Laura Salerno Owens, OSB #076230
`LauraSalerno@MarkowitzHerbold.com
`David B. Markowitz, OSB #742046
`DavidMarkowitz@MarkowitzHerbold.com
`Harry B. Wilson, OSB #077214
`HarryWilson@MarkowitzHerbold.com
`Anna M. Joyce, OSB #013112
`AnnaJoyce@MarkowitzHerbold.com
`Kathryn P. Roberts, OSB #064854
`KathrynRoberts@MarkowitzHerbold.com
`MARKOWITZ HERBOLD PC
`1455 SW Broadway, Suite 1900
`Portland, OR 97201
`Telephone: (503) 295-3085 ǀ Fax: (503) 323-9105
`
`Laura L. Ho (admitted pro hac vice)
`lho@gbdhlegal.com
`Barry Goldstein, Of Counsel (admitted pro hac vice)
`bgoldstein@gbdhlegal.com
`James Kan (admitted pro hac vice)
`jkan@gbdhlegal.com
`Byron Goldstein (admitted pro hac vice)
`brgoldstein@gbdhlegal.com
`Katharine L. Fisher (admitted pro hac vice)
`kfisher@gbdhlegal.com
`Mengfei Sun (admitted pro hac vice)
`msun@gbdhlegal.com
`GOLDSTEIN, BORGEN, DARDARIAN & HO
`155 Grand Avenue, Suite 900
`Oakland, CA 94612
`Telephone: (510) 763-9800 ǀ Fax: (510) 835-1417
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Opt-In Plaintiffs, and Putative Class
`[Additional Counsel of Record listed on the Signature page]
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
`PORTLAND DIVISION
`
`KELLY CAHILL, et al., individually and
`on behalf of others similarly situated,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`
`vs.
`
`NIKE, INC., an Oregon Corporation,
`
`Defendant.
`
`Case No. 3:18-cv-01477-JR
`CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
`[Fed. R. Civ. P. 23]
`PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS
`CERTIFICATION
`
`Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; Oregon
`Equal Pay Act; Oregon Equality Act
`
`FILED WITH REDACTIONS
`ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
`835645.49
`
`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`
`LR 7-1(A) CERTIFICATION .........................................................................................................1
`MOTION..........................................................................................................................................1
`MEMORANDUM OF LAW ...........................................................................................................1
`I.
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
`II.
`SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFFS’ CLASS CLAIMS .............................................................4
`III.
`PROCEDURAL HISTORY.................................................................................................7
`IV.
`STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................................8
`A.
`Nike’s Job Architecture Organizes All WHQ Positions Consistently and
`Defines Comparable Work. .....................................................................................8
`1.
`Nike Uses Its Uniform Job Architecture’s Type and Level of Work
`to Organize All Covered Positions. .............................................................8
`
`2.
`
`Nike Consistently Defines Comparable Work Based on Jobs
`Sharing the Same Type and Level of Work. ..............................................10
`
`B.
`
`Two Components of Nike’s Compensation Policies and Practices
`Adversely Impact Women’s Compensation. .........................................................12
`1.
`Nike’s Classwide Policy for Setting Starting Salaries, Which
`Included Consideration of Prior Pay, Disadvantaged Women. .................12
`
`2.
`
`Nike’s Classwide Practices for Awarding Annual Merit Increases
`and Bonuses Perpetuated Gender Disparities Because They Are
`Based on a Percentage of Current Salary. ..................................................15
`
`a.
`
`b.
`
`c.
`
`Nike Calculates Annual Merit Pay Increases as Percentage
`of Base Pay. ...................................................................................15
`Nike Calculates Annual Bonus Awards as a Percentage of
`Base Pay. ........................................................................................17
`These Poor Practices Exacerbate Existing Gender
`Differences in Pay. .........................................................................18
`Nike Pays Women Less than Men for Performing Comparable
`Work, Which Is Driven by Lower Starting Pay and Exacerbated by
`Merit Increases and Annual Bonuses. ........................................................19
`
`3.
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
`PAGE i
`835645.49
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`

