Case 1:23-cv-09878-JAV Document 181 Filed 07/22/25 Page 1 of 13
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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`DREW DIXON,
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`Plaintiff, Case No.: 1:23-cv-09878-VEC
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`\2
`ANTONIO MARQUIS “L.A.” REID,
`Defendant.
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`PLAINTIFF’S PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM OF LAW
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`Plaintiff Drew Dixon (“Plaintiff” or “Ms. Dixon”), by and through her undersigned
`counsel, files this pretrial memorandum of law pursuant to the Court’s March 10, 2025 scheduling
`order.
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`Kenya K. Davis (NY Bar #4162483)
`BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
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`1401 New York Ave., NW
`Washington, DC 20005
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`(202) 237-9608
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`kdavis@bsfllp.com
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`Sigrid S. McCawley (NY Bar # 6051460)
`Daniel J. Crispino (pro hac vice)
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`Amber S. Stewart (pro hac vice)
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`BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
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`401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200
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`Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
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`(954) 356-0011
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`smccawley@bstllp.com
`dcrispino@bsfllp.com
`astewart@bsfllp.com
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`Counsel for Plaintiff Drew Dixon
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`Case 1:23-cv-09878-JAV Document 181 Filed 07/22/25 Page 2 of 13
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Ms. Dixon intends to prove at trial that Defendant Antonio Marquis “L.A.” Reid
`(“Defendant) sexually abused her through a system of sexual assault, sexual harassment,
`retaliation, and coercive control while he was her boss at Arista Records (“Arista”). The evidence
`will show that Defendant sexually assaulted Ms. Dixon on two separate occasions, once on his
`private plane and once in his car. The evidence will further show that Defendant falsely imprisoned
`Ms. Dixon when he sexually assaulted her, and that with his actions, Defendant intentionally
`inflicted emotional distress on Ms. Dixon. Finally, the evidence will show that Defendant
`committed a crime of violence motivated by gender, violating New York City’s Gender Motivated
`Violence Act, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-903 (2017).
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`The following claims remain to be tried before a jury:
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`1. Defendant’s commission of sexual assault and battery against Ms. Dixon, as defined in
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`Article 130 of New York’s Penal Law. See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 130.52, 130.55, 130.60,
`130.65, 130.66, 130.67.
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`2. Defendant falsely imprisoning Ms. Dixon.
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`3. Defendant’s intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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`4. Defendant’s commission of a “crime of violence” and a “crime of violence motivated
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`by gender,” in violation of New York City’s Gender Motivated Violence Act
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`(“GMVA”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-903 (2017).
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`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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`The Court is familiar with the background of this case. See ECF Nos. 28, 58, 137, 142,
`147, 151, 154, and 174. Ms. Dixon is a talented music producer, executive, and entrepreneur who
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`helped create hits such as “American Boy” (Estelle featuring Kanye West), “My Love Is Your
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`Love” (Whitney Houston), “Maria Maria” (Carlos Santana), and “A Rose Is Still a Rose” (Aretha
`Franklin featuring Lauryn Hill), just to name a few. See ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) 49 1, 42, 44, 62. In
`April of 1996, Ms. Dixon began working at Arista as a Senior Director of Artists & Repertoire
`(“A&R”) and then Vice President of A&R for Clive Davis, an industry-leading music producer
`and CEO of Arista. See ECF No. 143-1, Dixon Dep. Tr. at 166:13-18; 175:22-176:21, 178:23-
`179:2. While working for Davis at Arista, Ms. Dixon was successful and prolific—she signed an
`artist shortly after starting, which was unheard of, and she consistently found big singles for
`existing artists. See id. at 168:23-169:19.
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`In 1999, Arista’s leadership announced that Defendant would replace Davis as CEO of
`Arista. See id. at 189:20-190:15. Ms. Dixon initially agreed to move to Davis’s new label, but a
`kidney cancer diagnosis, coupled with pressure from Strauss Zelnick, Defendant’s boss, and
`Defendant himself made her reluctant to break her contract with Arista and leave. See id. at 194:14-
`196:10. She agreed to continue working at Arista under Defendant’s leadership. See id. at 215:18-
`216:2. Soon after Defendant became CEO of Arista, his coercive control of Ms. Dixon through
`sexual harassment, intimidation, retaliation, and sexual assault began. What started as
`inappropriate flirting and comments quickly escalated to fondling Ms. Dixon under her shirts,
`kissing her neck, and inviting her to his hotel room. See id. at 210:19-212:20; 214:22-215:5; 222:3-
`16. Defendant’s sexual abuse reached a boiling point during a flight to Puerto Rico on his private
`plane.
