`Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822 Entered: January 21, 2014
`
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________________
`
`CRS ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
`Petitioner
`v.
`FRONTLINE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
`Patent Owner
`____________________
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151 C1
`___________________
`
`Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, THOMAS L. GIANNETTI, and
`JENNIFER S. BISK, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`
`BISK, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 328(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
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`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151 C1
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`I. INTRODUCTION
`A. Background
`On September 21, 2012, CRS Advanced Technologies, Inc. (“CRS”
`or “Petitioner”) filed a Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 321, pursuant to Section
`18 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act1 (“AIA”). Paper 2 (“Pet.”).
`The Petition challenged claims 3, 6, 7, 16, 24, and 33 of U.S. Patent No.
`6,675,151 C1 (“the ’151 patent”, Ex. 1001). On January 23, 2013, the
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the “Board”) instituted a transitional covered
`business method patent review for all challenged claims based solely upon
`Petitioner’s assertion that the claims are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
`Paper 17 (“Decision to Institute”).
`After institution, Frontline Technologies, Inc. (“Frontline” or “Patent
`Owner”) filed a Patent Owner Response on March 18, 2013 (Paper 36; “PO
`Resp.”) and CRS filed a Reply to the Patent Owner Response on June 20,
`2013 (Paper 48; “Reply”). A hearing was held on August 13, 2013, a
`transcript of which appears in the record. Record of Oral Hearing, Paper 62
`(“Transcript”).
`This decision is a final written decision under 35 U.S.C. § 328(a) as to
`the patentability of the challenged claims. Based on the record presented,
`we hold that all the challenged claims, claims 3, 6, 7, 16, 24, and 33 of the
`’151 patent, are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.2
`
`
`1 Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
`2 This decision addresses issues and arguments raised during the trial. Issues
`and arguments raised prior to institution of trial, but not made during trial,
`are not addressed in this decision.
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`B. The ’151 Patent
`The ’151 patent generally relates to “human resources management.”
`Ex. 1001, col. 1, ll. 14-15. In particular, the patent describes “automating
`the performance of substitute fulfillment to assign a replacement worker to
`substitute for a worker during a temporary absence, performing placement of
`floating workers, tracking absences and entitlements of workers, notifying
`interested parties regarding unexpected events and daily announcements, and
`bidding for temporary workers.” Ex. 1001, Abstract.
`The ’151 patent describes known methods for supporting substitute
`fulfillment in the education field that typically use “one dedicated computer,
`combined with specialized telephony equipment, including multiple phone
`lines, and other equipment,” and a database accessed through a dial-up
`connection. Id. at col. 3, ll. 36-42, ll. 51-56. The invention described in the
`’151 patent improves the prior art systems with a system implemented using
`a central database located on a server and accessed over a communication
`connection such as the Internet. Id. at Abstract, col. 7, ll. 25-34. One
`preferred embodiment uses the described invention to fulfill substitute teller
`requirements in a retail bank. Id. at col. 14, ll. 47-50.
`An ex parte reexamination of claims 3-13 of the ’151 patent was
`granted on October 24, 2007, based upon several prior art references. A
`reexamination certificate was issued on October, 20, 2009 (prior to the
`decision in the Supreme Court case of Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218
`(2010) (“Bilski II”)), with original claims 1 and 2, amended claims 3, 6, and
`9, and new claims 14-55. Ex. 1002.
`The challenged claims encompass a method and system of substitute
`fulfillment “for a plurality of organizations.” Ex. 1002, claims 3 and 6. Of
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`the six challenged claims, claims 3 and 6 are independent, claim 7 depends
`from claim 6, and claims 16, 24, and 33 depend from claim 3. Both
`independent claims are reproduced below. Claim 3 is as follows:
`3. A method for performing substitute fulfillment for a
`plurality of different organizations comprising:
`receiving absentee information representing an absent
`worker that will be or is physically absent from an organization
`worksite via at least one communication link;
`generating and posting by one or more computers a list of
`one or more positions of one or more absent workers that need to
`be filled by one or more substitute workers on a website and
`providing, for one or more of the positions, information indicating
`directly or indirectly an organization worksite location for the
`respective position;
`receiving a response by comprising an acceptance, by the
`one or more computers, from a substitute worker selecting a posted
`position on the website via an Internet communication link; and
`securing, in response to receiving the acceptance from the
`substitute worker, via the Internet communication link and the one
`or more computers, the posted position for the substitute worker
`who selected the posted position to fill in for the absent worker, the
`securing comprising halting, at the one or more computers, further
`processing to fulfill the posted position with any other substitute
`worker.
