Case 6:19-cv-06910-EAW Document 50 Filed 06/28/21 Page 1 of 40
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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`FARM SANCTUARY, ANIMAL EQUITY,
`ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND,
`CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,
`MERCY FOR ANIMALS, INC.,
`NORTH CAROLINA FARMED ANIMAL SAVE,
`ANIMAL OUTLOOK,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`6:19-CV-06910
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`6:20-CV-06081
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`v.
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`UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
`AGRICULTURE, FOOD SAFETY AND
`INSPECTION SERVICE, PAUL
`KIECKER, in his official capacity as
`Food Safety and Inspection Service
`Administrator,
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`Defendants.
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`____________________________________
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`FARM SANCTUARY,
`ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND,
`ANIMAL OUTLOOK,
`ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE,
`COMPASSION IN WORLD FARMING,
`FARM FORWARD, MERCY FOR ANIMALS, INC.,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
`AGRICULTURE, FOOD SAFETY AND
`INSPECTION SERVICE, THOMAS
`VILSACK, in his official capacity as
`Secretary of Agriculture, PAUL
`KIECKER, in his official capacity as Food
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`Case 6:19-cv-06910-EAW Document 50 Filed 06/28/21 Page 2 of 40
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`Safety and Inspection Service
`Administrator,
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`Defendants.
`____________________________________
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Plaintiffs are nonprofit organizations working to protect animals, people, and
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`environments from industrial animal agriculture, and to ensure that laws intended to
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`regulate industrial animal agriculture are properly implemented. In the above two
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`captioned lawsuits, they challenge certain actions by Defendants related to the slaughtering
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`of pigs. Specifically, on December 18, 2019, Plaintiffs Farm Sanctuary, Animal Equity,
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`Animal Legal Defense Fund, Center for Biological Diversity, Mercy for Animals, Inc.,
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`North Carolina Farmed Animal Save, and Animal Outlook filed a complaint against
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`Defendants United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), the Food Safety and
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`Inspection Service (“FSIS”), and the FSIS Administrator, challenging the implementation
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`of the Modernization of Swine Slaughter Inspection, 84 Fed. Reg. 52,300 (Oct. 11, 2019),
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`promulgated by the FSIS and the USDA (hereinafter, the “Slaughter Rule”), which
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`Plaintiffs allege “will allow nearly all of the pigs slaughtered in the United States to be
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`slaughtered at unlimited speeds with very little federal oversight, posing serious risks to
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`animal welfare, consumer health and safety, and the environment.” (See Farm Sanctuary
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`v. USDA, Docket No. 19-CV-06910, Dkt. 22 at ¶ 1 (the “2019 Action”)).
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`Additionally, on February 6, 2020, Plaintiffs Farm Sanctuary, Animal Legal
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`Defense Fund, Animal Outlook, Animal Welfare Institute, Compassion in World Farming,
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`Farm Forward, and Mercy for Animals, Inc., filed a complaint against the USDA, FSIS,
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`the USDA Secretary, and the FSIS Administrator, challenging Defendants’ failure to ban
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`the slaughter of all non-ambulatory, or “downed” pigs. (See Farm Sanctuary v. USDA,
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`Docket No. 20-CV-06081, Docket No. 13 at ¶ 1 (the “2020 Action”)).
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`Defendants have filed motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ amended complaints in both
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`actions. (See 2019 Action, Dkt. 25; 2020 Action, Dkt. 14). Defendants raise virtually the
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`same arguments in both cases: that Plaintiffs’ amended complaints must be dismissed
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`pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), because Plaintiffs lack standing to sue. (Id.). For the
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`following reasons, the motions are denied.
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`BACKGROUND
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`The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ amended complaints. (2019 Action,
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`Dkt. 22; 2020 Action, Dkt. 13). As is required at this stage of the proceedings, the Court
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`treats Plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations as true.
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`I.
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`The 2019 Action
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`Plaintiffs are seven nonprofit organizations “dedicated to protecting the animals,
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`people, and environments that suffer due to industrial animal agriculture and to ensuring
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`that laws intended to protect against this suffering are faithfully implemented.” (Dkt. 22
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`at ¶ 1). Under the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (“HMSA”), the USDA has
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`responsibility to ensure humane handling of all animals at slaughterhouses. (Id. at ¶ 65).
