throbber
Paper 35
`
`Trials@uspto.gov
`571.272.7822 Entered: August 18, 2016
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`GOOGLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`BETTER FOOD CHOICES LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case CBM2015-00071
`Patent 5,841,115
`
`
`Before MICHAEL P. TIERNEY, GLENN J. PERRY, and MINN CHUNG,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 328(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
`

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`CBM2015-00071
`Patent 5,841,115
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`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`In this covered business method patent review, instituted pursuant to
`35 U.S.C. § 324, Petitioner Google Inc. (“Petitioner”) challenges the
`patentability of claims 1–20 (the “challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No.
`5,841,115 (Ex. 1001, “the ’115 patent”), owned by Better Food Choices
`LLC (“Patent Owner”). The Board has jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(c).
`This Final Written Decision is entered pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 328(a) and
`37 C.F.R. § 42.73. With respect to the grounds instituted in this trial, we
`have considered the papers submitted by the parties and the evidence cited
`therein. For the reasons discussed below, we determine Petitioner has
`shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–20 of the ’115
`patent are unpatentable.
`
`A. Procedural History
`On February 4, 2015, Petitioner filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”)
`requesting a covered business method patent review of claims 1–20 of the
`’115 patent under Section 18 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub.
`L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 329 (2011) (“AIA”). Patent Owner filed a
`Preliminary Response (Paper 8, “Prelim. Resp.”). On August 20, 2015, we
`instituted a covered business method patent review based on the following
`specific grounds (Paper 10, “Dec. on Inst.,” 30–31):
`
`Claims Challenged
`
`Statutory Basis
`
`Ground
`
`1–20
`
`1–10
`
`
`
`§ 101
`
`Lack of patent-eligible subject
`matter
`
`§ 112, ¶ 2
`
`Indefiniteness
`
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`After institution of trial, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner Response
`(Paper 14, “PO Resp.”), to which Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 18, “Pet.
`Reply”). The parties also briefed whether certain exhibits submitted by
`Patent Owner should be excluded from the record. See Papers 21, 25, 27.
`An oral hearing was held on May 19, 2016. A transcript of the
`hearing is included in the record as Paper 34 (“Tr.”).
`
`B. Related Proceedings
`Petitioner indicates that the ’115 patent has been asserted against
`Petitioner in the following patent infringement case: Better Food Choices,
`LLC v. MyNetDiary, Inc., No. 14-cv-00204-CWD (D. Idaho). Pet. 4.
`According to Petitioner, the case has been transferred to the United States
`District Court for the Northern District of California as Case No. 3:15-cv-
`00198-EDL. Id.
`Patent Owner indicates that the ’115 patent is also the subject of the
`following patent infringement case: Better Food Choices, LLC v. Amazon,
`Inc., No. 3:15-cv-00198 (N.D. Cal.). Paper 9, 2.
`
`II. THE ’115 PATENT
`A. Described Invention
`The ’115 patent describes a computerized method and system to
`provide personalized nutritional information to consumers. Ex. 1001,
`Abstract, col. 5, ll. 40–43. The computerized apparatus and method
`correlate personal data—such as age, height, weight, medical conditions,
`nutritional preferences, and demographic data—with the food products the
`person seeks to purchase or consume, or has purchased or consumed. Id. at
`col. 5, ll. 43–48. In an embodiment, personal data may be provided or
`
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`entered by using a magnetic card reader, a barcode reader, a keypad entry
`device, or a touch screen entry system. Id. at col. 5, ll. 60–63. The data
`input regarding an individual may include the individual’s age, gender, and
`weight; the existence of dietary regulated conditions such as high cholesterol
`level or diabetes; and the existence of medical conditions such as heart
`disease. Id. at col. 5, l. 64–col. 6, l. 3. In another embodiment, a shopper at
`a supermarket may provide personal and product information by using a
`barcode scanner available on a shopping cart to scan a user identification
`card and the barcodes on packaged food. Id. at col. 7, ll. 16–19. The system
`accesses a nutritional database (NDB)—which contains a listing of foods,
`the UPC barcode number for prepackaged food products, and nutritional
`information regarding those foods—and correlates the personal data input by
`the individual with the nutritional data pertaining to the food products the
`individual intends to purchase. Id. at col. 6, ll. 24–28; col. 7, ll. 19–26. The
`correlated data output may include information and/or recommendations
`regarding the particular food choices of the individual—e.g., if an individual
`is a diabetic, the system will inform the person whether any of the chosen
`food items contain sugars or glucose. Id. at col. 6, ll. 37–41. By using the
`claimed system, the food shoppers can obtain individualized nutritional
`information while they shop, allowing them to make better informed food
`choices. Id. at col. 7, ll. 31–35.
