`
`THOMAS P. SMITH, JR.
`CO-ACTING REGIONAL DIRECTOR
`Hane L. Kim
`Shannon Keyes*
`SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
`New York Regional Office
`100 Pearl Street, Suite 20-100
`New York, New York 10004-2616
`(212) 336-1088 (Kim)
`kimha@sec.gov
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`
`SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
`COMMISSION,
`
` Plaintiff,
`
` -against-
`
`FRANCISLEY VALDEVINO DA SILVA,
`RAMON ANTONIO PEREZ ARIAS, JUAN
`ANTONIO TACURI FAJARDO, AND JOSE
`RAMIRO CORONADO REYES,
`
` Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`COMPLAINT
`
`
`22 Civ. 10534 ( )
`
`
`
`
`
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”), for its Complaint against
`
`Defendants Francisley Valdevino Da Silva (“Da Silva”), Ramon Antonio Perez Arias (“Perez”),
`
`Juan Antonio Tacuri Fajardo (“Tacuri”), and Jose Ramiro Coronado Reyes (“Coronado”)
`
`(collectively, “Defendants”), alleges as follows:
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 1:22-cv-10534 Document 1 Filed 12/14/22 Page 2 of 30
`
`SUMMARY
`
`1.
`
`This is an international pyramid scheme case involving a fake crypto asset trading
`
`and mining company. In approximately mid-2017, Brazilian national Da Silva, a self-
`
`proclaimed “boss of the pyramid scammers,” concocted a pyramid scheme, Forcount Trader
`
`Systems, Inc. (“Forcount”), with the assistance of three U.S.-based sellers, or “promoters” of the
`
`scheme, Tacuri, Perez and Coronado.
`
`2.
`
`During various time periods within approximately July 2017 to at least November
`
`2020, Defendants (1) raised funds from retail investors in Spanish-speaking communities in the
`
`United States, and several other countries, through the unregistered offer and sale of securities
`
`styled as membership interests in Forcount; and (2) knowingly or recklessly engaged in a scheme
`
`to defraud numerous investors—bilking the investors out of over $8.4 million—by enticing them
`
`with the promise of guaranteed, astronomical daily returns from investments in securities.
`
`3.
`
`Defendants sold sham “memberships” in Forcount as investments. Defendants
`
`claimed that a membership in Forcount would give investors interests in returns generated from
`
`various crypto assets through Forcount’s fake crypto asset trading and mining operations,
`
`accessible on Forcount’s website. Defendants claimed that investors would profit from two
`
`income streams: (1) sharing proceeds from Forcount’s own crypto asset trading “calibrated
`
`robots” and a crypto asset “intelligent mining system” from which investors would receive
`
`guaranteed profits, and (2) Forcount’s referral program, which gave investors the right to earn
`
`compensation for recruiting new investors into the scheme, such that an investor acted as a
`
`promoter and had layers of other promoters and investors below them (the “downline”).
`
`4.
`
`The Forcount memberships were investment contracts and therefore securities,
`
`because investors made an investment of money in a common enterprise with a reasonable
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`Case 1:22-cv-10534 Document 1 Filed 12/14/22 Page 3 of 30
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`expectation of profits from the efforts of Defendants or third parties. Defendants offered and
`
`sold these securities without registering their offers or sales with the Commission or qualifying
`
`for an exemption from registration.
`
`5.
`
`Forcount was also a classic pyramid scheme. Forcount did not sell any real
`
`product or service to retail customers. Despite Defendants promises of returns based on
`
`Forcount’s trading and mining, as well as the referral program, Forcount had no real source of
`
`revenue other than funds received from investors. Defendants had no basis for the promised
`
`returns, and funds received from later investors were used to make Ponzi-type payments to
`
`earlier investors.
`
`6.
`
`Da Silva devised and controlled the vast majority of Forcount’s operations,
`
`including the invention of Forcount’s supposed business, the creation of a sham website that
`
`purported to reflect a crypto asset trading platform and investor accounts, the compensation plan
`
`for promoters and investors, the website infrastructure, and the distribution of payments to
`
`investors.
`
`7.
`
`Defendants took part in promoting Forcount to investors, including by planning
`
`and participating in promotions in which they knowingly or recklessly made materially false and
`
`misleading claims to investors concerning Forcount’s operations, Forcount’s success, and the
`
`success of investors in Forcount memberships. For those investors, their success was
`
`substantially dependent on the efforts of Defendants to market Forcount and recruit investors.
