Case 6:23-cv-06233-FPG Document 27 Filed 04/10/24 Page 1 of 6
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`Plaintiff,
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`Defendants.
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` 23-CV-6233-FPG
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` DECISION AND ORDER
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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`STACEY S. MIRINAVICIENE,
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`v.
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`KEUKA COLLEGE, et al.,
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`INTRODUCTION
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`On November 30, 2023, the Court dismissed Pro se Plaintiff Stacey S. Mirinaviciene’s
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`federal-law claims without prejudice and granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.
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`ECF No. 21. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, ECF No. 22, which Defendants1 now move to
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`dismiss. ECF No. 23. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED
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`to the extent discussed below.
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`BACKGROUND
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`The following facts are taken from the amended complaint, unless otherwise noted. Prior
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`to her termination, Plaintiff was a tenured professor of accounting at Keuka College. ECF No. 22
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`at 2. At the time relevant to these events, Plaintiff was over forty years old and therefore protected
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`under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Id. at 1.
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`Plaintiff’s overarching allegation is that Keuka College used the COVID-19 pandemic as
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`a means to “oust tenured faculty and replace them with younger, less experienced and less
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`expensive non-tenured and adjunct faculty.” Id. at 3. On December 21, 2021, Keuka College
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`instituted a “booster mandate,” under which all faculty members were required to prove that they
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`had received a “booster” shot against COVID-19 within thirty days. Id. Faculty and staff could
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`1 Defendants are Keuka College and other individuals associated with, or employed by, the college. See ECF No. 22
`at 2.
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`1
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`Case 6:23-cv-06233-FPG Document 27 Filed 04/10/24 Page 2 of 6
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`obtain religious and medical exemptions, and faculty who taught classes online were not subject
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`to the mandate.
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`When Plaintiff learned of the mandate, she notified the college that, due to her medical
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`conditions, she would first need to obtain a medical examination to confirm whether and which
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`“booster” to take. Id. When Plaintiff could not obtain an appointment quickly, she requested an
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`extension of the deadline, which Keuka College denied. On March 10, 2022, Keuka College
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`terminated Plaintiff’s employment, ostensibly due to her failure to comply with the vaccination
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`policy. ECF No. 22 at 4. Plaintiff alleges that, in terminating her, Keuka College ignored her
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`contractual rights to pre-termination due process. Id.
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`To show that Keuka College undertook these actions as a “pretext to remove [her] due to
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`[her] age,” Plaintiff relies on the following facts. ECF No. 22 at 4; see also ECF No. 25 at 7-8.
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`First, Plaintiff was replaced by a “younger and untenured professor who ended up teaching mostly
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`online[] and with a decreased teaching schedule.” ECF No. 22 at 4. Second, Keuka College chose
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`to terminate Plaintiff for violating the vaccination policy in lieu of an alternative accommodation,
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`like “making all [Plaintiff’s] classes online or giving her academic leave or sabbatical.” ECF No.
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`25 at 7; see also id. at 8. Third, Plaintiff alleges that five other faculty members in her department,
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`all of whom were “over forty years of age,” were “terminated or harassed so much that they
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`resigned.” ECF No. 22 at 4. In addition, “several other similarly situated faculty throughout Keuka
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`College [] were also terminated or forced out of employment.” Id. As it stands, “there are currently
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`no other older, tenured professors remaining in the Business Department of Keuka College.” Id.
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`Plaintiff filed the present action in May 2023. ECF No. 1. In her original complaint,
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`Plaintiff brought federal-law claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),
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`the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), and the Americans with
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`2
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`Case 6:23-cv-06233-FPG Document 27 Filed 04/10/24 Page 3 of 6
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`Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”).2 ECF No. 1 at 1. Plaintiff also brought several state-law claims,
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`including for breach of contract, wrongful termination, and violation of the New York State
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`Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”).
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`In its November 30, 2023 Decision & Order, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal-law
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`claims and notified the parties that it intended to “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
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`over Plaintiff’s state-law claims.” ECF No. 21 at 11. Before doing so, the Court permitted Plaintiff
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`to file an amended complaint to support her federal-law claims. Id.
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`In her amended complaint, Plaintiff raises one federal-law claim: violation of the ADEA.
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`ECF No. 22 at 5. Plaintiff raises three state-law claims: two NYSHRL violations and a claim for
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`breach of contract. Id. at 5-6. As with her original complaint, the Court’s subject matter
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`jurisdiction over this action is federal-question jurisdiction, along with supplemental jurisdiction
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`over Plaintiff’s state-law claims. See id. at 1; ECF No. 21 at 9.
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`LEGAL STANDARD
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`A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) when it states a plausible
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`claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). A claim for relief is plausible when
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`the plaintiff pleads sufficient facts that allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the
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`defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678. In considering the plausibility of a
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`claim, the Court must accept factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the
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`plaintiff’s favor. Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011). At the same time,
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`the Court is not required to accord “[l]egal conclusions, deductions, or opinions couched as factual
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`allegations . . . a presumption of truthfulness.” In re NYSE Specialists Secs. Litig., 503 F.3d 89,
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`95 (2d Cir. 2007).
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`2 In addition, Plaintiff raised a claim for violation of her due-process rights under the U.S. Constitution. ECF No. 1
`at 21-22. Because Defendants are all private parties, that claim failed as a matter of law. ECF No. 21 at 2 n.1.
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`DISCUSSION
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`Defendants request that the Court dismiss the ADEA and NYSHRL claims and decline to
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`exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. ECF No. 23-2 at 16.
