`
`Trials@uspto.gov
`571.272.7822
`
`Paper No. 11
` Filed: April 12, 2017
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________
`
`FACEBOOK, INC. and INSTAGRAM, LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`SKKY, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`_______________
`
`Case CBM2017-00002
`Patent 9,203,870 B2
`_______________
`
`
`
`
`
`Before KARL D. EASTHOM, WILLIAM V. SAINDON, and
`CHRISTOPHER G. PAULRAJ, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`SAINDON, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Covered Business Method Patent Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.208
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`CBM2017-00002
`Patent 9,203,870 B2
`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`Facebook, Inc. and Instagram, LLC (collectively, “Petitioner”), filed a
`Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) requesting covered business method (“CBM”)
`patent review of claims 1–14 of U.S. Patent No. 9,203,870 B2 (Ex. 1001,
`“the ’870 patent”) under Section 18 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents
`Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284, 329 (2011) (“AIA”). Patent Owner,
`Skky, LLC, filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”). With
`its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner provided evidence (Ex. 2001) that it
`filed with the Office a statutory disclaimer of claims 1–7 and 9 of the ’870
`patent pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). Prelim. Resp. 1–2 (citing Ex.
`2001). After the Preliminary Response, Petitioner filed a Preliminary Reply
`to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response, as authorized by the panel
`pursuant an e-mail request by Petitioner, to address the consequences of
`Patent Owner’s disclaimer of those claims. Paper 9 (“Pet. Prelim. Reply”).
`In response to the Preliminary Reply, Patent Owner filed a Preliminary Sur-
`Reply, also as authorized by the panel. Paper 19 (“PO Sur-Reply”).
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a).
`Section 18(a)(1) of the AIA provides that a covered business method
`patent review “shall be regarded as, and shall employ the standards and
`procedures of, a post-grant review” with certain exceptions not relevant
`here. Under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), a post-grant review cannot be “instituted
`unless the Director determines that the information presented in the
`petition. . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of
`the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.”
`Upon consideration of the record, we determine that the ’870 patent is
`not a covered business method patent and accordingly deny the Petition.
`
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`CBM2017-00002
`Patent 9,203,870 B2
`
`
`A. Related Matters
`Petitioner states that Patent Owner asserted the ’870 patent against
`Petitioner in pending litigation, namely Skky, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., No.
`16:cv-00094 (D. Minn.) (filed Jan. 15, 2016). Pet. 1. Petitioner lists related
`PTAB proceedings as follows: CBM2016-00091 (challenging U.S. Pat. No.
`9,037,502, a continuation of the same application to which the ’870 patent
`also claims priority); and IPR2014-01236 (challenging U.S. Patent No.
`7,548,875, the parent to the ’870 patent). Id. at 1–2. In addition to
`CBM2016-00091, Patent Owner lists several related PTAB proceedings and
`other related matters. See Paper 6, 2–3. Listed PTAB proceedings involving
`the instant parties include the following: CBM2017-00003; CBM2017-
`00006; CBM2017-00007; IPR2017-00088; IPR2017-00089; and IPR2017-
`00092; IPR2017-00097. Id. at 2.
`B. The ’870 Patent
`The ’870 patent describes a method for delivering audio and/or visual
`media files, including recordings of songs, musical compositions, ringtones,
`video, films, television shows, and personal recordings, wirelessly or non-
`wirelessly to devices for playback of the content, with or without an Internet
`connection. Ex. 1001, Abstract.