`
`8.
`
`Defendants accelerated Forcount’s inevitable collapse by misappropriating
`
`investor funds for personal use—including to purchase homes, dozens of cars, and luxury
`
`goods—and paying for lavish events and other methods of attracting additional investors. By
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`Case 1:22-cv-10534 Document 1 Filed 12/14/22 Page 4 of 30
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`late 2019, Forcount had been regularly restricting investor redemptions, and by late 2020,
`
`Forcount collapsed.
`
`9.
`
`Defendants defrauded hundreds of investors from at least 19 U.S. states and other
`
`countries. From July 2017 through November 2020, investors sent more than $8.4 million to
`
`Forcount, mainly through cash transfers. Defendants then misappropriated, collectively, at least
`
`$3.4 million in investor funds for their personal use. By the time Forcount collapsed, investors
`
`were left with nothing.
`
`VIOLATIONS
`
`10.
`
`By virtue of the foregoing conduct and as alleged further herein, Defendants
`
`violated Sections 5(a), 5(c), 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act”) [15 U.S.C. §§
`
`77e(a), 77e(c), 77q(a)] and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange
`
`Act”) [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rule 10b-5 thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5].
`
`11.
`
`Unless Defendants are restrained and enjoined, they will engage in the acts,
`
`practices, transactions, and courses of business set forth in this Complaint or in acts, practices,
`
`transactions, and courses of business of similar type and object.
`
`NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND RELIEF SOUGHT
`
`12.
`
`The Commission brings this action pursuant to the authority conferred upon it by
`
`Section 20(b) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(b)] and Section 21(d) of the Exchange Act
`
`[15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)].
`
`13.
`
`The Commission seeks a final judgment: (a) permanently enjoining Defendants
`
`from violating the federal securities laws and rules this Complaint alleges they have violated;
`
`(b) permanently enjoining Defendants from directly or indirectly, including, but not limited to,
`
`through any entity owned or controlled by Defendants, offering, operating, or participating in
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`Case 1:22-cv-10534 Document 1 Filed 12/14/22 Page 5 of 30
`
`any marketing or sales program in which a participant is compensated or promised compensation
`
`solely or primarily for inducing another person to become a participant in the program, or if such
`
`induced person induces another to become a participant in the program; (c) permanently
`
`enjoining Defendants from participating, directly or indirectly, in any offering of any crypto
`
`asset security, provided, however, that such injunction shall not prevent them from purchasing or
`
`selling crypto asset securities for their own personal accounts; (d) ordering Defendants to
`
`disgorge their ill-gotten gains and to pay prejudgment interest thereon pursuant to Sections
`21(d)(3), (5) and (7) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(3), (5) and (7)]; (e) ordering the
`
`Defendants to pay civil money penalties pursuant to Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15
`
`U.S.C § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)];
`
`(f) permanently prohibiting the Defendants from serving as officers or directors of any company
`
`that has a class of securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78l] or
`
`that is required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78o(d)],
`
`pursuant to Section 20(e) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(e)] and Section 21(d)(2) of the
`
`Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)]; and (g) ordering any other and further relief the Court
`
`may deem just and proper.
`
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
`
`14.
`
`This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Sections 20(b) and 20(d)
`
`of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 77t(d)] and Section 21(d) of the Exchange Act [15
`
`U.S.C. § 78u(d)].
`
`15.
`
`Defendants, directly and indirectly, made use of the means or instrumentalities of
`
`interstate commerce or of the mails in connection with the transactions, acts, practices, and
`
`courses of business alleged herein.
`
`
`
`5
`
`
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`Case 1:22-cv-10534 Document 1 Filed 12/14/22 Page 6 of 30
`
`16.
`
`Venue lies in this District under Section 22(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C.
`
`§ 78v(a)] and Section 27 of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78aa]. Certain of the acts, practices,
`
`transactions, and courses of business alleged in this Complaint occurred within the Southern
`
`District of New York. Through Forcount, Defendants communicated with and received funds
`
`from investors located in this District.
`
`DEFENDANTS
`
`17.
`
`Da Silva, age 37, is Brazilian national and resides primarily in Brazil. Da Silva
`
`was Forcount’s Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”). He developed the idea for and, at all relevant
`
`times, controlled Forcount, and received investor funds directly from investors and through
`
`Forcount.
