Case 1:23-cr-00134-VSB Document 268 Filed 03/25/25 Page 1 of 17
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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`VERNON S. BRODERICK, United States District Judge:
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`S3 23-CR-134 (VSB)
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`OPINION & ORDER
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`-against-
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`CALVIN DARDEN, JR.,
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`Defendant.
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`Before me is the motion of Calvin Darden, Jr. (“Defendant” or “Darden”) for a judgment
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`of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 or, in the alternative, for a new
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`trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. (Doc. 231, the “Motion.”) Because
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`Defendant has failed to raise grounds that would justify a judgment of acquittal or a new trial,
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`Defendant’s Motion is DENIED.
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` Background
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`On March 23, 2023, the indictment against Defendant, among others, was unsealed.
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`(Doc. 3.) The indictment contained five counts. On July 18, 2024, a five-count superseding
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`indictment was filed against Defendant (“Indictment”). (Doc. 142.) Count One of the
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`Indictment charges that, from at least 2019 through in or about 2021, Defendant conspired and
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`agreed with other people to commit wire fraud and bank fraud. (Id. ¶¶ 16–19.) Count Two of
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`the Indictment charges that during that same period Defendant committed wire fraud. (Id. ¶¶ 20–
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`21.) Count Three of the Indictment charges that, from in or about 2020 through in or about
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`2021, Defendant committed bank fraud. (Id. ¶¶ 22–23.) Counts Four and Five of the Indictment
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`charge that, from in or about 2019 through in or about 2021, Defendant conspired and agreed
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`with others to commit money laundering and committed money laundering, respectively. (Id.
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`¶¶ 24–28.)
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`On September 18, 2024, trial began with jury selection.0F
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`1 After the parties gave their
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`opening statements, witness testimony began during the afternoon of September 24, 2024. The
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`Government called 19 witnesses at trial. At the conclusion of the Government’s case, Darden
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`moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 arguing that the evidence with regard to
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`knowledge and intent was insufficient to sustain convictions on each count. (Tr. 959–60.)1F
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`2 I
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`denied the motion, stating: “I think at this stage, the evidence presented is more than ample for
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`this case to go to the jury for the reasons the government mentioned.” (Id. 962.) I then
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`mentioned the email, texts, and testimony demonstrating Dwight Howard’s desire to own a
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`Women’s National Basketball Association (“WNBA”) team. (Id.) I described the vision plan as
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`being used “to entice Mr. Howard, Mr. Brock, Mr. Schmidt, and others that this was a deal that
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`was heavily supported in a way that — I think Mr. Brock testified in a way that was sort of
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`unique in terms the sort of the WNBA team.” (Id. 963.) With regard to the scheme to defraud
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`Chandler Parsons, I commented that allowing the case to go to the jury was supported by the
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`email and texts admitted in evidence. (Id.)
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`Darden called two witnesses in his case on October 1 and October 2, 2024. The
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`Government did not call any witnesses in rebuttal. At the conclusion of his witnesses’
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`testimony, Darden renewed his oral Rule 29 motion. Specifically, Defense counsel stated that
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`with “respect to each of the five counts, . . . that the government has presented insufficient
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`evidence on the elements of knowledge and intent as it relates to each count to sustain a
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`conviction under those individual counts.” (Tr. 1093.) The defense did not make any additional
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`1 Because I tested positive for COVID, jury selection was paused midday on September 17, and was resumed and
`completed on September 23–24, 2024.
`2 “Tr.” refers to the transcript of the trial.
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`2
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`arguments with regard to the motion. The Government, referenced its prior remarks related to
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`the Rule 29 motion made after the close of its case, and then stated that “there’s an abundance of
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`evidence demonstrating that the jury could find the defendant guilty.” (Id.) I commented that
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`my statements at the close of the Government’s case concerning Darden’s Rule 29 motion were
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`“equally applicable here, so they should be considered as reiterated in connection with my denial
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`at that time,” and I went on to say that “my views have not changed concerning the evidence, and
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`I do believe there’s more than sufficient evidence to present the case to the jury with regard to
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`each of the counts and the elements of those counts, and that nothing that has been presented in
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`the defense case would cause me to change that view concerning the Rule 29 application.” (Id.)