`

`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`Nike’s Fill Strategy Policy or Practice for Determining Whether to Fill
`Promotions Non-Competitively or Competitively Adversely Impacts
`Women. ..................................................................................................................22
`1.
`Nike’s Fill Strategy Determines Whether to Promote Employees
`Either Non-Competitively or Competitively .............................................22
`
`2.
`
`Nike Promotes Women Less Often Than Men Because it
`Overwhelmingly Chose to Fill Positions Through its Non-
`Competitive Practice. .................................................................................24
`
`Nike’s Initial Job Assignment Policies or Practices Adversely Impact
`Women. ..................................................................................................................26
`Women Raised Serious Gender Discrimination Complaints, Including the
`2018 Starfish Survey, But HR Has Been Ineffective in Addressing
`Discrimination........................................................................................................28
`1.
`The Starfish Survey Raises Systemic Complaints of Gender
`Discrimination at Nike. ..............................................................................28
`
`2.
`
`Nike’s Inadequate Responses to Discrimination, Including HR’s
`Admitted Failures.......................................................................................31
`
`V.
`
`F.
`
`The Representative Plaintiffs Suffered Under the Same Nike Policies or
`Practices. ................................................................................................................33
`ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................................34
`A.
`Plaintiffs Meet the Rule 23 Standards for Class Certification ...............................34
`B.
`The Rule 23(a)(1) Numerosity Requirement Is Met. .............................................35
`C.
`The Rule 23(a)(2) Commonality Requirement Is Met Because the
`Determination of Common Questions Will Resolve Issues Central to the
`Claims. ...................................................................................................................35
`1.
`Plaintiffs’ Disparate Impact Claims Are Capable of Classwide
`Resolution. .................................................................................................36
`
`a.
`
`b.
`
`Plaintiffs’ Prima Facie Case that Nike’ Classwide Starting
`Pay Policy and Practice Caused a Disparate Impact on
`Women Is Capable of Classwide Resolution. ................................38
`Plaintiffs’ Prima Facie Case that Nike’s Classwide Annual
`Merit Increase and Annual Bonus Policies and Practices
`Caused a Disparate Impact on Women Is Capable of
`Classwide Resolution. ....................................................................40
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
`PAGE ii
`835645.49
`
`

`

`c.
`
`d.
`
`e.
`
`Plaintiffs’ Prima Facie Case that Nike’s Classwide Practice
`of Implementing Its Fill Strategy to Fill Positions Non-
`competitively Caused a Disparate Impact on Women Is
`Capable of Classwide Resolution. .................................................43
`Plaintiffs’ Prima Facie Case that Nike’s Classwide Practice
`of Hiring Caused a Disparate Impact on Women Is Capable
`of Classwide Resolution. ...............................................................45
`Classwide Evidence Will Show Nike Cannot Meet Its
`Burden of Showing the Challenged Practices Are Job
`Related and Consistent with Business Necessity ...........................46
`Plaintiffs’ Disparate Treatment Claims Are Capable of Classwide
`Resolution. .................................................................................................48
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Plaintiffs’ Oregon Equal Pay Act Claim Are Capable of Classwide
`Resolution. .................................................................................................50
`
`D.
`
`E.
`F.
`
`The Rule 23(a)(3) Typicality Requirement Is Met Because Plaintiffs’ and
`the Class Claims Are Based on the Same Classwide Policies or Practices. ..........51
`The Rule 23(a)(4) Adequacy Requirement is Met. ................................................52
`Plaintiffs Meet the Requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). .........................54
`1.
`Plaintiffs’ Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Claims Based on Sex
`Discrimination Are Well Suited for Rule 23(b)(2) Certification. ..............54
`
`2.
`
`Plaintiffs Satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s Requirements of Predominance
`and Superiority. ..........................................................................................55
`
`a.
`b.
`
`c.
`d.
`
`Common Issues Predominate for Disparate Impact Claims ..........56
`Common Issues Predominate for Disparate Treatment
`Claims. ...........................................................................................57
`Commons Issues Predominate for Oregon EPA Claims................58
`A Class Trial Is Manageable With a Bifurcated Trial
`Proceeding......................................................................................58
`Superiority of Class Action Procedure ..........................................58
`e.
`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................59
`
`
`VI.
`
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
`PAGE iii
`835645.49
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`