`
`18.
`
`Perez, age 40, is a resident of Orlando, Florida. Perez was a Forcount promoter
`
`from approximately October 2017 through late 2020, and received investor funds directly from
`
`Forcount investors and through Forcount.
`
`19.
`
`Tacuri, age 44, is a resident of Kissimmee, Florida. Tacuri was a Forcount
`
`promoter from approximately October 2017 through November 2020, and received investor
`
`funds directly from Forcount investors and through Forcount.
`
`20.
`
`Coronado, age 34, is a resident of Orlando, Florida. Coronado was a Forcount
`
`promoter from approximately October 2017 through January 2019, and received investor funds
`
`directly from Forcount investors and through Forcount.
`
`FORCOUNT
`
`21.
`
`Forcount is a Panamanian corporation, incorporated on or about February 19,
`
`2018. Forcount had no securities registered with the Commission. Forcount purports to have
`
`existed since approximately 2015, but public records indicate Forcount’s website did not exist
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`Case 1:22-cv-10534 Document 1 Filed 12/14/22 Page 7 of 30
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`until July 2017. Forcount claims to have been an international multi-level marketing (“MLM”)
`
`organization and to have operated a crypto asset trading platform and crypto asset mining
`
`services. In or about late 2017, Da Silva caused Forcount to issue its own token, MindExCoin
`
`(“MIC”). In 2019, Forcount was at least partially rebranded as Weltsys, a MIC-based supposed
`
`MLM enterprise, which claimed to be a Hong Kong-based company but did not appear to be
`
`organized in any jurisdiction or have any formal legal existence.1 Da Silva created, controlled,
`
`and managed the day-to-day operations of Forcount.
`
`FACTS
`
`A.
`22.
`
`DA SILVA CREATES FORCOUNT’S MEMBERSHIP OFFERING.
`
`In or about mid-2017, Da Silva created Forcount, following at least one other
`
`failed crypto asset-based supposed MLM enterprise. Da Silva developed the idea for Forcount,
`
`created and controlled Forcount’s website and its compensation plan, solicited promotors,
`
`developed and participated in promotions, and directed his associates on Forcount’s operations.
`
`23.
`
`Defendants offered and sold memberships in Forcount. Investors would pay cash
`
`(or occasionally crypto assets) to Forcount, which had a website that purported to host a crypto
`
`asset trading platform and mining services, to acquire a membership in Forcount. Da Silva or
`
`those he controlled would create an account for the investor on Forcount’s website, which would
`
`reflect that the account “held” certain crypto assets.
`
`24.
`
`Initially, Forcount memberships involved purported interests in one or more
`
`known crypto assets, with supposed returns paid in kind. In or about January 2019, Da Silva
`
`announced that all Forcount memberships were converting from all other crypto assets to
`
`
`
`1 “Forcount” is used in this complaint for Forcount Trader Systems, Inc. as well as the partially
`re-branded entity “Weltsys.”
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`Case 1:22-cv-10534 Document 1 Filed 12/14/22 Page 8 of 30
`
`Forcount’s proprietary crypto asset token, MIC.
`
`25.
`
`Da Silva devised a structure in which investors would supposedly profit from two
`
`streams of income: sharing proceeds from Forcount’s purported efforts to trade and mine crypto
`
`assets, and receiving commissions and bonuses for selling additional memberships. Forcount’s
`
`website displayed fictitious returns based on the specified amounts and types of crypto assets that
`
`investors appeared to hold in their Forcount accounts.
`
`26.
`
`Investors in Forcount memberships could not withdraw their principal (the
`
`amount of the initial investment). Instead, the memberships only gave investors an interest in the
`
`supposed returns on the principal, and no access to the principal amount invested.
`
`27. Moreover, investors had no right to the crypto assets allegedly in their account.
`
`Thus, investors had no ability to sell, trade, or transfer these supposed crypto assets anywhere
`
`outside of the Forcount website.
`
`28.
`
`Earlier in the scheme, investors could ask to “withdraw” the returns they had
`
`supposedly received and would receive either cash or some type of crypto asset; as Forcount
`
`headed towards collapse, investors’ withdrawal requests were no longer honored.
`
`29.