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`Shortly after Defendant became CEO of Arista, he announced a company-wide retreat to
`Puerto Rico. See id. at 229:17-230:10. Karen Kwak, Defendant’s “person” in A&R administration,
`instructed Plaintiff that she did not need to book a commercial flight because the senior staff would
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`be flying on a private plane to meet and plan presentations. See id. at 230:20-231:5. This was a
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`trap, because when Plaintiff arrived at the airport and boarded the plane, no other Arista staff
`members or executives were there. See id. at 237:6-9; 238:9-16; 239:4-25. Plaintiff hid in the
`bathroom to wait for others to arrive, but eventually she was told to exit. See id. at 279:2-22.
`Having finally gotten Plaintiff alone and after trapping her on his plane, Defendant sexually
`assaulted her. See id. at 279:17-22. Once they arrived at Puerto Rico, Plaintiff stayed in her
`assistant’s room during the retreat and avoided Reid. See id. at 287:22-25; ECF No. 120-1 at 5.
`She flew back to New York on a commercial flight to avoid flying back with Defendant. See id.
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`Following the Puerto Rico retreat, Defendant was armed with the threat that he would that
`he would sexually assault Plaintiff if he got her alone. He continued his cycle of sexual harassment,
`coercive control, and retaliation by sabotaging Ms. Dixon’s work projects when she refused to visit
`his hotel room. See ECF No. 143-1 at 375:9-15. After 10 months of Defendant rejecting her work
`and music projects, Ms. Dixon agreed to ride in his car to play a sample by Alice Smith, another
`young artist she’d discovered. See id. at 292:6-12; ECF No. 120-1 at 6. During this car ride,
`Defendant sexually assaulted Ms. Dixon again. See ECF No. 143-1 at 292:19-293:7.
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`After this assault, Ms. Dixon was depressed and suicidal. See id. at 298:19-24; ECF No.
`120-1 at 6. Still, she continued to try to do her job as Vice President of A&R by bringing John
`Legend and Kanye West to audition at Arista, but Defendant sabotaged those auditions as well.
`For Legend, Defendant offered Ms. Dixon the budget to book a rehearsal space for Legend to
`perform for him live and even said he would bring other Arista staff members as well. See id. at
`309:23-310:4. But the day of the audition, Defendant cancelled, and no one from Arista’s senior
`staff besides Ms. Dixon attended the audition. See id. at 310:14-311:14. For West, Defendant
`allowed West to audition for him, but he then “dressed down” Ms. Dixon in a room full of other
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`Arista executives, telling her that she was bad at her job and that the audition had been a waste of
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`his time. See id. at 305:3-25. Helpless in the face of Defendant’s cycle of sexual abuse, sexual
`harassment, coercive control and retaliation, Plaintiff quit her Vice President of A&R role at Arista
`and enrolled at Harvard Business School but remained a consultant for Arista for the next two
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`years to maintain a salary and health benefits. ECF No. 120-1 at 7.
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`ARGUMENT
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`New York law and the evidence at trial will show that Ms. Dixon is entitled to a verdict in
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`her favor on all counts in her Complaint.
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`I. Ms. Dixon Will Prove Defendant Sexually Assaulted Her.
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`As explained in Ms. Dixon’s opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss and strike, which
`this Court denied, Defendant’s actions “constitute sexual offenses as defined in Article 130,
`including but not limited to aggravated sexual abuse, criminal sexual acts, forcible touching, sexual
`abuse, sexual assault, and sexual misconduct, inasmuch as Defendant intentionally and forcibly
`digitally penetrated and touched sexual and intimate parts of Ms. Dixon’s body for his own sexual
`gratification.” See ECF No. 28 at 21. In addition to satisfying the elements of numerous sections
`of Article 130 as required under the ASA, the evidence at trial will also show that committed a
`sexual battery under New York’s legal standard. To recover for battery, a plaintiff “must prove that
`there was bodily contact, that the contact was offensive, that is, ‘wrongful under all the
`circumstances,’ and that [the] defendant intended to make the contact.” Goffv. Clarke, 302 A.D.2d
`725, 726, 755 N.Y.S.2d 493 (2003) (quoting Zgraggen v. Wilsey, 200 A.D.2d 818, 819, 606
`N.Y.S.2d 444 (1994)). Here, Ms. Dixon’s allegations more than satisfy this evidentiary
`requirement.
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`II. Ms. Dixon Will Prove Defendant Falsely Imprisoned Her.
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`To state a claim for false imprisonment under New York law, a plaintiff “must show that
`(1) the defendant intended to confine [her], (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3)
`the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise
`privileged.”” Doe v. Alsaud, 224 F. Supp. 3d 286, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (internal citations omitted).
