`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
`
`
`
`AUSTIN MOORE, Individually, and
`TIFFANY MOORE, Individually,
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ELECTRONIC MARKETING, LLC,
` and SAMSUNG SDI CO., LTD, a
`Foreign Company,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`Case No. CIV-21-836-D
`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`
`ORDER
`
`Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction [Doc. No.
`
`51] filed by Defendant Samsung SDI Co., Ltd (“Samsung”). Plaintiffs Austin and Tiffany
`
`Moore responded in opposition [Doc. No. 62], and Samsung replied [Doc. No. 63]. The
`
`matter is fully briefed and at issue.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Plaintiffs initiated this action after an e-cigarette’s 18650 lithium-ion battery
`
`allegedly exploded in Plaintiff Austin Moore’s pocket, causing him to suffer burns to his
`
`right hand and leg. He purchased the e-cigarette from Amazon and alleges that Samsung
`
`manufactured the device’s lithium-ion battery. Samsung is a South Korean corporation
`
`with its principal place of business and headquarters in South Korea.
`
`
`
`Case 5:21-cv-00836-D Document 64 Filed 12/27/22 Page 2 of 18
`
`Samsung seeks dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal
`
`jurisdiction. It claims that, because it has not “marketed, sold, shipped, or distributed”
`
`18650 lithium-ion batteries to customers in Oklahoma, “there is no basis for exercising
`
`specific jurisdiction” over it in this case. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 1, 20. Plaintiffs counter
`
`that, “[r]egardless of whether Samsung itself sold products in Oklahoma, it knew or should
`
`have known that its batteries would be incorporated into products sold in Oklahoma—
`
`making it subject to jurisdiction here if or when its batteries failed.” Pls.’ Resp. at 14.
`
`STANDARD OF DECISION
`
`A plaintiff bears the burden to establish personal jurisdiction over each defendant
`
`named in the action. Rockwood Select Asset Fund XI (6)–1, LLC v. Devine, Millimet &
`
`Branch, 750 F.3d 1178, 1179-80 (10th Cir. 2014). This burden is light in the preliminary
`
`stages of litigation. AST Sports Science, Inc. v. CLF Distrib. Ltd., 514 F.3d 1054, 1056
`
`(10th Cir. 2008). When there has been no evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff must only present
`
`competent proof in the form of affidavits and other written materials that, if true, would
`
`establish a prima facie showing that jurisdiction is proper. Id. at 1057. “In order to defeat
`
`a plaintiff’s prima facie showing of jurisdiction, a defendant must present a compelling
`
`case demonstrating ‘that the presence of some other considerations would render
`
`jurisdiction unreasonable.’” OMI Holdings v. Royal Ins. Co. of Can., 149 F.3d 1086, 1091
`
`(10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985)).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`Case 5:21-cv-00836-D Document 64 Filed 12/27/22 Page 3 of 18
`
`DISCUSSION
`
`I. Specific Jurisdiction
`
`To establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, “a plaintiff must
`
`show that jurisdiction is legitimate under the laws of the forum state and that the exercise
`
`of jurisdiction does not offend the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
`
`Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Bartile Roofs, 618 F.3d 1153, 1159 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal
`
`quotation omitted). Under Oklahoma law, the personal jurisdiction inquiry is simply a due
`
`process analysis. See Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 2011). The
`
`familiar due process standard requires “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the
`
`forum state, and a finding that the exercise of jurisdiction comports with “traditional
`
`notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476.
`
`Minimum contacts may be established under doctrines of general jurisdiction or
`
`specific jurisdiction. See OMI Holdings, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1090-91. Because Plaintiffs do
`
`not argue that Samsung is subject to general jurisdiction in Oklahoma, the Court limits its
`
`analysis to the issue of specific jurisdiction.
`
`The specific jurisdiction analysis is two-fold. First, the Court must determine
`
`whether a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that the
`
`defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide
`
`Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Within this inquiry, the Court
`
`must determine whether the “defendant has purposefully directed [its] activities at residents
`
`of the forum . . . and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to
`
`those activities.” Kuenzle v. HTM Sport-Und Freizeitgerate AG, 102 F.3d 453, 455 (10th
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 5:21-cv-00836-D Document 64 Filed 12/27/22 Page 4 of 18
`
`Cir. 1996) (internal quotation omitted). If the defendant’s actions create sufficient
`
`minimum contacts, the Court must next consider whether exercising personal jurisdiction
`
`over the defendant offends “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Asahi
`
`Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (internal quotations
`
`omitted).
