IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
`WESTERN DIVISION
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`NO. 5:25-CV-46-FL
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`RACHEL A. ROYER,
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` P l a i n t i f f ,
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` v.
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`SYNEOS HEALTH, LLC.,
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` Defendant.
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`ORDER
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`This matter is before the court on defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule
`of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the alternative to compel arbitration. (DE 8). The motion has
`been briefed fully, and in this posture the issues raised are ripe for ruling. For the following
`reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.
`1
`STATEMENT OF THE CASE
`Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this action against her former employer January 31,
`2025, asserting claims based upon failure to provide religious accommodation in violation of Title
`VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(a)(2) et seq. (“Title VII”), fraud, and
`violations of 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 as well as the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
`United States Constitution. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, compensatory damages, and punitive
`damages, a remedy styled in the complaint as a separate claim for relief.
` Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss, relying on email correspondence with
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`1 Where the court concludes the complaint fails to state a claim, the court does not reach that part of the instant
`motion seeking in the alternative to compel arbitration.
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`plaintiff, declaration by defendant’s human resources director Jennifer Trucks, and certain
`documents filed in related matters, Sulander et al. v. Syneos Health, LLC, No. 5:23-CV-539-FL
`(E.D.N.C.) and Kneece v. Syneos Health US, Inc., d/b/a Syneos Health Commercial Services,
`LLC, No. 6:22-CV-02776-TMC-KFM (D.S.C.), including an arbitration agreement executed by
`plaintiff May 12, 2021 (the “arbitration agreement”). Plaintiff responded in opposition, relying on
`email correspondence between plaintiff and certain employees of defendant. Defendant replied.
`STATEMENT OF FACTS
` Though not a model of clarity, the facts alleged in the complaint may be summarized as
`follows. Plaintiff began working for defendant as a “hematology clinical account specialist” June
`1, 2021. (Compl. 4).
`2 Her duties consisted of providing sales support services for one of
`defendant’s client companies (the “client company”). (Id.).
` Defendant announced September 2, 2021, that all employees would be required to take a
`COVID-19 vaccine, absent an exemption for medical reasons or sincere religious beliefs. (Compl.
`Attach. (DE 1-1) at 1; see Email (DE 1-2)). The client company for which plaintiff provided
`services did not require its employees to be vaccinated. (Compl. Attach. (DE 1-1) at 2). Plaintiff
`sought a religious exemption from defendant’s vaccination requirement, which was granted
`October 6, 2021, “pending a hardship analysis to be conducted by [defendant] within 15 business
`days.” (Id. at 2). The notice provided by defendant stated that defendant “may not be able to
`provide workplace accommodations to all employees who would otherwise qualify for an
`exemption.” (Email (DE 1-3) at 2).
`Subsequently, defendant informed plaintiff on December 9, 2021, that continued
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`2 Unless otherwise specified, page numbers in citations to the record in this order refer to the page number
`designated in the court’s case management and electronic case filing (CM/ECF) system, and not to page numbering,
`if any, specified on the face of the underlying document.
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`accommodations would impose an undue hardship on defendant. (Compl. Attach. (DE 1-1) at 2;
`see Letter (DE 1-4)). Defendant advised plaintiff that she must become vaccinated or find a
`position that did not require vaccination by the end of January 2022. (Compl. Attach. (DE 1-1) at
`2; Letter (DE 1-4) at 1). When plaintiff remained unvaccinated, her employment was terminated
`January 31, 2022. (Compl. Attach. (DE 1-1) at 2). Defendant characterized plaintiff’s termination
`as “voluntary” and denied plaintiff a quarterly bonus. (Id.).
`Following termination, defendant amended plaintiff’s post-employment file, “warning
`future employers and/or contractors that there may be a problem with [plaintiff].” (Compl. Attach.
`(DE 1-1) at 3).
`Plaintiff filed charge of discrimination with the United States Equal Opportunity
`Employment Commission (“EEOC”) February 9, 2022, and received notice of right to sue August
`12, 2022. (Sulander Compl. (DE 9-4) ¶ 165).
`3 Along with seven other former employees of
`defendant, plaintiff initiated suit against defendant in the United States District Court for the
`Western District of North Carolina under the caption Scott et al. v. Syneos Health, LLC, no. 5:22-
`CV-163-KDB (W.D.N.C.) (hereinafter, plaintiff’s “prior action”).4 On March 28, 2023, in that
`prior action, plaintiff filed notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice as to all claims asserted
`on her behalf in that matter. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Sulander et al. v. Syneos Health,
`LLC, no. 5:23-CV-539-FL (DE 25).
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`3 A court may, at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, “consider a document submitted by the movant that was not attached
`to or expressly incorporated into a complaint, so long as the document was integral to the complaint and there is no
`dispute about the document’s authenticity.” Goines v. Valley Cmty. Serv. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016).
`The court also may take judicial notice of matters of public record. Goldfarb v. Mayor of Balt., 791 F.3d 500, 508
`(4th Cir. 2015).