`Here, the evidence at trial will show that Defendant falsely imprisoned Ms. Dixon on two separate
`occasions—on his private plane and in his car. See ECF No. 143-1 at 278:8-279:22.
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`Ms. Dixon testified that as part of Defendant’s scheme to confine her, Karen Kwak,
`Defendant’s right hand at Arista, instructed her not to book a commercial flight for the retreat
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`because Defendant was flying Arista senior staff on a private plane. See id. at 230:18-231:5; Ex.
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`I < (X Reid Dep. Tr. 153:10-13. In the face of Ms.
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`Dixon’s clear memory of how she ended up on Defendant’s private plane, Defendant and Kwak’s
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`“vague denials” and “memory lapses” will not be persuasive to the jury. F.D.I.C. v. Nat'l Union
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`Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 205 F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 2000) (““Vague denials and memory lapses
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`... do not create genuine issues of material fact.”). See also Genger v. Genger, 663 F. App'x 44, 49
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`n.4 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order) (noting that a statement that one “ha[d] no recollection” of a
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`fact “does not constitute a denial”).
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`I11. Ms. Dixon Will Prove Defendant Intentionally Inflicted Emotional Distress on Her.
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`At trial, Ms. Dixon will also prove that the Defendant committed the tort of intentional
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`infliction of emotional distress. “The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are
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`(1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) the intent to cause, or the disregard of a substantial
`likelihood of causing, severe emotional distress; (3) causation; and (4) severe emotional distress.”
`Eskridge v. Diocese of Brooklyn, 210 A.D.3d 1056, 1057-58, 180 N.Y.S.3d 179 (2022). Here,
`Defendant’s conduct in forcibly touching and making bodily contact with Ms. Dixon by fondling
`her beneath her clothes and subjecting her to digital penetration without her consent on two
`occasions was extreme and outrageous, and caused Plaintiff severe emotional distress. New York
`courts routinely find that such behavior is sufficient for consideration by a jury on an intentional
`infliction of emotional distress claim. See Cowan v. City of Mount Vernon, 95 F.Supp.3d 624, 657
`(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (denying defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s
`intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because “Plaintiff not only alleges pervasive
`sexual harassment, but instances of battery. Specifically, Plaintift alleges that Miller physically
`touched Plaintiff in a sexual manner, including feeling her back, pinching her buttocks, slapping
`and/or squeezing her buttocks, grabbing her chest, and rubbing his crotch against her. . . .
`Moreover, when Miller locked Plaintiff into his office and exposed his penis to her, Miller pushed
`Plaintiff away from the door and blocked her from leaving. . . .These instances of battery, many of
`which Plaintiff alleges were repeated over nearly a year-long period, constitute extreme and
`outrageous conduct for the purpose of an IIED claim.”). See also Sowemimo v. D.A.O.R. Sec., Inc.,
`43 F.Supp.2d 477, 491 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (finding the allegation of sexual battery (i.e., touching
`plaintiff's breast) in sexual harassment context sufficient to survive summary judgment motion to
`dismiss intentional emotional distress claim). Ms. Dixon expects the evidence at trial to show that
`Defendant acted extremely and outrageously with an intent to cause her severe emotional distress,
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`and that he did in fact cause her to feel severe emotional distress.
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`IVv. Ms. Dixon Will Prove Defendant Violated the GMVA.
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`“The [GMVA] provides a civil cause of action for “injur[y] by an individual who
`commit[ted] a crime of violence motivated by gender” (Administrative Code § 10—1104). The term
`“crime of violence” is defined as “an act or series of acts that would constitute a misdemeanor or
`felony against the person as defined in state or federal law ... if the conduct presents a serious risk
`of physical injury to another, whether or not those acts actually resulted in criminal charges,
`prosecution or conviction” (Administrative Code § 10-1103). The term “crime of violence
`motivated by gender” is defined as a “crime of violence committed because of gender or on the
`basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender” (id.). This
`section was adopted verbatim from VAWA.” Breest v. Haggis, 180 A.D.3d 83, 88 (2019). The
`evidence at trial will show that Defendant has committed numerous crimes of violence motivated
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`by gender against his female subordinates.
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`V. Ms. Dixon Will Prove She Is Entitled to Punitive Damages.