`

`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Federal Cases
`
`Abdullah v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., Inc.,
`731 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) ...................................................................................................59
`
`Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
`422 U.S. 405 (1975) .................................................................................................................55
`
`Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
`521 U.S. 591 (1997) ...........................................................................................................54, 55
`
`Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. California,
`231 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2000) ...................................................................................................46
`
`In re AutoZone, Inc., Wage & Hour Emp. Pracs. Litig.,
`289 F.R.D. 526 (N.D. Cal. 2012) .............................................................................................53
`
`Bazemore v. Friday,
`478 U.S. 385 (1986) .................................................................................................................19
`
`Bouman v. Block,
`940 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1991) .................................................................................................47
`
`Buchanan v. Tata Consulting Servs. Ltd.,
`No. 4:15-cv-01696-YGR, 2017 WL 6611653 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2017) .................................5
`
`Butler v. Home Depot, Inc.,
`No. 3:94-cv-04335-SI, 1997 WL 605754 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1997) .......................................5
`
`Campbell v. City of Los Angeles,
`903 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2018) ...................................................................................................8
`
`Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs, & Co.,
`325 F.R.D. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) ....................................................................................... passim
`
`Contreras v. City of Los Angeles,
`656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981) .................................................................................................20
`
`Dawson v. Entek Int’l,
`630 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2011) .....................................................................................................4
`
`E.E.O.C. v. Farmer Bros. Co.,
`31 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 1994) .......................................................................................................5
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
`PAGE iv
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`

`

`E.E.O.C. v. Inland Marine Indus.,
`729 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1984) .............................................................................................5, 50
`
`Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
`285 F.R.D. 492 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ..................................................................................... passim
`
`Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,
`424 U.S. 747 (1976) .................................................................................................................55
`
`Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon,
`457 U.S. 147 (1982) .................................................................................................................51
`
`Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
`401 U.S. 424 (1971) .................................................................................................................46
`
`Gulino v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Educ.,
`460 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 2006).....................................................................................................48
`
`Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.,
`150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998) ..........................................................................................35, 52
`
`Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp.,
`976 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1982) ...................................................................................................52
`
`Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States,
`433 U.S. 299 (1977) .................................................................................................................20
`
`Hemminger v. Tidyman’s Inc.,
`285 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2002) .............................................................................................4, 36
`
`Hollander v. Am. Cyanamid Co.,
`895 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1990).........................................................................................................5
`
`Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
`431 U.S. 324 (1977) .................................................................................................4, 35, 57, 58
`
`Jones v. City of Boston,
`752 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2014) ......................................................................................................46
`
`Kassman v. KPMG LLP,
`416 F. Supp. 3d 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)......................................................................................36
`
`Levya v. Midline, Indus. Inc.,
`716 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2013) ...................................................................................................57
`
`McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc.,
`519 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2008) ...............................................................................................4, 45
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
`PAGE v
`835645.49
`
`

`

`McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
`672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012) ......................................................................................37, 47, 54
`
`McReynolds v. Sodexho Marriott Servs.,
`208 F.R.D. 428 (D.D.C. 2002) .................................................................................................53
`
`Moussouris v. Microsoft Corp.,
`No. 2:15-cv-01483-JLR, 2018 WL 3328418 (W.D. Wash. June 25, 2018) ............................36
`
`Obrey v. Johnson,
`400 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2005) ...........................................................................................4, 5, 48
`
`Paige v. California,
`291 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2002) .............................................................................................4, 43
`
`Pena v. Taylor Farms Pac., Inc.,
`305 F.R.D. 197 (E.D. Cal. 2015) .............................................................................................53
`
`Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co.,
`494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974) ...................................................................................................57
`
`Rizo v. Yovino,
`950 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2020) ...........................................................................................40, 51
`
`Sali v. Corona Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
`909 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2018) ...................................................................................................34
`
`Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc.,
`No. 3:08-cv-00540-MOC-DSC, 2016 WL 9665158 (W.D.N.C. June 24, 2016) ........37, 39, 43
`
`Segar v. Smith,
`738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ...............................................................................................36
`
`Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp.,
`934 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2019) ...................................................................................................54
`
`Smith v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist.,
`830 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................................59
`
`Stagi v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
`391 Fed. Appx. 133 (3d Cir. 2010) ..........................................................................................42
`
`Staton v. Boeing,
`327 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2003) ...................................................................................................53
`
`Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc.,
`803 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ..........................................................................................46
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
`PAGE vi
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`

