throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`Tel: 571-272-7822
`
`Paper 48
`Entered: September 25, 2015
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`SMARTFLASH LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`
`Case CBM2014-001121
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`Before JENNIFER S. BISK, RAMA G. ELLURU, JEREMY M. PLENZLER, and
`MATTHEW R. CLEMENTS, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`ELLURU, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`
`35 U.S.C. § 328(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1 Case CBM2014-00113 has been consolidated with the instant proceeding.
`
`
`
`

`
`CBM2014-00112
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`A.
`
`Background
`
`Petitioner, Apple Inc. (“Apple”), filed two Petitions to institute covered
`
`business method patent review of claims 1, 6–8, 12–14, 16, and 18 (“the
`
`challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 7,942,317 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’317
`
`patent”) pursuant to § 18 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”).
`
`CBM2014-00112 (Paper 2, “112 Pet.”) and CBM2014-00113 (Paper 2, “113
`
`Pet.”).2 On September 30, 2014, we consolidated CBM2014-00112 and
`
`CBM2014-00113 and instituted a transitional covered business method patent
`
`review (Paper 7, “Decision to Institute” or “Dec.”) based upon Petitioner’s
`
`assertion that claims 1, 6–8, 12, 13, 16, and 18 are unpatentable based on the
`
`following grounds:
`
`Reference[s]3
`
`Basis
`
`Claims Challenged
`
`Stefik ’2354 and Stefik ’9805
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`Ginter6
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`1, 6–8, 12, 13, 16,
`and 18
`1, 6–8, 12, 13, 16,
`and 18
`
`Dec. 22. Petitioner provides declarations from Anthony J. Wechselberger
`
`(“Wechselberger Decl.”) in support of its petitions. 112 Ex. 1021; 113 Ex. 1121.
`
`
`2 Unless otherwise specified, hereinafter, paper numbers refer to paper numbers in
`CBM2014-00112.
`3 Exhibits with numbers 1001–1029 were filed in CBM2014-00112 and
`those with numbers 1101–1129 were filed in CBM2014-00113. For
`purposes of this decision, where the two cases have duplicate exhibits, we
`refer to the exhibit filed in CBM2014-00112.
`4 U.S. Patent No. 5,530,235 (June 25, 1996) (Ex. 1013, “Stefik ’235”).
`5 U.S. Patent No. 5,629,980 (May 13, 1997) (Ex. 1014, “Stefik ’980”).
`6 U.S. Patent No. 5,915,019 (June 22, 1999) (Ex. 1015, “Ginter”).
`
`2
`
`

`
`CBM2014-00112
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`Subsequent to institution, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner Response
`
`(Paper 22, “PO Resp.”) and, in support, a declaration from Jonathan Katz, Ph.D.
`
`(Ex. 2031, “Katz Declaration”). Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 30, “Pet. Reply”)
`
`to Patent Owner’s Response.
`
`An oral hearing was held on July 7, 2015, and a transcript of the hearing is
`
`included in the record (Paper 47, “Tr.”).
`
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(c). This Final Written Decision is
`
`issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 328(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73.
`
`For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a
`
`preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 6–8, 12, 13, 16, and 18 of the ’317
`
`patent are unpatentable.
`
`B.
`
`The ’317 Patent
`
`The ’317 patent relates to “a portable data carrier for storing and paying for
`
`data and to computer systems for providing access to data to be stored” and the
`
`“corresponding methods and computer programs.” Ex. 1001, 1:18–23. Owners of
`
`proprietary data, especially audio recordings, have an urgent need to address the
`
`prevalence of “data pirates” who make proprietary data available over the internet
`
`without authorization. Id. at 1:38–51. The ’317 patent describes providing
`
`portable data storage together with a means for conditioning access to that data
`
`upon validated payment. Id. at 1:55–2:3. This combination allows data owners to
`
`make their data available over the internet without fear of data pirates. Id. at 2:3–
`
`11.
`
`As described, the portable data storage device is connected to a terminal for
`
`internet access. Id. at 1:55–63. The terminal reads payment information, validates
`
`that information, and downloads data into the portable storage device from a data
`
`3
`
`

