Case: 1:20-cv-01872-JG Doc #: 79 Filed: 06/28/21 1 of 13. PageID #: 4123
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
`EASTERN DIVISION
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`Case No. 1:20-CV-01872
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`Hon. James S. Gwin
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`Magistrate Judge Thomas M. Parker
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`CITY OF MAPLE HEIGHTS, OHIO,
`individually and on behalf of all others similarly
`situated,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`NETFLIX, INC., and HULU, LLC,
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`Defendants.
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`PLAINTIFF CITY OF MAPLE HEIGHTS, OHIO’S
`REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION
`TO STRIKE THE EXPERT REPORT OF JESSE DAVID, Ph.D.
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`Dated: June 28, 2021
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`Case: 1:20-cv-01872-JG Doc #: 79 Filed: 06/28/21 2 of 13. PageID #: 4124
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Defendant Netflix, Inc. (“Netflix”) submits the expert report of Jesse David, Ph.D. (“Dr.
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`David”) in support of its specious argument that Plaintiff’s damage approach is “simplistic,
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`unsubstantiated, and inconsistent with its liability theory.”1 ECF No. 71 at 2. Plaintiff’s liability
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`theory and damage approach, however, are consistent with and substantiated by the plain language
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`of O.R.C. 1332.21, et seq. (the “Act”), which the Court is fully capable of interpreting and applying
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`on a classwide basis without Dr. David. Netflix’s opposition—which makes the same legal
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`arguments that Dr. David sets forth in his report without identifying a single issue requiring his
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`expertise as an economist—proves the point. Indeed, Dr. David himself readily admits that the
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`Court is fully capable of interpreting Plaintiff’s liability theory, interpreting the plain language of
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`the Act, and determining whether Plaintiff’s theory of liability and damage approach are consistent
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`with the requirements of the statute.
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`Netflix claims that Dr. David’s opinions “result from specialized knowledge and expertise”
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`because he performed “economic analysis” of Plaintiff’s proposed damages approach to determine
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`“what it does and does not cover” and opine that it cannot be implemented on a classwide basis.
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`ECF No. 71 at 2. But Plaintiff’s “proposed damages approach” is mandated by the express terms
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`of the Act (see O.R.C. § 1332.32) and the only “economic analysis” that Dr. David performed is
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`adopting Netflix’s interpretation of the Act (and Plaintiff’s Complaint) and making argument that
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`1 Just as it did in its opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to exceed the page limitation (ECF No. 51), Netflix
`misrepresents to the Court that Plaintiff “refused to agree to jointly ask the Court to permit Netflix and Hulu
`an additional five (5) pages to oppose Plaintiff’s 20 page motion for class certification.” ECF No. 71 at 1
`n.1. But, as demonstrated in Plaintiff’s reply brief in support of its motion to exceed the page limitation,
`Plaintiff initially did agree to allow Defendants an additional five (5) pages and it was Netflix that refused
`to agree to Plaintiff’s proposed joint motion. See ECF No. 52. Netflix then falsely accuses Plaintiff of
`“unilaterally grant[ing] itself a 15-page extension.” ECF No. 71 at 1 n. 1. But nothing in the Local Rules
`prohibits Plaintiff from filing a joint reply in response to Defendants’ two opposition briefs. See L.R. 7.1.
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`2
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`Case: 1:20-cv-01872-JG Doc #: 79 Filed: 06/28/21 3 of 13. PageID #: 4125
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`Plaintiff’s interpretation of the statute does not consider factors that Netflix argues are relevant.2
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`It is the province of the Court, however, to determine which interpretation of the Act’s damages
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`provision is correct and whether it can be applied on a classwide basis.
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`II.
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`PLAINTIFF’S DAMAGES APPROACH IS MANDATED BY THE OHIO ACT
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`A. The Ohio Act Explicitly Sets Forth the Manner in Which Damages Are Required to
`be Calculated.
