Case 1:23-cv-05177 Document 1 Filed 06/20/23 Page 1 of 80
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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`GANNETT CO., INC.
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`-against-
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`GOOGLE LLC and ALPHABET INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`Defendants.
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`CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-cv-5177
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`COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND
`INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`Case 1:23-cv-05177 Document 1 Filed 06/20/23 Page 2 of 80
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 
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`PARTIES ........................................................................................................................................ 6 
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE ..................................................................................................... 7 
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`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ......................................................................................................... 8 
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`I. 
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`BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................ 8 
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`A. 
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`B. 
`
`C. 
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`The Sale of Online Display Advertising ................................................................. 8 
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`Ad-Tech Products ................................................................................................. 10 
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`Google’s Manipulation of Real-Time Bidding ..................................................... 14 
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`1. 
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`2. 
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`3. 
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`4. 
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`Dynamic Allocation .................................................................................. 15 
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`Last Look .................................................................................................. 16 
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`Unified Auction ........................................................................................ 18 
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`Other Forms of Insider Trading ................................................................ 19 
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`II. 
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`RELEVANT MARKETS AND GOOGLE’S MARKET POWER .................................. 19 
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`A. 
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`Publisher Ad Servers............................................................................................. 19 
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`1. 
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`2. 
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`Market Definition...................................................................................... 19 
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`Monopoly Power ....................................................................................... 21 
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`B. 
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`Ad Exchanges ....................................................................................................... 22 
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`1. 
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`2. 
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`Market Definition...................................................................................... 22 
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`Monopoly Power ....................................................................................... 23 
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`C. 
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`General Search Services ....................................................................................... 25 
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`1. 
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`2. 
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`Market Definition...................................................................................... 25 
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`Market Power ............................................................................................ 26 
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`III. 
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`UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ................................................................................................ 27 
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`A. 
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`Google Monopolizes Publisher Ad Serving ......................................................... 27 
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`Case 1:23-cv-05177 Document 1 Filed 06/20/23 Page 3 of 80
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`1. 
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`2. 
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`3. 
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`Google ties AdX to DFP (2008 – 2018) ................................................... 28 
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`Google Ad Manager (2018 – Present) ...................................................... 31 
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`Google Eliminates Client-Side Header Bidding (2014 – Present) ............ 31 
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`B. 
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`Google Abuses DFP to Monopolize the Market for Ad Exchanges ..................... 32 
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`1. 
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`2. 
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`3. 
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`4. 
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`5. 
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`6. 
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`7. 
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`8. 
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`9. 
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`10. 
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`11. 
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`Google Hashes User IDs (2009 – Present) ............................................... 33 
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`Last Look (2014 – 2019)........................................................................... 35 
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`Enhanced Dynamic Allocation (2014 – Present) ...................................... 38 
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`Project Bernanke (2013 – Present) ........................................................... 40 
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`Dynamic Revenue Share (2014 – Present) ............................................... 43 
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`Exchange Bidding (2018 – Present) ......................................................... 46 
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`Minimum Bid to Win (2018 – Present) .................................................... 48 
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`Projects Poirot and Elmo (2018 – Present) ............................................... 50 
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`Google Redacts Datasets (2018 – Present) ............................................... 51 
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`Google Manipulates DFP to Artificially Deflate Bids from Rival
`Exchanges (2017 – Present) ...................................................................... 52 
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`Google Eliminates Prices Floors and Imposes Unified Pricing Rules
`(2018 – Present) ........................................................................................ 54 
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`C. 
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`Google Abuses its Search Monopoly to Monopolize Ad Exchanges (2016 –
`2021) ..................................................................................................................... 58 
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`IV. 
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`ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS ..................................................................................... 61 
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`A. 
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`B. 
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`Publisher Ad Servers............................................................................................. 62 
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`Ad Exchanges ....................................................................................................... 63 
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`CLAIMS ....................................................................................................................................... 66 
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`I. 
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`II. 
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`COUNT 1 — MONOPOLIZATION OF THE MARKET FOR PUBLISHER AD
`SERVERS IN VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 2......................... 66 
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`COUNT 2 — MONOPOLIZATION OF THE MARKET FOR AD EXCHANGES
`IN VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 2 ........................................... 66 
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`ii
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`Case 1:23-cv-05177 Document 1 Filed 06/20/23 Page 4 of 80
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`III. 
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`IV. 
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`V. 