`
`CBM2014-00112
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`supplier. Id. The data on the portable storage device can be retrieved and output
`
`from a mobile device. Id. at 1:64–67.
`
`The ’317 patent makes clear that the actual implementation of these
`
`components is not critical and may be implemented in many ways. See, e.g., id. at
`
`25:49–52 (“The skilled person will understand that many variants to the system are
`
`possible and the invention is not limited to the described embodiments.”).
`
`C.
`
`Related Matters
`
`The parties indicate that Smartflash has sued Apple for infringement of the
`
`’317 patent and identify the following district court case: Smartflash LC v. Apple
`
`Inc., Case No. 6:13-cv-447 (E.D. Tex.). See, e.g., 112 Pet. 15–16; 112 Papers 4, 5.
`
`Patent Owner indicates that other patents in the same patent family are the subject of
`
`several other district court cases. Paper 32, 2–3.
`
`In addition to the 112 and 113 Petitions, Apple, as well as other Petitioners,
`
`has filed numerous other Petitions for covered business method patent review
`
`challenging claims of patents owned by Smartflash and disclosing similar subject
`
`matter.
`
`D.
`
`The Instituted Claims
`
`We instituted review of claims 1, 6–8, 12, 13, 16, and 18 of the ’317 patent.
`
`Dec. 22. Claims 1, 8, 12, 16, and 18 are independent. Claims 6 and 7 depend from
`
`claim 1 and claim 13 depends from claim 12. Claims 1 and 8 are illustrative of the
`
`claims at issue and recite the following:
`
`A computer system for providing data to a data requester,
`1.
`the system comprising:
`
`a communication interface;
`
`a data access data store for storing records of data items available from the
`system, each record comprising a data item description and a pointer to a data
`provider for the data item;
`
`4
`
`

`
`CBM2014-00112
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`a program store storing code implementable by a processor;
`
`a processor coupled to the communications interface, to the data access data
`store, and to the program store for implementing the stored code, the code
`comprising:
`
`code to receive a request for a data item from the requester;
`
`code to receive from the communications interface payment data comprising
`data relating to payment for the requested data item;
`
`code responsive to the request and to the received payment data, to read data
`for the requested data item from a content provider; and
`
`code to transmit the read data to the requester over the communications
`interface.
`
`Ex. 1001, 25:55–26:8.
`
`8.
`
`A method of providing data to a data requester comprising:
`
`receiving a request for a data item from the requester;
`
`receiving payment data from the requester relating to payment for the
`requested data;
`
`reading the requested data from a content provider responsive to the received
`payment data; and
`
`transmitting the read data to the requester.
`
`Id. at 26:36–43.
`
`II.
`
`EVIDENTIARY MATTERS
`
`A. Wechselberger Declarations
`
`In its Response, Patent Owner urges that the 112 and 113 Wechselberger
`
`declarations should be given little or no weight. PO Resp. 4–8; see Tr. 72:23–
`
`73:17. In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner argued that we should disregard
`
`the declarations, but we determined that Patent Owner did not offer any evidence
`
`that Mr. Wechselberger “used incorrect criteria, failed to consider evidence, or is
`
`5
`
`