`
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`CBM2017-00002
`Patent 9,203,870 B2
`
`
`Figure 5 of the ’870 patent follows:
`
`
`
`According to the specification, Figure 5 depicts a flow chart for
`delivering data content by transmitting data over an audio channel of a
`wireless telephone. See Ex. 1001, 16:29–34. Data transmission method 500
`includes transferring data from a server by converting stored digital
`information to analog information (i.e., D/A conversion, step 510) wherein
`the server transmits the signal to a receiver using an orthogonal frequency-
`division multiplex scheme (OFDM). See id. at 16:29–17:46; Ex. 1002
`¶¶ 42–45, 93–95. Prior to the D/A conversion, the transmitter scrambles
`data representing a data file (502), maps that to complex frequency symbols
`(504), converts that to time samples using a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT)
`(506), and adds a cyclic prefix (508). Ex. 1001, 16:37–41. After the D/A
`conversion and OFDM modulation, a telephone receiver decodes the
`modulated symbols by a reverse conversion process (i.e., an analog to digital
`(A/D) conversion process) to recover the transmitted audio or video file to
`be stored as digital information (512–520). See id. at 16:41–46, 18:5–11.
`
`4
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`

`CBM2017-00002
`Patent 9,203,870 B2
`
`
`C. Challenged Claim 1
`Claims 8 and 10–14 remain of the originally challenged claims.
`Claim 8 is the sole independent claim challenged:
`8. A method for distributing electronic content over a cellular
`network to a user operating a cellular phone, the method being
`executable by a computer system that includes server hardware
`and a data base, the method comprising:
`providing for the transmission to the cellular phone by
`orthogonal
`frequency-division multiplex
`(OFDM)
`modulation of a database of electronically accessible data
`files, each data file been subject to a copyright owner;
`receiving, by the computer system, a selection from the cellular
`phone corresponding to at least one of the data file;
`providing for the transmission of, by the computer system and in
`response to the received selection, a portion of the selected
`data file to the cellular phone electronic device;
`receiving, by the computer system, a request for the data file for
`which the portion was provided to the cellular phone
`electronic device; and
`providing for the transmission, by the computer system, of the
`requested data file to the cellular phone, said cellular phone
`including a digital signal processor configured to receive the
`data file over a cellular network by orthogonal frequency-
`division multiplex (OFDM) modulation.
`
`
`
`D. The Alleged Grounds of Unpatentability
`The Petition asserts the unpatentability of claims 1–14 for failure to
`recite patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, for failure to
`correspond in scope with that which the inventor regards as the invention
`under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2), and for lack of
`written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1).
`Pet. 44. Based on Patent Owner’s disclaimer of claims 1–7 and 9, only
`challenges to claims 8 and 10–14 remain. To support its challenges,
`
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`CBM2017-00002
`Patent 9,203,870 B2
`
`Petitioner relies on the Declaration of William H. Beckmann, Ph.D. Ex.
`1002.
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`A. Grounds for Standing
`Section 18 of the AIA created a transitional program for persons who
`have been sued or charged with infringement of a “covered business method
`patent.” AIA §§ 18(a)(1)(B), 18(d)(1); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.302. As noted
`above, Petitioner represents that it has been sued for infringement of the
`’870 patent in Skky, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 16:cv-00094 (D. Minn.)
`(filed Jan. 15, 2016). Pet. 1. We determine that the infringement suit
`confers standing on Petitioner. See AIA §§ 18(a)(1)(B), 18(d)(1); 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.302. Patent Owner does not dispute that Petitioner has standing. See
`Paper 6, 2.
`
`B. Covered Business Method Patent
`A “covered business method (CBM) patent” is “a patent that claims a
`method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other
`operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial
`product or service, except that the term does not include patents for
`technological inventions.” AIA § 18(d)(1); 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a). Under
`AIA § 18 (a)(1)(E), “[t]he Director may institute a transitional proceeding
`only for a patent that is a covered business method patent.” (Emphasis
`added). A patent is eligible for CBM review if it has at least one claim
`directed to a covered business method. Transitional Program for Covered
`Business Method Patents—Definitions of Covered Business Method Patent
`and Technological Invention; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,734, 48,736
`(Response to Comment 8).
`
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`

`CBM2017-00002
`Patent 9,203,870 B2
`
`
`Addressing the scope of CBM patents, Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP
`Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasis added), cert.