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`COUNT 3 — ATTEMPTED MONOPOLIZATION OF THE MARKET FOR AD
`EXCHANGES IN VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 2 .................. 67 
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`COUNT 4 — UNLAWFUL TYING IN VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT,
`15 U.S.C. § 1 ..................................................................................................................... 68 
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`COUNT 5 — UNLAWFUL DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES IN VIOLATION
`OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW §§ 349-350 .......................................... 69 
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`VI. 
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`COUNT 6 — COMMON-LAW FRAUD ........................................................................ 73 
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`VII.  COUNT 7 — UNJUST ENRICHMENT .......................................................................... 74 
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`PRAYER FOR RELIEF ............................................................................................................... 75 
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`DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL .................................................................................................... 75 
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`Case 1:23-cv-05177 Document 1 Filed 06/20/23 Page 5 of 80
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`1.
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`Plaintiff Gannett Co., Inc. is a digitally focused media and marketing solutions
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`company that owns over 500 digital news and media brands, including USA TODAY and its
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`network of local properties in the United States and the United Kingdom, as well over 200 daily
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`print news media brands. By total daily circulation, Gannett is the largest news media publisher
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`in the United States.
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`2.
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`For centuries, Gannett has been in the business of local news — its oldest
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`newspaper, the Poughkeepsie Journal Sentinel, has been in circulation since 1785. Today, 43
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`states are home to a Gannett publication, including longstanding local papers like Detroit Free
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`Press, Indianapolis Star, and Arizona Republic. Gannett’s newspapers deliver leading national
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`news and the local stories that bind our communities together and encourage civic engagement.
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`3.
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`As Gannett’s readers have moved online, its publications have innovated to
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`provide sophisticated and engaging content on the internet. For example, USA TODAY has been
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`a pioneer in reader-friendly charts and graphics for decades. Gannett’s local publications have
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`adopted video formats and photo galleries to deliver the news. And, most importantly, the
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`internet has made it possible for Gannett’s publications to circulate more news stories and reach
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`a wider audience. Never before has there been a greater opportunity for readers to get the news.
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`4.
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`Digital news publishing also has opened a new frontier for news and other
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`publications to earn revenue: digital advertising. Now publishers can do more than negotiate
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`print advertising deals on an advertiser-by-advertiser basis. Across its publications, Gannett can
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`use sophisticated, enterprise-level software to auction off ad space to advertisers who want to
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`display an ad on a particular page to a particular user. Because ad space is bought and sold
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`electronically, Gannett can sell millions of ad slots (called “impressions”) every day.
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`5.
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`Today, online digital advertising is a $200 billion business — a nine-fold increase
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`since 2009. Yet, despite the opportunity for publishers to produce more news content and earn
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`more revenue, news publications’ advertising revenue has declined by nearly 70% over the same
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`timeframe. As a result, newspaper newsroom employment has dropped by more than half, and
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`more than 20% of all newspapers have closed. The circulation of daily and weekly newspapers
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`has decreased by more than 40%.
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`6.
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`Gannett has not been spared. Since 2019 — just the past four years — over 170
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`Gannett publications have been shuttered. For Gannett’s largest remaining publications, average
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`daily circulation fell by nearly 20% between 2020 and 2021 alone. The result is less news where
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`it is needed most. Communities throughout the United States now do not have a suitable local
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`paper to advise on local events, hold local officials to account, or encourage the civic bonds that
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`are paramount in an increasingly polarized country.
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`7.
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`Publishers are not suffering because readers demand less online content. Growing
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`numbers of U.S. readers get their news online, and spending on online advertising to reach those
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`readers has exploded. Rather, publishers do not see the growing ad spending because Google
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`and its parent Alphabet unlawfully have acquired and maintain monopolies for the advertising
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`technology (“ad tech”) tools that publishers and advertisers use to buy and sell online ad space.
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`8.
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`Google controls how publishers sell their ad slots, and it forces publishers to sell
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`growing shares of that ad space to Google at depressed prices. The result is dramatically less
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`revenue for publishers and Google’s ad-tech rivals, while Google enjoys exorbitant monopoly
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`profits.
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`9.
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`Virtually all major U.S. news publishers, and many thousands of smaller
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`publishers, use a “publisher ad server” to manage their inventory of impressions. Among other
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`core functions, the ad server identifies when an impression is available for sale, solicits bids for
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`the impression, and ultimately chooses which bid is the winner. Google’s publisher ad server,
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`DoubleClick for Publishers (“DFP”), controls over 90% of the publisher-ad-server market.
