.2.3.
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`82.
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`Defendant at all relevant times was an employer within the meaning of Iowa Code
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`§ 91A.2.4.
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`83.
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`84.
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`Defendant was required to pay Plaintiff and the Iowa Class for all hours worked.
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`Iowa Code § 91A.3 requires every employer to pay “all wages due” every pay
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`period, including overtime pay.
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`85. Wages are defined as “[l]abor or services rendered by an employee, whether
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`determined on a time, task, piece, commission, or other basis of calculation” Iowa Code § 91A.2.7.
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`86.
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`Defendant, pursuant to its policies and illegal timekeeping practices, refused and
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`failed to pay Plaintiff and the Iowa Class for all hours worked.
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`87.
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`By failing to properly compensate Plaintiff and the Iowa Class for all “labor or
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`services rendered” for which Plaintiff and members of the Iowa Class had a reasonable expectation
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`of being paid, Defendant violated, and continues to violate its CSRs’ statutory rights under Iowa
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`Code § 91A.8.
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`88.
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`Defendant’s actions were willful, unreasonable, and done in bad faith. See Iowa
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`Code § 91A.8.
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`89.
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`As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the
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`proposed Iowa Class have suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
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`90.
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`Plaintiff and the proposed Iowa Class seek damages in the amount of their unpaid
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`straight-time and overtime wages for all hours worked, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’
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`fees and costs for this action, pre- and post- judgment interest, and such other legal and equitable
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`relief as the Court deems proper.
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`COUNT III
`
`BREACH OF CONTRACT
`(National Breach of Contract Class Action)
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`91.
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`Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class re-allege and incorporate all previous paragraphs
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`herein and further allege as follows.
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`92.
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`Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class were hired at various times. Defendant offered
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`to pay Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class certain rates per hour for each hour worked as a CSR.
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`Each Nationwi