`
`CBM2014-00112
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`not an expert in the appropriate field.” Dec. 4 n.9. Patent Owner renews its
`
`contention arguing that because Mr. Wechselberger’s declarations do not state the
`
`evidentiary weight standard that he used in arriving at his conclusions, he “‘used
`
`incorrect criteria.’” PO Resp. 5. Referring to excerpts from Mr. Wechselberger’s
`
`deposition, Patent Owner contends that he “could neither articulate what the
`
`difference was between ‘substantial evidence’ and ‘preponderance of the
`
`evidence,’ nor could he articulate which standard he was supposed to use when
`
`alleging invalidity of claims in a patent.” Id. at 5–7. Thus, concludes Patent
`
`Owner, we can only afford little or no weight to his testimony, otherwise we would
`
`be accepting his opinion without knowing “‘the underlying facts . . . on which the
`
`opinion is based’ (i.e., how much evidence he thinks show any of his opinions
`
`discussed therein).” Id. at 7.
`
`In its Reply, Petitioner argues that “Mr. Wechselberger is a highly-qualified
`
`expert,” that Patent Owner offers no evidence disputing that he is a qualified
`
`expert, and that an expert is not required to recite or apply the “preponderance of
`
`standard’ expressly in order for the expert opinion to be accorded weight.” Pet.
`
`Reply 20–21 (citation omitted).
`
`Patent Owner has not articulated a persuasive reason for giving Mr.
`
`Wechselberger’s declarations, as a whole, little or no weight in our analysis.
`
`Patent Owner has not cited any authority requiring an expert to recite or apply the
`
`“preponderance of the evidence” standard in order for the expert opinion to be
`
`accorded weight. Under 37 C.F.R. 42.1(d), we apply the preponderance of the
`
`evidence standard in determining whether Petitioner has established
`
`unpatentability. In doing so, it is within our discretion to determine the appropriate
`
`weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, including the weight accorded to
`
`expert opinion, based on the disclosure of the underlying facts or data upon which
`
`6
`
`

`
`CBM2014-00112
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`the opinion is based. Thus, we decline to make a determination about Mr.
`
`Wechselberger’s opinion, as a whole. Rather, in our analysis, we will consider, as
`
`it arises, relevant opinion from Mr. Wechselberger and give it due weight, if
`
`appropriate.
`
`B.
`
`Katz Declaration
`
`Petitioner contends that “Dr. Katz’s unsupported opinions, to the extent that
`
`they are given any weight at all, should be given far less weight than Mr.
`
`Wechselberger’s.” Pet. Reply 16–20. Specifically, Petitioner argues that Dr. Katz
`
`is not qualified as a person of ordinary skill in the art under either party’s
`
`definition, he repeatedly stated that “he was ‘not sure’ about various technologies
`
`that are indisputably in the relevant prior art, and that he does not know what a
`
`POSITA would have understood about that technology,” and he repeatedly stated
`
`that “he was ‘not sure’ how a POSITA would interpret several passages of the
`
`cited prior art and several passages of the challenged patent[].” Pet. Reply 2–3,
`
`16–20; Tr. 50:8–57:19. Thus, concludes Petitioner, “Dr. Katz (a) does not know
`
`this information and is therefore not a qualified expert and/or (b) did not properly
`
`consider the scope and content of the prior art or a POSITA’s understanding of the
`
`prior art.” Id. at 20.
`
`We decline to make a determination as to Dr. Katz’s testimony as a whole.
`
`As noted above, we have the discretion to determine the appropriate weight to be
`
`accorded to the evidence presented, including the weight accorded to expert
`
`opinion, based on the disclosure of the underlying facts or data upon which the
`
`opinion is based. Thus, in our analysis, we will consider, as it arises, relevant
`
`opinion from Dr. Katz and give it due weight, if appropriate.
`
`7
`
`

`
`CBM2014-00112
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`III. ANALYSIS
`
`A. Claim Construction
`
`We construe all terms, whether or not expressly discussed here, using the
`
`broadest reasonable construction in light of the ’317 patent specification. See
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b); see also In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268,
`
`1278–80 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Congress implicitly approved the broadest reasonable
`
`interpretation standard in enacting the AIA,” and “the standard was properly
`
`adopted by PTO regulation.”). Applying that standard, we interpret the claim
`
`terms of the ’317 patent according to their ordinary and customary meaning in the
`
`context of the ’317 patent’s written description. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc.,
`
`504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In the Decision to Institute, we construed
`
`the term “use rule data” as “data for a rule specifying a condition under which
`
`access to content is permitted.” Dec. 7. Neither party contests this construction.
`
`We discern no reason to deviate from this construction of “use rule data.” For
`
`purposes of this Final Written Decision, we additionally expressly construe
`
`“payment data.”
`
`“payment data”
`
`Petitioner asserts that “[f]or review purposes, [payment data] is construed to
`
`mean ‘data representing payment made for requested content data’ and is distinct
`
`from ‘access control data.’” 112 Pet. 17; 113 Pet. 22 (emphasis added). Patent
`
`Owner disagrees, arguing that the term “payment data” should be interpreted to
`
`mean “data that can be used to make payment for content.” PO Resp. 8 (emphasis
`
`added).
`
`Although Petitioner and Patent Owner disagree on the proper broadest
`
`reasonable construction of the term “payment data,” both proposed constructions
`
`incorporate an element of timing. The main dispute between the parties is the
`
`8
`
`