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`10. When an ad server calls for bids to fill an impression, it usually does not call
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`advertisers directly. Rather, the ad server solicits bids from “ad exchanges,” which organize
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`real-time auctions among participating buyers. Each exchange returns a bid from its winning
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`buyer, and the ad server then chooses the winning exchange. Google’s exchange, DoubleClick
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`Ad Exchange (“AdX”), controls over 60% of the exchange market. Most of Google’s exchange
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`rivals have market shares in the single digits. And, critically, the buyers in Google’s exchange
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`are unique. Google largely prohibits them from participating in any other exchange.
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`11. With control over the largest ad exchange and ad server — both of which Google
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`acquired rather than developed — Google has carried out a sophisticated, anticompetitive, and
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`deceptive scheme for well over a decade.
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`12.
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`First, Google has tied its ad exchange (AdX) to its publisher ad server (DFP).
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`Gannett and the entire U.S. publishing industry cannot practically reach 60% of buyers without
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`using DFP. Predictably, Google’s tie has forced publishers to use DFP, which has eliminated
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`virtually every remaining publisher-ad-serving rival.
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`13.
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`Second, with control over ad serving, Google defeats competition among
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`exchanges and drives down prices for publishers’ inventory. Google’s market manipulations
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`have evolved over the years, but the goal has remained the same: Google prohibits publishers
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`from soliciting competitive bids from rival exchanges, while at the same time rigging AdX’s bids
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`by trading on inside information from DFP. To take one example: Google prohibits publishers
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`from communicating publisher-owned data about readers to rival exchanges, which results in
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`rival exchanges returning substantially lower bids. Then, AdX trades on those depressed bids by
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`returning bids that are a penny higher, even though AdX buyers originally submitted
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`substantially higher bids to AdX for the same ad slot. That means Google wins more inventory
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`at depressed prices.
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`14.
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`Google’s scheme has been wildly profitable. For example, in 2022 alone, Google
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`made $30 billion from manipulating auctions for ad space across the internet. That is six times
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`more revenue than every single U.S. news publication made from digital advertising, combined.
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`Google, as middleman, has dwarfed the content creators that invest in journalists, editors,
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`photographers, and many others to produce important news content.
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`15.
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`And Google, as search monopolist, generates billions of dollars in additional
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`revenue by copying publishers’ content on its search engine and other platforms without proper
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`attribution or compensation. In 2022, Google made upwards of $60 billion from third-party
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`news content on its search page. Google thus makes money off publishers both when readers
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`visit a Google page, and even when readers go straight to the source.
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`16.
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`That result is not what should occur in a functioning, competitive market. For
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`that reason, and now for years, antitrust enforcers in the United States and throughout the world
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`have recognized that Google’s unlawful monopolization must be stopped:
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`a.
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`The U.K. Competition and Markets Authority identified Google’s
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`misconduct and the harm to publishers, but concluded it had insufficient injunctive
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`authority to implement a remedy. See Online Platforms and Digital Advertising Market
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`Study Final Report at 20, 60, 394-406 (July 1, 2020) (“Google’s strong position at each
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`level of the intermediation value chain creates clear conflicts of interest, as it has the
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`ability and incentive to exploit its position on both sides of a transaction to favour its own
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`sources of supply and demand.”).
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`b.
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`The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission identified
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`Google’s misconduct and the harm to publishers, and is prescribing compensation and a
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`code of conduct to remedy some of Google’s practices. See Digital Advertising Services
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`Inquiry Interim Report (Dec. 2020).
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`c.
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`The U.S. House Antitrust Subcommittee studied the conduct of Google
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`and other platforms, collecting 1.3 million documents and holding seven hearings. The
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`House Subcommittee found that Google is harming “the free and diverse press” and
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`endangering “political and economic liberty.” Final Report and Recommendations,
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`Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets, at 57-77, 206-11 (Apr. 15, 2021).
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`d.
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`In December 2020, a bipartisan group of 17 State Attorneys General filed
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`suit against Google alleging monopolization and misrepresentations similar to those
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`described in this Complaint. See Texas v. Google LLC, No. 20-cv-00957 (E.D. Tex.
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`Complaint filed Dec. 16, 2020, Fourth Amended Complaint filed May 5, 2023).
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`e.