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`The HMSA is incorporated by reference into the Federal Meat Inspection Act (“FMIA”),
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`which is a “self-contained, comprehensive statutory inspection scheme that prohibits meat
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`from covered species, including pigs, from entering interstate commerce unless both pre-
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`slaughter (ante-mortem) and post-slaughter (post-mortem) inspections are conducted by
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`federal inspectors.” (Id. at ¶¶ 66-67). The FMIA requires USDA inspection of animals
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`both before they enter a slaughtering establishment and after slaughter to ensure that no
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`part of any carcass determined to be “adulterated” passes into the human food supply. (Id.
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`at ¶ 71).
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`As relevant to this case, the ante-mortem provision of the FMIA expressly requires
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`that USDA inspectors inspect all animals upon arrival at the slaughterhouse, before they
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`enter the slaughterhouse. (Id. at ¶ 79). If an inspector’s ante-mortem inspection reveals an
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`animal showing any signs of abnormality or disease, that animal must be set aside into a
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`separate pen for examination by a USDA veterinarian. (Id. at ¶ 85). The ante-mortem
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`inspection “has long been recognized by the USDA and experts as critical to protect against
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`outbreaks of foreign animal diseases that pose devastating risks to animals, human health,
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`and the U.S. economy.” (Id. at ¶ 90). Pigs who pass ante-mortem inspection are sent down
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`a conveyor line for slaughter processes. (Id. at ¶ 93). USDA inspectors also ensure the
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`humane handling of animals during their time in the slaughterhouse. (Id. at ¶¶ 94, 95).
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`USDA regulations set maximum slaughter line speeds, which are based on the number of
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`animals per hour inspectors are able inspect. (Id. at ¶ 99).
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`Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), federal agencies,
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`including the USDA, are required to prepare a “detailed statement” regarding all “major
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`Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” (Id. at
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`¶ 103). This statement is referred to as an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) and it
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`must describe and disclose the environmental impact of the proposed action. (Id. at ¶ 104).
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`Under certain circumstances, a federal agency may prepare an Environmental Assessment
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`(“EA”) to evaluate whether an EIS is necessary. (Id. at ¶ 111). An EIS or EA need not be
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`prepared for a major federal agency action when the action is “categorically excluded”
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`from NEPA review because it does not have a significant effect on the human environment.
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`(Id. at ¶ 112).
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`In 1997, as part of a pilot program called the HACCP-Based Inspection Models
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`Project (“HIMP”), the USDA granted five pig slaughterhouses a “waiver” from regulatory
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`mandates, authorizing them to operate without any maximum line speeds and with fewer
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`agency inspectors. (Id. at ¶ 121). Plaintiffs allege that while the stated goals of this pilot
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`program were to increase food safety and plant efficiency, neither humane handling nor
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`environmental impacts were considered. (Id. at ¶ 122). Numerous government audits have
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`raised concerns about HIMP, including that the plants involved in the pilot program may
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`have a higher potential for food safety risks. (Id. at ¶¶ 123-24). Likewise, a 2015
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`undercover investigation documented instances of inhumane handling and slaughter as
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`workers attempted to keep animals moving in pace with high-speed lines. (Id. at ¶ 125).
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`On February 1, 2018, the USDA published a proposed rule announcing its plans to
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`“establish a new inspection system” for pig slaughterhouses that would make the HIMP
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`program available to any pig slaughterhouse, and allow them to opt out of line speed limits,
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`reduce the number of federal inspectors, and have slaughterhouse personnel take on
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`inspection responsibilities historically performed by agency officials, including examining
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`and sorting animals upon arrival at the slaughterhouse. (Id. at ¶ 131). In proposing the
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`rule, the USDA stated that it had determined that “40 high volume establishments that
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`exclusively slaughter market hogs” and that “account for 92 percent of total swine
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`slaughter” were “expected to” take advantage of the proposed provisions allowing for high-
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`speed slaughter and reduced agency oversight. (Id. at ¶ 133).