`
`a. Stream of Commerce Framework
`
`Plaintiffs allege that Samsung sells lithium-ion batteries to companies which then
`
`incorporate those batteries into consumer products. They maintain that, because those
`
`consumer products are available for sale nationwide—including in Oklahoma—Samsung
`
`“has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Oklahoma—
`
`regardless of whether it made direct sales in Oklahoma or marketed its batteries” in
`
`Oklahoma. Pls.’ Resp. at 10.
`
`
`
`This argument implicates the “stream of commerce” theory of personal jurisdiction.
`
`The Supreme Court first addressed this theory in World-Wide Volkswagen, stating that a
`
`“forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal
`
`jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with
`
`the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.” 444 U.S. at
`
`297-98. It later addressed “whether the mere awareness on the part of a foreign defendant
`
`that the components it manufactured, sold, and delivered outside the United States would
`
`reach the forum State in the stream of commerce constitutes minimum contacts between
`
`the defendant and the forum State such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`Case 5:21-cv-00836-D Document 64 Filed 12/27/22 Page 5 of 18
`
`traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at
`
`105.
`
`
`
`Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality of the Court, concluded that “[t]he
`
`placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the
`
`defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Id. at 112. Rather, some
`
`“additional conduct” indicating the defendant’s “intent or purpose to serve the market in
`
`the forum State” is necessary before personal jurisdiction may be exercised. Id. Such
`
`additional conduct may include “designing the product for the [forum State’s] market. . . .
`
`advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice to
`
`customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has
`
`agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.” Id. Although the plurality did not
`
`conclusively limit “additional conduct” to the foregoing examples, it excluded a
`
`defendant’s mere awareness “that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product
`
`into the forum State.” Id. Such knowledge simply “does not convert the mere act of placing
`
`the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Id.
`
`
`
`Justice Brennan—joined by three other justices—filed an opinion concurring in the
`
`judgment but disagreeing with Justice O’Connor’s stream of commerce analysis. He
`
`concluded that it was not necessary for plaintiffs to show “additional conduct directed
`
`toward the forum before finding the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant to be
`
`consistent with the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 117. He reasoned that “[a]s long as a
`
`participant in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`Case 5:21-cv-00836-D Document 64 Filed 12/27/22 Page 6 of 18
`
`State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.” Id. Thus, under the
`
`concurring opinion, “jurisdiction premised on the placement of a product into the stream
`
`of commerce is consistent with the Due Process Clause,” without any requirement of “a
`
`showing of additional conduct.” Id.
`
`
`
`The Court revisited the stream of commerce theory in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd.
`
`v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). Nicastro involved a products liability suit where the
`
`manufacturer of a metal-shearing machine contested personal jurisdiction. It argued that it
`
`lacked minimum contacts because (1) it did not sell its machines to buyers in the United
`
`States beyond its American distributor; (2) its employees never attended any scrap metal
`
`conventions in the forum state; and (3) no more than four of its machines ultimately
`
`reached the forum state. Id. at 878.
`
`
`
`Again, the Court remained splintered. Writing for a four-justice plurality, Justice
`
`Kennedy acknowledged that, in the stream of commerce context, “[t]he defendant’s
`
`transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be
`
`said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might
`
`have predicted that its goods will reach the forum state.” Id at 882. The plurality also noted
`
`that, although the defendant may have had “an intent to serve the U.S. market,” it had not
`
`“purposefully availed itself of the [forum state’s] market.” Id. at 884. Thus, “a defendant
`
`[could] in principle be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States but not
`
`of any particular state.” Id. at 884.