`

`Stockwell v. City & Cty. of San Francisco,
`749 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2014) .....................................................................................34, 35, 38
`
`Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,
`577 U.S. 442 (2016) .....................................................................................................42, 56, 57
`
`Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
`564 U.S. 338 (2011) ......................................................................................................... passim
`
`Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Overtime Pay Litig.,
`571 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2009) ...................................................................................................59
`
`State Cases
`
`Ellis v. Google, LLC,
`No. CGC-17-561299, 2021 WL 4169813 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 27, 2021) .......................43, 51
`
`Jewett v. Oracle Am., Inc.,
`No. 17CIV02669, 2020 WL 11036307 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2020) ...........................43, 51
`
`Smith v. Bull Run Sch. Dist. No. 45,
`80 Or. App. 226 (1986) ............................................................................................................50
`
`Federal Statutes
`
`Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. .......................................4, 8, 45, 46
`
`State Statutes
`
`O.R.S.
`§ 652.210(16) .............................................................................................................................6
`§ 652.220................................................................................................................................1, 6
`§ 659A.001 et seq. .....................................................................................................................4
`§ 659A.030 .................................................................................................................................1
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
`PAGE vii
`835645.49
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`

`

`Rules
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P.
`23...................................................................................................................................... passim
`23(a) .........................................................................................................................................34
`23(a)(1) ....................................................................................................................................35
`23(a)(2) ....................................................................................................................................35
`23(a)(3) ....................................................................................................................................51
`23(a)(4) ....................................................................................................................................52
`23(b)(2) ............................................................................................................................ passim
`23(b)(3) ............................................................................................................................ passim
`23(b)(3)(A) ...............................................................................................................................55
`23(b)(3)(B) ...............................................................................................................................55
`23(b)(3)(C) ...............................................................................................................................55
`23(c)(4) ....................................................................................................................................37
`23(g) .................................................................................................................................1, 3, 59
`30(b)(1) ......................................................................................................................................9
`30(b)(6) ............................................................................................................................ passim
`42(b) .........................................................................................................................................35
`
`Regulations
`
`29 C.F.R.
`§ 1607.3(A) ..............................................................................................................................47
`§ 1607.5(C) ..............................................................................................................................47
`§ 1607.14(A) ............................................................................................................................47
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression (Fed. Judicial Ctr.
`3d ed. 2011) .............................................................................................................................19
`
`Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) (2004) ...........................................................................35
`
`
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`