`In another embodiment, the claimed system may provide personalized
`nutritional information at the check-out counter of a food market. Id. at
`col. 7, ll. 64–66. The information provided to the shopper would be in the
`form of a printed report the shopper receives at the time of purchase, and
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`may be based on a single purchase of food items or based upon weekly food
`purchases. Id. at col. 7, ll. 66–67; col. 8, ll. 4–5.
`
`B. Illustrative Claim
`Of the challenged claims, claims 1, 4, and 11 are independent.
`Claims 1 and 11 are illustrative of the challenged claims and are reproduced
`below:
`for generating personalized nutritional
`Apparatus
`1.
`information for a shopper comprising:
`(a) means for inputting personal data relating to an
`individual;
`(b) barcode means for inputting data identifying at least
`one food product which said shopper has selected or specified,
`or has purchased or consumed;
`(c) processor means under the control of a prestored
`computer program for correlating the personal data with
`prestored nutritional data,
`including a barcode address,
`pertinent to the at least one food product which said shopper
`has selected or specified, or has purchased or consumed; and
`(d) means for outputting information pertinent to the at
`least one food product and the personal data of the individual.
`
`11. A method for providing a shopper with personalized
`nutrition information regarding food purchased or consumed, or
`food selected or specified by said shopper, comprising the
`following steps:
`(a) inputting personal data relating to an individual;
`(b) selecting or specifying at least one food product
`which said shopper is interested in, or has purchased or
`consumed, and inputting data identifying said food product;
`(c) correlating the personal data with prestored nutritional
`data including a barcode address, pertinent to the at least one
`food product which said shopper has specified or selected, or
`has purchased or consumed; and
`
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`(d) outputting information pertinent to the at least one
`food product and the personal data of the individual.
`
`III. ANALYSIS
`A. Standing
`Section 18 of the AIA limits filing of petitions for a covered business
`method patent review to persons or their privies that have been sued or
`charged with infringement of a covered business method patent. AIA,
`§ 18(a)(1)(B); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a). A “covered business method
`patent” is a patent that “claims a method or corresponding apparatus for
`performing data processing or other operations used in the practice,
`administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that
`the term does not include patents for technological inventions.” AIA
`§ 18(d)(1); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a). For the reasons described below, we
`determine that Petitioner has standing to file the Petition for covered
`business method patent review of the ’115 patent.
`
`1. Sued for Infringement
`As discussed above, Petitioner represents, and Patent Owner does not
`dispute, that Petitioner has been sued for infringement of the ’115 patent in
`Better Food Choices, LLC v. MyNetDiary, Inc., No. 14-cv-00204-CWD (D.
`Idaho). Pet. 4; Paper 9, 2. Thus, Petitioner has been sued for infringement
`for purposes of AIA § 18(a)(1)(B).
`
`2. Whether the ’115 Patent is a Covered Business Method Patent
`Subject to Covered Business Method Patent Review
`
`Petitioner asserts that the ’115 patent is a covered business method
`patent as defined in Section 18(d)(1) of the AIA. Pet. 5–18. Patent Owner
`
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`disagrees and asserts that the ’115 patent is not subject to covered business
`method patent review. See Prelim. Resp. 3–4, 6–9. In the Decision on
`Institution, we determined, upon considering the arguments and evidence
`submitted by the parties, Petitioner has met its burden of demonstrating that
`the ’115 patent is a covered business method patent under AIA § 18(d)(1)
`and is eligible for review under the transitional covered business method
`patent program. Dec. on Inst. 6–14. We determined that Petitioner has
`demonstrated sufficiently that claims 1, 4, and 11 of the ’115 patent recite a
`method or apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used
`in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or
`service, as required by Section 18(d)(1) of the AIA (id. at 6–11) and that the
`’115 patent is not a patent for a technological invention under Section
`18(d)(1) of the AIA (id. at 11–14). Patent Owner and Petitioner do not
`dispute whether the ’115 patent is subject to covered business method patent
`review in the Patent Owner Response and Petitioner’s Reply, and we do not
`perceive any reason or evidence that compels deviation from our earlier
`determination. Accordingly, we adopt our previous analysis for purposes of
`this Final Written Decision. See id. at 6–14.