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`Netflix’s argument that Plaintiff was required to submit a damages model to identify the
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`gross revenues that Netflix derives from providing “video service” in each Ohio city is based upon
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`a fundamental misreading of the Act. See ECF No. 71 at 3. The Act does not place the burden on
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`Ohio municipalities to calculate for Netflix the amount of fees it owes. Indeed, Netflix’s reading
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`of the statute is nonsensical because the information necessary to calculate the video service
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`provider fees owed is within Netflix’s sole possession.3 That is precisely the reason why the Act
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`contains an audit provision that permits Ohio municipalities to inspect the books and records
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`pertaining to gross revenues of a video service provider “for the purpose of verifying the accuracy
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`of a video service provider’s calculation of the video service provider fees it paid….” O.R.C.
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`§1332.33(A) (emphasis added).
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`2 Netflix argues that Dr. David “analyzes data, surveys, and other information” to show that Plaintiff’s
`approach is not in the best interest of the Class and creates conflicts among Class members. ECF No. 71 at
`2. First, whether Plaintiff’s approach is in the best interest of the Class and creates conflicts among Class
`members are issues that go directly toward Plaintiff’s adequacy as a class representative, which is a legal
`determination within the sole province of the Court. Second, specialized knowledge is not required to
`review census data and surveys and argue whether such information is relevant to the damages provision
`in the Act. Netflix’s lawyers were equally capable of making such arguments in their brief and supplying
`the underlying data to the Court so the Court could make its own determination of its relevance. Instead,
`Netflix hired Dr. David, an economist, to make legal arguments for it (circumventing the Court’s page
`limitations) without performing any economic analysis whatsoever.
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`3 Indeed, Plaintiff presently receives video service provider fees from Spectrum, AT&T, and WOW!. See
`Deposition of Tinita Tillman (“Tillman Tr.”) at 37:8-17, 41:21 – 44:5 (Ex. 1). Each of these video service
`providers calculates the amount of video service provider fee owed each quarter and remit payment to the
`City without any involvement from the City in calculating those fees. Id.
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`3
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`Netflix’s arguments (adopted wholesale by Dr. David) with respect to viewer location and
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`ownership of the rights-of-way also have no basis whatsoever in the Act’s plain language. If
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`Netflix provides video programming over wires or cables located at least in part in public rights-
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`of-way in Ohio, it provides video service. O.R.C. § 1332.21(J). As a video service provider, it is
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`not permitted to provide video service in the state of Ohio “except pursuant to a video service
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`authorization issued under section 1332.24 of the Revised Code.” O.R.C. § 1332.23(A). In order
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`to obtain a video service authorization, Netflix is required to submit an application specifying,
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`among other information: (1) the geographic and political boundaries of its proposed video service
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`area; and (2) a general description of the type of technologies it will use to deliver video
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`programming, which may include wireline, wireless, or any other alternative technology. See
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`O.R.C. §§ 1332.25(A)(2)-(3).
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`Once Netflix receives a video service authorization to provide video service within the
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`video service area(s) identified and by the technological means identified in its application,
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`political subdivisions no longer have the right to regulate Netflix’s provision of video service on a
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`local level. See O.R.C. § 1332.26(A)-(B). Netflix is thus unburdened from having to negotiate
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`separate local franchise agreements with each municipality and can provide its video service on a
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`statewide basis in all service areas identified in its application. Id. In exchange, Netflix is required
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`to pay each municipality within the video service areas identified in its application, that has a local
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`ordinance requiring a fee, a video service provider fee. O.R.C. § 1332.32(C)(1)(b).
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`Before providing video service to subscribers in a given video service area, Netflix is
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`required to provide “ten days’ advance, written notice of [the] service or additional service to the
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`respective municipal corporation or township and to every person providing video service in all or
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`part of that video service area.” O.R.C. § 1332.27(A). After receiving the required notice, the
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`municipality or township is then required to provide Netflix with notice of the “appropriate
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`4
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`percentage” owed within ten days after it receives notice from Netflix. O.R.C. § 1332.32(C)(2).
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`Upon receipt of such notice, Netflix is then required to pay a video service provider fee to each
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`municipal corporation and township in which it offers video service. O.R.C. § 1332.32(A).
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`The amount owed by Netflix is calculated quarterly by determining its gross revenue for
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`the preceding calendar quarter and multiplying it by the percentage specified by the municipality
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`or township. Id. Gross revenue, in relevant part, consists of revenue collected by Netflix for video
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`service from all its subscribers having service addresses within the municipal corporation or
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`township, including: (a) recurring monthly charges for video service; (b) event-based charges for
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`video service, including, but not limited to, pay-per-view and video-on-demand charges; and (c)
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`advertising revenue (if the municipal corporation has passed a resolution to include such revenue).