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`The USDA received more than 83,000 comments on the proposed rule. (Id. at
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`¶ 134). Most of the comments were negative, and reflected concerns that the Slaughter
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`Rule would put animals at increased risk of inhuman handling, (id. at ¶¶ 134, 138-47), and
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`also detailed the “direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental consequences of the
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`proposed rule” (id. at ¶¶ 148-62).
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`Despite these comments and opposition, on October 1, 2019, the USDA finalized
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`the Slaughter Rule “largely as proposed, with only minor modifications.” (Id. at ¶ 163).
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`The first “key element” of the Slaughter Rule is “[r]equiring establishment personnel to
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`sort and remove unfit animals before ante-mortem inspection by [USDA] inspectors.” (Id.
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`at ¶ 164). In other words, establishment employees—rather than specially-appointed
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`USDA inspectors and public health veterinarians—are responsible for identifying and
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`removing pigs that are not fit for slaughter. (Id.). The establishment employees performing
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`these responsibilities are not required to undergo any training. (Id.). In addition, the
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`Slaughter Rule “revok[es] maximum line speeds and authoriz[es] establishments to
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`determine their own line speeds,” while simultaneously reducing the number of federal
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`inspectors on the line from a maximum of seven to a maximum a three. (Id. at ¶ 166). The
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`final rule states that the USDA “will implement” high-speed, reduced-inspection pig
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`slaughter “at all pig slaughterhouses that notify the agency of their intent to take advantage
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`of the Slaughter Rule.” (Id. at ¶ 172).1
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`Despite these “significant regulatory changes,” the USDA did not prepare an EIS or
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`an EA pursuant to NEPA before finalizing them—rather, it found that the FSIS, the USDA
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`agency issuing the regulation, was categorically excluded from having to perform a NEPA
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`review. (Id. at ¶ 168). The USDA further explained that it did not anticipate that the
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`changes implemented by the Slaughter Rule would have any individual or cumulative
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`effects on the environment, because “expected sales of pork products to consumers will
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`determine the total number of hogs that an establishment slaughters, not the maximum line
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`speed under which it operates.” (Id. at ¶ 169).
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`Plaintiffs contend that, due to Defendants’ implementation of the Slaughter Rule,
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`they have been injured. For example, Plaintiff Farm Sanctuary alleges that since it was
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`On April 6, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a “Notice of Recent Events,” informing the Court
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`that March 31, 2021, in United Food & Com. Workers Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No.
`19-cv-2660(JNE/TNL), 2021 WL 1215865 (D. Minn. Mar. 21, 2021), the United States
`District Court for the District of Minnesota partially granted the plaintiffs’ motion for
`summary judgment, finding that “FSIS’s elimination of line speed limits in the NSIS was
`arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA” id. at *25, but “stay[ed] its order and
`entry of judgment in this case for 90 days,” to “allow the agency to decide how to proceed
`in light of this opinion and give regulated entities time to prepare for any operational
`change” id. at *29. (See Dkt. 44 at 1). Plaintiffs note that this decision leaves intact the
`remainder of the deregulatory rule, including the delegation of ante-mortem inspection
`responsibilities—which Plaintiffs also challenge—and does not address Defendants’
`failure to consider the environmental impacts of the Slaughter Rule. (Id. at 2-3). It appears
`from a review of the docket in that case that an appeal has been filed with the Eighth Circuit
`Court of Appeals (see United Food and Com. Workers Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Case
`No. 19-cv-2660 (D. Minn. June 3, 2021), Dkt. 174), and the district court recently denied
`a motion to stay pending appeal (id. at Dkt. 189 (June 16, 2021)). Thus, at this time, the
`impact of the decision remains unclear.
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`founded in 1986 it has engaged in the rescue of farm animals. (Id. at ¶ 13). Since that
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`time, it has rescued over 15,000 farm animals, and receives more than 1,000 requests for
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`assistance to place animals in need annually. (Id.). Farm Sanctuary further alleges that by
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`authorizing high-speed pig slaughter and reducing government oversight, the Slaughter
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`Rule “increase[es] the number of pigs subjected to inhumane handling,” and therefore
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`“directly conflicts with, impairs, and frustrates Farm Sanctuary’s mission.” (Id. at ¶ 15).