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`Case 5:21-cv-00836-D Document 64 Filed 12/27/22 Page 7 of 18
`
`
`
`Two justices, led by Justice Breyer, concurred in the result, finding that “[n]one of
`
`our precedents find that a single isolated sale . . . is sufficient” to establish the required
`
`minimum contacts. Id. at 888 (concurring opinion). Notably, the concurrence disagreed
`
`with the approach articulated by Justice Brennan in Asahi, explaining that “[i]t would
`
`ordinarily rest jurisdiction instead upon no more than the occurrence of a product-based
`
`accident in the forum State,” a concept that is at odds with the Court’s precedent. See
`
`World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 296 (rejecting the notion that a defendant’s
`
`amenability to suit “travel[s] with the chattel”).
`
`Although the Tenth Circuit has not definitively determined the proper framework
`
`for a stream of commerce analysis, it has recognized that, under Nicastro, “six Justices
`
`emphasized that personal jurisdiction did not exist simply because of a defendant’s
`
`awareness that its products could, through stream of commerce, end up in the forum State.”
`
`XMission, L.C. v. Fluent LLC, 955 F.3d 833, 843 (10th Cir. 2020). It also noted that the
`
`Tenth Circuit “has followed the Supreme Court in requiring a particular focus by the
`
`defendant on the forum State to satisfy the purposeful [availment] requirement.” Id.
`
`In addition, numerous “district courts in this circuit have held that ‘something more
`
`than merely placing a product into the stream of commerce is required to establish
`
`minimum contacts for jurisdictional purposes.’” Cagle v. Rexon Indus. Corp., Ltd., No.
`
`CIV-18-1209-R, 2019 WL 1960360, at *8 (W.D. Okla. May 2, 2019) (quoting Fischer v.
`
`BMW of N. Am., LLC, 376 F.Supp.3d 1178, 1184 (D. Colo. 2019)); see also Lynch v.
`
`Olympus Am., Inc., No. CIV-18-512-NYW, 2018 WL 5619327, at *4 n.5 (D. Colo. Oct.
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`Case 5:21-cv-00836-D Document 64 Filed 12/27/22 Page 8 of 18
`
`30, 2018) (failing to “find a single court in the Tenth Circuit that applied the most
`
`permissive [stream of commerce] test, which only requires a defendant to put the offending
`
`product into the stream of commerce without any action specifically directed at the forum
`
`itself”); FITn40, LLC v. Glanbia Nutritionals (Ireland) Ltd., No. CIV-20-871-JNP, 2022
`
`WL 79910, at *7 (D. Utah Jan. 7, 2022) (“Simply placing a product, which a third-party
`
`retailer fortuitously elects to sell in [the forum state], into the stream of commerce does not
`
`rise to the level of purposeful availment.”); Lacebark, Inc. v. Sakata Seed Am., Inc., No.
`
`CIV-12-746-D, 2013 WL 12086778, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 16, 2013) (“The Tenth Circuit
`
`has not held that simply placing a product into a stream of commerce that ends in a forum
`
`state is sufficient, by itself, to permit suit within the state.”); Ortiz v. Alfa Laval India Pvt.
`
`Ltd., No. CIV-20-869-J, 2020 WL 6531946, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 20, 2020) (“It appears
`
`that Justice O’Connor’s opinion carries weight in the Tenth Circuit.”).
`
`i. Purposeful Availment
`
`Turning to the present set of facts, Samsung asserts that it “has never marketed, sold,
`
`shipped, or distributed 18650 lithium-ion batteries to Oklahoma.” Def’s. Mot. to Dismiss
`
`at 1. It claims that it is a “business to business company,” as it “does not sell 18650 [lithium-
`
`ion batteries] to individual consumers anywhere in the world.” Id. at 4. Rather, it sells these
`
`batteries “in bulk to sophisticated purchasers involved in the manufacture of battery packs”
`
`because these batteries are not “designed or intended to be handled by consumers in any
`
`capacity.” Id.
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`Case 5:21-cv-00836-D Document 64 Filed 12/27/22 Page 9 of 18
`
`Further, Samsung states that it has no employees, agents, or representatives located
`
`in Oklahoma, and it is not registered to conduct business in Oklahoma. It has no bank
`
`account, mailing address, or telephone number in Oklahoma and does not own or control
`
`any property in the state. It does not have an officer or place of business in Oklahoma, nor
`
`does it pay Oklahoma taxes. Accordingly, Samsung argues that “[n]o stream-of-commerce
`
`or other purposeful availment test can allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
`
`defendant like SDI Co. who played no intentional role in the path its product took to the
`
`forum State.” Id. at 19.