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`O.R.C. §§ 1332.32(B)(1)(a)-(b), (B)(2)(g). If the municipal corporation or township has reason to
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`doubt the accuracy of Netflix’s calculation of the video service provider fee owed, it has the right
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`to audit Netflix by inspecting its “records pertaining to its gross revenue” for “the purpose of
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`verifying [Netflix’s] calculation of the video service provider fees it paid to the municipal
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`corporation or township in the audit period.” O.R.C. § 1332.33(A) (emphasis added).
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`Plaintiff’s “simplistic approach” is thus mandated by the statute and no amount of
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`“economic or damages analysis” permits Plaintiff (or Netflix) to rewrite the plain language of the
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`Act and propose a damages model that is different from that required by the plain terms of the Act.
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`See ECF No. 71 at 3. Further, no expert analysis is required for the Court to interpret the Act’s
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`plain meaning and determine whether O.R.C. § 1332.32 can be applied on a classwide basis.
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`B. Dr. David’s Opinions Are Neither Necessary Nor Helpful In Interpreting the Plain
`Language of the Ohio Act.
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`Dr. David’s opinions are neither necessary nor helpful to the Court because he simply
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`adopts Netflix’s interpretation of the Act and argues that Plaintiff’s interpretation of the Act’s
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`5
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`damage provision does not account for information that Netflix contends is relevant and Plaintiff
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`contends is irrelevant under the Act’s plain language.4 Such arguments consist entirely of legal
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`analysis of the parties’ respective interpretations of the Act and do not require the expertise of an
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`economist. Indeed, while Netflix contends that “Dr. David analyzes available data, surveys, census
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`results, and other information and reaches several conclusions based on his area of expertise and
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`his data analysis” (ECF No., 71 at 4), Netflix does not identify a single economic principle (nor
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`does Dr. David) that Dr. David uses to reach his conclusions and Dr. David admits he was not
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`asked to propose a damages model in this case.5 See Deposition of Jesse David, Ph.D. (“David
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`Tr.”) at 40:9 – 41:19.
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`First, Dr. David’s opinion that it is necessary for Plaintiff’s damages approach to determine
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`“how much ‘video service’ Netflix allegedly provides in a particular city and what the revenues
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`associated with that ‘video service’ are” (ECF No. 71 at 4), is a legal argument based upon
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`Netflix’s (wrong) interpretation of the Act that Netflix’s lawyers are capable of making without
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`Dr. David. Moreover, as set forth above, Netflix is required to calculate the amount of fees it owes
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`based upon gross revenues derived from “recurring monthly charges for video service” from
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`subscribers with service addresses in the municipality or township. O.R.C. §§ 1332.32(A)-(B). If
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`Netflix contends that some of its subscribers do not receive Netflix’s video programming over
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`4 Netflix justifies Dr. David’s legal arguments by asserting that “[t]he Court cannot be expected to
`independently research and analyze census data, survey results, and other information, and Dr. David’s
`opinions therefore serve to assist the Court in analyzing the issues related to class certification here.” ECF
`No. 71 at 6 n. 3. But Plaintiff does not contend the Court is required to “independently research” anything.
`Rather, Netflix could have and should have attached the data as exhibits to its brief and cited the relevant
`portions thereof in conjunction with its legal arguments so the Court could independently evaluate those
`legal arguments for itself, based upon the evidence submitted. Instead, Netflix improperly submitted an
`additional 40 pages of legal argument in the form of Dr. David’s report.
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`5 Tellingly, much of the “data, surveys, census results, and other information” that Dr. David “analyzes” is
`also contained and analyzed in the report of Netflix’s other expert (a non-economist), Steven Turner. See,
`e.g., ECF No. 63-4 at ¶¶ 55-56, 59-60. That is because specialized knowledge is not required to analyze
`such information.
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`6
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`wires and cables located at least in part in public rights-of-ways, under the plain language of the
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`Act, it is Netflix’s burden to exclude those subscribers from its calculation. Id. If Plaintiff disagrees
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`with Netflix’s calculation and/or interpretation of the Act, Plaintiff has the right to conduct an audit
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`and bring the dispute in a court of competent jurisdiction. O.R.C. §§ 1332.33(A), (D).