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`4 The prior action subsequently was transferred to this district, consolid ated with Sullivan v. Syneos Health,
`LLC, no 5:23-CV-540-FL (E.D.N.C.), and the claims of five out of seven of the original plaintiffs (not including the
`plaintiff in the instant case) are pending before the unde rsigned under the caption Sulander et al. v. Syneos Health,
`LLC, no 5:23-CV-539-FL (E.D.N.C.).
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`COURT’S DISCUSSION
`A. Standard of Review
`To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
`factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft
`v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
`“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
`Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In evaluating whether a claim is stated, the “court accepts all well-
`pled facts as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” but does not
`consider “legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, . . . bare assertions devoid of further
`factual enhancement[,] . . . unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.”
`Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009).
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`B. Analysis
` 1. Title VII (Count I)
`Defendant asserts plaintiff’s Title VII claim must be dismissed because it is time-barred.
`Title VII requires that aggrieved persons file a civil action within 90 days of receiving a right-to-
`sue letter from the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). 42
`U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). According to complaint filed in plaintiff’s prior action, plaintiff received
`her right-to-sue letter August 12, 2022. (Sulander Compl. (DE 9-4) ¶ 165). Plaintiff does not
`contest this fact. Thus, plaintiff’s January 31, 2025, Title VII claim is untimely because it was
`filed more than 90 days after plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter.
`However, the 90-day period provided for in Title VII is subject to principles of equitable
`tolling along the lines of a statute of limitations. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89,
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`5 Throughout this order, internal citations and quotation marks are o mitted from citations unless otherwise
`specified.
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`95-96 (1990). A district court must engage in a “case-by-case examination to determine if an
`equitable tolling of the filing period is appropr iate.” Harvey v. City of New Bern Police Dep’t,
`813 F.2d 652, 654 (4th Cir. 1987). Here, plaintiff argues the time limit should be tolled because
`she had no knowledge of an arbitration agreement until after such deadline had passed. The court
`is not persuaded.
`“Equitable tolling is appropriate when, but only when, extraordinary circumstances beyond
`[a plaintiff’s] control prevented [her] from complying with the statutory time limit.” Rouse v. Lee,
`339 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2003). Although plaintiff claims that knowledge of the arbitration
`agreement was beyond her control, she does not provide any reasonable explanation for why such
`lack of knowledge prevented her from filing her claim in the instant matter within the 90-day limit.
`Therefore, equitable tolling is not appropriate in this instance.
`The fact that the complaint in plaintiff’s prior action was timely does not change the court’s
`analysis. This is “consistent with the general rule that a Title VII complaint that has been filed but
`then dismissed without prejudice does not toll the 90-day limitations period.” Angles v. Dollar
`Tree Stores, Inc., 494 Fed. App’x 326, 329 (4th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases).
`In sum, because plaintiff’s complaint in the instant matter was filed outside the 90-day
`limitations period and because such period was not tolled, her Title VII claim must be dismissed
`under Rule 12(b)(6).
`2. Constitutional Claims (Counts II, IV, V)
`Defendant asserts plaintiff’s claims under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments
`must be dismissed for failure to state a claim because defendant is not a state actor. “Statutory and
`common law, rather than the Constitution, traditionally govern relationships between private
`parties.” Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 291 (4th Cir. 2006). However, “a private entity can qualify
`as a state actor,” and therefore be constrained by the Constitution, “in a few limited circumstances,”
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`including “(i) when the private entity performs a traditional, exclusive public function, (ii) when
`the government compels the private entity to take a particular action, or (iii) when the government
`acts jointly with the private entity.” Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S. 802, 804
`(2019).
` Where plaintiff does not allege any circumstance indicating defendant qualifies as a state
`actor, her constitutional claims necessarily fail.
` 3. Regulatory Claim (Count III)
`Defendant argues plaintiff’s regulatory claim fails as a matter of law because the regulatory
`provisions on which she relies do not create a private right of action. Federal regulation requires
`human trial participants give legal, effective, and informed consent before participating in a
`research project; this consent cannot be obtained through coercion or undue influence. 45 C.F.R.
`§ 46.116. Federal law also authorizes the United States Secretary of Health and Human Services
`(the “Secretary”) to introduce into interstate commerce medical products intended for use in an
`emergency and requires the Secretary to ensure recipients of such products are informed “of the
`option to accept or refuse administration of the product.” 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3. Plaintiff alleges
`defendant violated these provisions by mandating vaccination of its employees.
`“Private parties may not bring enforcement suits” under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics
`Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399i, which includes the statutory section cited by plaintiff. POM
`Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102, 109 (2014). Additionally, the only authorities
`this court has found addressing the question indicate the same is true of 45 C.F.R. § 46.116. See,
`e.g., Elansari v. Univ. of Pa., 779 Fed. App’x 1006, 1008 (3rd Cir. 2019) (“[Section] 46.116 does
`not provide a private cause of action.”). Plaintiff does not direct the court to any binding authority
`refuting these conclusions. Thus, count III of plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for failure
`to state a claim.