`
`Da Silva, as the mastermind of Forcount, knew from the outset that the crypto
`
`assets that were supposedly in investors’ Forcount accounts were fictitious and therefore had no
`
`value. Perez, Tacuri, and Coronado each learned of the same as they began to promote Forcount,
`
`but knowingly or recklessly continued to promote it.
`
`30.
`
`Da Silva created Forcount’s marketing materials, including a “Business Plan,”
`
`which was an approximately 30-page PowerPoint document that evolved over the course of the
`
`scheme, but consistently contained descriptions of Forcount’s “operations,” as well as (a) the
`
`“returns” investors would receive from investing in Forcount memberships and (b) the
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`Case 1:22-cv-10534 Document 1 Filed 12/14/22 Page 9 of 30
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`commissions and bonuses investors would receive for recruiting others to invest in memberships.
`
`Forcount promoters, including Perez, Tacuri, and Coronado, disseminated the Business Plan to
`
`investors and potential investors.
`
`Forcount’s Alleged Trading and Mining
`
`1.
`According to its Business Plan, Forcount claimed to be an expert in crypto asset
`
`31.
`
`trading. Forcount asserted that its crypto asset trading was “automated” and described it as a
`
`“key business line” and as its “oldest most profitable activity.” Forcount claimed that
`
`investments through Forcount would result in returns from “daily trade through our calibrated
`
`robots to generate daily earns!” Forcount further touted its alleged trading platform, promising
`
`“access to the latest products in the cryptocurrency market.”
`
`32.
`
`Forcount also claimed investors would receive returns from Forcount’s use of
`
`“intelligent mining system” with “10,000 machines” that “automatically mine” such crypto
`
`assets.
`
`33.
`
`Forcount claimed to be a “100% decentralized system–All operations are
`
`performed through cryptocurrencies and their blockchains.”
`
`34.
`
`Da Silva was initially responsible for Forcount’s claims about its operations, and
`
`Defendants parroted these claims to investors and potential investors.
`
`35.
`
`According to its “Business Plan,” Forcount promised “a positive result in a
`
`constant way, guaranteeing our users an increase in their investments.” Forcount specifically
`
`promised returns of 0.5% up to 3% per business day, or up to 780% annual return, with larger
`
`returns promised to those who invested greater amounts. For example, according to an investor
`
`from the Bronx, New York, who attended approximately six Forcount events starting in the fall
`
`of 2018 (“Investor A”), Tacuri told attendees that their investments would earn a return of at
`
`least 1.5% per day.
`
`
`9
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`Case 1:22-cv-10534 Document 1 Filed 12/14/22 Page 10 of 30
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`36. When promoting Forcount memberships, promoters, including Perez, Tacuri, and
`
`Coronado, told investors that they could expect their investment to double in six to eight months.
`
`37.
`
`In or around October 2019, Forcount capped supposed annual returns at 200%.
`
`Compensation from Forcount’s Referral Program
`
`2.
`Da Silva established a referral program so that investors would be rewarded for
`
`38.
`
`bringing in additional investors and forming a downline of investors. Through the referral
`
`program, investors earned compensation by recruiting others to invest in Forcount memberships.
`
`39.
`
`The referral program compensation consisted of commissions and a complicated
`
`points-based bonus plan. Investors who promoted Forcount memberships received commission
`
`and “points” for successfully recruiting new investors to Forcount and when their downline
`
`investors recruited new investors.
`
`40.
`
`Investors received, at a minimum, a 5% commission on the initial investment
`
`amount for anyone they persuaded to invest in Forcount. Coronado and Tacuri showed the
`
`Business Plan to investors during promotional events, which reflected a commission structure of
`
`1% to 20% for recruiting additional investors. Coronado specifically told one investor to expect
`
`commissions as high as 20%.
`
`41.
`
`Investors could also receive points, which, like commissions, were given based on
`
`the size of an investor’s downline. The points were calculated on a monthly basis, and investors
`
`reached certain levels based on the points earned each month. Defendants also told investors
`
`that, depending on the level, investors could receive bonuses ranging from $400 to $100,000 per
`
`month, or even a new car.
`
`42.
`
`Da Silva exercised complete control over compensation for the referral program.
`
`It changed frequently at Da Silva’s direction—with varying levels, bonuses, and prizes. On
`
`multiple occasions, Da Silva blocked promoters from earning additional points or took away
`
`10
`
`
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`Case 1:22-cv-10534 Document 1 Filed 12/14/22 Page 11 of 30
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`points, and switched the crypto assets that points were purportedly earning. Da Silva also
`
`regularly changed the payment structure, making it unpredictable.