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`Second, Dr. David’s opinion that Plaintiff is required to determine the locations from where
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`Netflix’s subscribers subscribe is also legal argument based upon Netflix’s (wrong) interpretation
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`of the Act. Expertise in economics is not required to analyze Ohio’s ZIP Codes. Indeed, Steven
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`Turner, a non-economist, performs the same analysis. ECF No. 63-4 at ¶¶ 55-56. Moreover, under
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`the Act’s plain language, once Netflix is determined to be a video service provider, as discussed
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`above, it is Netflix’s burden to calculate its gross revenues subject to the fee. See O.R.C. §§
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`1332.32-33. The Act does not permit Netflix to avoid paying video service provider fees by
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`claiming that it does not collect the information necessary to do so. Netflix is fully capable of
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`collecting the addresses of its subscribers or determining its subscribers addresses based upon the
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`vast information it collects about its subscribers.6 See ECF No. 68 at 12-14.
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`Third, whether Plaintiff’s proposed damages approach (i.e., the Act’s damages provision)
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`is in the best interests of the proposed Class is a determination solely within the Court’s province.
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`Dr. David has performed no investigation or analysis and has no expertise in determining what is
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`or is not in the proposed Class’ best interest. See David Tr. at 77:7 – 79:11. Furthermore, Netflix’s
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`argument that viewer location is relevant under the Act is a legal argument based solely upon
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`Netflix’s erroneous interpretation of the Act. Dr. David’s “opinions” are thus nothing more than
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`6 Dr. David admits that he performed no investigation or analysis as to whether Netflix is capable of
`determining its subscribers’ addresses. Instead, he simply took the information provided to him at face
`value and adopted Netflix’s arguments in that regard. David Tr. at 55:2 – 63:14.
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`7
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`legal arguments that are neither necessary nor helpful to the Court in determining whether the
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`Act’s damages provision can be applied on a classwide basis.
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`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION SHOULD BE GRANTED AND DR. DAVID’S OPINIONS
`SHOULD BE EXCLUDED
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`III.
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`A. Plaintiff’s Motion is Not Premature.
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`The Court can and should make a determination, at this juncture, as to whether Dr. David’s
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`opinions should be excluded. The Supreme Court has never decided whether a district court is
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`required to undertake a Daubert analysis at the class-certification stage, but it “has suggested that
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`such an analysis may be required in some circumstances.” In re Carpenter Co., No. 14-0302, 2014
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`WL 12809636, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 29, 2014). Likewise, the Sixth Circuit has yet to decide whether
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`a district court must undertake a Daubert analysis at the class-certification stage when an expert’s
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`report is relevant to the class certification analysis. Hicks v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,
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`965 F.3d 452, 465-66 (6th Cir. 2020). The Sixth Circuit, however, has held that the district court
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`does not abuse its discretion by conducting a Daubert analysis at the class-certification stage. See
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`In re Carpenter Co., 2014 WL 12809636, at *3; see also Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 600 F.3d
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`813, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2010).7
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`While the usual concerns about shielding the jury from unreliable expert testimony do not
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`arise when the court is the factfinder, Daubert’s standards must still be met. See Attorney General
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`of Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 779 (10th Cir. 2009). “Although the trial court
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`is not required to hold an actual hearing to comply with Daubert, the Court must make an initial
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`7 Contrary to Netflix’s assertion otherwise (ECF No. 71 at 7), district courts in the Sixth Circuit routinely
`conduct Daubert analyses at the class certification stage. See, e.g., Kondash v. Kia Motors America, Inc.,
`No. 1:15-cv-506, 2020 WL 5816228, at *6-7 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2020) (conducting Daubert analysis at
`class certification stage); In re FCA US LLC Monostable Electronic Gearshift Litig., 382 F. Supp. 3d 687,
`691-92 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (same); Willis v. Big Lots, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-604, 2017 WL 1074048, at *1 n. 1
`(S.D. Ohio Mar. 17, 2017) (same); In re Behr Dayton Thermal Products, LLC, No. 3:08-CV-326, 2015 WL
`13651286, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 2015) (same).