`In paragraph 41 of the Declaration of Kenneth J. Shepley (Ex. 2005)
`submitted during trial, Mr. Shepley, the inventor of the ’115 patent, asserts
`that our Decision on Institution did not consider the remarks by Senator Kyl
`in the legislative history of the AIA reproduced below.
`As the proviso at the end of the definition makes clear, business
`methods do not include “technological inventions.” In other
`words, the definition applies only to abstract business concepts
`and their implementation, whether in computers or otherwise,
`but does not apply to inventions relating to computer operations
`
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`for other uses or the application of the natural sciences or
`engineering.
`
`157 Cong. Rec. S1379 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
`(emphasis added). Paragraph 41 of the Shepley Declaration is not
`referenced or discussed in the Patent Owner Response. Nonetheless, Mr.
`Shepley’s assertion does not change our analysis because, contrary to Mr.
`Shepley’s assertion and as discussed in the Decision on Institution, in
`promulgating rules for covered business method reviews, the Office
`considered the legislative intent and history behind the AIA’s definition of
`“covered business method patent.” Dec. on Inst. 6–7 (citing Transitional
`Program for Covered Business Method Patents—Definitions of Covered
`Business Method Patent and Technological Invention; Final Rule, 77 Fed.
`Reg. 48,734, 48,735–36 (Aug. 14, 2012)). Following Congress’s
`instructions, the promulgated rules include the definition of “technological
`inventions.” See AIA § 18(d)(2). In the Decision on Institution, we applied
`the definition provided in the final rules to determine that the ’115 patent is
`not a patent for a technological invention. See Dec. on Inst. 11–14.
`For purposes of this Final Written Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s
`contentions as summarized in the Decision on Institution. See Dec. on Inst.
`7–8, 11–13. For instance, the record supports, and we adopt, Petitioner’s
`contention that the ’115 patent admits that the claimed technological features
`were generic, well-known, existing, and conventional at the time of
`invention. See Dec. on Inst. 11–12 (citing Pet. 13–17). The record also
`supports, and we adopt, Petitioner’s contention that the ’115 patent does not
`solve a technical problem because the problem addressed by the ’115 patent
`is “sift[ing] through possible misleading health claims, other advertising
`
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`influences and complicated food label information to make a wise choice”
`when shopping for groceries, which does not present a technical problem.
`See id. at 13 (citing Pet. 17–18). Hence, we determine for the reasons
`discussed in the Decision on Institution and notwithstanding Mr. Shepley’s
`assertion or Patent Owner’s arguments in the Preliminary Response, that
`Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently that the ’115 patent is not a patent
`for a technological invention under Section 18(d)(1) of the AIA. Id. at 11–
`14. As discussed in the Decision on Institution, we have determined,
`notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments in the Preliminary Response, the
`claims of ’115 patent recite activities that are, at a minimum, complimentary
`or incidental to a financial activity—i.e., purchase of food by a shopper. Id.
`at 6–11. Therefore, the challenged claims recite a method or apparatus for
`performing data processing or other operations used in the practice,
`administration, or management of a financial product or service, as required
`by Section 18(d)(1) of the AIA. Id. at 11. Accordingly, we determine
`Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently that the ’115 patent is a covered
`business method patent under AIA § 18(d)(1) and is eligible for review
`under the transitional covered business method patent program. See Dec. on
`Inst. 6–14.
`
`B. Claim Construction
`Petitioner asserts that it is not necessary to construe any claim
`limitations of the ’115 patent for the purposes of the patentability analysis
`under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Pet. 21. Nonetheless, Petitioner asserts that the
`limitations of claims 1 and 4 reciting the word “means” should be
`interpreted as means-plus-function limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6,
`especially for the purposes of determining definiteness of claims 1–10 under
`
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`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2.1 Pet. 23–25, 37–38. In particular, Petitioner asserts
`that the term “processor means under the control of a prestored computer
`program for correlating the personal data with prestored nutritional data”
`recited in claims 1 and 4 should be construed as a means-plus-function
`limitation subject to § 112, ¶ 6. Id. at 37–38. In the Decision on Institution,
`we preliminarily determined that this term is a means-plus-function
`limitation and that § 112, ¶ 6 applies. Dec. on Inst. 27–28. Patent Owner
`disagrees and argues that this term should not be construed according to
`§ 112, ¶ 6. PO Resp. 39–40. We will address the construction under § 112,
`¶ 6 in Section III.D below for the purposes of determining definiteness of
`claims 1–10 under § 112, ¶ 2. No express construction is necessary for any
`other claim term of the ’115 patent. See, e.g., Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci.
`& Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only those terms that are
`in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to
`resolve the controversy).
`
`C. Asserted Ground Based on 35 U.S.C. § 101
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1–20 of the ’115 patent are unpatentable
`under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
`Pet. 19–36. Upon review of all of the parties’ papers and supporting
`evidence discussed in those papers, we are persuaded that Petitioner has
`demonstrated, by a preponderance of evidence, that claims 1–20 are
`unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
`
`
`1 Section 4(c) of the AIA re-designated 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶¶ 2 and 6, as
`35 U.S.C. § 112 (b) and (f), respectively. Because the ’115 patent has a
`filing date prior to September 16, 2012, the effective date of § 4(c) of the
`AIA, we refer to the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 112. See AIA § 4(e).
`
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`Section 101 provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new
`and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
`new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to
`the conditions and requirements of this title.” The Supreme Court has “long
`held that this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of
`nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice
`Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting
`Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107,
`2116 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). “The
`‘abstract ideas’ category embodies the longstanding rule that ‘[a]n idea of
`itself is not patentable.’” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Gottschalk v.
`Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (quotations omitted)). Notwithstanding that
`an abstract idea, by itself, is not patentable, the practical application of an
`abstract idea may be deserving of patent protection. Mayo Collaborative
`Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–94 (2012). To be
`patent-eligible, a claim cannot simply state the abstract idea and add the
`words “apply it.” Id. at 1294. The claim must incorporate enough
`meaningful limitations to ensure that it claims more than just an abstract idea
`and is not merely a “drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract
`idea] itself.” See id. at 1297.
`The first step in the analysis is to “determine whether the claims at
`issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Alice, 134
`S. Ct. at 2355. If so, a second step in the analysis is warranted to consider
`the elements of the claims “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to
`determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the nature
`of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 132
`
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`S. Ct. at 1298, 1297). In other words, the second step is to “search for an
`‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is
`‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
`than a patent on the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. (alteration in original)
`(quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294). The prohibition against patenting an
`abstract idea “cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
`formula to a particular technological environment or adding insignificant
`postsolution activity.” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610–11 (2010)
`(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Following this framework,
`we analyze Petitioner’s asserted ground of unpatentability based on § 101.
`As an initial matter, Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner has not met
`its burden of proof because Petitioner relies only on the ’115 patent and its
`prosecution history to argue unpatentability and does not present any other
`evidence, such as a witness. PO Resp. 6–7, 13–20. Patent Owner argues
`that Petitioner has presented no evidence of unpatentability because the ’115
`patent and its file history “shows the Patent Owner has a valid, issued patent
`and nothing more.” Id. at 7. We are not persuaded because, as discussed
`below, in this case we need to look only to the ’115 patent and its
`prosecution history to support a finding of unpatentability under §§ 101 and
`112. See In re TLI Comm. LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613–14 (Fed.
`Cir. 2016) (the patent alone is sufficient to sustain a finding of
`unpatentability under § 101).
`
`1. Abstract Idea
`Petitioner asserts that the challenged claims are “directed to the
`abstract idea of providing shoppers with information about their potential
`food purchases that is relevant to their own personal nutritional needs.” Pet.
`
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`25. Analyzing claim 11 as a representative claim, Petitioner discusses the
`steps recited in the claim and the corresponding disclosure in the
`Specification and argues that the recited steps are, viewed as a whole,
`directed to an awareness of personal information, shopping for food, and
`correlating personal needs with the characteristics of the food, and, hence,
`“cover the abstract idea of paying attention to nutrition while grocery
`shopping.” Id. at 25–27. Petitioner argues that claim 11 recites nothing
`more than “the typical, routine nutritional analysis that grocery shoppers
`have been performing on their own for decades.” Id. at 2. According to
`Petitioner, “shoppers have selected groceries based upon their nutritional
`needs and goals for at least as long as there have been nutritional labels” and
`that “this fundamentally abstract concept” is unpatentable under § 101. Id.
`at 27–28. Petitioner asserts that a district court has reached a similar
`conclusion in a case concerning customized meal-planning using a food
`database. Id. at 28 (citing DietGoal Innovations LLC v. Bravo Media LLC,
`33 F. Supp. 3d 271, 283–84 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 599 F. App’x 956 (Fed.
`Cir. 2015)).