`
`43.
`
`Defendants aggressively pushed investors to participate in the referral program
`
`and to solicit family and friends to invest. Defendants promised investors that they would earn
`
`more from the referral program than they did from their membership “returns.” Defendants also
`
`presented or distributed the Business Plan, which promised investors greater returns the higher
`
`up an investor was in a recruitment chain based on commissions and bonuses.
`
`44.
`
`For example, Tacuri told investors that the referral program was a “fast start,”
`
`which provided investors with an opportunity to double the rate of return. Perez pushed Investor
`
`A to recruit investors for Forcount memberships, offering the investor crypto assets then valued
`
`at $1100. Da Silva regularly announced referrals that could earn investors even more points and
`
`therefore higher bonuses, or prizes like international trips and luxury cars.
`
`45.
`
`Defendants’ appeals to investors were effective, and many, in turn, convinced
`
`family and friends to invest in Forcount memberships. Investor A, for example, said that he was
`
`convinced to invest after hearing claims about Forcount’s success, and that after his investment
`
`was successful, he convinced four family members to invest as well.
`
`46.
`
`Investors who participated in the referral program generally received more in
`
`fictitious returns from commission and points than they earned from their alleged returns from
`
`Forcount’s operations.
`
`B.
`47.
`
`DA SILVA INVITES OTHER DEFENDANTS TO FORCOUNT.
`
`Da Silva sought out experienced promoters to solicit investors, such as Perez,
`
`Tacuri, and Coronado, who had a track record of recruiting investors for similar apparent
`
`schemes.
`
`
`
`11
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`Case 1:22-cv-10534 Document 1 Filed 12/14/22 Page 12 of 30
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`48.
`
`Around or about August 2017, Da Silva reached out to Coronado, who had
`
`previously invested in a different Da Silva-operated supposed MLM enterprise, and asked him to
`
`meet to discuss promoting Forcount. Coronado was not able to meet Da Silva at the time, but
`
`Coronado asked Perez, who also had promoted similar schemes, to meet with Da Silva instead.
`
`49.
`
`After the meeting, Perez and Coronado decided to promote Forcount together as
`
`partners. Until Coronado ceased promoting Forcount in 2019, Perez and Coronado operated as
`
`equal partners, they shared an account on Forcount’s website and split the commissions and
`
`points they received from downline investors equally.
`
`50.
`
`Shortly thereafter, Da Silva and Perez invited experienced promoters to
`
`participate in the scheme. Around October 2017, Da Silva and Perez travelled to Las Vegas,
`
`Nevada, to recruit additional, experienced promoters for Forcount at an MLM networking event,
`
`and successfully recruited other promoters, including Tacuri.
`
`C.
`51.
`
`DEFENDANTS OFFERED AND SOLD FORCOUNT MEMBERSHIPS.
`
`Da Silva offered and sold Forcount memberships from approximately July 2017.
`
`Perez, Tacuri, and Coronado began to offer and sell the memberships from late 2017. When
`
`Coronado left Forcount in early 2019, Da Silva, Tacuri, and Perez, continued to offer and sell
`
`memberships through at least November 2020.
`
`52.
`
`At Da Silva’s direction, Perez, Tacuri, and Coronado solicited potential Forcount
`
`investors. Perez, Tacuri, and Coronado targeted Spanish-speaking communities, first primarily
`
`in the Bronx, New York, and Florida, and later throughout the United States.
`
`53.
`
`Defendants made false statements when soliciting investors, primarily through
`
`video appeals and/or in-person or virtual events. They also widely publicized Forcount’s
`
`website, and anyone who accessed the site could invest in a Forcount membership. Defendants
`
`
`
`12
`
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`Case 1:22-cv-10534 Document 1 Filed 12/14/22 Page 13 of 30
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`also broadly disseminated Forcount’s Business Plan to any interested investors as a way to
`
`promote Forcount, either directly or through other promoters.
`
`Video Solicitation
`
`1.
`Da Silva directed the creation of highly stylized, professionally produced,
`
`54.