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`Likewise, in January 2023, the United States and 17 additional State
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`Attorneys General filed suit against Google for unlawful monopolization of the
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`advertising technology markets at issue in this Complaint. See United States v. Google
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`LLC, No. 23-cv-00108 (E.D. Va. Complaint filed Jan. 24, 2023). Among other remedies,
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`the United States is seeking a breakup of Google’s digital advertising monopolies.
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`f.
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`Last week, the European Commission filed its own case against Google
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`alleging unlawful abuse of monopoly power in digital advertising. Like the United
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`States, the Commission is seeking a breakup remedy. In a statement, the head of the
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`Commission explained why divestiture of Google’s ad-tech tools is necessary: “As long
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`as these conflicts of interest remain in place, Google could continue such self-
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`preferencing practices or it could engage in new ones. This market is highly technical
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`market. It is very dynamic. The detection of these behaviours can therefore be very
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`challenging. We have seen this play out concretely: each time a practice was detected by
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`the industry, Google subtly modified its behaviour so as to make it more difficult to
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`detect, but with the same objectives, with the same effects. A remedy requiring Google
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`just to change its behaviour would allow Google to continue doing what it has been doing
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`so far, just under a different disguise.” Remarks by Executive Vice President Margrethe
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`Vestager, AT.40670 Google – Adtech and Data-related practices (June 14, 2023).
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`g.
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`Finally, the leadership of both the Senate and House Antitrust
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`Subcommittees have introduced bills that, among other things, would break Google’s
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`unlawfully acquired dominance over several advertising technology markets and provide
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`additional resources to antitrust enforcers to address Google’s conduct.
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`17.
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`Gannett brings this antitrust action for compensation and for injunctive relief to
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`restore competition in the monopolized markets and safeguard news content for readers.
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`18.
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`Plaintiff Gannett Co., Inc. (“Gannett”) is a publicly traded company incorporated
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`and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware and headquartered in McLean, Virginia.
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`With over 500 news and digital media brands, Gannett is the largest news publisher in the United
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`States. Gannett was formed in November 2019 as the result of a merger between New Media
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`Investment Group, Inc., parent of GateHouse Media, Inc., and Gannett Co., Inc., now known as
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`Gannett Media Corp. and a wholly owned subsidiary of Gannett.
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`19.
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`Defendant Google LLC (“Google”) is a limited liability company organized and
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`existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business in Mountain
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`View, California. Google is an online advertising company providing internet-related products,
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`including various online advertising technologies, directly and through subsidiaries and business
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`units it owns and controls. Google maintains an office in this District at 111 8th Avenue, New
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`York, New York 10011.
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`20.
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`Defendant Alphabet Inc. (“Alphabet”) is a publicly traded company incorporated
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`and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware and headquartered in Mountain View,
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`California. Alphabet was created as a holding company for Google in late 2015, and Alphabet
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`controls Google’s day-to-day operations. Virtually all of Alphabet’s revenue comes from
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`Google. Since December 2019, Alphabet and Google have had the same Chief Executive
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`Officer. As a result of Alphabet’s operational control, Google is Alphabet’s alter ego. This
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`Complaint refers to Google and Alphabet together as “Google.”
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`21.
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`This action arises under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2,
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`and Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26. The Court has subject-matter
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`jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 4, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337(a).
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`22.
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`In addition to pleading violations of federal antitrust law, Gannett alleges
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`violations of state law and seeks relief thereunder. All claims under federal and state law are
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`based upon a common nucleus of operative facts, and the entire action commenced by this
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`Complaint constitutes a single case that ordinarily would be tried in one judicial proceeding.
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`This Court therefore has jurisdiction over the state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
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`Exercising jurisdiction over the state-law claims will avoid unnecessary duplication of actions
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`and supports the interests of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness.
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`23.
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`The Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Google because Google does
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`extensive business within this District — including by providing the monopolized products in
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`this District to Gannett — and this action arises out of Google’s contacts within this District.
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`24.
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`Venue is proper in this District under Sections 4 and 12 of the Clayton Act, 15
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`U.S.C. §§ 15 and 22, and 28 U.S.C. § 1391, because a substantial part of the events or omissions
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`giving rise to Gannett’s claims occurred in this District, and because Google transacts business
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`and is found within and resides in this District.
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`25.
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`26.
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`Google’s conduct affects interstate trade and commerce.
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`Google’s conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on
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`commerce within the United States, which in turn injures Gannett’s United States operations.
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`A.
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`27.