`
`CBM2014-00112
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`timing of “payment data.” For example, Petitioner argues that the ’317 patent’s
`
`definition of the term “encompasses data relating to either current or past
`
`payment.” Pet. Reply 4. In support, Petitioner refers (id. at 3–4) to the following
`
`disclosure from the ’317 patent Specification:
`
`“[t]he payment data received may either be data relating to an actual
`payment made to the data supplier, or it may be a record of a payment
`made to an e-payment system . . . .”
`
`Ex. 1001, 6:57–61 (emphasis added).
`
`Patent Owner, on the other hand, argues that the ’317 patent discloses that
`
`“payment data” exists prior to the payment operation, i.e., “used for making a
`
`payment.” PO Resp. 8–9. In support of its argument that “‘payment data’ is used
`
`for making a payment,” Patent Owner refers to the following disclosure from the
`
`Specification7: “[P]ayment data for making a payment . . . is received from the
`
`smart Flash card by the content access terminal and forwarded to an e-payment
`
`system.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 20:59–62).
`
`We are persuaded that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term
`
`“payment data,” encompasses both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s definitions of
`
`the term. As used in the ’317 patent, “payment data” encompasses data relating to
`
`future, current, and past payments. In other words, we are persuaded that the ’317
`
`patent does not incorporate an element of timing into the definition of payment
`
`data. First, the plain and ordinary meaning of the two words that make up the
`
`term—“payment” and “data”—do not incorporate any notion of time and nothing
`
`about their combination changes that determination.
`
`
`7 We note that Patent Owner mistakenly refers to the disclosure from the “’221
`patent” in at least one instance. PO Resp. 9. We, however, interpret this as a
`reference to the ’317 patent.
`
`9
`
`

`
`CBM2014-00112
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`Second, the ’317 patent specification supports “payment data” representing
`
`data existing prior to, concurrent with, and after payment of the requested content.
`
`For example, the ’317 patent states that “payment data for making a payment to the
`
`system owner is received from the smart Flash card by the content access terminal
`
`and forwarded to an e-payment system.” Ex. 1001, 20:59–62. We agree with
`
`Patent Owner that this language indicates that payment data exists prior to the
`
`payment being made for the requested content. See PO Resp. 8–9. Petitioner does
`
`not address this language. See Pet. Reply 3–4. In addition, we agree with
`
`Petitioner that the language in the ’317 patent, “payment data received may either
`
`be data relating to an actual payment made to the data supplier, or it may be a
`
`record of a payment made to an e-payment system,” (Ex. 1001, 6:57–60) clearly
`
`shows that “payment data,” includes data for payments that have already been
`
`made. See Pet. Reply 3–4.
`
`Moreover, the plain and ordinary meaning of data does not allow for it to
`
`change character based on when it is used in a transaction. For example, a credit
`
`card number is “data relating to payment” before the number is processed, while
`
`the number is being processed, and after the number is processed. See, e.g., Ex.
`
`1015, 232:14–24 (providing credit or debit card information to a retail terminal).
`
`Thus, without an express description to the contrary, we presume that “payment
`
`data” retains the same meaning before, during, and after the payment operation.
`
`Neither party points to any such contrary description.
`
`Indeed, the ’317 patent describes “payment data” in several instances as data
`
`relating to payment for the requested data item. Ex. 1001, 10:5–6, 10:27–28,
`
`10:38–39. Thus, we are persuaded that the broadest reasonable interpretation of
`
`“payment data” as used in the ’317 patent is “data relating to payment for the
`
`requested data item.”
`
`10
`
`