`
`Plaintiffs do not dispute that Samsung only sells these batteries to businesses. Yet
`
`they maintain that Samsung “has made deliberate, purposeful, and considerable efforts to
`
`increase its share of the lithium-ion market throughout the United States (and, of course,
`
`in Oklahoma) by selling its batteries (singularly and in packs) to companies for
`
`incorporation into consumer products.” Pls.’ Resp. at 10. Thus, Plaintiffs argue, Samsung
`
`has “purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Oklahoma—
`
`regardless of whether it made direct sales in Oklahoma or marketed its batteries (singularly
`
`or in packs) in Oklahoma.” Id.
`
`To support their argument, Plaintiffs primarily focus on Samsung’s activities
`
`throughout the United States. For instance, Plaintiffs point out that Samsung participated
`
`in auto shows located in Detroit, Michigan from 2015 to 2018. They also note that Samsung
`
`currently operates a battery assembly plant in Michigan and intends to build another battery
`
`plant in Indiana. In addition, Plaintiffs suggest that Samsung maintains “sales and
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`Case 5:21-cv-00836-D Document 64 Filed 12/27/22 Page 10 of 18
`
`marketing arms” in “Los Angeles, Chicago, Austin, and Houston.” Id. at 6. Further, they
`
`allege that Samsung’s batteries are “used in a variety of consumer products marketed and
`
`sold in the United States . . . which may be purchased through a variety of U.S.-based
`
`retailers,” including Dell and Harley-Davidson, which each have a presence in Oklahoma.
`
`Id. at 6-7.
`
`Plaintiffs also contend that because Samsung is a “global” company and “its
`
`business is everywhere,” it is subject to suit in Oklahoma based on the Supreme Court’s
`
`recent decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017
`
`(2021). Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Samsung is a “unified brand” responsible for selling
`
`a variety of consumer goods, including phones, tablets, and home appliances throughout
`
`Oklahoma. Pls.’ Resp. at 14. Thus, they argue, Samsung has purposefully availed itself of
`
`Oklahoma’s market because it “deliberately uses its shared brand identity with other
`
`companies that very clearly target and serve the Oklahoma market.” Id. at 15.
`
`The Court first addresses Samsung’s alleged activities in Michigan, Indiana,
`
`California, Illinois, and Texas. Although Plaintiffs dispute that “a showing of additional
`
`conduct”—as discussed by Justice O’Connor in Asahi—is required to satisfy minimum
`
`contacts, they nonetheless argue that Samsung “engaged in more than placing the product
`
`in the stream of commerce in several ways—for example, by actively seeking to increase
`
`its American market share.” Id. at 13. However, the “additional conduct” that Plaintiffs
`
`point to does not establish that Samsung has purposeful contacts with Oklahoma. See
`
`Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 886 (plurality opinion) (“[I]t is petitioner’s purposeful contacts with
`
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`Case 5:21-cv-00836-D Document 64 Filed 12/27/22 Page 11 of 18
`
`[the forum state], not with the United States, that alone are relevant” to the jurisdictional
`
`analysis.); see also id. at 891 (Breyer, J., concurring) (rejecting the view that jurisdiction
`
`may be established based solely on the existence of a nationwide distribution system). As
`
`these alleged activities occurred in other jurisdictions, they do not demonstrate that
`
`Samsung purposefully availed itself of Oklahoma’s market. See XMission, L.C., 955 F.3d
`
`at 843 (The Tenth Circuit “has followed the Supreme Court in requiring a particular focus
`
`by defendant on the forum State to satisfy the purposeful [availment] requirement.”).