`
`promotional videos for Forcount. Da Silva dictated the content and directed these videos to be
`
`posted on Forcount’s website and social media sites like YouTube. Tacuri and Coronado re-
`
`posted these videos on social media. Defendants primarily used these videos to recruit investors
`
`and encourage additional investment, and the videos often created the false appearance that
`
`Forcount was a profitable, sophisticated entity.
`
`55.
`
`Some videos would showcase Forcount’s in-person events. Others would flaunt
`
`Da Silva’s extravagant lifestyle—purportedly funded by his success in Forcount investments—
`
`showing him and his associates at fine dining establishments or celebrating at upscale venues.
`
`56.
`
`The videos created the false image that Forcount was a real, operating company.
`
`To create such image, Da Silva, who appeared relatively young, hired an older, more mature
`
`looking actor who lived in Spain, Individual 1. In videos that Da Silva produced and distributed,
`
`Individual 1 portrayed a supposed high-level Forcount executive, “Salvador Molina.” However,
`
`in reality Individual 1 had no control over Forcount, and no relevant crypto asset expertise.
`
`Despite this, by mid-2018, Individual 1 regularly appeared in videos, discussing Forcount’s
`
`success and promoting the company, repeating words from scripts that Da Silva provided. The
`
`videos did not disclose that Individual 1 was actually an actor hired to play the fictitious
`
`“Salvador Molina,” and Da Silva did not disclose this fact to potential investors.
`
`57.
`
`As early as January 2019, Da Silva falsely called “Salvador Molina” Forcount’s
`
`CEO.
`
`
`
`13
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`Case 1:22-cv-10534 Document 1 Filed 12/14/22 Page 14 of 30
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`58.
`
`In another video posted on YouTube on or about October 11, 2018, Tacuri
`
`promoted investing in Forcount and encouraged participation in the referral program, promising
`
`a “fast start,” with a chance to double the rate of return.
`
`59.
`
`Da Silva also falsely presented the offices of a different company as Forcount’s,
`
`even though Forcount had no offices of its own. Specifically, one Forcount promoter, who
`
`travelled to Brazil on or about August 2019, told Coronado that he saw Forcount’s supposed
`
`offices. He reported to Coronado that the offices were “dressed up” to look like Forcount’s
`
`office but were “fake.” (Translation, original in Spanish.)
`
`60.
`
`Da Silva created the content on Forcount’s website for the other Defendants, as
`
`well as other promoters, to use in recruiting new investors. Defendants widely disseminated the
`
`content, and encouraged others to share, to promote, and to recruit for Forcount.
`
`In-Person or Virtual Events
`
`2.
`Defendants regularly held or participated in in-person and virtual events to solicit
`
`61.
`
`investors in Forcount memberships, using investors’ funds to pay for these events.
`
`62.
`
`Defendants planned presentations at Forcount events at hotel conference rooms
`
`throughout the United States throughout 2018 and at least early 2019. These events included
`
`ones held in East Elmhurst, New York; New York, New York; Oxon Hill, Maryland; and
`
`Woburn, Massachusetts. Da Silva also held international events.
`
`63.
`
`The hotel events were open to the public and heavily promoted on social media.
`
`Defendants did not restrict who could attend events or who could invest at or following the
`
`events.
`
`64.
`
`To attract potential investors to attend, Forcount would hold raffles and give away
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`prizes, and cash. For example, in late 2018, Tacuri gave a cash prize of $150 to Investor A for
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`14
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`Case 1:22-cv-10534 Document 1 Filed 12/14/22 Page 15 of 30
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`repeating Tacuri’s “rules” for investing in Forcount; “create a free account, invest, invite friends,
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`double up, and repeat the process.”
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`65.
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`Throughout 2018, Perez also frequently solicited downline investors one-on-one,
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`or in small groups throughout the United States, including in Miami, Atlanta, New York, and
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`Orlando as well as in in Cancun, Mexico on or about August 15, 2018.
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`66.
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`Beginning in or about March 2018 and continuing for several months, Coronado
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`hosted virtual meetings generally five days per week to solicit investors in Forcount. Coronado
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`broadly promoted these virtual meetings on social media, and they were open to the general
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`public. These virtual meetings frequently had hundreds of attendees.
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`67.
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`At these in-person or virtual meetings, Defendants touted Forcount memberships,
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`repeated false claims about Forcount’s profitability and operations, encouraged participation in
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`Forcount’s referral program as a means of recruiting new investors, boasted about their own
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`supposed success from investing and promoting Forcount, and presented false testimonials from
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`downline promoters.