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`“Punitive damages are [ ] available in assault actions.” Matthews v. Garrett, 756 N.Y.S.2d
`469, 470 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2003). Such damages under New York law “may be assessed where
`a defendant's actions evince a high degree of moral culpability or demonstrate a wanton or
`reckless disregard for the rights of the plaintiff.” Solis-Vicuna v. Notias, 898 N.Y.S.2d 45, 48
`(App. Div. 2d Dep't 2010). “Punitive damages are also available under the GMVPA.” Doe v. Olive
`Leaves, Inc., No. 18-CV-5734 (HG) (TAM), 2024 WL 3048373 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2024)
`(citing N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 10-1104(a)). In this case, the evidence at trial will show that
`Defendant’s numerous instances of assault and harassment against his female subordinates
`evinces a high degree of moral culpability, and that a sizeable punitive damages award must be
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`assessed against him to deter future conduct.
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`And, “[i]t is well-settled, in fact, that evidence of a defendant's net worth is properly
`considered given the goals of punishment and deterrence served by punitive damages.” TVT Recs.
`v. Island Def Jam Music Grp., 257 F. Supp. 2d 737, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing State Farm Mut.
`Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,416,123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003)); cf- Tesser
`v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of New York, 370 F.3d 314, 318 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Evidence
`of wealth ... is generally inadmissible in trials not involving punitive damages” (emphasis
`added)). Similarly, “[c]ourts have been instructed to consider the wealth of the defendant” under
`New York state law when evaluating punitive damages to serve their purpose of punishing and
`deterring defendants an others from “similarly willful or outrageous misconduct.” Greenbaum v.
`Handelsbanken, 67 F. Supp. 2d 228, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (Sotomayor, J.) (collecting cases in suit
`involving NYCHRL punitive damages); Koch v. Greenberg, 14 F. Supp. 3d 247, 275 (S.D.N.Y.
`2014) (“The wealth of the defendant is also relevant [under New York law], because
`a defendant's ability to pay impacts whether damages are sufficient to function as a punishment
`and a deterrent”), aff'd, 626 F. App'x 335 (2d Cir. 2015). Thus, evidence of Defendant’s wealth
`will be proper for the jury to consider at trial when determining a punitive damages award.
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`VL Defendant’s Anticipated Counterargument Will Fail At Trial.
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`Ms. Dixon expects Defendant to argue at trial that because Ms. Dixon referred to
`Defendant’s sexual harassment of her in previous statements and didn’t always refer to his sexual
`assaults somehow means that they didn’t happen. The evidence at trial will show both the
`absurdity and falsity of this argument.
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`At deposition, Ms. Dixon testified countless times that her past references to Defendant’s
`“sexual harassment” included not only his inappropriate verbal overtures towards her, but also his
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`forced kissing her, touching her hair, groping her, and digitally penetrating her on the plane and in
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`the car, as that was how she (and countless other laypersons) defined “harassment” in the colloquial
`sense. See Harass, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (“harass: to create an unpleasant
`or hostile situation for especially by uninvited and unwelcome verbal or physical conduct”™).
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`Examples of this testimony, which Ms. Dixon will give at trial, include:
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`Ms. Dixon’s testimony is supported by Dr. Raghavan’s expert report, where she explains that
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`Dkt. 120-1 at 5 n.11. At bottom, regardless of the noun or adjective Ms. Dixon used to describe
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`the assaults at Defendant’s hands, the outcome is the same. Forced digital penetration of her vulva
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`To be sure, Ms. Dixon did tell other persons that Defendant not only harassed her but
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`digitally penetrated her against her will:
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`And to be certain, Defendant did also sexually harass Ms. Dixon as part of his modus operandi
`and intertwined system of sexual misconduct, coercive control, and cyclical retaliation, all
`resulting in his sexual assaults on Ms. Dixon. But none of Ms. Dixon’s statements as to
`Defendant’s sexual harassment of her precludes or changes the fact that Defendant sexually
`assaulted her as well, which the evidence adduced at trial will confirm.
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`CONCLUSION
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`For all the reasons outlined above, Defendant is liable to Ms. Dixon on all claims in her
`Complaint.
`Dated: July 21, 2025 Respectfully submitted,
`BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
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`/s/ Kenva K. Davis
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`Kenya K. Davis (NY Bar #4162483)
`BoOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
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`1401 New York Ave., NW
`Washington, DC 20005
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`(202) 237-9608
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`kdavis@bsfllp.com
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`Sigrid S. McCawley (NY Bar # 6051460)
`Daniel J. Crispino (pro hac vice)
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`Amber S. Stewart (pro hac vice)
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`BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
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`401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200
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`Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
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`(954) 356-0011
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`smccawley(@bsfllp.com
`derispino@bsfllp.com
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`astewart@bsfllp.com
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`Counsel for Plaintiff Drew Dixon
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