`
`CBM2014-00112
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`B. Obviousness over Stefik ’235 and Stefik ’980
`
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1, 6–8, 12–14, 16, and 18 would have been
`
`obvious over the Stefik references alone. 112 Pet. 25–77. After considering the
`
`arguments and evidence presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response
`
`(112, Paper 6), we instituted trial with respect to claims 1, 6–8, 12, 13, 16, and 18
`
`concluding that Petitioner was likely to prevail in showing unpatentability under
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of Stefik ’235 and Stefik ’980. Dec. 22.
`
`After considering the arguments and evidence presented during the trial, our
`
`determination remains unchanged.
`
`1. Overview of Stefik ’235 (Ex. 1013)
`
`Stefik ’235 teaches a portable Document Card (“DocuCard”) for storing
`
`information in a digital form, storing usage rights for the information, processing
`
`user-initiated functions and requests to access documents stored therein,
`
`interfacing to external devices for reading and writing digital information, and
`
`allowing a user to directly interact with the DocuCard. Ex. 1013, 2:29–40, 7:35–
`
`42.
`
`2. Overview of Stefik ’980 (Ex. 1014)
`
`Stefik ’980 teaches a “repository” for storing digital works, controlling
`
`access to digital works, billing for access to digital works and maintaining the
`
`security and integrity of the system. Ex. 1014, 6:57–61.
`
`11
`
`

`
`CBM2014-00112
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`3. Analysis
`
`The parties focus on only certain claim limitations. For the remaining
`
`limitations, we have reviewed Petitioner’s evidence and argument and agree that
`
`Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Stefik8 teaches these limitations. See 112
`
`Pet. 28–77. We turn now to the disputed limitations.
`
`“payment data”
`
`
`
`Claims 8, 12, and 18
`
`Patent Owner contends that claims 8, 12, and 18 would not have been
`
`obvious over Stefik. PO Resp. 14–15. Claim 8 recites “receiving payment data
`
`from the requester relating to payment for the requested data.” Claim 12 recites “a
`
`data access system comprising: a data supply computer system for forwarding data
`
`from a data provider to a data access terminal; . . . wherein data is forwarded from
`
`the data provider to the data carrier on validation of payment data provided from
`
`the data carrier to the electronic payment system.” Claim 18 recites “receiving
`
`payment data from the requester relating to payment for the requested data” and
`
`“outputting payment data to a payment system for distributing the payment for the
`
`requested data.” (emphasis added).
`
`Petitioner contends that Stefik teaches the claimed “payment data” because
`
`Stefik describes “reporting transaction information and fees to a credit server or
`
`billing clearinghouse.” 112 Pet. 71–72, 75. For example, Setfik describes
`
`“generat[ing] billing information for the access which is transmitted to a credit
`
`
`8 Petitioner refers to Stefik ’235 and Stefik ’980 collectively as “Stefik,”
`contending that Stefik ’235 incorporates Stefik ’980 by reference, and providing
`rationale for combining the teachings from the two references. 112 Pet. 20–21
`n.12; PO Resp. 10–15 (Patent Owner not disputing Petitioner’s contention
`regarding “Stefik” being a single reference, or Petitioner’s rationale for combining
`the teachings of Stefik ’235 and Stefik ’980). We follow Petitioner’s
`nomenclature.
`
`12
`
`