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`68.
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`In or about July 2018, Tacuri spoke at a Forcount event at a hotel in East
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`Elmhurst, New York, with approximately 40 people in attendance, and Tacuri told investors at
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`this event that they could double their money by investing in Forcount memberships, and that
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`Forcount would trade on investors’ behalf.
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`69.
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`At various events held in 2018, Tacuri, Perez, and Coronado each showed off
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`borrowed, leased, or rented cars that they falsely claimed to have purchased with investment
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`proceeds generated from their memberships, including from the referral program.
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`70.
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`Da Silva directed Perez, Tacuri, and Coronado to claim that they were more
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`successful than they actually were. For example, during 2018, Perez, Tacuri, and Coronado
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`15
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`Case 1:22-cv-10534 Document 1 Filed 12/14/22 Page 16 of 30
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`referred to themselves as the “Black Diamond” level promoters. According to Forcount’s
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`Business Plan, to be at the “Black Diamond” level would have meant they brought in
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`approximately $100,000 in investor funds per month for three consecutive months and would
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`receive an additional $10,000 bonus each month. Perez, Tacuri, and Coronado never brought in
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`this much, per month, in investor funds.
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`71.
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`By early 2019, Perez and Tacuri were claiming to be even more successful. They
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`advertised two events held on February 25, 2019, at the East Elmhurst hotel and on February 27,
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`2019, at the hotel in Woburn, Massachusetts over a messaging service:
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`Attention
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`The moment has arrived, two years in the industry and we keep making history.
`You can’t miss this event with the EXECUTIVE DIAMONDS Ramon Perez and
`Juan Tacuri with special guest [REDACTED] DIAMOND
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`…they will teach how to duplicate your capital and benefit from your money.
`Don’t let banks take advantage of your capital.
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`We’ll be expecting you, make the difference this year, be different and dare
`yourself…lose your fear, we’re going for the MILLION.”
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`(Translation, original in Spanish.) According to Forcount’s Business Plan, to be at the
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`“Executive Diamond” level would have meant that Perez and Tacuri brought in $150,000 in
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`investor funds per month for three consecutive months and would receive an additional $15,000
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`(by October 2019 it was $20,000) bonus each month. Perez and Tacuri had never brought in this
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`much, per month, in investor funds.
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`72.
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`Defendants similarly claimed downline promoters were far more successful than
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`they actually were, in order to create the appearance of success, and invited these promoters to
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`provide testimonials that Defendants knew were false.
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`16
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`Case 1:22-cv-10534 Document 1 Filed 12/14/22 Page 17 of 30
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`73.
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`For example, in or around mid-2018, Coronado and Perez asked one downline
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`promoter (“Promoter 1”) to provide a testimonial at an in-person event, and directed her to state
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`she was making upwards of $20,000 per month. From then on, Promoter 1 gave testimonials
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`approximately every other month, and Coronado and Perez regularly introduced her as making
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`over $20,000 per month. Coronado and Perez knew these statements about Promoter 1 were
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`false.
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`74.
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`Also, in late 2018, Coronado took a video of Promoter 1’s home, and showed this
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`video at promotional events, claiming that Promoter 1 had been able to purchase it with her
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`Forcount compensation. Coronado knew that Promoter 1 did not own the property and was
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`renting the house and that these statements were false.
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`75.
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`As with the videos, Da Silva deceived investors at in-person and virtual events.
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`For example, at a promotional event in Cancun, Mexico, in or around October 2019, Da Silva
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`sold raffle tickets for a car. When Da Silva was unable to sell enough raffle tickets, he decided
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`to draw a fictitious number so that he could keep the proceeds.
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`76.
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`Da Silva also used Individual 1 to create, like Da Silva had with the videos, the
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`false impression that Forcount was a successful company. For example, in January 2019, Da
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`Silva filmed a video for Individual 1, in which he directed Individual 1 to lead a virtual meeting
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`for investors and potential investors as Forcount’s CEO “Salvador Molina,” and gave Individual
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`1 instructions on what to say:
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`I want it to go something more or less like this. He’s going to talk about a
`lot of things, okay? And then I’ll tell you more or less what he’s going to
`talk about and you’ll improve the text, okay? . . . Just as if it were live.
`“Happy to be here with you today. I would like to tell you that this year
`you will be seeing more of me. I will be closer to