`

`LR 7-1(a) CERTIFICATION
`Pursuant to Local Rule 7-1(a), counsel for Named Plaintiffs Kelly Cahill, Sara Johnston,
`
`Lindsay Elizabeth, and Heather Hender (“Plaintiffs”), certify that they have conferred
`
`with defendant’s counsel by telephone, email, and exchange of letters regarding the subject of
`
`this motion, but the parties could not reach a resolution.
`
`MOTION
`Plaintiffs hereby move the Court to certify this case as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule
`
`of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3).1 Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify a class of
`
`All female current and former Nike employees at Nike Headquarters in
`Oregon, who were employed at any time from October 11, 2017 through the
`resolution of this action for claims under Title VII, and for the period from
`August 9, 2017 through the resolution of this action for claims under ORS
`652.220 and ORS 659A.030, in a salaried, corporate position in Bands L, U,
`E, or S2 (“Putative Class”)
`Excluded from the Putative Class are Nike retail store employees and employees in Nike’s Finance,
`
`Human Resources (“HR”), and Legal Job Functions. Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint the four
`
`Named Plaintiffs as Class Representatives and to appoint Plaintiffs’ counsel as Class Counsel,
`
`pursuant to Rule 23(g).
`
`MEMORANDUM OF LAW
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`Nike pays women lower starting salaries than men. It assigns them to lower-level and lower-
`
`paying jobs upon hire. Once hired, Nike widens the pay gap with lower annual bonuses, annual
`
`merit increases that perpetuate the disparities, and fewer promotions. This means thousands of
`
`women underpaid on day one continue to fall further and further behind their male peers with each
`
`
`1 All citations hereinafter to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will be in the form of “Rule
`__” unless otherwise specified.
`2 Nike places employees under the executive level in six bands, known as VALUES. See
`Section IV.A.1, infra.
`PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
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`835645.49
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`

`

`passing year. All the while, Nike fails to protect these women from harassment and other forms of
`
`sex discrimination. Accordingly, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a Putative Class of women
`
`who have worked at Nike’s world headquarters (“WHQ”) around Beaverton, Oregon, bring this class
`
`action to stop this discrimination.
`
`Plaintiffs challenge four policies or practices that Nike applied across the Putative Class.
`
`First, Nike’s use of prior pay when setting starting pay caused women to start with lower salaries
`
`than men. While Nike eventually stopped this prior pay policy, it never adjusted or remedied the
`
`lower pay of women hired under this admittedly “biased” policy. Second, Nike’s continuing policy
`
`or practice of awarding annual merit increases and bonuses calculated as a percentage of current
`
`salary perpetuates or exacerbates the starting pay disparities because smaller salaries mean smaller
`
`salary increases and bonus awards. Third, through its “fill strategy,” Nike chose to fill most job
`
`openings non-competitively instead of competitively which caused women to receive fewer
`
`promotions despite having similar or better backgrounds, performance ratings, and talent
`
`assessments. Fourth, Nike consistently hires women into lower-level and lower-paying jobs even
`
`though they had equal or better educational backgrounds and prior work experiences.
`
`Taken together, these four challenged practices resulted in Nike paying women roughly
`
`$11,000 less than men per year even though women had the same or better performance ratings,
`
`educational background, and work experience.3
`
`Nike is well aware of the discriminatory effects of these challenged policies and practices
`
`because Nike admits it. In 2018, Nike’s Chief Human Resources Officer (“CHRO”) told employees
`
`that Nike had to remove “bias” from critical parts of its hiring process, including stopping its
`
`
`3 Declaration of Dr. David Neumark (“Neumark Decl.”), filed herewith, Ex. A (“Neumark
`Report”) ¶¶ 8(a)-d(d) & 54, Table 2, col. 2, Panel C; Neumark Decl. Ex. B (“Neumark
`Rebuttal”) 22, Table R6, col. 2, Panel C. See Section IV.B.3, infra.
`PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
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`835645.49
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`

`

`collection and use of prior pay when setting starting pay. The CHRO further admitted that Nike had
`
`failed to “gain traction” in promoting women and that Nike needed to improve “female
`
`representation” at all levels. Around the same time, Nike’s CEO admitted that Nike’s HR
`
`department had “underserved” the company for years.
`
`Moreover, women at Nike raised concerns about discrimination and HR’s ineffectiveness at
`
`stopping it prior to the filing of this case. In early 2018, Nike employees, including several female
`
`Vice Presidents, provided Nike with a survey that described a pattern of sex discrimination at Nike.
`
`According to one female executive, “[o]ur culture is broken.” Another had a “loss of faith in a fair
`
`and equitable promotion process.” According to another female employee, “ER and HR at this
`
`company are a joke” and “unreliable.”
`
`Because of this survey and related complaints before and after the survey, Nike was forced to
`
`admit the pervasiveness of its discrimination and that its policies, top management, and HR caused or
`
`condoned this discrimination. The CEO announced the reorganization of his leadership team,
`
`including the departure of Trevor Edwards, Nike’s second most senior executive, and Nike forced
`
`the resignation of other executives because of these discrimination complaints. While Nike has made
`
`some attempts to address the serious gender discrimination it long perpetuated, it has not corrected all
`
`the problems it already knows exist, and women continue to work in an unequal capacity. This case
`
`seeks to make it finally possible for female employees to be paid fairly and equally and be
`
`recognized fully for their contributions to Nike.
`
`Accordingly, this Court should certify the proposed class of nearly 5,000 women who have
`
`worked at Nike WHQ under Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) and appoint Class Counsel pursuant to Rule
`
`23(g) because, as set forth in detail below, all the requirements of Rule 23 are satisfied.
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
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`