`Petitioner further asserts that the challenged claims recite data
`operations that replicate a series of tasks that could be otherwise
`accomplished with the human mind and a pen and paper and are, therefore,
`directed to an abstract idea because claims covering nothing more than
`receiving, storing, processing, and/or transmitting data, are inherently
`abstract. Pet. Reply 6–7 (citing Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for
`Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1349–51 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Petitioner
`additionally argues that “providing personalized nutritional information of
`food products to shoppers based on their nutritional needs” can be performed
`
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`with a pen and paper and/or in the human mind and that claims directed to
`human activities that can be accomplished with pen and paper have been
`found to be abstract by several courts. Id. at 7 (citing CyberSource Corp. v.
`Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2011); OpenTV,
`Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 14-cv-1622, 2015 WL 1535328, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
`Apr. 6, 2015)). Petitioner also asserts that the challenged claims are drawn
`to “method[s] of organizing human activity” or longstanding practices, and,
`therefore, are abstract. Id. (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356).
`Petitioner contends that claims 1 and 4 are drawn to the same abstract
`idea as method claim 11, “differing only insofar as they attempt to expressly
`tie the idea to a computerized environment using generic means-plus-
`function claiming.” Pet. 31. Petitioner argues claims 1 and 4 meet the first
`part of the Alice test because adding common components claimed in means-
`plus-function form to the underlying abstract idea does not make the claims
`less abstract. Id. (citing Indeed, Inc. v. Career Destination Development,
`LLC, Case CBM2014-00068, slip. op. at 16–17 (PTAB Aug. 20, 2014)
`(Paper 11)).
`Patent Owner criticizes Petitioner’s choice of claim 11 as a
`representative claim as being arbitrary and focuses instead on claim 1 as the
`“primary reference claim.” PO Resp. 32 & n.15. Patent Owner also
`disputes Petitioner’s characterization of the challenged claims and asserts
`that determining whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea at step
`one of the Alice framework requires identifying the “core invention” of the
`’115 patent. Id. at 30. Patent Owner asserts that this “core invention” must
`include “three essential primary elements,” defined by Patent Owner as “#1
`a barcode entry device, #2 personal data related to the individual, and #3
`
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`prestored nutritional data.” Id. at 31. Hence, Patent Owner argues that
`claim 1 is directed to “the combination of a barcode entry device, personal
`data related to the individual, and prestored nutritional data, combined and
`correlated to allow a shopper to avoid relying on product labels for
`nutritional information.” Id. Patent Owner asserts that the claim is,
`therefore, not drawn to a long prevalent practice because “the number of
`shoppers carrying a barcode reader and their own data into a store is a very
`small number.” Id. at 24. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s challenge
`under § 101 fails at step one because Petitioner has provided no evidence
`that the “core invention,” as defined by Patent Owner, is directed to an
`abstract idea or a prevalent practice. Id. at 52.
`Patent Owner further asserts that the use of a barcode reader and
`“prestored nutritional data” must be considered in step one of the Alice
`analysis because these elements are part of the purported “core invention” as
`defined by Patent Owner. Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner subjectively
`recasts the claimed invention overly broadly by leaving out these elements to
`favor a finding of abstractness. PO Resp. 47–49. Patent Owner argues our
`consideration of these elements in step two, rather than step one, of the Alice
`framework in the Decision on Institution was unfair and erroneous. Id. at
`27, 50–51.
`As noted by Petitioner, the Specification describes the barcode reader
`as one of the well-known systems for data entry. Ex. 1001, col. 5, ll. 61–63;
`Pet. 15. The Specification also describes “prestored nutritional data” and
`“personal data related to [an] individual” as well-known and conventional in
`the Background of the Invention section. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, col. 3, ll. 39–
`41 (“Variations of these three primary methods [of collecting nutrition
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`intake data] also exist. Some of these include personal-, telephone-, and
`mail-assisted reporting, with retrospective and prospective variations of
`each.”), 54–64 (“Most of these methods usually convert food consumption
`information into nutrient intake data via the coding of various foods for
`entry into computer programs. . . . Variations in the nutrient databases used
`to define the nutrient composition of foods pose another problem in
`assessing data.”) (emphases added).