`
`Next, the Court turns to Plaintiffs’ second argument. Alleging that Samsung’s
`
`batteries are incorporated into consumer products that are available for sale in Oklahoma
`
`through Dell and Harley-Davidson, Plaintiffs claim that, “[r]egardless of whether Samsung
`
`itself sold products in Oklahoma, it knew or should have known that its batteries would be
`
`incorporated into products sold in Oklahoma—making it subject to jurisdiction here if or
`
`when its batteries failed.” Pls.’ Resp. at 14. In short, Plaintiffs’ theory is that Samsung
`
`purposefully availed itself of the Oklahoma market vis-à-vis its relationships with Dell and
`
`Harley-Davidson, which each have a physical presence in the state.
`
`Plaintiffs’ tenuous theory is unconvincing, as “specific jurisdiction must be based
`
`on actions by the defendant and not on events that are the result of unilateral actions taken
`
`by someone else.” Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Heliqwest Intern., Ltd., 385 F.3d 1291,
`
`1296 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1092). Under Plaintiffs’ theory,
`
`Samsung has met the purposeful availment requirement in each jurisdiction that houses
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`
`Case 5:21-cv-00836-D Document 64 Filed 12/27/22 Page 12 of 18
`
`one of the more than 1,400 Harley-Davidson dealerships.1 But this is not the law; the
`
`purposeful availment requirement ensures that jurisdiction will not attach “solely as a result
`
`of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts” but rather “where the contacts proximately
`
`result from actions by the defendant [itself] that create a substantial connection with the
`
`forum State.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see
`
`also Daniels v. Exal Corp., No. CIV-16-1085-HE, 2017 WL 696130, at *3 (W.D. Okla.
`
`Jan. 5, 2017) (A defendant’s “ability to foresee that [a distributor] would purchase [its]
`
`product and then use it in a finished product that would reach the state of Oklahoma is not
`
`enough to establish personal jurisdiction.”).
`
`The Court next considers Plaintiffs’ argument that Ford Motor Co. requires a
`
`finding that Samsung has purposefully availed itself of the Oklahoma market. Plaintiffs
`
`assert that Samsung “deliberately sought to increase its market share in the United States,”
`
`and that “[s]imply because Samsung designed, manufactured, or sold these batteries
`
`elsewhere is of no consequence—in the face of their global reach—as the Ford case
`
`indicates.” Pls.’ Resp. at 11.
`
`Ford Motor Co. centered on two separate accidents involving Ford vehicles in
`
`Montana and Minnesota. After suits were brought against Ford in those states, Ford moved
`
`to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on nearly identical grounds: it argued that the
`
`respective state courts “had jurisdiction only if the company’s conduct in the State had
`
`
`1 Locations, Harley-Davidson, https://www.harley-davidson.com/us/en/about-
`us/careers/locations.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2022).
`12
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 5:21-cv-00836-D Document 64 Filed 12/27/22 Page 13 of 18
`
`given rise to the plaintiff’s claims.” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1023. Ford’s argument,
`
`labeled as a “causation-only approach,” was that specific jurisdiction could only be located
`
`“in the State where Ford sold the car in question, or else the States where Ford designed
`
`and manufactured the vehicle.” Id. at 1026. Thus, because the cars at issue were sold
`
`outside of the forum states, Ford claimed that “the courts of those States could not decide
`
`the suits.” Id. at 1023.
`
`The Court’s analysis centered on whether the claims “relate[d] to the defendants
`
`contacts with the forum”—whether Ford purposefully availed itself of either forum state’s
`
`market was not an issue squarely presented to the Court. Id. at 1026. Nonetheless, the Court
`
`did dedicate a portion of its discussion to Ford’s activities within the forum states.
`
`However, this discussion does not support Plaintiffs’ argument—it undermines it.
`
`Ford—unlike Samsung here—did not contest “that it actively [sought] to serve the
`
`market for automobiles and related products” in Montana and Minnesota. Id. at 1026. In
`
`other words, it conceded that it “purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
`
`activities in both places.” Id. at 1026 (internal quotation and alteration omitted). Indeed,
`
`there was “[s]mall wonder” why Ford “conceded purposeful availment of the two States’
`
`markets . . . [b]y every means imaginable—among them, billboards, TV and radio spots,
`
`print ads, direct mail—Ford urge[d] Montanans and Minnesotans to buy its vehicles.” Id.