`
`CBM2014-00112
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`server” (Ex. 1014, 7:33–36) and explains that “[f]or the most part, billing
`
`transactions are well understood in the state of the art” (id. at 29:58–64). 112 Pet.
`
`71–72; Pet. Reply 8. Stefik further describes that “[t]he user on the DocuCard now
`
`uses the user interface to assign payment of any fees associated with the
`
`transaction to be executed” (Ex. 1013, 6:66–7:1) and “[t]his logging in process
`
`may also activate credit accounts” (id. at 6:60–65). 112 Pet. 24, 42–43; Pet. Reply
`
`8. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s position that Stefik teaches “payment data,”
`
`which we construe as “data relating to payment for the requested data item.”
`
`Patent Owner contends that “payment data” is not rendered obvious by
`
`Stefik. PO Resp. 14–15. In support, however, Patent Owner refers to Petitioner’s
`
`contentions regarding the limitation reciting “an electronic payment system for
`
`confirming an electronic payment,” not Petitioner’s contentions regarding
`
`“payment data.” Id. at 14 (citing 1129 Pet. 55–56). Moreover, Patent Owner
`
`summarily states that Stefik “is still discussing post-usage processing,” and
`
`concludes that because Petitioner has adopted an incorrect interpretation of
`
`“payment data,” the 112 Petition has not shown that “payment data” is rendered
`
`obvious by Stefik. PO Resp. 15. At the hearing, Patent Owner conceded that if we
`
`do not adopt its construction of “payment data” and instead adopt Petitioner’s
`
`construction, it has no remaining argument as to why Stefik does not teach
`
`“payment data.” Tr. 77:10–78:14. We adopt an even broader construction of
`
`“payment data” than that proposed by Petitioner. Our construction of “payment
`
`data” does not including a timing component, and Patent Owner’s argument is
`
`based on the timing of payment data. PO Resp. 14–15. Thus, Patent Owner has
`
`not persuaded us that Stefik does not teach “payment data.”
`
`
`9 We also note that Patent Owner erroneously refers to the 113 Petition, which
`discusses Ginter. PO Resp. 14.
`
`13
`
`

`
`CBM2014-00112
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`“pointer to a data provider for the data item” and “resource locator identifying a
`data provider”
`
`Claims 1, 6, 7, and 16
`
`Patent Owner contends that claims 1, 6, 7, and 16 would not have been
`
`obvious over Stefik. PO Resp. 10–13. Independent claim 1, and thus claims 6 and
`
`7, based on their dependency from claim 1, recite “a data access data store for
`
`storing records of data items available from the system, each record comprising a
`
`data item description and a pointer to a data provider for the data item.” Similarly,
`
`independent claim 16 recites “a data access data store for storing records of data
`
`items available from the system, each record comprising a data item description
`
`and a resource locator identifying a data provider for the data item.”
`
`Stefik discloses that the file information for a “document,” i.e., data, is
`
`comprised of a “‘contents file’ and a ‘description file.’” Ex. 1013, 7:35–36; see
`
`Ex. 1014, 9:21–23. The “contents file” contains the documents, which are stored
`
`on a “DocuCard.” Ex. 1013, 6:10, 7:19–20; see Ex. 1014, 14:37–38. “The
`
`‘contents’ file is a stream of addressable bytes.” Ex. 1013, 6:36–38; see Ex. 1014,
`
`9:23–26. For example, a document is stored starting at a relative address of 0.
`
`Ex. 1013, 7:42–55, Fig. 4; Ex. 1014, 9:34–46, Fig. 5.
`
`Stefik states that the descriptor file contains “a pointer to the document in
`
`the content part.” Ex. 1013, 7:35–58, Fig. 4; see Ex. 1014, 9:21–49, Fig. 5.
`
`Specifically, as Petitioner argues (Pet. Reply 5–7), Stefik teaches that the
`
`description tree [i.e., description file] is comprised of “descriptor blocks (d-
`
`blocks),” wherein “d-block 500 includes an identifier 501” and “a starting address
`
`502 providing the start address of the first byte of the work [i.e., data].” Ex. 1013,
`
`6:2–17, 7:60–67, Fig. 5a; see Ex. 1014, 9:26–27, 9:52–58, Fig. 7; Tr. 37:17–38:2,
`
`39:14–40:8. Identifier 501 is comprised of a “unique number assigned to the
`
`14
`
`