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`3. Fraud (Count VI)
`Defendant asserts plaintiff fails to state a claim for fraud.6 In North Carolina, “the elements
`of actual fraud are ‘(1) [f]alse representation or concealment of a material fact, (2) reasonably
`calculated to deceive, (3) made with intent to deceive, (4) which does in fact deceive, (5) resulting
`in damage to the injured party.’ ” Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 189 (4th Cir. 2007)
`(quoting Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 526-27 (2007)). “Additionally, any reliance on the
`allegedly false representations must be reasonable.” Id.
`Under Rule 9(b), a party pleading fraud must state “with particularity the circumstances
`constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Thus, a fraud plaintiff must plead the “time, place, and
`contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the
`misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby.” Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co.,
`176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Terry v. Terry, 302 N.C. 77, 85 (1981). The court
`examines the alleged misrepresentations in turn.
`First, plaintiff alleges defendant “made representations that accommodations would be
`made for sincere religious exemption” in a September 2, 2021, email. (Compl. Attach. (DE 1-1)
`at 1). However, this allegation is belied by documents attached to the complaint. The email
`plaintiff references states, “Employee Exemption & Accommodation Process: Employees seeking
`an exemption or accommodation to the vaccine requirement for medical reasons or sincerely held
`religious beliefs should fill out an exemption re quest form.” (Email (DE 1-2) at 2). There is no
`statement in the email representing that all, or any, requests for religious exemption
`accommodation would be granted. Therefore, the court need not accept as true plaintiff’s
`allegation that defendant promised accommodations. See Goines, 822 F.3d at 166 (“[I]n the event
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`6 Where it concludes plaintiff has not stated a claim for fraud, the court does not reach defendant’s argument
`that the claim has expired.
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`of conflict between the bare allegations of the complaint and any exhibit attached, the exhibit
`prevails.”).
`Although plaintiff further alleges that defendant made “promises to accommodate that were
`withdrawn,” “lied about its intention to find accommodation,” and made “false representations that
`accommodations would be made,” (Compl. Attach. (DE 1-1) at 3), such general allegations do not
`comply with the heightened pleading requirements for claims of fraud. Where plaintiff does not
`specify the time, place, or speaker of such representations, her complaint does not satisfy Rule 9(b)
`as to defendant’s alleged promises to accommodate.
`Plaintiff next alleges defendant represented that plaintiff’s “request for a religious
`exemption was granted, pending a ‘hardship’ analysis to be conducted by [defendant] within 15
`business days.” (Compl. Attach. (DE 1-1) at 2). Although she also alleges that “[n]o hardship
`analysis was conducted within 15 days,” there is no indication in the complaint that plaintiff relied
`on the 15-day window or that she was damaged thereby. Id. Thus, plaintiff fails to allege facts
`permitting an inference of reliance, thus precluding that part of her claim for fraud premised upon
`the timing of a hardship analysis.
`Finally, plaintiff alleges defendant falsely represented “that it would be a hardship for
`[defendant] to accommodate Plaintiff’s religious beliefs.” (Compl. Attach. (DE 1-1) at 2).
`According to plaintiff, such representation of hardship was fraudulent because plaintiff could
`perform all duties of her job while remaining unvaccinated with no added cost to defendant.
`However, plaintiff’s further allegations indicate that she never believed defendant’s representation
`of hardship to be true. Plaintiff attaches to her complaint an email to defendant’s human resources
`director, wherein plaintiff clarifies her understanding that the client company did not require her
`to be vaccinated and that vaccination status should not be seen “as a barrier to doing [her] job in
`the field and in interactions with customers.” (Email (DE 1-5) at 1). Thus, plaintiff does not
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`plausibly allege that she relied upon the alleged misrepresentation or was “in fact deceive[d].” See
`Anderson, 508 F.3d at 189.
`Additionally and in the alternative, plaintiff does not plausibly allege that she was damaged
`by defendant’s representation of hardship. Although plaintiff argues she “was damaged by the
`deception and fraud . . . when [defendant] fired her on January 31, 2022,” (Resp. at 7), there is no
`indication in the complaint or elsewhere in the record that plaintiff was fired because of her reliance
`on defendant’s representation of hardship. Rather, she continued to challenge defendant’s
`hardship conclusion and ultimately was terminated for failure to comply with defendant’s
`vaccination policy. (See Compl. Attach. (DE 1-1) at 2).
`In sum, plaintiff fails to state a claim which meets the heightened pleading requirements of
`Rule 9(b). Therefore, her fraud claim must be dismissed.
` 4. Punitive Damages (Count VII)
` In North Carolina, “no freestanding claim exists for punitive damages.” Sykes v. Health
`Network Solutions, Inc., 372 N.C. 326, 329 (2019). Therefore, where plaintiff has no remaining
`claim to which it might attach, her claim for punitive damages must fail. See id.
`CONCLUSION
` Based on the foregoing, defendant’s motion to dismiss (DE 8) is GRANTED, and
`plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
`The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.
`SO ORDERED, this the 12th day of August, 2025.
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` _____________________________
` LOUISE W. FLANAGAN
` United States District Judge
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