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`As a result, Farm Sanctuary alleges that it has been “forced to redirect its limited time and
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`resources away from its existing farmed animal protection work to publicize and counteract
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`the Slaughter Rule,” including by redirecting resources “away from its core rescue,
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`education, and advocacy work toward requesting information about incidents of inhumane
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`handling and food safety risks at high-speed slaughterhouses; fighting to obtain that
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`information; reviewing, analyzing, and digesting that information; and publicizing it to
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`educate its members and the public in order to counteract inhumane handling and food
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`safety violations.” (Id. at ¶ 16; see also id. at ¶ 17 (“By significantly increasing the number
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`of pigs raised for slaughter, the Slaughter Rule also forces Farm Sanctuary to divert
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`additional resources to find placement, and provide transport and care for, increased
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`numbers of pigs in need.”)). The remaining plaintiff organizations also allege that the
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`promulgation of the Slaughter Rule impairs their mission-critical activities and has forced
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`them to divert their limited resources from these activities to combat the rule. (See, e.g.,
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`id. at ¶¶ 23-24, 27, 43-44, 51-52).
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`Some of the plaintiff organizations further allege that their members include
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`consumers who eat pork products and are concerned about the increased health risks they
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`face from consuming products from pigs who have not been adequately inspected. (Id. at
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`¶ 18; see also id. at ¶¶ 30, 39). These organizations also have members who live and work
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`in communities adjacent to slaughterhouses that will take advantage of the Slaughter Rule’s
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`deregulatory provisions, and these members will suffer harms to their health and aesthetic
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`enjoyment of their communities. (Id. at ¶ 19; see also id. at ¶¶ 28, 36).
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`II.
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`The 2020 Action
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`Plaintiffs are animal-welfare advocacy groups that believe the USDA should ban
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`the slaughter of all non-ambulatory, or “downed” pigs.2 (Dkt. 13 at ¶¶ 1, 17, 25, 35, 43,
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`57, 63, 71).
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`Under the HMSA, the USDA regulates the slaughter of animals, including pigs, and
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`it mandates that the handling and slaughtering of livestock be carried out only by humane
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`methods. (Id. at ¶¶ 82-84). In 2002, Congress amended the HMSA specifically to address
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`concerns about the humane treatment of downed animals, including pigs. (Id. at ¶ 89 (the
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`“2002 mandates”)). Specifically, the mandate provided that:
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` The Secretary of Agriculture shall investigate and submit to Congress a
`report on—
`(1) the scope of nonambulatory livestock;
`(2) the causes that render livestock nonambulatory;
`(3) the humane treatment of nonambulatory livestock; and
`(4) the extent to which nonambulatory livestock may present handling and
`disposition problems for stockyards, market agencies, and dealers.
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`At oral argument, the Court clarified that the current regulations prohibit non-
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`ambulating pigs from being used in the human food supply; however, if a pig is non-
`ambulatory and then forced to rise, the regulations permit that it be used for human
`consumption. (See Dkt. 27 at 4).
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`(Id. (citing HMSA, 7 U.S.C. § 1907(a)). Based on the findings of the report, the Secretary
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`was required to promulgate regulations to provide for the humane treatment, handling, and
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`disposition of downed livestock. (Id. at ¶ 90). The FSIS is responsible for implementing
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`these mandates. (Id. at ¶ 91).
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`In 2007, FSIS promulgated a rule prohibiting the slaughter of downed cattle for
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`food, as these animals had a higher incidence of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)
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`than ambulatory cattle. (Id. at ¶ 102). Due to humane handling concerns, which reflected
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`that producers have an incentive to send weakened animals to slaughter and to force non-
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`ambulatory cattle to rise, the FSIS subsequently expanded this slaughter prohibition to
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`include cattle that are ambulatory when they arrive at a slaughterhouse, but subsequently
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`become non-ambulatory, and also to include veal calves. (Id. at ¶¶ 103-08).