`
`CBM2014-00112
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`DocuCard [i.e., where data is stored] upon manufacture.” Ex. 1013, 8:4–8; see Ex.
`
`1014, 9:62–65. Stefik further explains that the description file may be stored
`
`independently from the contents file. Ex. 1013, 6:2–17, 7:21–41; see Ex. 1014,
`
`14:28–36, Fig. 12.
`
`With respect to the claimed “pointer” in claim 1 and claimed “resource
`
`locator” in claim 16, Petitioner refers to Stefik’s “d-blocks” in the descriptor file.
`
`112 Pet. 33, 69 (claim chart for claim 16 referring to claim 1). According to
`
`Petitioner, Stefik’s “pointers” (i.e., descriptor blocks) identify the device (i.e., the
`
`data provider) where content is stored, which can be stored separately from the
`
`descriptor file, and the “‘start address of the first byte of work.’” See Pet. Reply 5–
`
`7 (citation omitted); Tr. 29:12–30:17, 31:6–21 (Petitioner contends that the pointer
`
`points to the location of the first bits that make up the data item).
`
`We determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence
`
`that Stefik teaches the claimed “pointer to a data provider” and “resource locator
`
`identifying a data provider,” as required by claims 1 and 16, respectively. Based
`
`on the disclosures in Stefik, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that a
`
`skilled artisan would understand Stefik’s descriptor blocks as pointing to the
`
`DocuCard (i.e., the data provider or resource locator) where content is stored and
`
`the start address, i.e., location, of the first byte of the data time. See Pet. Reply 5–
`
`7. As such, Stefik’s descriptor blocks, like the pointers described in the ’317
`
`patent, identify a location(s) where a data item can be downloaded. See Ex. 1001,
`
`14:61–65 (data store stores records comprising location data comprising one or
`
`more pointers to a location(s) where the data item can be downloaded).
`
`Patent Owner contends that the various citations referred to by Petitioner do
`
`not satisfy either “pointer” or “resource locator.” Tr. 118:20–119. Patent Owner
`
`acknowledges that Stefik’s descriptor file contains “a pointer to the document in
`
`15
`
`

`
`CBM2014-00112
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`the content part,” but asserts that “this is a pointer to the content part itself, not the
`
`claimed ‘data provider for the data item’” or “a resource locator identifying a data
`
`provider for the data item.” PO Resp. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1013, 7:35–42). Patent
`
`Owner’s argument is conclusory and not persuasive. Tr. 114:3–118:14; PO
`
`Resp. 12–13. As we discuss above, Stefik’s descriptor blocks include an identifier
`
`comprising a unique number assigned to the DocuCard where the data is stored and
`
`a start address for the location of the first byte of the data. Ex. 1013, 6:2–17, 7:60–
`
`67, Fig. 5a; see Ex. 1014, 9:26–27, 9:52–58, Fig. 7; see Tr. 37:17–38:2, 39:14–
`
`40:8. Furthermore, Patent Owner’s contention that Stefik’s descriptor blocks “are
`
`pointers to other d-blocks in the description file” (PO Resp. 13) is not consistent
`
`with Stefik’s disclosure. See Ex. 1013, 7:60–67; Ex. 1014, 9:52–58.
`
`Accordingly, we are persuaded that Stefik’s descriptor block teaches the
`
`claimed “pointer” and “resource locator” of claims 1 and 16, respectively. For the
`
`same reasons, we determine that Stefik teaches the claimed “pointer” of dependent
`
`claims 6 and 7.
`
`C. Obviousness over Ginter
`
`Petitioner contends that claims 1, 6–8, 12–14, 16, and 18 would have been
`
`obvious over Ginter. 113 Pet. 22, 40–78. After considering the arguments and
`
`evidence presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response (113, Paper 6), we
`
`instituted trial with respect to claims 1, 6–8, 12, 13, 16, and 18 concluding that
`
`Petitioner was likely to prevail in showing unpatentability under 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 103(a) over Ginter. Dec. 19, 22. After considering the arguments and evidence
`
`presented during the trial, our determination remains unchanged.
`
`16
`
`