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`After summations on October 3, 2024, the jury began deliberations. On October 4, 2024,
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`the jury convicted Darden on all five counts of the Indictment. Darden filed his motion pursuant
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`to Rules 29 and 33 on November 13, 2024. (Doc. 231.) The Government filed its opposition on
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`December 6, 2024. (Doc. 237.)
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` Legal Standards
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`A.
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`Rule 29
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`Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c)(2) provides, in part, that “[i]f the jury has
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`returned a guilty verdict, the court may set aside the verdict and enter an acquittal.” A district
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`court may enter a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 “only if, after viewing the evidence in the
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`light most favorable to the prosecution and drawing all reasonable inferences in the
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`government’s favor, it concludes no rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty
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`beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Reyes, 302 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing
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`Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). In other words, the “evidence that the defendant
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`committed the crime alleged [must be] nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury could
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`3
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`find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” for a court to acquit. United States v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d
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`122, 130 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). When making this determination a
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`court cannot usurp the role of the jury or “substitute its own determination of . . . the weight of
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`the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn for that of the jury.” Id. at 129 (quoting
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`United States v. Mariani, 725 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir. 1984)). The court must “consider the
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`evidence in its totality, not in isolation, and the government need not negate every theory of
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`innocence.” United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). If
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`“the court concludes that either of the two results, a reasonable doubt or no reasonable doubt, is
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`fairly possible, [the court] must let the jury decide the matter.” Guadagna, 183 F.3d at 129
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`(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant faces a “heavy burden”
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`in meeting this standard. United States v. Bullock, 550 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 2008).
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`B.
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`Rule 33
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`“Upon the defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if
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`the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). A district court has “broad
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`discretion . . . to set aside a jury verdict and order a new trial to avert a perceived miscarriage of
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`justice.” United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1413 (2d Cir. 1992). However, the court
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`must “strike a balance between weighing the evidence and credibility of witnesses and not
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`wholly usurping the role of the jury.” United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir.
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`2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is the jury’s role to weigh the evidence and assess a
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`witness’s credibility, and a district court generally “must defer to the jury’s resolution” of those
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`issues. United States v. Bell, 584 F.3d 478, 483 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting Sanchez,
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`969 F.2d at 1414). “Matters of the choice between competing inferences, the credibility of the
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`witnesses, and the weight of the evidence are within the province of the jury, and [a court is] not
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`entitled to second-guess the jury’s assessments.” United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1221–22
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`(2d Cir. 1992) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir.
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`2006) (explaining that a court may not “substitute its own determination of . . . the weight of the
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`evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn for that of the jury” (internal quotation marks
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`omitted)). Indeed, only in “exceptional circumstances” may a trial judge “intrude upon the jury
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`function of credibility assessment.” Sanchez, 969 F.2d at 1414.
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`“The ultimate test on a Rule 33 motion is whether letting a guilty verdict stand would be
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`a manifest injustice. The trial court must be satisfied that competent, satisfactory and sufficient
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`evidence in the record supports the jury verdict.” Ferguson, 246 F.3d at 134 (internal quotation
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`marks omitted). “There must be a real concern that an innocent person may have been
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`convicted. It is only when it appears that an injustice has been done that there is a need for a new
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`trial in the interest of justice.” Bell, 584 F.3d at 483 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The
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`defendant bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to a new trial.” United States v.
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`McCourty, 562 F.3d 458, 475 (2d Cir. 2009). Where a defendant fails to demonstrate that an
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`erroneous evidentiary ruling resulted in “manifest injustice” he has not met his burden under
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`Rule 33 and is not entitled to a new trial. See McCourty, 562 F.3d at 477.