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` Plaintiffs allege that, despite strictly prohibiting the slaughter of non-ambulatory
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`cattle, the FSIS is not consistent in its treatment of downed pigs, which may be slaughtered
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`if they are forced to rise. (Id. at ¶ 111). Plaintiffs allege that, since Congress’ 2002
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`mandates, the Secretary of Agriculture has never investigated or submitted a report to
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`Congress on the scope of downed pigs; the causes that render them non-ambulatory; the
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`humane treatment of downed pigs; or the extent to which downed pigs present handling
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`and disposition problems (id. at ¶ 114), and therefore, no regulations were ever
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`promulgated (id. at ¶ 115). Although the FSIS has stated that it plans to evaluate measures
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`necessary to ensure the humane handling of livestock other than cattle, it has not followed
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`through with these plans. (Id. at ¶¶ 116-17).
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`According to an FSIS official, before the prohibition on slaughtering downed calves
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`was promulgated, a review of HMSA non-compliance records found “eighteen times as
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`many instances of inhumane handling involving nonambulatory pigs as those involving
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`calves,” and that “although more pigs are slaughtered than other species, downed pigs are
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`also inhumanely handled at a disproportionately higher rate.” (Id. at ¶ 118). This is
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`because female breeding pigs are permitted to deteriorate into a weakened condition,
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`making them likely to become downers, and due to production practices of breeding pigs
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`for “rapid growth, high leanness and extreme muscularity” which makes them prone to
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`stress and causes them to become non-ambulatory. (Id. at ¶¶ 121-22). Without regulations
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`to prohibit their slaughter, pig producers are incentivized to send weakened pigs to
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`slaughter. (Id. at ¶ 119).
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`Allowing the slaughter of downed pigs also creates an incentive for establishments
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`to inhumanely force these animals to rise, which often occurs by using inhumane methods.
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`(Id. at ¶¶ 134-35). This is because “[t]he flesh from a nonambulatory pig who is forced to
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`rise is worth an estimated $38 to $126 more than one who does not rise.” (Id. at ¶ 135).
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`Inhumane handling of downed pigs has been “repeatedly documented” by the FSIS, and
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`many instances of inhumane handling occur outside the view of inspection personnel. (Id.
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`at ¶ 136). A 2013 audit report found that FSIS’s enforcement policies do not effectively
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`deter swine slaughter plants from becoming “repeat offenders,” and from otherwise
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`engaging in inhumane treatment, and there have been instances of inspectors failing to
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`issue suspensions and taking inconsistent actions when they identify violations. (Id. at ¶¶
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`138-41). Accordingly, Plaintiffs allege that “[b]ecause the FSIS allows non-ambulatory
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`pigs to be slaughtered and does not limit how long they can be set aside and held, and
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`because the flesh of pigs who can be forced to rise sells for more money than the flesh of
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`those who remain downed and are condemned, there is an incentive to hold downed pigs
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`for prolonged periods in the hopes that they might rise and pass inspection.” (Id. at ¶ 144).
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`Plaintiffs further allege that the USDA has recognized that downed animals are “the
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`bellwethers of contagion in the herd,” the underlying reason for an animal’s non-
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`ambulatory condition cannot always be determined when those animals are presented for
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`slaughter, and downed pigs are far more likely to harbor disease than ambulatory pigs. (Id.
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`at ¶¶ 147-50). For example, because they are unable to rise from the floor of their pens,
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`downed pigs have prolonged exposure to fecal matter, which contains a host of bacterial
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`pathogens. (Id. at ¶¶ 152-54). Non-ambulatory pigs are also more susceptible to carrying
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`swine influenza subtypes H1N1 and H3N2, than are other pigs, as well as other types of
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`bacteria. (Id. at ¶¶ 157-59).
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`On June 3, 2014, Plaintiffs submitted a petition for rulemaking, requesting that the
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`FSIS prohibit the slaughter of all downed pigs. (Id. at ¶ 160). The FSIS received at least
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`twenty letters urging it to grant Plaintiffs’ petition for rulemaking and did not receive any
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`letters opposing the petition. (Id. at ¶¶ 161-62). On September 16, 2019, the FSIS denied
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`the petition, based on the conclusion that “existing regulations and inspection procedures
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`are sufficient and effective in ensuring that [nonambulatory] pigs are handled humanely at
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`slaughter and in preventing diseased animals from entering the human food supply.” (Id.
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`at ¶ 163). Plaintiffs allege that in denying the petition, Defendants “failed to consider
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`important aspects of the problem of the slaughter of nonambulatory pigs that were
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`presented in the petition, offered explanations for its decision that run directly counter to
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`the evidence before the agency, and unreasonably treated nonambulatory pigs differently
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`from nonambulatory cattle.” (Id. at ¶ 169).