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`8
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`assessment of the relevance and reliability of the expert testimony.” Greenwell v. Boatwright, 184
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`F.3d 492, 498 (6th Cir. 1999). Here, as set forth fully in Plaintiff’s opening brief as well as below,
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`even the most basic assessment of Dr. David’s opinions reveals that they are legal arguments
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`disguised as expert opinions that are not based upon any specialized knowledge he holds as an
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`economist.
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`B. Dr. David’s Opinions Constitute Impermissible Legal Argument That Are Not Based
`Upon Specialized Knowledge.
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`Netflix falsely asserts that Plaintiff “does not challenge the relevance or reliability of Dr.
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`David’s testimony, nor could it.” ECF No. 71 at 8. While Plaintiff does not dispute that Dr. David
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`may be a qualified economist, his qualifications as an economist are beside the point because, as
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`set forth below, he does not offer any opinions that require an economist’s specialized knowledge.
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`Rather, Dr. David’s opinions are premised entirely upon his interpretation of Plaintiff’s liability
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`theory, as he reads Plaintiff’s Complaint (with the help of Netflix’s lawyers). David Tr. at 50:3 –
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`54:5. Dr. David’s opinions, therefore, are unreliable because he has no legal expertise and is not
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`qualified to interpret Plaintiff’s liability theory. Id. And, even if he was qualified, he readily admits
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`that the Court is fully capable of interpreting Plaintiff’s liability theory and comparing it with
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`Plaintiff’s damages model (both of which are mandated by the plain language of the Act) to
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`determine whether they are consistent under Comcast. Id.
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`Netflix’s argument that Plaintiff “appears to claim that the Court should simply find that
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`its damages approach meets the dictates of Comcast . . . without any further analysis” is false. ECF
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`No. 71 at 9. Plaintiff claims that the damages model in this case is mandated by statute and that
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`the Court is fully capable, as Dr. David admits, of performing the rigorous analysis required and
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`determining whether the statutory damage provision meets the requirements of Comcast without
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`Dr. David. David Tr. at 53:9 – 54:5. Indeed, for example, Dr. David’s “analysis” of census data
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`9
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`and tourism statistics do not require the expertise of an economist.8 Netflix’s lawyers were equally
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`capable of submitting the alleged “survey data, statistics, census data, and other information” to
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`the Court, citing to the relevant portions thereof, and advancing the legal arguments offered by Dr.
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`David regarding alleged intra-class conflicts.
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`Indeed, each of Dr. David’s “opinions” could have and should have been advanced by
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`Netflix’s lawyers because they similarly do not require the specialized knowledge of an economist.
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`Netflix does not dispute that Dr. David is not offering a damage model in this case and does not
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`identify a single economic principle utilized by Dr. David in reaching his opinions. Instead, for
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`example, it asserts, ipse dixit, that he “applies his expertise” to determine whether billing ZIP
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`Codes can be utilized to determine Netflix’s subscribers’ addresses. ECF No. 71 at 10. Setting
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`aside that Netflix’s ability to determine the service addresses of its subscribers is a damages
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`allocation issue that applies equally to all proposed Class members, Netflix does not explain why
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`an economist is necessary to submit evidence to the Court that a single ZIP Code can contain
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`residents from more than one city.
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`Furthermore, assuming for the sake of argument that Dr. David’s expertise as an economist
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`is required to explain the basics of ZIP Codes to the Court, his opinions are unreliable in that regard
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`because he performed no independent analysis or investigation into the vast amount of information
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`that Netflix actually collects about its subscribers and whether such information could be used to
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`determine its subscribers service addresses. David Tr. at 55:2 – 63:14. Indeed, he did not even
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`8 Additionally, Dr. David’s opinions are irrelevant, since, for example, under the Act’s plain language, gross
`revenues are derived from Netflix’s subscribers’ flat monthly subscriptions and calculated based upon the
`subscriber’s service address—and not where content is viewed—his “analysis” as to whether certain Ohio
`cities have more travel than others is irrelevant under the plain language of the statute. See O.R.C. §
`1332.32(A)-(B).
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`investigate whether it was possible to determine a subscriber’s service address by using his or her
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`name and ZIP Code (which even the most basic inquiry would have revealed). Id.