`
`at 1028. These vehicles were “available for sale, whether new or used, throughout the
`
`States, at 36 dealerships in Montana and 84 in Minnesota.” Id. Sales aside, Ford “foster[ed]
`
`
`
`13
`
`
`
`Case 5:21-cv-00836-D Document 64 Filed 12/27/22 Page 14 of 18
`
`ongoing connections to its cars’ owners” and “distribute[d] replacement parts” in the two
`
`forum states, while its dealers “regularly maintain[ed] and repair[ed] Ford cars.” Id.
`
`Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that Samsung directly markets, sells, or distributes
`
`18650 lithium-ion batteries in Oklahoma. In fact, Plaintiffs do not identify any Oklahoma-
`
`based activities undertaken by Samsung, from advertisements to distributions to repairs.
`
`The present set of facts stand in stark contrast to those in Ford Motor Co., where there was
`
`little question that Ford purposefully availed itself of the respective forum states’ markets.
`
`Accordingly, the Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ claim that Ford Motor Co. compels a
`
`finding that Samsung has purposefully availed itself of the Oklahoma market.
`
`Finally, the Court addresses Plaintiffs’ claim that “Samsung is a global brand that
`
`uses a consistent logo worldwide” and that this “unified brand . . . is well-known for a
`
`variety of consumer goods, which are available and sold in Oklahoma.” Pls.’ Resp. at 14.
`
`This in mind, Plaintiffs maintain that Samsung purposefully availed itself of Oklahoma’s
`
`market even if it “was not the ultimate manufacturer or marketer of such goods [because]
`
`it deliberately used the same branding, which seeks to portray the modern image of the
`
`leading company.” Id.
`
`Even assuming that Samsung’s parent corporation2 is subject to personal
`
`jurisdiction in Oklahoma due to its efforts to market and sell phones, tablets, and home
`
`appliances, “jurisdiction over a parent corporation [does not] automatically establish
`
`
`2 To be sure, the parties’ briefs do not conclusively establish that Samsung SDI Co., Ltd.
`is organized under a parent corporation, and the Court makes no such determination here.
`14
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 5:21-cv-00836-D Document 64 Filed 12/27/22 Page 15 of 18
`
`jurisdiction over a wholly owned subsidiary.” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S.
`
`770, 781 n.13 (1984); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564
`
`U.S. 915 (2011) (recognizing that the defendant’s foreign subsidiaries were not subject to
`
`personal jurisdiction in the forum state despite their parent corporation being subject to
`
`personal jurisdiction in the state); accord Good v. Fuji Fire & Marine, Ins. Co., Ltd., 271
`
`F. App’x. 756, 759 (10th Cir. 2008) (“For purposes of personal jurisdiction, ‘a holding or
`
`parent company has a separate corporate existence and is treated separately from the
`
`subsidiary.’”) (quoting Quarles v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 504 F.2d 1358, 1362 (10th Cir.
`
`1974)).
`
`As there are no factual allegations indicating that Samsung “has purposefully
`
`directed [its] activities at residents of the forum” the Court is unable to conclude that it has
`
`specific jurisdiction over Samsung. Kuenzle, 102 F.3d at 455 (internal quotation omitted).
`
`Accordingly, the Court will not address the issue of whether the exercise of jurisdiction
`
`would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See Soma Med. Int’l v.
`
`Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1299 n.1 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Because we
`
`conclude that [the plaintiff] has failed to establish that [the defendant] has minimum
`
`contacts with the [forum state], we need not proceed to the next step of the due process
`
`analysis—i.e., whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over [the defendant] could
`
`offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”) (quoting Asahi Metal
`
`Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 113).
`
`
`
`
`
`15
`
`
`
`Case 5:21-cv-00836-D Document 64 Filed 12/27/22 Page 16 of 18
`
`II. Jurisdictional Discovery
`
`In lieu of dismissal, Plaintiffs alternatively request permission to engage in
`
`jurisdictional discovery, claiming they “have not yet had a chance to develop the record.”
`
`Pls.’ Resp. at 21. “District courts are endowed with broad discretion over discovery,
`
`including whether to grant discovery requests with respect to jurisdictional issues.” Dental
`
`Dynamics, LLC v. Jolly Dental Grp., LLC, 946 F.3d 1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing
`
`Budde v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 511 F.2d 1033, 1035 (10th Cir. 1975)). Under Tenth
`
`Circuit precedent, “a refusal to grant jurisdictional discovery constitutes an abuse of
`
`discretion if the denial results in prejudice to a litigant and that prejudice is present where
`
`pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted.” Breakthrough
`
`Mgmt. Grp, Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 629 F.3d 1173, 1189-90 (10th Cir.
`
`2010) (internal alterations and quotations omitted). As Plaintiffs seek discovery, they bear
`
`the burden of demonstrating an entitlement to jurisdictional discovery and the resulting
`
`prejudice from its denial. See id. at 1189 n.11; Dutcher v. Matheson, 840 F.3d 1183, 1195
`
`(10th Cir. 2016).
`
`Plaintiffs’ primary assertion in support of jurisdictional discovery is that such
`
`discovery is necessary to “explore Samsung’s distribution to its so-called ‘sophisticated
`
`companies’—particularly those to whom Samsung shipped in bulk without a battery pack
`
`such that it can determine if the distribution was, in fact, unauthorized.” Pls.’ Resp. at 22.
`
`In short, Plaintiffs contend that if the “sophisticated companies” to which Samsung ships
`
`its batteries are located in Oklahoma, it is likely subject to personal jurisdiction in the state.
`
`
`
`16
`
`
`
`Case 5:21-cv-00836-D Document 64 Filed 12/27/22 Page 17 of 18
`
`Samsung notes that its interaction with the battery “ends at the point of sale from [it] to the
`
`particular sophisticated, qualified customer.” Def.’s Decl. [Doc. No. 52] at 5. It contends
`
`that, after the battery is sold, it “does not have the right or ability to control the customer’s
`
`subsequent use or sale of assembled battery packs.” Id.
`
`As noted, the Tenth Circuit recently remarked that “six Justices emphasized that
`
`personal jurisdiction [does] not exist simply because of a defendant’s awareness that its
`
`product could, through stream of commerce, end up in the forum state.” XMission, L.C.,
`
`955 F.3d at 843. Rather, there must be a “particular focus by the defendant on the forum
`
`State to satisfy the purposeful [availment] requirement.” Id. As detailed above, Plaintiffs
`
`have failed to identify any “additional conduct” that Samsung has directed toward the
`
`forum state. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 112 (“[A] defendant’s awareness that
`
`the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not
`
`convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed
`
`toward the forum State.”). Thus, even assuming that, after engaging in jurisdictional
`
`discovery, it is determined that these “sophisticated companies” are located in Oklahoma,
`
`there does not appear to be any additional conduct directed at the state sufficient to exercise
`
`personal jurisdiction over Samsung.
`
`Many of Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments supporting its request mirror its arguments
`
`surrounding whether Samsung purposefully availed itself of the Oklahoma market. See
`
`generally Pls.’ Resp. at 22-23 (Seeking “documents demonstrating that Samsung sought to
`
`increase its share of the lithium-ion battery market in the United States, . . . documents
`
`
`
`17
`
`
`
`Case 5:21-cv-00836-D Document 64 Filed 12/27/22 Page 18 of 18
`
`demonstrating that Samsung knew that products containing its [batteries] were available
`
`for purchase by consumers at various retailers throughout the United States and that those
`
`retailers have a presence in Oklahoma, . . . [and] documents demonstrating Samsung
`
`benefit[s] from a uniform brand across its companies.”). As discussed, these activities are
`
`not bases upon which personal jurisdiction may rest. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to
`
`demonstrate that jurisdictional discovery is appropriate, and the Court must deny their
`
`request.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`
`
`For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
`
`Jurisdiction [Doc. No. 51] is GRANTED. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims against
`
`Defendant Samsung SDI Co., Ltd. are DISMISSED, as the Court lacks personal
`
`jurisdiction over Samsung.
`
`IT IS SO ORDERED this 27th day of December, 2022.
`
`
`
`. DeGIUSTI
`TIMOTHY
`Chief United States District Judge
`
`18
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`