`
`Claim 6 is as follows:
`6. A substitute fulfillment system that secures one or more
`substitute workers for a plurality of organizations comprising:
`a database comprising worker records, said worker records
`having information associated with workers for each of the
`organizations, and substitute records, said substitute records
`having information associated with at least one substitute
`worker, and;
`one or more computers comprising a server connected to the
`database, the server configured for:
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`receiving absentee information representing an absent
`worker that will be or is physically absent from an organization
`worksite via at least one communication link;
`generating and posting a list of one or more positions of one
`or more absent workers that need to be filled by one or more
`substitute workers on a website and providing, for one or more
`of the positions, information indicating directly or indirectly an
`organization worksite location for the respective position;
`receiving a response by comprising an acceptance from a
`substitute worker selecting a posted position on the website via
`an Internet communication link; and
`securing, in response to receiving the acceptance from the
`substitute worker, via the Internet communication link and the
`one or more computers, the posted position for the substitute
`worker who selected the posted position to fill in for the absent
`worker, the securing comprising halting, at the one or more
`computers, further processing to fulfill the posted position with
`any other substitute worker.
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`CRS contends that the challenged claims are unpatentable because
`they are abstract and not directed to statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 101. Pet. 20-31. Specifically, CRS states that the challenged claims are
`directed to the abstract idea of a method of hiring temporary workers. Pet. 5.
`Frontline contends that that the challenged claims are not abstract, but
`instead are patent-eligible under § 101. Frontline maintains that each of the
`claims, considered as a whole, is directed to “a specific and novel way for
`computing and communication technology to perform substitute
`fulfillment,” with the claimed technology playing a central role in the
`process. PO Resp. 24.
`CRS, as petitioner, bears the ultimate burden of proof that Frontline’s
`claims are unpatentable under § 101. We begin our analysis with claim
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`construction. Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada,
`687 F.3d 1266, 1273-74 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[I]t will ordinarily be desirable—
`and often necessary—to resolve claim construction disputes prior to a § 101
`analysis, for the determination of patent eligibility requires a full
`understanding of the basic character of the claimed subject matter.”).
`A. Claim Construction
`Consistent with the statute and the legislative history of the AIA, the
`Board will interpret claims using the broadest reasonable construction. See
`Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,766 (Aug. 14,
`2012); 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b). This is true even if a district court has
`construed the patent claims.3 See Changes to Implement Inter Partes
`Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and Transitional
`Program for Covered Business Method Patents, Final Rules, 77 Fed. Reg.
`48,680, 48,697(Aug. 14, 2012) (citing In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1269, 1274
`(Fed. Cir. 2011)); see also SAP America, Inc. v. Versata Development
`Group, Inc., CBM2012-00001 Paper 70, 7-19 (discussing the history of
`broadest reasonable interpretation at the Office and its application to AIA
`proceedings). There is a “heavy presumption” that a claim term carries its
`ordinary and customary meaning. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
`288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
`In the Decision to Institute, the Board adopted CRS’s construction of
`several claim terms, concluding that they corresponded to the plain and
`ordinary meaning in the context of the specification. Decision to Institute 5-
`
`
`3 In this case, there has been a construction of some of the terms of this
`patent in a district court case. Frontline Placement Techs., Inc. v. CRS, Inc.,
`No. 2:07-cv-2457 (E.D. Pa.) (Markman Order Feb. 8, 2011). Neither party
`asserts that the district court’s construction is relevant here.
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`6. The Board, however, did not agree with CRS’s proposed construction of
`two terms: “organization worksite” and “posting.” Id. The Board construed
`“organization worksite” as “any location associated with any work
`environment” and construed “posting” as “the act of visually displaying
`information, including in the form of a list.” Id. at 6. For all other claim
`terms not specifically addressed in the Petition, the Board applied the plain
`and ordinary meaning that the term would have had to a person of ordinary
`skill in the art. Id.
`Frontline argues that several of the constructions adopted in the
`Decision to Institute should be rejected as going beyond the ordinary
`meaning and incorporating extraneous language, and proposes alternative
`constructions for those terms. PO Resp. 12-13. CRS contends that
`Frontline’s proposed constructions are incorrect. Reply 2-4. Both parties
`agreed at oral argument that claim construction does not affect the § 101
`analysis in this case. See Transcript 14-15; 30. The following table
`summarizes the claim interpretations contested by Frontline:
`
`Claim Term
`
`website
`
`one or more
`computers
`
`organization
`worksite
`receiving
`
`generating
`
`Adopted by the Decision to
`Institute
`one or more related HTML-
`code webpages on the
`World Wide Web
`one or more general-
`purpose computational
`devices
`any location associated with
`any work environment
`being given information
`
`the act of creating a visual
`representation of
`
`Frontline’s Proposed
`Construction
`a file or related group of files
`available on the World Wide
`Web
`one or more machines
`capable of executing
`instructions on data
`a scene of work associated
`with an organization
`to take possession or delivery
`of
`to bring into existence
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`posting
`
`information
`
`providing
`
`information, including in
`the form of a list or report
`the act of visually
`displaying information
`any type of data that may be
`stored or recorded
`the act of conveying or
`making information
`available
`
`to publish, announce, or
`advertise
`data
`
`supplying for use
`
`For each of the claim terms discussed above, we conclude that either
`definition would result in the same § 101 analysis. In other words, each of
`the challenged claims is unpatentable under § 101 whether or not we adopt
`CRS’s proposed claim constructions. Therefore, we conclude that each of
`the claim terms is given its ordinary and customary meaning and the issue of
`claim construction will not be addressed further.
`B. The Challenged Claims are Unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101
`CRS challenges claims 3, 6, 7, 16, 24, and 33 as unpatentable under
`35 U.S.C. § 101. Pet. 20. Frontline maintains that its claims are directed to
`patent-eligible processes and machines in which computing technology
`plays a significant part in performing the claimed operations. PO Resp. 19-
`42.
`
`1. Patent Eligibility Under § 101
`Section 101 provides that patentable subject matter extends to four
`broad categories, including four statutory classes: processes, machines,
`manufactures, or compositions of matter. 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme
`Court recognizes three exceptions to these statutory classes: laws of nature,
`physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. Bilski II, 130 S. Ct. at 3220.
`Although a fundamental principle cannot be patented, the Supreme
`Court has held that “an application of a law of nature or mathematical
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`formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
`protection,” so long as that application would not preempt substantially all
`uses of the fundamental principle. Bilski II, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (quoting
`Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (internal quotations omitted)).
`In making this determination, the claim must be considered as a whole, as it
`is “inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to
`ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at
`176. Nonetheless, a scientific principle cannot be made patentable by
`limiting its use “to a particular technological environment” or by adding
`“insignificant post-solution activity.” Id. at 191.
`The test for whether a claim embraces something more than an
`abstract idea has been clarified in recent cases. The “machine-or-
`transformation test” has been used as one inquiry regarding the abstractness
`of process claims. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 955-56 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
`(en banc) (“Bilski I”). Under this test, a claimed process is patent-eligible
`under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus; or (2) it
`transforms a particular article into a different state or thing. Id. (citing
`Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)). Thus, the machine-or-
`transformation test reveals limitations on the claimed process that indicate
`that the patent covers an application of an abstract idea, instead of claiming
`the abstract idea itself. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335,
`1343 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[A] claim is not patent eligible only if, instead of
`claiming an application of an abstract idea, the claim is instead to the
`abstract idea itself.”).
`Although the machine-or transformation test remains a “useful and
`important clue,” the Supreme Court held that it is not the sole test for
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`determining the patent-eligibility of process claims. Bilski II, 130 S. Ct. at
`3227; see also Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628
`F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In the wake of Bilski II, the Federal
`Circuit has provided many guideposts, several of which are summarized
`below, for determining whether a particular claim encompasses a patent-
`eligible application of an abstract idea, or a patent-ineligible abstract idea
`itself.
`Several cases have held claims were to patent-eligible subject matter
`where computing technology was integral to the claimed process. For
`example, in SiRF, the primary claim at issue involved a method by which a
`GPS receiver could “calculate its position without having to wait to receive
`time information from a satellite, thereby allowing the receiver to calculate
`its position more quickly even in weak-signal environments.” SiRF Tech.,
`Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The
`Federal Circuit held that “[a] GPS receiver is a machine and is integral to
`each of the claims at issue.” Id. at 1332. The integral nature of the GPS
`receiver was clear because the receiver “play[ed] a significant part in
`permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function[ing]
`solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved
`more quickly, i.e., through the utilization of a computer for performing
`calculations.” Id. at 1333. Moreover, the inability of the claimed method to
`be “performed without” a GPS receiver is indicative of the receiver’s
`indispensability to the patented process. Id. (emphasis added).
`More recently, the Federal Circuit held claims concerning a method
`for distributing media products over the Internet to be patent-eligible.
`Ultramercial, 722 F.3d at 1352-53. The court noted that the claims required
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`steps to be performed through an “extensive computer interface” involving
`“eleven separate and specific steps with many limitations and sub-steps in
`each category.” Id. The court reasoned that “it is clear that several steps
`plainly require that the method be performed through computers, on the
`internet, and in a cyber-market environment.” Id. at 1350.
`Other cases have found claims to be directed to patent-ineligible
`subject matter where computing technology did not limit the scope of the
`claims meaningfully. For example, in Dealertrack, the Federal Circuit
`found patent-ineligible claims to “[a] computer aided method of managing a
`credit application.” Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1331-34
`(Fed. Cir. 2012). The court observed that the “claims are silent as to how a
`computer aids the method, the extent to which a computer aids the method,
`or the significance of a computer to the performance of the method.” Id. at
`1333. The mere addition of “a ‘computer aided’ limitation to a claim
`covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to render the
`claim patent eligible.” Id. (citing SiRF, 601 F.3d at 1333).
`Similarly, in Bancorp, the patent at issue described “systems and
`methods for administering and tracking the value of life insurance policies in
`separate accounts.” Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1269. The court observed that the
`“computer required by some of Bancorp’s claims is employed only for its
`most basic function, the performance of repetitive calculations, and as such
`does not impose meaningful limits on the scope of those claims.” Id. at
`1278 (citation omitted). Moreover, the court noted that the computer alluded
`to in the claims was not part of a “technological advance” of any sort and
`that “[u]sing a computer to accelerate an ineligible mental process does not
`make that process patent-eligible.” Id. at 1279.
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`Finally, in Accenture, the Federal Circuit found patent ineligible
`system claims for generating insurance file notes comprising steps, such as
`“transmitting information” and “storing the updated information,” and
`components, such as “transaction database for storing information” and
`“event processor.” Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software,
`Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The court relied on the CLS
`Bank decision for the holding that “system claims that closely track method
`claims and are grounded by the same meaningful limitations will generally
`rise and fall together.” Id. at 1341 (citing plurality opinion in CLS Bank,
`Int’l. v. Alice Corp. 717 F.3d 1269, 1274 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc)).
`The court concluded that “because the system claims offer no meaningful
`limitations beyond the method claims that have been held patent-ineligible
`and because, when considered on their own, under Mayo and our plurality
`opinion in CLS Bank, they fail to pass muster.” Id.
`2. Claims 3, 16, 24, and 33
`Claims 3, 16, 24, and 33 recite processes. CRS contends that these
`challenged process claims contain patent-ineligible abstract ideas and fail the
`machine-or-transformation test. Pet. 20-30. Specifically, CRS contends that
`the claims fail the “machine” prong because they recite only generic
`devices—a computer, a communication link, and a website—not integral to
`the claimed invention. Id. at 25-26. Moreover, CRS contends that the
`claims do not transform physical objects to another state or thing. Id. at 24.
`According to CRS, the process claims encompass the preexisting process of
`substitute fulfillment simply made more efficient with the use of generic
`computer hardware and software, and, therefore, constitute unpatentable
`abstract ideas under § 101. Id.
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`In response, Frontline contends that the claims recite a specific and
`novel way for computing and communication technology to perform
`substitute fulfillment in which the technology is integral. PO Resp. 23-30.
`According to Frontline, the claims do not merely recite that the “one or more
`computers,” “website,” and “communications links” must be used, nor do
`they merely use the computer to carry out the steps more quickly, but instead
`the claimed operations only work when carried out using the recited
`technology. Pet. 26. Frontline adds that efficiency is only one of the many
`benefits achieved by the claimed invention. Id. at 27-28.
`We conclude that claims 3, 16, 24, and 33 are directed to abstract,
`and, therefore, unpatentable, methods for substitute fulfillment. The claims
`are directed to concepts for taking the preexisting process of substitute
`fulfillment and implementing it in a networked computing environment.
`We do not agree with Frontline’s argument that the computer
`technology is integral to the claimed subject matter. As we explained in the
`Decision to Institute, the “one or more computers,” “Internet communication
`link,” and “website” recited in claim 3 are not analogous to the GPS receiver
`in SiRF. Decision to Institute 10-11. Frontline has not directed us to
`anything in the record at trial to cause us to change our position. Frontline
`asserts that because the claimed limitations “generating and posting by one
`or more computers a list of one or more positions of one or more absent
`workers that need to be filed by one or more substitute workers on a
`website” and “receiving via at least one communication link absentee
`information” are required for the claimed process to work as intended, they,
`like the GPS receiver in SiRF, are integral to the claimed subject matter. PO
`Resp. 25-26. We, however, disagree. We find these additions of generic
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`computer technology to be more akin to the addition of “computer-aided” to
`the claims of Dealertrack, and the additions of “transaction database” and
`“transmitting information” to the claims of Accenture. Accenture, 728 F.3d
`at 1339; Dealertrack, 674 F. 3d at 1333.
`Like the terms “computer-aided” in Dealertrack, and “transaction
`database” in Accenture, the terms “one or more computers,” “website,” and
`“communication link” at issue in this case do not impose meaningful limits
`on the challenged claims’ scope. This particular technology is employed
`only for the purposes of creating more efficient communication and data
`storage—basic functions of those components. Ex. 1001, col. 4, ll. 46-58
`(stating that the advantages of the present invention are “to provide a
`reliable, efficient system . . . . that has low overhead and requires little . . .
`oversight. . . . includ[ing] an interface to the Internet . . . .[and] a central
`database”); see also col. 3, ll. 36-64 (describing the prior art automated
`systems). In other words, the claims here, even with the recitation of
`computing technology, are not part of a “technological advance” of any sort.
`See Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1279.
`Frontline argues that the claims at issue in Bancorp are different than
`the claims at issue here because none of the recited operations of the ’151
`patent claims are mathematical calculations, but instead recite a particular
`series of interactive operations. PO Resp. 29-30. According to Frontline, as
`opposed to simply accelerating the mental process of performing
`mathematical calculations, here the computing structure plays a significant
`part in performing the interactive steps and thereby imposes meaningful
`limits on the claim scope. PO Resp. 30 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 13-18).
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`We agree that the claims of the ’151 patent are not exactly the same as
`those at issue in Bancorp. However, we determine that the ’151 patent
`claims are closer to those at issue in Bancorp, Dealertrack, and Accenture
`than to those at issue in SiRF and Ultramercial. Specifically, similar to the
`claims in Bancorp, Dealertrack, and Accenture, the challenged claims of the
`’151 patent all recite technology components that are simply examples of
`well-known, generic computing technology being asked to do their generic
`function without any specified constraints, and without being a part of any
`technological advance used to implement an abstract idea unrelated to that
`technology. For example, the technology recited in the ’151 patent claims—
`“website,” “one or more computers,” and “Internet communication link” —
`is similar to the technology recited in the patent-ineligible claims of
`Dealertrack— “computer aided,” “remote application entry and display
`device,” and “remote funding source terminal devices.” Dealertrack, 674
`F.3d at 1331.
`On the other hand, the claims at issue in SiRF and Ultramercial both
`involve specific technology that is integral to the actual method being
`implemented. For example, in SiRF, the technology in the claim is a GPS
`receiver used to implement “[a] method for calculating an absolute position
`of a GPS receiver.” SiRF, 601 F.3d at 1331. And in Ultramercial, the claim
`implements “a method for monetizing and distributing copyrighted products
`over the Internet” using an “Internet website” with an “extensive computer
`interface.” Ultramercial, 722 F.3d at 1352.
`We are persuaded that, like the claims in Bancorp, Dealertrack, and
`
`Accenture, the challenged claims of the ’151 patent involve implementing an
`abstract idea—a method of substitute fulfillment—using well-known
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`technology. Thus, we conclude that claims 3, 16, 24, and 33 do not embrace
`an application of an abstract idea, but an abstract idea itself.
`3. Claims 6 and 7
`Independent claim 6 and claim 7, depending from claim 6, recite a
`“substitute fulfillment system,” tracking the language of claim 3 with the
`addition of a “database” and a “system” for performing the method claimed
`in claim 3. These additions do not necessarily change the patent-eligibility
`analysis. See Accenture, 728 F.3d at 1341; Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1276-77
`(“[W]e look not just to the type of claim but also ‘to the underlying
`invention for patent-eligibility purposes.’” (quoting CyberSource Corp. v.
`Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2011))). “As the
`Supreme Court has explained, the form of the claims should not trump basic
`issues of patentability.” Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1277 (citing Parker v. Flook,
`437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)). In this case, we are persuaded that claim 6 is
`simply an alternative format for claiming the same underlying patent-
`ineligible subject matter of claim 3.
`Frontline argues that claims 6 and 7 include a meaningful limitation
`over and above those included in the method claims, in the form of “a
`particular database with a particular structure.” PO Resp. 22-23.
`Specifically, Frontline refers to the following limitation:
`a database comprising worker records, said worker records
`having information associated with workers for each of the
`organizations, and substitute records, said substitute records
`having information associated with at least one substitute
`worker.
`
`PO Resp. 34-35.
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`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151 C1
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`
`We do not agree that this language in claims 6 and 7 meaningfully
`limits the claims so as to distinguish them from the patent-ineligible method
`claims. The database is not enough to limit the claims meaningfully.
`Instead, the database is another piece of computing technology similar to
`those already required by claim 3 and addressed by the Federal Circuit in
`Bancorp, Dealertrack, and Accenture.
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`This is a final written decision of the Board under 35 U.S.C. § 328(a).
`We hold Frontline’s claims 3, 6, 7, 16, 24, and 33 to be unpatentable under
`35 U.S.C. § 101. Specifically, the claims recite unpatentable abstract ideas,
`and the claims do not provide enough significant meaningful limitations to
`transform these abstract ideas into patent-eligible applications of these
`abstractions.
`
`IV. ORDER
`Accordingly, it is hereby:
`ORDERED that claims 3, 6, 7, 16, 24, and 33 are CANCELLED as
`unpatentable.
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`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151 C1
`
`For Patent Owner
`
`John P. Donohue, Jr. (Reg. No. 29, 916)
`John E. McGlynn
`WOODCOCK WASHBURN, LLP
`Cira Centre, 12 th Floor
`2929 Arch Street
`Philadelphia, PA 19104-2891
`Phone: (215) 564-8367
`Fax: (215) 568-3439
`donohue@woodcock.com
`
`For Petitioner
`
`E. Robert Yoches, Esq. (Reg. No. 30,120)
`Aaron J. Capron, Esq. (Reg. No. 56,170)
`Darrel C. Karl, Esq.
`FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP
`901 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20001-4413
`Phone: (202) 408-4000
`bob.yoches@finnegan.com
`aaron.capron@finnegan.com
`darrel.karl@finnegan.com
`
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