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`Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of Defendants’ failure to comply with Congress’s
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`2002 mandates and its denial of Plaintiffs’ petition, they have been injured. For example,
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`plaintiff Farm Sanctuary alleges that, since its founding in 1986, it has advocated on behalf
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`of downed animals, and it has also “rescued, rehabilitated, and provided lifelong care to
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`numerous animals who were left for dead at stockyards, including pigs,” and “led
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`campaigns on behalf of downed animals, including investigations to expose downed animal
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`abuse and campaigns focused on state and federal legislation and on stockyard policies.”
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`(Id. at ¶ 19). Farm Sanctuary further alleges that Defendants’ actions impair its ability to
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`carry out its mission and, as a result, Farm Sanctuary has had to redirect its limited time
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`and resources away from other work. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21). Specifically, Farm Sanctuary has
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`spent time and resources “requesting information about incidents of inhumane handling
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`and food safety violations involving nonambulatory pigs; fighting to obtain that
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`information in a timely manner, in some cases through litigation; reviewing, analyzing, and
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`digesting that information; and publicizing it to educate its members and the public,” and
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`that these activities consume time that could be spent on its other work, including animal
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`rescue efforts. (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 21-22).
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`The remaining plaintiff organizations also allege that Defendants’ actions impair
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`their mission-critical activities and force them to divert their limited resources from these
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`activities. (See id. at ¶¶ 27-31, 37-40, 45-53, 58, 65-68, 73-76). For example, plaintiff
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`Animal Outlook, which among other things, conducts undercover investigations to expose
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`animal cruelty, “has been forced to expend significantly more investigative resources
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`documenting downed pigs.” (Id. at ¶¶ 36, 38). Likewise, plaintiff Animal Welfare Institute
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`alleges that it has “diverted thousands of dollars and hundreds of hours” to address
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`Defendants’ failure to address downed pigs such as publishing and updating reports on
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`downed pigs, including a report addressing the transport of downed pigs which, as
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`explained above, is incentivized by Defendants’ failure to act. (Id. at ¶¶ 46-48, 53).
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`Some of the Plaintiff organizations further allege that their members include
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`individuals who consume pork products and are concerned about the health risks they face
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`from their potential exposure to meat from downed pigs contaminated with pathogens, and
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`due to Defendants’ failure to investigate, report on, and regulate the humane treatment,
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`handling, and disposition of downed pigs, they are at an increased risk for exposure to these
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`pathogens. (Id. at ¶ 23; see also id. at ¶¶ 33, 61, 69).
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`PROCEDURAL HISTORY
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`I.
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`The 2019 Action
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`Plaintiffs filed their complaint on December 18, 2019. (Dkt. 1). On February 18,
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`2020, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ consent motion to file an amended complaint (Dkt. 20;
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`Dkt. 21), which Plaintiffs filed that same day (Dkt. 22). Plaintiffs’ amended complaint
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`alleges three causes of action, including: (1) violation of the FMIA, the HMSA and the
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`Administrative Procedures Act (APA), for Defendants’ failure to conduct an ante-mortem
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`inspection; (2) violation of the HMSA, FMIA, and APA for Defendants’ revocation of
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`maximum line speeds; and (3) violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
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`and the APA, for Defendants’ failure to prepare an EIS or EA. (Dkt. 22 at 43-47).
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`On March 13, 2020, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint.
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`(Dkt. 25). Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss on April 10,
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`2020 (Dkt. 30), and Defendants filed reply papers on May 1, 2020 (Dkt. 34). The parties
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`subsequently filed notices of supplemental authority and notices of recent events. (Dkt.
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`39; Dkt. 42; Dkt. 43; Dkt. 44). The Court held oral argument on March 17, 2021, and
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`reserved decision. (Dkt. 41).
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`II.
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`The 2020 Action
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`Plaintiffs filed their complaint on February 6, 2020. (Dkt. 1). On April 10, 2020,
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`Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. (Dkt. 9).
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`Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on April 20, 2020. (Dkt. 13). Accordingly, the Court
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`denied the motion to dismiss as moot, in light of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint. (Dkt. 21).