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`The Court concludes that the ADEA claim must be dismissed and that supplemental jurisdiction
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`should not be exercised over the state-law claims.
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`“To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
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`Procedure, a plaintiff asserting an employment discrimination complaint under the ADEA must
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`plausibly allege that adverse action was taken against her by her employer, and that her age was
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`the ‘but-for’ cause of the adverse action.” Downey v. Adloox Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 514, 519
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`(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The plaintiff need not prove discrimination,
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`or even allege facts establishing every element of a prima facie case of discrimination, but [] must
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`plead facts that give plausible support to a minimal inference of the requisite discriminatory
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`causality.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “More specifically, the plaintiff must supply
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`sufficient factual material, and not just legal conclusions, to push the misconduct alleged in the
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`pleading beyond the realm of the conceivable to the plausible.” Id. (internal quotation marks
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`omitted).
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`In this case, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that her age was a “but-for” cause of her
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`termination. The Court has already rejected several of the allegations on which Plaintiff relies to
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`show age discrimination. The Court may not consider Plaintiff’s mere conclusory assertions—
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`e.g., that Keuka College used the pandemic to “oust tenured faculty”—on a motion to dismiss. See
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`Boswell v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 3d 89, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“[M]ere conclusory
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`statements . . . are not entitled to the presumption of truth and must be disregarded.”); see also
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`ECF No. 21 at 8-9. And for the reasons stated in the prior decision, neither Plaintiff’s claim that
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`she was replaced by a younger professor, nor her argument that termination was an unduly harsh
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`sanction in comparison to other alternatives, permits an inference of discriminatory causality. Id.
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`at 8 & n.4, 9.
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`The only material addition to Plaintiff’s amended complaint is her assertion that five older
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`faculty members in her department, as well as other unnamed faculty in Keuka College, were
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`“terminated,” “harassed so much that they resigned,” or otherwise “forced out of employment.”
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`ECF No. 22 at 4. Plaintiff relies on their experiences to argue that Keuka College had a “pattern
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`and practice” of “systematically terminat[ing] older, tenured faculty.” Id. These allegations do
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`not support Plaintiff’s ADEA claim.
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`This is because, as Defendants correctly argue, “Plaintiff provides no factual context for
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`her conclusory assertion that these employees were subject to any discrimination or harassment
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`based on their ages.” ECF No. 23-2 at 12. Plaintiff does not describe any of the circumstances of
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`the faculty members’ terminations and/or harassment. See ECF No. 22 at 4. Without such
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`allegations, Plaintiff’s claim that such harassment, terminations, constructive discharges were the
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`product of age discrimination—and therefore would permit the inference that she was terminated
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`due to age—is conclusory and must be disregarded. Accord Bernstein v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.,
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`No. 21-2670, 2022 WL 1739609, at *2 (2d Cir. May 31, 2022) (summary order) (teacher failed to
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`sufficiently allege that principal “targeted older non-Hispanic employees to leave the school,”
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`where he identified “ten employees who were allegedly targeted but fail[ed] to provide any
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`information suggesting they were targeted because of age”); Marcus v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 661 F.
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`App’x 29, 32 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order) (plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege that employer
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`was seeking to replace older employees with “younger hires,” where the amended complaint was
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`“nearly bereft of any specific facts to support this conclusion,” and noting that plaintiff only alleged
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`“a single name and [] no dates, ages, or reasons with respect to the termination of other
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`employees”); Fitzgerald v. Signature Flight Support Corp., No. 13-CV-4026, 2014 WL 3887217,
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`at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2014) (on a motion to dismiss, disregarding “plaintiff’s unelaborated
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`allegation that [his manager] pushed out two other senior employees . . . by harassing them and
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`causing them to resign” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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`Because Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a “a minimal inference of the requisite
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`discriminatory causality,” Downey, 238 F. Supp. 3d at 519 (internal quotation marks omitted),
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`Plaintiff’s ADEA claim must be dismissed. Since Plaintiff has already had an opportunity to
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`amend her complaint to further support her ADEA claim, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff
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`another opportunity to amend, and her ADEA claim is dismissed with prejudice.
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`Therefore, the Court is again faced with the question of whether to exercise supplemental
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`jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims. See ECF No. 21 at 9-11. For the reasons stated in
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`the prior decision, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.3 See id.
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`CONCLUSION
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`Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 23) is GRANTED, insofar as
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`Plaintiff’s ADEA claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff’s state-law claims are
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`DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling in state court. The parties’ motions for summary
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`judgment (ECF Nos. 12, 14) are DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter
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`judgment and close the case.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`Dated: April 10, 2024
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`Rochester, New York
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`______________________________________
`HON. FRANK P. GERACI, JR.
`United States District Judge
`Western District of New York
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`3 Defendants argue that the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s NYSHRL claims because
`they “are parallel to her ADEA claim[] and are governed by the same legal standard.” ECF No. 23-2 at 15. However,
`in 2019, “the New York State legislature amended the [the NYSHRL] so that the standards are now broader than
`similar protections under federal law.” Fitzgibbons v. Cnty. of Tompkins, No. 21-CV-1019, 2023 WL 4467094, at
`*13 (N.D.N.Y. July 11, 2023). Neither party acknowledges the amendment or discusses what effect, if any, it may
`have on the Court’s analysis of the NYSHRL claims. The Court will not undertake that task sua sponte. Because this
`matter will proceed to state court regardless (assuming Plaintiff chooses to renew her breach-of-contract claim in that
`forum), the Court concludes that the better course is to allow the state court to adjudicate the NYSHRL claims.
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