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` Discussion
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`Darden seeks a judgment of acquittal, or, in the alternative, for an order granting him a
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`new trial. With regard to his argument for a judgment of acquittal, Darden claims that the
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`evidence related to materiality was insufficient to sustain convictions on Counts One (conspiracy
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`to commit wire fraud and bank fraud), Two (wire fraud), and Three (bank fraud). With regard to
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`Counts Four (conspiracy to commit money laundering) and Count Five (money laundering),
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`Darden does not assert an independent legal basis for acquittal but attempts to bootstrap these
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`5
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`charges based on the fact that the “specified unlawful activity” referenced in these counts is the
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`wire fraud and bank fraud charged in Counts Two and Three.2F
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`3 In the alternative, Darden seeks a
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`new trial based on the purported bias of a witness called by the Government.
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`Because there is more than ample evidence in the record of Darden’s material, false
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`statements related to Dwight Howard and Chandler Parsons, the fraud victims from whom
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`Darden stole $7 million and $1 million, respectively, Darden’s motion for judgment of acquittal
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`is DENIED. With regard to Darden’s motion for a new trial, because the evidence upon which
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`Darden bases his motion for a new trial does not raise a concern that Darden was convicted
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`despite being innocent, Darden’s motion for a new trial is DENIED.
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`Below, I set forth the basis for my decision first with regard to Darden’s motion for a
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`judgment of acquittal and then turn to the motion for a new trial.
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`A. Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal
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`1. Applicable Law
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`The elements of wire fraud are: (1) “a scheme or artifice to defraud or to obtain or retain
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`money or property by materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises”;
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`(2) “that the defendant knowingly and willfully participated in the scheme or artifice to defraud,
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`with knowledge of its fraudulent nature and with specific intent to defraud”; and (3) “that in
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`execution of that scheme, the defendant used or caused the use of interstate wires.” (Tr. 1244.)
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`Similarly, the elements of bank fraud are: (1) “a scheme to obtain money or property that was
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`under the custody or control of a bank by means of materially false or fraudulent pretenses,
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`3 The defense argues that the money laundering charges, which accuse Darden of laundering the proceeds of
`criminal activity—in this case wire and mail fraud—must fail because of the alleged lack of evidence supporting one
`of the elements of wire and mail fraud. Although the defense is correct that the Government must prove beyond a
`reasonable doubt that Darden committed all elements of the underlying offense, see United States v. Silver, 948 F.3d
`538, 576 (2d Cir. 2020), I find that there is ample evidence in the record supporting the jury’s verdict as to wire
`fraud and mail fraud and therefore the defense’s arguments as to the money laundering charges necessarily fail.
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`6
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`representations, or promises”; (2) “the defendant acted knowingly, willfully, and with a specific
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`intent to obtain money or property that was under the control of a bank”; and (3) “at the time of
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`the scheme, the bank that was the target of the scheme was insured by the Federal Deposit
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`Insurance Corporation.” (Id. 1253–54.)
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`“[M]ateriality is an element of the federal . . . wire fraud[] and bank fraud statutes.”
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`Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 4 (1999). “In general, a false statement is material if it has ‘a
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`natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making
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`body to which it was addressed.’” Id. at 16 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509
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`(1995)). Whether a statement is material is analyzed using an objective test. See United States v.
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`Frenkel, 682 F. App’x 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (“[A] matter is material if ‘a
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`reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his
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`choice of action in the transaction in question’” (emphasis omitted)); see also Lee v. Union Mut.
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`Fire Ins. Co., No. 22-3142-CV, 2023 WL 7014138, at *3 (2d Cir. Oct. 25, 2023) (summary
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`order) (“The ‘reasonable person’ standard is an objective one.” (citations omitted)).
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`As I instructed the jury,
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`A statement or representation is false if it is untrue when made and was then known
`to be untrue by the person making it or causing it to be made. A statement may
`also be false if it contains half truths, conceals material facts, or is ambiguous or
`incomplete in a manner that makes what is said or represented misleading or
`deceptive.
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`The deception need not be based upon spoken or written words alone. The
`arrangement of the words, the circumstances in which they are used, or the
`defendant’s conduct may convey the false and deceptive appearance. If there is
`deception, the manner in which it is accomplished does not matter.