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`Plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges three causes of action, including: (1) failure
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`to investigate and report to Congress on downed pigs in violation of the HMSA and APA;
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`(2) failure to regulate the humane treatment, handling, and disposition of downed pigs, in
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`violation of the HMSA and APA; and (3) arbitrary and capricious denial of Plaintiffs’
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`petition for rulemaking, in violation of the APA. (Dkt. 13 at 36-38). On May 4, 2020,
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`Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. (Dkt. 14). Plaintiffs filed a
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`response on May 13, 2020 (Dkt. 16; Dkt. 19), and Defendants filed a reply on May 28,
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`2020 (Dkt. 18). The Court held oral argument on February 11, 2021, and reserved decision.
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`(Dkt. 26).
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`DISCUSSION
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`In the motions to dismiss both the 2019 and 2020 Actions, Defendants contend that
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`Plaintiffs lack both organizational and associational standing. (See 2019 Action, Dkt. 26
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`at 19-37; 2020 Action, Dkt. 15 at 13-26). Further, in the 2020 Action, Defendants contend
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`that Plaintiffs’ first and second causes of action are not redressable. (2020 Action, Dkt. 15
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`at 26-28). As explained below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs in both the 2019 Action and
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`the 2020 Action have standing to sue, and therefore Defendants’ motions to dismiss are
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`denied.
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`I.
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`Standard on Motion to Dismiss—Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
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`“A district court properly dismisses an action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack
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`of subject matter jurisdiction if the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to
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`adjudicate it, such as when . . . the plaintiff lacks constitutional standing to bring the
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`action.” Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecomms., S.á.r.l, 790 F.3d 411, 416-17
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`(2d Cir. 2015) (quotation and citation omitted). “In order to survive a defendant’s motion
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`to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff must allege facts ‘that
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`affirmatively and plausibly suggest that it has standing to sue.’” Brady v. Basic Research,
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`L.L.C., 101 F. Supp. 3d 217, 227 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Amidax Trading Grp. v.
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`S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 671 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2011)).
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`“When the Rule 12(b)(1) motion is facial, i.e., based solely on the allegations of the
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`complaint or the complaint and exhibits attached to it . . . the plaintiff has no evidentiary
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`burden.” Carter v. HealthPort Technologies, LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2016).
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`“Because standing is challenged [here] on the basis of the pleadings, we accept as true all
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`material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of
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`[Plaintiffs].” Alliance for Open Society Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d
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`218, 227 (2d Cir. 2011), aff’d, 570 U.S. 205 (2013) (quoting W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co.,
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`LLC v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 549 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2008)) (alterations in original).
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`“[A]t the pleading stage, standing allegations need not be crafted with precise detail, nor
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`must the plaintiff prove his allegations of injury.” Fin. Guar. Ins. Co. v. Putnam Advisory
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`Co., LLC, 783 F.3d 395, 401 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 631
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`(2d Cir. 2003)).
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`II.
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`Standing
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`“To satisfy the requirements of Article III standing, plaintiffs must demonstrate ‘(1)
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`[an] injury-in-fact, which is a concrete and particularized harm to a legally protected
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`interest; (2) causation in the form of a fairly traceable connection between the asserted
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`injury-in-fact and the alleged actions of the defendant; and (3) redressability, or a non-
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`speculative likelihood that the injury can be remedied by the requested relief.’” Hu v. City
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`of N.Y., 927 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 711 F.3d
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`253, 257 (2d Cir. 2013)) (alteration in original).
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`While both the 2019 Action and the 2020 Action involve multiple plaintiffs
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`asserting standing, the Court is not required to examine each Plaintiff’s allegations; rather,
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`“[i]t is well settled that where . . . multiple parties seek the same relief, ‘the presence of
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`one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy
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`requirement.’” Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay,
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`868 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). However, “a plaintiff must
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`demonstrate standing for each claim [s]he seeks to press.” Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.,
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`683 F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
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`Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 335 (2006)).
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`“An organization can have standing to sue in one of two ways. It may sue on behalf
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`of its members, in which case it must show, inter alia, that some particular member of the
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`organization would have had standing to bring the suit individuall