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`The Sale of Online Display Advertising
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`For over a century, Gannett’s newspapers have made high-quality journalism
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`available to Americans from all walks of life. USA TODAY and hundreds of local newspapers
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`have offered engaging, affordable news by selling advertisements alongside their content. Any
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`revenue generated from subscriptions or newsstand fees cannot, alone, fund Gannett’s extensive
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`investments in national or local news. The cost of news for most Americans would be
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`unsustainable without advertising revenue to sustain core news-reporting operations.
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`28.
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`Historically, with paper circulations, Gannett’s publications could sell ad space
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`only for static print advertisements. Everyone who picked up a print newspaper saw the same
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`ads, despite their varied profiles and interests. That meant advertisers would have to present ads
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`to a wide and variable audience just to reach the slice of readers they actually wanted to target.
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`As a result, readers saw ads that were not relevant to them, advertisers spent money to reach
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`customers outside the market, and publishers’ ad space was less valuable.
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`29.
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`Americans’ move online fundamentally has transformed news publishing and
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`advertising. Today, more than 86% of Americans consume news content over the internet.
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`Publishers can deliver new forms of content — e.g., infographics, videos, photo essays — almost
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`instantaneously to readers. No longer must readers wait for the next day’s paper to get the news.
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`30.
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`And rather than the static print ads of the twentieth century, publishers present
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`what are known as “display ads” to their readers — image, text, and video-based ads that appear
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`on the reader’s screen alongside the publisher’s content. With the move to online content,
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`Gannett can display unique ads on each page and for each reader that visits its news sites.
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`31.
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`Specifically, publishers like Gannett sell their ad space to advertisers on an
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`“impression-by-impression” basis. As each reader loads a Gannett webpage — for any of its
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`national or local newspapers — Gannett can fill each ad slot (called an “impression”) with an ad
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`targeted to that particular user. So, different readers on the same Gannett page can see different
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`ads that are relevant to them. That makes publishers’ ad space markedly more valuable to
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`advertisers, who no longer need to spend ad dollars where they are unlikely to make a difference,
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`and to readers, who are more likely to see advertisements in line with their interests.
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`32.
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`Generally speaking, publishers sell impressions through two sales channels: the
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`“direct” and “indirect” channels. Direct sales are pre-negotiated between publishers and
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`advertisers, including advertising campaigns sold by the publisher’s internal sales staff. Gannett
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`often reserves its most valuable advertising space (e.g., banners at the top of the page, full-screen
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`sponsored ads during important sporting events) for the direct-sales channel. Advertisers also
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`value direct sales because they permit greater flexibility and customization in how an advertiser
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`can present its advertisement. For example, they can purchase a set of impressions over a
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`particular time frame, targeted to a particular audience, and appearing on a particular section of a
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`publisher’s website. When a reader arrives at a Gannett site and fulfills a direct deal’s criteria,
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`Gannett instantaneously loads the direct advertisement pursuant to the direct deal.
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`33.
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`Indirect sales, by contrast, do not involve prior negotiation between publisher and
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`advertiser. Instead, publishers auction off their ad space in real time through electronic trading
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`venues called “ad exchanges.” When a reader arrives at a Gannett site, and no direct deal applies
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`or is available, Gannett solicits bids from exchanges, who contact their participating advertisers
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`and solicit their offers for the impression. At the conclusion of this process, Gannett chooses the
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`winning ad and loads it onto the webpage, all before the page finishes loading on the browser.
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`The process of auctioning off impression “inventory” and loading the ad takes less than half a
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`second.
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`34.
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`This process is repeated for each reader and each page the reader visits on a
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`Gannett website. As discussed, that allows advertisers to target their ads to the particular reader,
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`depending on the data available about that individual. Further, every page has several slots
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`where publishers can serve an ad. Gannett has millions of readers and therefore fills many
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`millions of impressions every day.
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`35. While Gannett sells roughly two-thirds of its ad inventory through the indirect
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`sales channel, the remaining third of direct sales accounts for nearly half of Gannett’s online
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`advertising revenue.
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`B.
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`36.
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`Ad-Tech Products
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`To facilitate the sale of these impressions, all within milliseconds, publishers and
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`advertisers use a series of specialized and distinct products.
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`37.
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`Certain publishers will sell their advertising inventory using “ad networks,” which
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`pool inventory across the internet for sale to advertisers affiliated with the network. Ad networks
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`offer relatively limited functionality and do not permit publishers to sell impressions to
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`advertisers outside the network.
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`38.