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`Likewise, Dr. David’s remaining opinions regarding viewer location, viewer methodology,
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`costs imposed by Netflix’s use of the public rights-of-way, etc. are similarly not based upon
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`specialized knowledge and he applies no economic principles to reach them.9 Instead, he simply
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`adopts Netflix’s erroneous interpretation of the statute, reviews data that non-economists are
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`equally capable of analyzing, and opines that Plaintiff’s interpretation of the Act does not take
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`such data into consideration. Again, Netflix’s lawyers could have and should have submitted the
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`underlying data to the Court and advanced these legal arguments without Dr. David.
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`Lastly, that Dr. David is permitted to “rely on the factual assumptions and opinions of
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`others when rendering [his] own damages opinions” (EFC No. 71 at 12), is of no moment because
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`Dr. David is not providing a damages calculation in this case and his opinions, as set forth above,
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`are not based upon specialized knowledge or any economic principles. See Allied Erecting and
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`Dismantling Co., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 4:12-cv-1390, 2015 WL 1530648, at *14 (N.D. Ohio
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`Apr. 6, 2015) (permitting damages expert to incorporate factual assumptions and opinions of others
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`“into their calculations”); LG Elec. U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 08 C 242, 2010 WL
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`3397358, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2010) (involving expert providing damages calculation);
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`Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l Inc., Nos. 5:02-571, 5:04-84, 2007 WL 7083655,
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`at *6 (E.D. Ky. May 12, 2007) (same). Instead, he simply assumes the relevance of the facts fed
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`to him by Netflix and regurgitates Netflix’s arguments that Plaintiff’s interpretation of the Act’s
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`damages provision is wrong because it does not consider those facts. But determining the proper
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`interpretation of the Act’s damages provision and the facts relevant to that interpretation is within
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`9 In addition to not being based upon specialized knowledge, none of these considerations are relevant under
`the plain language of the Act. See ECF No. 68 at §§ B.1, B.5-9.
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`the sole province of the Court. Thus, Plaintiff’s motion should be granted and Dr. David’s opinions
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`should be excluded.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in its opening brief, Plaintiff City of
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`Maple Heights, Ohio respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion to Strike the Expert
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`Report of Jesse David, Ph.D.
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`Dated: June 28, 2021
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/s/ Justin J. Hawal
`Mark A. DiCello (0063924)
`Justin J. Hawal (0092294)
`DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC
`7556 Mentor Avenue
`Mentor, Ohio 44060
`Tel: 440-953-8888
`madicello@dicellolevitt.com
`jhawal@dicellolevitt.com
`
`Adam J. Levitt
`Mark S. Hamill (pro hac vice)
`Brittany Hartwig (pro hac vice)
`DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC
`Ten North Dearborn Street, Sixth Floor
`Chicago, Illinois 60602
`Tel: 312-314-7900
`alevitt@dicellolevitt.com
`mhamill@dicellolevitt.com
`bhartwig@dicellolevitt.com
`
`Austin Tighe*
`Michael Angelovich*
`NIX PATTERSON, LLP
`3600 North Capital of Texas Highway
`Building B, Suite 350
`Austin, Texas 78746
`Tel: 512-328-5333
`atighe@nixlaw.com
`mangelovich@nixlaw.com
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`C. Cary Patterson*
`NIX PATTERSON, LLP
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`12
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`Case: 1:20-cv-01872-JG Doc #: 79 Filed: 06/28/21 13 of 13. PageID #: 4135
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`2900 St. Michael Drive, 5th Floor
`Texarkana, Texas 75503
`Tel: 903-223-3999
`ccp@nixlaw.com
`
`Peter Schneider*
`SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL
`KONECKY, LLP
`3700 Buffalo Speedway, Ste. 1100
`Houston, Texas 77098
`Tel: 713-338-2560
`pschneider@schneiderwallace.com
`
`Todd M. Schneider*
`Jason H. Kim*
`SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL
`KONECKY, LLP
`2000 Powell Street, Suite 1400
`Emeryville, California 94608
`Tel: 415-421-7100
`tschneider@schneiderwallace.com
`jkim@schneiderwallace.com
`
`Counsel for Plaintiff and the Proposed
`Class
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`* Pro Hac Vice applications to be filed
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was filed electronically using the Court’s
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`CM/ECF service, which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record on this 28th
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`day of June 2021.
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`/s/ Justin J. Hawal
`Justin J. Hawal
`DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC
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`13
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