`

`SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFFS’ CLASS CLAIMS
`II.
`Plaintiffs seek Rule 23 certification of three types of class claims: (1) disparate impact under
`
`the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) and the Oregon
`
`Equality Act, Oregon Revised Statutes section 659A.001 et seq. (“OEA”); (2) disparate treatment
`
`under Title VII and the OEA; and (3) pay discrimination under the Oregon Equal Pay Act (“OEPA”).
`
`The analysis under Title VII and the OEA is the same. Dawson v. Entek Int’l, 630 F.3d 928, 934-35
`
`(9th Cir. 2011).
`
`Disparate impact claims concern “employment practices that are facially neutral in their
`
`treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot
`
`be justified by business necessity.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335, n.15
`
`(1977). “Proof of discriminatory motive … is not required ….” Id. To establish a prima facie case,
`
`plaintiffs must show a significant disparate impact on a protected class resulting from a specific
`
`employment practice. Hemminger v. Tidyman’s Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002).4 If
`
`plaintiffs establish a prima facie case, the employer then has the burden of “demonstrat[ing] that a
`
`challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”
`
`42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2k(1)(A)(i). A class disparate impact claim is often proved through statistical
`
`evidence. See e.g., Paige v. California, 291 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2002).
`
`In a disparate treatment class action, the focus is on whether there was a “pattern or practice”
`
`of disparate treatment , which means that discrimination is the employer’s “standard operating
`
`procedure—the regular rather than the unusual practice.” Obrey v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 691, 694 (9th
`
`Cir. 2005) (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336). Plaintiffs can prove disparate treatment through
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`4 Title VII provides that if it is not possible to separate different employment practices then the
`adverse impact caused by several practices may establish a prima facie case. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
`2(k)(1)(B)(i); McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 276, 278 (5th Cir. 2008), cert.
`denied, 555 U.S. 881 (2008).
`PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
`PAGE 4
`835645.49
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`“direct, circumstantial, or ... statistical evidence, and all evidence that the plaintiff presents in that
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`regard can contribute to the inference in a cumulative manner.” Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No.
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`3:94-cv-04335-SI, 1997 WL 605754, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1997) (citations omitted).5 Like
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`disparate impact, “[s]tatisical disparities in the treatment of women alone may be sufficient to
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`establish a prima facie case” of disparate treatment. ECF No. 64 at 9 (citing Buchanan v. Tata
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`Consulting Servs. Ltd., No. 4:15-cv-01696-YGR, 2017 WL 6611653, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 27,
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`2017)). In addition, anecdotal evidence helps “establish a general discriminatory pattern.” Obrey,
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`400 F.3d at 698.6 “The burden of establishing a prime facie case is not designed to be onerous…the
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`plaintiff need only provide evidence that suggests that the employment decision was based on a
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`discriminatory criterion.” Buchanan, 2017 WL 6611653, at *12 (internal citations and quotations
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`omitted).
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`It is well established that maintaining policies or practices that an employer knows have a
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`discriminatory effect is evidence of disparate treatment. See e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Inland Marine Indus.,
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`729 F.2d 1229, 1235 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984) (“By refusing to change ...
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`wage-setting policies or to bring black w