`denied, 136 S. Ct. 2510 (2016), explains that
`as a matter of statutory construction, the definition of “covered
`business method patent” is not limited to products and services
`of only the financial industry, or to patents owned by or directly
`affecting the activities of financial institutions such as banks and
`brokerage houses. The plain text of the statutory definition
`contained in § 18(d)(1)—“performing . . . operations used in the
`practice, administration, or management of a financial product or
`service”—on its face covers a wide range of finance-related
`activities. The statutory definition makes no reference to
`financial institutions as such, and does not limit itself only to
`those institutions.
`Stated differently, the scope of what constitutes a covered business method
`patent includes a broad array of “monetary matters.” See SAP Am., Inc. v.
`Versata Dev. Grp., Inc., Case CBM2012-00001, slip op. at 23 (PTAB Jan. 9,
`2013) (Paper 36) (“The term financial is an adjective that simply means
`relating to monetary matters.”).
`In two recent cases, PTAB’s reviewing court clarified the scope of
`CBM review, and held that the Board’s reliance on phrases in the legislative
`history, i.e., whether the patent claims activities “incidental to” or
`“complementary to,” a financial activity as the legal standard to determine
`whether a patent is a CBM patent, was not in accordance with AIA
`§ 18(d)(1). Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 1376, 1379–82
`(Fed. Cir. 2016); Secure Axcess, LLC v. PNC Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 848 F.3d
`1370, 1381 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2017) (“Consistent with Unwired Planet, we
`hold that the emphasized phrase [i.e., ‘incidental to’ or ‘complementary to’ a
`financial activity (as set forth in the legislative history)] is not a part of the
`
`7
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`CBM2017-00002
`Patent 9,203,870 B2
`
`statutory definition of what is a CBM patent, and, as we did in Unwired
`Planet, we conclude that such a definition of a CBM patent is beyond the
`scope of the statutory standard and thus ‘not in accordance with law.’”
`(quoting Unwired Planet, 841 F.3d at 1382)).
`C. Analysis
`As noted above, Patent Owner disclaimed claims 1–7 and 9. Prelim.
`Resp. 5 (citing Ex. 2001); Pet. Prelim. Reply (addressing the disclaimer); PO
`Sur-Reply (replying to Pet. Prelim. Reply). Patent Owner argues that for the
`purpose of determining whether or not to institute a CBM proceeding, the
`Board must treat disclaimed claims “as never having existed.” Prelim. Resp.
`5–6 (citing Great West Cas. Co. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, Case
`CBM2015-00171, slip op. at 7 (PTAB Feb. 9, 2016) (Paper 10)).
`Relying on 37 C.F.R. § 42.207 and non-precedential Board cases,
`Patent Owner contends that “[w]hen a patent owner files a statutory
`disclaimer with its preliminary response, ‘no post-grant review will be
`instituted based on disclaimed claims.’” Id. at 5 (quoting 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.207; citing, e.g., Google Inc. v. SimpleAir, Inc., Case CBM2015-00019,
`slip. op. at 5, (PTAB Aug. 19, 2015) (“Our rules permit a patent owner to
`file a statutory disclaimer with its preliminary response and no post-grant
`review will be instituted based on the disclaimed claims.”) (Paper 15, 5)).
`Patent Owner also contends that pursuant to the disclaimer, “only
`Petitioners’ arguments relating to independent claim 8 and its dependent
`claims 10–14 remain,” and these claims do not confer CBM status on the
`’870 patent. Id. at 5, 5–25.
`Although previous non-precedential PTAB decisions do not bind this
`panel, several panels confronted with the issue of alleged CBM eligibility on
`
`8
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`

`CBM2017-00002
`Patent 9,203,870 B2
`
`the basis of disclaimed claims have reached the conclusion that the
`disclaimed claims should be disregarded, as Patent Owner argues. See, e.g.,
`CoreLogic, Inc. v. Boundary Solutions, Inc., Case CBM2016-00016, slip op.
`at 6−7 (PTAB May 24, 2016) (Paper 9) (“[T]he disclaimed claims should
`not be consulted when determining whether the patent is a covered business
`method patent.”); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, Case
`CBM2015-00185, slip op. at 10 (PTAB May 4, 2016) (Paper 10) (“[W]e will
`not consider the now-statutorily disclaimed claims in our determination.”);
`Great West Casualty Co. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, Case CBM2015-
`00171, slip op. at 7 (PTAB Feb. 9, 2016) (Paper 10) (“[F]or the purposes of
`whether or not to institute a covered business method patent review, we treat
`[the disclaimed claims] as never having existed.”); Google Inc. v. SimpleAir,
`Inc., Case CBM2015-00019, slip op. at 14–15 (PTAB May 19, 2014) (Paper
`11) (“[W]e treat the [challenged] patent as though [the disclaimed claim]
`never existed.”).
`On the other hand, other non-binding PTAB decisions have held that a
`disclaimed dependent claim that includes finance-related subject matter may
`be considered for purposes of CBM eligibility when assessing the scope of
`the claimed subject matter in the parent (non-disclaimed) independent claim.
`See, e.g., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, Case
`CBM2014-00157, slip op. at 2–3 (PTAB Feb. 18, 2015) (Paper 11)
`(“[S]tanding for covered business method patent review remains at least
`because disclaimer of claim 12 does not change the scope of independent
`claim 1, from which it depends.”).
`The majority of PTAB cases cited above track Federal Circuit
`precedents that treat disclaimed claims in non-CBM contexts as if those
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`9
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`

`CBM2017-00002
`Patent 9,203,870 B2
`
`claims never existed. See Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TWNK Corp., 162 F.3d
`1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“This court has interpreted the term
`‘considered as part of the original patent’ in section 253 to mean that the
`patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”); Guinn v.
`Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A statutory disclaimer under 35
`U.S.C. § 253 has the effect of canceling the claims from the patent and the
`patent is viewed as though the disclaimed claims had never existed in the
`patent.”); Genetics Inst., LLC v. Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc., 655
`F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the Board’s interference
`jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 291 requires “the existence of an interference,
`and a claim that ‘never existed[ ]’ [due to a statutory disclaimer,] Vectra,
`162 F.3d at 1383, cannot form the basis for an interference”).
`Nevertheless, Petitioner contends that because Patent Owner
`disclaimed claims 1–7 and 9 after Petitioner filed its Petition, they must be
`considered in determining if the ’870 patent qualifies for CBM review. Pet.
`Prelim. Reply 2 (arguing that “the disclaimed claims, if considered, will
`amply qualify the ’870 patent for CBM patent review”). According to
`Petitioner, not considering these claims would violate “the time-of-filing
`rule,” a rule in federal court litigation that “serves the important policy of
`preventing a responding party from depriving a forum of its authority
`through post-filing manipulation of the facts under the responding party’s
`control.” Id. at 3. Petitioner also argues that 37 C.F.R. § 42.207 (upon
`which Patent Owner relies as noted above and further below), “only prevents
`the institution of CBM patent review against claims that have been
`disclaimed.” Id. at 5 (emphasis deleted).
`
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`

`CBM2017-00002
`Patent 9,203,870 B2
`
`
`Further addressing 37 C.F.R. § 42.207 in the context of the “time-of-
`filing” rule, Petitioner explains that
`[t]he
`[regulation]
`is simply one of convenience and
`administrative economy that obviates the Board from having to
`pass on the merits of claims that a patent owner itself has
`abandoned. Nothing in that [regulation] prohibits the Board from
`relying on a disclaimed claim to determine whether the patent as
`a whole qualifies as a “covered business method patent” under
`the AIA at the time the CBM petition is filed. Nor does that
`[regulation] require that the Board treat disclaimed claims “as if
`they never existed,” as Patent Owner urges. (Paper 6 at 5–6.)
`After all, a disclaimer does not erase the existence of the claim
`from the intrinsic record. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
`Tex. v. BENQ Am. Corp., 533 F.3d 1362, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
`(reviewing a cancelled dependent claim during claim
`construction analysis); Great West Cas. Co. v. Intellectual
`Ventures II LLC, CBM2015-00171 (Paper 10), at p. 8 (PTAB
`Feb. 9, 2016) (“We acknowledge that other panels of the Board
`have taken the caveat that an otherwise statutorily disclaimed
`dependent claim, which includes finance-related subject matter,
`may still be considered . . . [.]”) (internal citations omitted); J.P.
`Morgan Chase & Co. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, Case
`CBM2014-00157, slip op. at 2–3 (PTAB Feb. 18, 2015) (Paper
`11) (holding post-institution disclaimer did not alter scope of
`claims being challenged or justify termination of trial).
`Pet. Prelim. Reply 6–7.
`Petitioner makes additional related arguments urging the adoption of
`the “time-of-filing” rule. See id. at 1–7. Petitioner’s arguments are not
`persuasive. Patent Owner persuasively argues, “[w]hen a patent owner files
`a statutory disclaimer with its preliminary response, ‘no post-grant review
`will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.’” Prelim. Resp. 5 (quoting 37
`C.F.R. § 42.207). Supporting Patent Owner, AIA § 18 (a)(1)(E) states that
`“[t]he Director may institute a transitional proceeding only for a patent that
`is a covered business method patent.” (Emphasis added).
`
`11
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`Patent 9,203,870 B2
`
`
`Adopting the “time-of-filing” rule, as advanced by Petitioner, would
`require determining if the ’870 patent was a CBM at the time of filing of the
`Petition, instead of what “is a covered business method patent,” AIA § 18
`(a)(1)(E), i.e., what is a CBM patent at the time of institution. Adopting the
`“time-of-filing” rule also appears to violate 37 C.F.R. § 42.207, which
`prohibits instituting a CBM “based on disclaimed claims.” Id. (emphasis
`added). Consistent with the view that a CBM institution determination must
`focus on the challenged claims existing at least as of the time of institution,
`Secure Axcess requires a challenged patent to “have a claim that contains . . .
`a financial activity element,” 848 F.3d at 1381, and Vectra Fitness, Inc., 162
`F.3d at 1383, Guinn, 96 F.3d at 1422, and Genetics Inst., 655 F.3d at 1299,
`require treating disclaimed claims as though they never existed. See PO Sur-
`Reply 2 (“relevant case law directly contradicts Petitioners’ arguments”)
`(citing Secure Axcess and Unwired Planet); see also Blue Calypso, LLC v.
`Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (approving of prior
`Board decisions that “properly focuse[d] on the claim language at issue and,
`finding nothing explicitly or inherently financial in the construed claim
`language, decline[d] to institute CBM review,” and finding that the
`challenged patent was eligible for review because the claims recited “an
`express financial component in the form of a subsidy” that was “central to
`the operation of the claimed invention”).
`Notwithstanding that the focus must be on the challenged claims,
`Petitioner also contends that the specification shows that the claimed
`transmitting step has a financial purpose. Pet. 10–11. For example,
`Petitioner argues that “the specification describes monitoring information
`related to each copyrighted file downloaded to a user device, such as
`
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`CBM2017-00002
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`
`purchase price, and reporting that information.” Pet. 6 (quoting Ex. 1001,
`30:40–52). The purpose of this tracking is to “provid[e] performing rights
`organizations or songwriters’ organizations with an accurate method for
`determining royalty payments to writers and performers of music.” Id. at 10
`(citing Ex. 1001, 3:33–35). According to Petitioner, “[t]he specification thus
`confirms that the claimed transmission of files subject to copyright is
`incidental or complimentary to . . . financial activity.” Id. at 11.
`Despite Petitioner’s citations to the specification, claim 8 does not
`require any financial activity as part of the data delivery method. Rather,
`claim 8 recites a method for delivering a data file to a user’s device using a
`specific type of modulation, OFDM. The discussion of Figure 5 above
`shows that important aspects of the disclosed and claimed transmission
`method highlight the OFDM scheme, without focusing on, let alone
`requiring, any financial activity. See supra Section 1.B. Although the
`specification describes providing a method of purchasing as part of
`downloading digital content, as Petitioner argues, it also implies that any
`such purchasing constitutes merely an optional part of the invention:
`The accessing of sound and/or image files by other
`electronic devices, such as home phones, computers, pagers,
`doorbells, alarms, palm pilots, watches, clocks, PDAs etc., for
`either allowing the consumer to browse, download, hear, view,
`and/or purchase sound recordings, image files, or associated
`items, or to use sound and/or image clips as alerts is also part of
`the invention and not limited to solely telephones. New
`electronic devices, whose independent purpose is to allow the
`user to browse, receive, store and play sound and image files,
`including clips, according to the present invention are also
`described.
`
`
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`
`Ex. 1001, 3:11–21 (emphasis added). The specification also generally touts
`the invention’s ability to download content “without the need for hand wired
`plug-in devices or a computer connection to the Internet” as follows:
`Furthermore, the delivery of files including clips is not limited to
`web based applications. Unlike conventional methods which
`require computer plug-in devices for delivering and transferring
`digital music, the current invention may use a delivery method
`which allows the user to browse, download, and listen to or
`watch sound or image files without the need for hand wired plug-
`in devices or a computer connection to the Internet.
` Id. at 3:54–61.
`Petitioner contends that the fact that the files transmitted to the cell
`phone are subject to a copyright renders the ’870 patent CBM eligible. Pet.
`8. Specifically, Petitioner argues that “the underlying purpose of a copyright
`is to create financial incentives for the creation of original works.” Id.
`Petitioner also argues that dependent claims 10, 11, and 14 “recite tracking
`information described in the specification is being used to determine royalty
`payments.” Pet. 12–13. Petitioner’s showing is not sufficient, because “[a]ll
`patents, at some level, relate to potential sale of a good or service.” See
`Unwired Planet, 2016 WL 6832978, at *5. As Patent Owner argues, “[i]t is
`not enough that a sale has occurred or may occur, or even that the
`specification speculates such a potential sale might occur.” Prelim. Resp. 9
`(quoting Unwired Planet, 2016 WL 6832978, at *8). None of the
`challenged claims actually involve a sale or other financial activity.
`In summary, claims 8 and 10–14, viewed in light of the specification,
`does not require any financial activity, let alone such activity that would
`confer CBM patent status to the ’870 patent. Petitioner’s arguments based
`on the specification and disclaimed claims do not account for the thrust and
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`Patent 9,203,870 B2
`
`holdings of Secure Axcess and Unwired Planet and other precedent
`collectively indicating a general requirement for treating disclaimed claims
`as never having existed for purposes related to jurisdiction, and the language
`of AIA § 18 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.207. Petitioner at best establishes that the
`existing challenged claims encompass methods that may include potential
`financial activity such as a sale. Based on the foregoing discussion,
`Petitioner fails to meet its burden of showing that the ’870 patent is eligible
`for the transitional covered business method patent review program.
`III. ORDER
`In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby:
`ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), a covered business
`method patent review is not instituted as to any claim of the ’870 patent.
`
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`CBM2017-00002
`Patent 9,203,870 B2
`
`
`
`PETITIONER:
`
`Heidi L. Keefe
`Andrew C. Mace
`COOLEY LLP
`hkeefe@cooley.com
`amace@cooley.com
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`Ryan M. Schultz
`Andrew J. Kabat
`ROBINS KAPLAN LLP
`rschultz@robinskaplan.com
`akabat@robinskaplan.com
`
`16
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