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`Other publishers like Gannett, who either have a larger supply of ad inventory,
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`desire greater control over their inventory, or both, do not rely on ad networks. Instead, they
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`license several different ad tech tools with the goal of exercising greater control over their
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`inventory and reaching a broader base of advertisers.
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`39.
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` The core tool for large publishers is the “publisher ad server,” which organizes
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`and sells their ad inventory both directly and indirectly across all platforms: desktop, mobile
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`web, and mobile applications.
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`40. When a user visits a webpage through any of these channels, the publisher ad
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`server accesses the reader’s anonymized user ID either from a “cookie” stored on the user’s
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`browser or from an identifier stored on the user’s mobile device. The ad server then checks
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`whether a direct deal is available to serve the impression(s) on the reader’s specific webpage.
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`41.
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`If no direct deal is available, the ad server calls “ad exchanges” to organize
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`auctions for each impression. As part of the bid request to an exchange, the ad server
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`communicates the reader’s anonymized user ID.
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`42.
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`Once called, each exchange requests participating “demand-side platforms”
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`(“DSPs”) to place bids on behalf of their advertisers. A DSP is automated ad-buying software
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`that advertisers use to buy display ad inventory. As part of the request to the DSPs, the exchange
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`passes the anonymized user ID, and the DSPs cross-reference that ID with various databases to
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`Case 1:23-cv-05177 Document 1 Filed 06/20/23 Page 16 of 80
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`ascertain whether the reader is a good candidate for a particular ad. The DSPs, based on
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`advertiser demand and the available user information, then enter bids for the impression.
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`43.
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`Each exchange collects the available bids, picks a winning DSP, and submits the
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`winning bid to the publisher ad server. While exchanges return bids for individual impressions,
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`each bid is priced in terms of “Cost-Per-Mille” (“CPM”), or the price for one thousand
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`impressions. So, for example, when an exchange wants to bid $0.01 for an individual
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`impression, the bid is communicated to the ad server as $10 CPM.
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`44.
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`Finally, the ad server decides which exchange’s bid to accept. If the ad server
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`rejects all bids, it can place a “house ad” — e.g., an ad from a Gannett newspaper advertising its
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`own brand — to fill the impression.
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`45.
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`At the conclusion of this auction process, publishers make money when ads are
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`loaded on their pages rather than when users click on them. That is because advertisers pay for
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`impressions — i.e., the right to display their ads on a publisher’s webpage page. Each ad-tech
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`product then exacts a fee for its services, often on a per-impression basis. For example, the ad
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`server charges the publisher monthly depending on the volume of impressions served.
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`Exchanges, meanwhile, charge the publisher a percentage (called a “revenue share” or “take
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`rate”) of each impression’s sale price. To account for that revenue share, exchanges submit bids
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`to the ad server on a “net” basis, i.e., the winning bid submitted by its DSPs less the revenue
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`share. Finally, DSPs charge their advertisers a fee (also a revenue share) for their services —
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`including identifying relevant users and then assessing whether the ads shown were effective.
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`46.
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`The below graphic depicts the relevant ad-tech products, with buyers (i.e.,
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`advertisers) on the left and sellers (i.e., publishers) on the right.
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`Case 1:23-cv-05177 Document 1 Filed 06/20/23 Page 17 of 80
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`Figure 1: Ad-Tech Products
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`47.
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`Google is the dominant player for each of these ad-tech products, and thus
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`controls the buying and selling of display ad inventory across most of the internet. Google’s
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`publisher ad server — “DoubleClick for Publishers” (“DFP”) — controls more than 90% of the
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`market for publisher ad serving. Google offers both a free version of DFP and a paid version for
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`publishers that require certain additional features to monetize their inventory.
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`48.
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`Google’s exchange — “DoubleClick Ad Exchange” (“AdX”) — controls more
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`than 60% of the exchange market. Finally, Google offers two DSPs — “Google Ads” (for small
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`advertisers) and “Display & Video 360” (“DV360”) (for larger advertisers) — that control more
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`than 70% of the DSP market.
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`49.
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`For years, Gannett has licensed DFP as its publisher ad server across its
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`publications. AdX is Gannett’s primary exchange. Today, AdX controls 60% of all
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`programmatic impressions served across Gannett’s newspaper websites. By contrast, the next
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`highest exchange competitor intermediates only 6% of Gannett’s impressions.
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`50.
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`Google acquired rather than built its ad-tech dominance. Google purchased its
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`leading ad