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`(Tr. 1244–45.) A “false or fraudulent ‘statement need not have exerted actual influence, so long
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`as it was intended to do so and had the capacity to do so.’” United States v. Madakor, 29 F.
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`App’x 636, 638 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Gregg, 179 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir.
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`7
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`1999)); see also United States v. Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[R]eliance is not an
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`element of criminal fraud, while materiality is.” (citing Neder, 527 U.S. 24–25 (1999))); cf.
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`United States v. Cleary, 565 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The essence of the crime was the
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`making of false statements with intent to influence [defendant], and whether or not [defendant]
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`was actually induced to rely upon them is irrelevant.” (citations omitted)). A jury finding as to
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`the materiality of a misrepresentation will only be overturned if no rational jury could make that
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`finding. See United States v. Litvak, 808 F.3d 160, 175 (2d Cir. 2015).
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`2. Application
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`a. The Scheme to Defraud Dwight Howard
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`With regard to the wire fraud and bank fraud charges, Darden argues that “the
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`Government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any alleged misrepresentations . . .
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`were ‘material’”, and therefore such misrepresentations “w[ere] insufficient to warrant
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`conviction in this matter.” (Doc. 231 at 2.) Darden is wrong, and ignores or improperly
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`dismisses the impact of the misrepresentations he and his co-conspirator Charles Briscoe
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`communicated to Howard, individuals affiliated with Howard, and individuals affiliated with the
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`Atlanta Dream (“Dream”), related to the purchase of the Dream, including in the Vision Plan.3F
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`4 It
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`was more than reasonable for the jury to come to the conclusion that these misrepresentations
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`were all intended to convince Howard to send money to purchase the Dream.
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`Darden ignores the fact that the jury was entitled to draw inferences concerning what the
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`intended consequences of the misrepresentations were from the unrebutted fact that Howard sent
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`$7 million to Darden and Briscoe and he received nothing in return. Darden also fails to address
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`the fact that the money trail unequivocally demonstrated that rather than spend the money to
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`4 Darden refers to the vision plan as the vision board throughout his motion papers. (See generally Doc. 231.)
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`8
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`purchase the Dream or to finance Darden Sports Group—as Darden claimed at trial and in his
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`brief—he went on an almost $6 million personal spending spree shortly after taking possession
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`of Howard’s $7 million.
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`Darden argues that the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
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`alleged misrepresentations were material, and therefore were insufficient to warrant conviction in
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`this matter. (Doc. 231 at 2.) Darden claims that “the only possible ‘material representation’ that
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`could be attributed to Mr. Darden regarding [Dwight Howard], relates to the ‘vision’ board.”
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`(Id. at 7.) Darden then asserts that there is no credible evidence that “[Dwight Howard] (or
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`anyone else) in this case relied on the vision board to provide any amount of money to Mr.
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`Darden or his alleged co-conspirator in this matter.” (Id.) Darden is wrong.
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`The Vision Plan was prepared by Darden, (GXs 2401, 2402, 2404), and paid for by
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`Howard according to an invoice from Legacy Consulting Corporation4F
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`5 (“Legacy”), (GX 2303,
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`Tr. 374, 547). Darden provided the Vision Plan to Briscoe. (GX 2402.) Briscoe then provided a
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`copy of the Vision Plan to Howard. (Tr. 375.) Darden also provided a copy of the Vision Plan
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`to John Brock, (Tr. 88–90; GX 2119), the husband of one of the prior owners of the Dream, and
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`“the primary contact to sell the Atlanta Dream.” (Tr. 75.)
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`In general, the Vision Plan served as a representation that the Darden Sports Group
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`would be used as a vehicle to purchase the Dream. (See, e.g., GX 2119A at 2 (“Darden Sports
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`Group (‘DSG’), led by prominent Atlanta businessman, Cal Darden, Sr., is proud to have an
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`opportunity to become the next owner of the WNBA’s Atlanta Dream.”); GX 2404A at 2
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`(same).) This representation and most of the other representations in the Vision Plan were false.
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`The Vision Plan contains a slide that purports to depict the members of an advisory board
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`5 The account name is Legacy AC, LLC.
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`9
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`to Darden Sports Group, the entity that was seeking to purchase the Dream. The advisory board
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`slide lists eight purported members of the advisory board. The members of the advisory board
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`were prominent business executives, including executives in the fields of music, film, and
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`coffeehouses; famous and accomplished sports athletes; artists, including an actor, an actress,
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`writers, directors, and producers; and a former politician. (Doc. 237 at 8.) This slide asserts that
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`“[e]ach board member has committed to using their ideas, voices, platforms, resources,
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`relationships and influence to support the Atlanta Dream and its various initiatives.” (GX 2144A
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`at 8). These representations were untrue.
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`Another slide of the Vision Plan lists 16 companies—identified by their corporate logos
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`on the slide—as corporate partners of the Darden Sports Group. Some of these purported
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`corporate partners are multinational corporations, some headquartered in or with ties to Atlanta,
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`Georgia, the home of the Dream. This slide asserts that each company was “committed to
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`investing in and across the Dream’s various platforms and properties immediately upon the
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`closing of DSG’s proposed acquisition.” (GX 2144A at 18). These representations, like those
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`about the advisory board, were untrue.
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`As the Government details in its opposition, numerous witnesses testified to the falsity of
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`the statements in the Vision Plan concerning the relationship of advisory board members and the
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`corporate sponsors to the Darden Sports Group, Darden, Briscoe, and the Dream.
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`Issa Rae. The Vision Plan identified actress and writer Issa Rae as a
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`member of the advisory board. GX 2144A at 8. Rae testified that she knew neither
`Darden nor Briscoe and that she never agreed to serve on the advisory board. Tr.
`at 221-25.
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`Aflac. The Vision Plan identified Aflac as a corporate sponsor. GX 2144A
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`at 18. Jennifer McMullin, a senior brand manager at Aflac, testified that Aflac had
`never, to her knowledge, even had preliminary discussions about any such
`sponsorship, and that she would likely have known about any such sponsorship if
`it existed. Tr. 213-20.
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`Tyler Perry and Tyler Perry Studios. The Vision Plan identified filmmaker
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`Tyler Perry as a member of the advisory board, and it listed Perry’s company, Tyler
`Perry Studios, as a corporate sponsor. GX 2144A at 8, 18. The Vision Plan also
`claimed that Darden Sports Group and Tyler Perry Studios had ‘agreed to form a
`joint venture production company’ that would promote the Atlanta Dream. Id. at
`22. Brannon Anthony, the general counsel for Tyler Perry Studios, testified that he
`was not aware of either Tyler Perry or Tyler Perry Studios having any conversations
`about these issues or agreeing to do any of the things the Vision Plan claimed. Tr.
`853-62[.]
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`Naomi Osaka. The Vision Plan identified professional tennis player Naomi
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`Osaka as a member of the advisory board. Stuart Duguid, Osaka’s agent, testified
`that Osaka had never agreed to serve on the advisory board. Tr. at 845-51.
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`Rosalind Brewer and Starbucks Coffee. The Vision Plan identified
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`corporate executive Rosalind Brewer as a member of the advisory board, and listed
`Starbucks Coffee as a corporate sponsor. GX 2144A at 8, 18. Brewer, the former
`Chief Operating Officer of Starbucks Coffee, testified that she never agreed to serve
`on the advisory board, and that Starbucks Coffee was not to her knowledge a
`corporate sponsor. Tr. at 925-35.
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`Jennifer Baltimore. The Vision Plan identified music industry executive
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`Jennifer Baltimore as a member of the advisory board, and also as one of the owners
`of the Darden Sports Group. GX 2144A at 2, 8. Baltimore testified that, while she
`knew Darden and discussed the acquisition of the Dream with him, she did not
`agree to serve on an advisory board and was not one of the owners of the Darden
`Sports Group. Tr. at 269-78[.]
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`(Doc. 237 at 9–10.) Although Darden had no obligation to put on a defense case or to cross
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`examine any witnesses, (Tr. 1234), he called two witnesses in his own defense and his counsel
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`cross-examined some of the Government’s witnesses, including some of the above witnesses.
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`During the cross-examination of these witnesses, Darden did not challenge the substance of their
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`testimony that neither they nor their companies had any knowledge of or affiliation with the
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`advisory board or Darden Sports Group. With regard to other witnesses, Darden did not ask a
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`single question. Thus, the falsity of the statements outlined above from the Vision Plan were
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`unrebutted.
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`Darden lied to Brock by providing him with the Vision Plan and by responding to a direct
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`question posed by Brock confirming that each of the advisory board members had committed to
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`being on the advisory board, (Tr. 92–93), and he also falsely told Brock that he had discussions
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`with each of the purported corporate sponsors, (id. 93–94). Darden also provided the Vision
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`Plan to Christopher Sienko, the General Manager of the Dream between 2018 and April 2021.
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`Based upon the Vision Plan, Sienko believed that the advisory board and the corporate sponsors
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`were real, (id. 1078–79), and he advised Darden that any presentation to the WNBA “should not
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`be pie in the sky”, (id. 1080).
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`The Vision Plan was also provided to Jeffrey Schmidt and Serge Ecityan, who were
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`banking professionals affiliated with Dwight Howard working at BMO Bank N.A. (“BMO”).
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`(Tr. 769–70, 775–76.) Darden also deceived others about the nature of his father’s involvement
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`in the process to purchase the Dream, including by impersonating his father in emails and on the
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`phone to Howard’s bankers at BMO, and Briscoe. (Doc. 237 at 18–19.)
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`Although these representations were not made directly to Howard, they were made to
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`individuals or entities affiliated with Howard and/or related to the purchase or sale of the Dream.
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`It was critical to Darden’s plan that these individuals believe the representations that he was
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`making. It was reasonable for the jury to infer that the lies told to representatives of Howard
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`were intended to ensure that Howard’s advisors were either duped into believing the lies or that
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`the lies placated them enough that they would not raise concerns with Howard concerning
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`relinquishing his $7 million. With regard to representatives of the Dream, the lies were intended
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`to ensure that the Darden Sports Group was taken as a legitimate potential purchaser for the
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`Dream. Here again, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that the lies told to representatives of
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`the Dream were intended to keep the Darden Sports Group as a contender for the purchase of the
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`Dream, so that Darden would be able to convince Howard that for $7 million he was going to
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`purchase the Dream. The law is clear a “false or fraudulent ‘statement need not have exerted
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`actual influence, so long as it was intended to do so and had the capacity to do so.’” Madakor,
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`29 F. App’x at 638. Not only did the Government meet its burden but the evidence also
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`demonstrated that false statements actually caused Howard to send $7 million to Darden and
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`Briscoe for which he got nothing. Therefore, Darden’s motion for a judgement of acquittal on
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`the basis that the Government failed to prove the materiality of the false representations made in
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`connection with the scheme to defraud Dwight Howard is DENIED.
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`b. The Scheme to Defraud Chandler Parsons
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`Similarly, with regard to the fraud committed against Chandler Parsons, “Darden and
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`Briscoe defrauded Parsons of $1 million by employing . . . material falsehoods” by soliciting
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`Parsons for money “based on the false claim that the money would be used as a loan to NBA
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`prospect James Wiseman.” (Doc. 237 at 2.) Darden ignores or improperly dismisses the
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`misrepresentations he and his co-conspirator Charles Briscoe made to Parsons related to James
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`Wiseman, including, as noted, that the money was to be a loan to Wiseman, creating and using a
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`forged contract purportedly showing that Wiseman had signed with Briscoe’s sports agency, and
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`that Parson’s money was guaranteed by two promissory notes. (Id.) Darden also ignores the fact
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`that Parsons wired $1 million to Briscoe and the next day Briscoe wired $544,000 to Darden’s
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`Legacy AC, LLC account. As with the money sent by Dwight Howard, the money Parsons
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`wired was not used for the represented purpose. None of Parsons’s money was given to
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`Wiseman, and Wiseman in fact had no knowledge of the purported loan despite the fact that
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`Parsons was told he would be the recipient. Nor did Parsons get any money back.
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`With regard to the two promissory notes, one “promissory note dated the day of
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`Parsons’s wire said that Chandler Parsons had loaned Briscoe Sports Group (an entity controlled
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`13
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`Case 1:23-cr-00134-VSB Document 268 Filed 03/25/25 Page 14 of 17
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`by Briscoe) $1 million, and that Briscoe Sports Group would repay it with interest (the
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`‘Parsons/Briscoe Note’),” and the “second promissory note said that Briscoe Sports Group had
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`loaned Darden Enterprises, LLC (an entity controlled by Darden) $1 million, and that Darden
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`Enterprises, LLC would repay it with interest (the “Briscoe/Darden Note”).” (Id. at 11.) The
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`promissory notes were intended to convince Parsons to send the $1 million by assuring him of
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`repayment from two entities. (Id. at 2, 11–12, 36–38.) It was reasonable for the jury to infer
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`from these facts that Briscoe and Darden intended that the false representations, including
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`creating two promissory notes that amounted to guarantees, were made to get Parsons to wire the
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`money.
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`Darden’s claim that “there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Darden said or did
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`anything related to [Parsons] that had a ‘natural tendency to influence’ his decision and
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`importantly Athlete 2 did not say that he did,” (Doc. 231 at 10), is belied by the record. With
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`regard to the two promissory notes, Darden’s role in the fraud against Parsons was in part
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`established through the electronic communications between Briscoe and Darden. (Doc. 237 at
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`11–13.) Those communications established that “it was Darden’s idea to create the
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`Parsons/Briscoe Note and the Briscoe/Darden Note to paper the fraud and provide false
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`assurance to Parsons that he would be paid back.” (Id. at 12.) Indeed, more generally, the
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`emails, summarized in the Government’s opposition brief, document Darden pressing Briscoe to
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`apply pressure on Parsons to send the money. (Id. at 12 (“On November 16 and 17, 2019,
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`Darden sent Briscoe a number of messages pressing him to confirm Parsons’s agreement.”
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`(citing GX 401-267 at 5–10); “On November 18, 2019, Darden messaged Briscoe, ‘I think
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`having BSG [Briscoe Sports Group] guarantee the money (with Darden Enterprises backing
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`BSG) could work also. Just a thought.’” (citing GX 401-283); “Also on November 19, 2019,
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`14
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`Case 1:23-cr-00134-VSB Document 268 Filed 03/25/25 Page 15 of 17
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`Darden pushed Briscoe to convince Parsons to wire the funds, writing, ‘you should speak to CP.
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`Let him know you got the loan agreement signed with a personal guaranty in the event of default
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`. . . CP trusts you. So if he knows you have an agreement signed and guaranteed, and he wants
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`to do the deal, he just needs to authorize it. He left it up to you to do the diligence, so now he
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`just needs to know everything is done and there’s no risk of him not getting his money back.’”
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`(citing GX 401-295 at 1); “On November 20, 2019, the day of the wire, Darden again pushed
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`Briscoe to convince Parsons to send the wire, writing, ‘[w]e need to get this done for a multitude
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`of reasons. Mainly, to have the # 1 draft pick, but to also get Jonathan off our backs.’ . . . Later
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`that day, Darden wrote, ‘even if it [sic] 750, we’re good. That gets them the 450 they owe, plus
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`300 to J Blue.’” (citing GX 401-308 at 1, 4)).) Therefore, contrary to Darden’s claim, he was
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`fully engaged in the scheme to defraud Parsons, including by coming up with specific ways
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`intended to convince Parsons to wire the $1 million. Darden provided Briscoe with the
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`Briscoe/Darden Note the day before Parsons wired the $1 million to Briscoe Sports Group,
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`provided wire instructions for his Legacy AC, LLC account, and the day after Parsons wired the
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`$1 million Briscoe wired $544,000 to Darden’s Legacy AC, LLC account. Darden used his
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`share of the fraud proceeds on personal items, including the purchase of a Mercedes G63, a
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`Rolls-Royce, and watches totaling $88,500. The evidence before the jury demonstrated explicit
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`false representations