`Including these well-known and conventional components does not
`render the claims any less abstract for purposes of step one of the Alice
`analysis. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792
`F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that including technical elements
`does not render the claims any less abstract). For example, in Content
`Extraction and Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343
`(Fed. Cir. 2014), although the patentee argued that the claims at issue require
`a scanner and therefore are distinguishable from the claims found to be
`abstract in Alice, the Federal Circuit nonetheless determined that the claims
`were directed to the abstract concept of data recognition and storage that is
`patent ineligible. Id. at 1347–48. The patentee in Content Extraction
`conceded that the use of a scanner was well-known at the time of filing,
`similar to the barcode reader and other components of the “three essential
`primary elements” defined by Patent Owner in this case. Id. at 1348.
`Whether these conventional components, individually or as an ordered
`combination, transform the claims into patent-eligible subject matter is a
`question to be considered in step two of the Alice analysis. Alice, 134 S. Ct.
`at 2355. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument
`that the challenged claims are not directed to an abstract idea predicated
`
`
`
`16
`
`

`
`CBM2015-00071
`Patent 5,841,115
`
`upon Patent Owner’s definition of the purported “core invention” of the ’115
`patent.
`Moreover, Patent Owner’s “core invention” analysis is inconsistent
`with the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedents on step one analysis
`under the Alice framework. In step one of the Alice analysis, to determine
`whether the challenged claims are directed to an abstract idea, the inquiry is
`to ask, considered in light of the Specification, whether “their character as a
`whole” is directed to an abstract idea, not, as Patent Owner contends,
`identifying the “core invention” of the patent. See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
`Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp.
`v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Relying on
`the distinction made in Alice between, on one hand, computer-functionality
`improvements and, on the other, uses of existing computers as tools in aid of
`processes focused on “abstract ideas,” the court in Enfish clarified that a
`relevant inquiry in step one of the Alice framework is to ask whether the
`“focus” of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer
`capabilities or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an “abstract idea” for
`which computers are invoked merely as a tool. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36
`(citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358–59). In this inquiry, claims “directed to an
`improvement in the functioning of a computer” are contrasted with claims
`“simply adding conventional computer components to well-known business
`practices” or “generalized steps to be performed on a computer using
`conventional computer activity.” See TLI, 823 F.3d at 612 (quoting Enfish,
`822 F.3d at 1338). The Federal Circuit further clarified recently and
`described the first-stage inquiry as “looking at the ‘focus’ of the claims, their
`‘character as a whole.’” Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., No. 2015-
`
`
`
`17
`
`

`
`CBM2015-00071
`Patent 5,841,115
`
`1778, __ F.3d __ , 2016 WL 4073318, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2016) (citing
`Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36; Internet Patents, 790 F.3d at 1346).
`Under the approach described in Alice and clarified in Enfish, TLI,
`and Electric Power Group, the challenged claims in this case, contrary to
`Patent Owner’s assertion, are not directed to a barcode entry device,
`personal data related to the individual, and prestored nutritional data,
`because the claims are not focused on any specific improvement in the
`functioning of a barcode reader or a nutritional database. The Specification
`does not describe a new barcode reader or new database technology. Rather,
`as discussed above, the Specification describes the barcode reader as one of
`the well-known systems for data entry. Ex. 1001, col. 5, ll. 61–63. The
`Specification also describes “prestored nutritional data” and “personal data
`related to [an] individual” as well-known and conventional components.
`See, e.g., Ex. 1001, col. 3, ll. 39–41. Moreover, the Specification does not
`provide any technical details for the barcode reader, the nutritional database,
`the processor, or correlating personal data with nutritional data, but instead
`mostly describes the system and the method in purely functional terms. See
`Ex. 1001, col. 5, l. 56–col. 6, l. 63.
`Based on the disclosure in the Specification and the claim language,
`we determine that the “focus” of the challenged claims in this proceeding,
`including claims 1 and 11,2 is on collecting and correlating information—
`i.e., collecting personal data of a shopper and data identifying selected food
`
`
`2 We note that, in this case, whether the claim is drafted as a method claim
`or in a means-plus-function format is immaterial in evaluating the “focus” of
`the claims or their “character as a whole.” Hence, for purposes of step one
`of the Alice analysis in this proceeding, we consider both claims 1 and 11 as
`representative claims.
`
`
`
`18
`
`

`
`CBM2015-00071
`Patent 5,841,115
`
`products, correlating the collected information with prestored nutritional
`data, and presenting the results of the data collection and correlation. In
`other words, the focus of the challenged claims is on collecting and
`correlating information, a process that qualifies as an “abstract idea” for
`which conventional components, such as a barcode reader, data input
`devices, a processor, and a nutritional database, are merely invoked as tools
`used in their ordinary and conventional

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