`
`CBM2014-00112
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`1. Overview of Ginter (Ex. 1015)
`
`Ginter discloses a portable “virtual distribution environment” that can
`
`“control and/or meter or otherwise monitor use of electronically stored or
`
`disseminated information.” Ex. 1015, Abstract, Fig. 71, 52:26–27.
`
`2. Analysis
`
`The parties focus on only one claim limitation. For the remaining
`
`limitations, we have reviewed Petitioner’s evidence and argument and agree that
`
`Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Ginter teaches these limitations. See 113 Pet.
`
`40–78. We turn now to the disputed limitation.
`
` “payment data”
`
`
`
`Patent Owner contends that claims 1, 6–8, 12, 13, 16, and 18 would not have
`
`been obvious over Ginter. PO Resp. 16–20. Each of these claims recites “payment
`
`data,” either explicitly or implicitly based on the dependency of the claim. For
`
`example, claim 1 recites “code to receive from the communications interface
`
`payment data comprising data relating to payment for the requested data item” and
`
`“code responsive to the request [for a data item] and to the received payment data,
`
`to read data for the requested data item from a content provider.” As noted above,
`
`we construe “payment data” as “data relating to payment for the requested data
`
`item.”
`
`
`
`In its Petition, Petitioner refers to Ginter’s disclosure of “audit information”
`
`and “real-time debits from bank accounts” as teaching the claimed “payment data.”
`
`See e.g., 113 Pet. 44–45 n.16 (citing Ex. 1015, 63:34–41), 54, 73. Petitioner
`
`further contends that to the extent Ginter’s audit information does not relate to
`
`payment for a currently-requested content object, Ginter renders this obvious. 113
`
`Pet. 45 n.16. In support, Petitioner refers to Ginter’s disclosure of paying for
`
`content with “real-time debits from bank accounts” and argues that a skilled artisan
`
`17
`
`

`
`CBM2014-00112
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`would have found it “obvious to apply Ginter’s teaching of using audit information
`
`as payment data to a real-time transaction in order to reflect payment for a
`
`currently–requested [content].” Pet. 45 n.16 (citing Ex. 1015, 63:34–41); Tr.
`
`16:24–17:4.
`
`In its Response, Patent Owner argues that “audit information is for tracking
`
`post-usage information, not current purchase information.” PO Resp. 19. In
`
`support, Patent Owner refers to Ginter’s disclosure that “‘the clearinghouse may
`
`analyze the contained audit information to determine whether it indicates misuse of
`
`the applicable [content],’” which Patent Owner argues indicates that the tracked
`
`usage has already occurred. Id. (citing Ex. 1015, cols. 161 and 162). Patent
`
`Owner also contends that changing “from post-usage tracking to pre-purchase
`
`processing would change the principle upon which Ginter works, which indicates
`
`nonobviousness.” Id. (citation omitted); Tr. 82:18–23, 84:1–5, 85:23–87:3.
`
`Patent Owner’s responsive arguments do not dispute that the audit
`
`information is “data representing payment for . . . requested content data,” which is
`
`the basis for Petitioner’s contentions. See e.g., 113 Pet. 44–45 n.16 (citing Ex.
`
`1015, 63:34–41), 54, 73. Patent Owner’s arguments are focused solely on the
`
`timing of the audit information (i.e., the timing of usage in relation to when
`
`payment is made) in Ginter. See PO Resp. 18–20 (“in the context of Ginter, the
`
`audit information is for tracking post-usage information, not current purchase
`
`information”).
`
`Moreover, in its Reply, Petitioner refers to Ginter’s disclosure of
`
`“‘prepayments, credits, [and] real-time debits’” and argues that Ginter expressly
`
`teaches that “payment is made before content access or usage is allowed.” Pet.
`
`Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1015, 63:34–41); see also Pet. Reply 14–15 (citing Ex. 1015,
`
`Fig. 44A, 44B, 179:27–36, 179:57–60, 270:19–22, 270:33–36, 281:37–39).
`
`18
`
`

`
`CBM2014-00112
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`We determine that Petitioner ha

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket