`
`Trials@uspto.gov
`571.272.782
`
`Paper No. 14
` Entered: November 27, 2017
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________
`
`FACEBOOK, INC. and INSTAGRAM, LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`SKKY, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`_______________
`
`Case CBM2017-00002
`Patent 9,203,870 B2
`_______________
`
`
`
`
`
`Before KARL D. EASTHOM, WILLIAM V. SAINDON, and
`CHRISTOPHER G. PAULRAJ, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`SAINDON, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`DECISION ON PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71
`
`
`
`
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`CBM2017-00002
`Patent 9,203,870 B2
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`I. INTRODUCTION
`Petitioner, collectively Facebook, Inc. and Instagram, LLC, requests a
`rehearing (Paper 12, “Reh’g Req.” or “Rehearing Request”), under
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) of our Decision Denying Institution (Paper 11, “Dec.
`Den’g Inst.”) denying its Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”). We denied institution on
`the sole ground that the U.S. Patent No. 9,203,870 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’870
`patent”) was not eligible for covered business method (“CBM”) patent
`review because the challenged claims existing at the time of the Decision
`Denying Institution did not require a financial activity. Dec. Den’g Inst. 15.
`Upon reconsideration of the record, we maintain our determination
`that the ’870 patent is not a covered business method patent. Accordingly,
`we deny the Rehearing Request to the extent it seeks a modification of our
`Decision Denying Institution.
`Prior to its Rehearing Request, Petitioner filed a Petition requesting
`CBM patent review of claims 1–14 of the ’870 patent under Section 18 of
`the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284,
`329 (2011) (“AIA”). Patent Owner, Skky, LLC, filed a Preliminary
`Response. Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”). With its Preliminary Response, Patent
`Owner provided evidence (Ex. 2001) that it filed with the Office a statutory
`disclaimer of claims 1–7 and 9 of the ’870 patent pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §
`1.321(a). Prelim. Resp. 2 (citing Ex. 2001). After the Preliminary
`Response, Petitioner filed a Preliminary Reply to Patent Owner’s
`Preliminary Response, as authorized by the panel pursuant an e-mail request
`by Petitioner, to address the consequences of Patent Owner’s disclaimer of
`claims 1–7 and 9. Paper 9 (“Pet. Prelim. Reply”). In response to the
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`Patent 9,203,870 B2
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`Preliminary Reply, Patent Owner filed a Preliminary Sur-Reply, also as
`authorized by the panel. Paper 10 (“PO Sur-Reply”).
`II. ANALYSIS
`A. Standard of Review
`When rehearing a decision on petition, the Board will review the
`decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “An abuse of
`discretion occurs if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law,
`if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the
`decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.”
`Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The party
`requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing an abuse of discretion, and
`“[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the
`Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).
`B. The ’870 Patent
`The ’870 patent describes a method for delivering audio and/or visual
`media files, including recordings of songs, musical compositions, ringtones,
`video, films, television shows, and personal recordings, wirelessly or non-
`wirelessly to devices for playback of the content, with or without an Internet
`connection. Ex. 1001, Abstract, 1:63–2:9.
`
`
`
`C. A Covered Business Method (CBM) Patent
`A “covered business method (CBM) patent” is “a patent that claims a
`method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other
`operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial
`product or service, except that the term does not include patents for
`technological inventions.” AIA § 18(d)(1); 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a). Under
`AIA § 18(a)(1)(E), “[t]he Director may institute a transitional proceeding
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`only for a patent that is a covered business method patent.” (Emphasis
`added). A patent is eligible for CBM review if it has at least one claim
`directed to a covered business method. Transitional Program for Covered
`Business Method Patents—Definitions of Covered Business Method Patent
`and Technological Invention; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,734, 48,736
`(Response to Comment 8).
`
`D. Discussion
`Petitioner refers the panel to a related CBM proceeding that also
`involved a disclaimer of claims, Facebook, Inc. v. Skky, LLC, Case
`CBM2016-00091 (PTAB) (“’091 CBM”). See Reh’g Req. 1. In deciding a
`rehearing request in the ’091 CBM proceeding, the Chief Judge expanded
`the panel “to provide guidance regarding the effect of . . . disclaimers on
`CBM patent review eligibility.” ’091 CBM, Paper 12, 3 (rehearing
`decision). In that case, the expanded panel denied petitioner’s request for
`rehearing, holding that “CBM patent review eligibility is determined based
`on the claims of the challenged patent as they exist at the time of the decision
`whether to institute, and statutorily disclaimed claims must be treated as if
`they never existed.” ’091 CBM, Paper 12, 11 (emphasis added). The instant
`Rehearing Decision tracks the reasoning and holding of the ’091 CBM
`rehearing decision.
`Similar to petitioner’s arguments in the ’091 CBM proceeding,
`Petitioner argues “a patent owner filing a statutory disclaimer of certain
`claims after the filing of the CBM petition does not extinguish the right of
`accused infringers (Petitioners here) to challenge the patent in CBM review
`and should not unilaterally strip the Board of its authority to institute CBM
`review.” Reh’g Req. 1–3. Citing Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP v.
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`Samsung Elecs. Co., 853 F.3d 1370, 2017 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 17, 2017),
`Petitioner contends that the decision “clarifies the impact of post-filing
`statutory disclaimers and underscores the points Petitioners previously
`explained in their preliminary reply.” Id. at 3. Namely, Petitioner explains
`federal courts apply a “time-of-filing” rule for determining federal court
`jurisdiction, and argues that the Board should use the same rule. Id. at 4–9.
`Although federal courts apply the rule that “the jurisdiction of the
`court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought,”
`Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570 (2004)
`(quoting Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. 537, 539 (1824)) (citation omitted), as
`an administrative agency, the Board has limited authority defined by statute,
`see Kilip v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 991 F.2d 1564, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
`(“An agency is but a creature of statute. Any and all authority pursuant to
`which an agency may act ultimately must be grounded in an express grant
`from Congress.”).
`The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat.
`284 (2011) (“AIA”) created a transitional program for the Board to conduct
`post-grant reviews of a limited set of patents designated as “covered
`business method patents.” AIA § 18(a). The AIA defines a “covered
`business method patent” as “a patent that claims a method or corresponding
`apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the
`practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service.”
`Id. § 18(d)(1). Thus, in order to institute a CBM review proceeding, the
`statute requires a patent that claims a particular type of method or apparatus.
`See Secure Axcess, LLC v. PNC Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 848 F.3d 1370, 1381
`(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Necessarily, the statutory definition of a CBM patent
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`requires that the patent have a claim that contains, however phrased, a
`financial activity element.” (emphasis added)); Unwired Planet, LLC v.
`Google Inc., 841 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (CBM patents “are
`limited to those with claims that are directed to methods and apparatuses of
`particular types and with particular uses ‘in the practice, administration, or
`management of a financial product or service’” (emphasis added)); Blue
`Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing
`previous Board decisions that “properly focuse[d] on the claim language at
`issue” (emphasis added)).
`Under AIA § 18(a)(1)(E), “[t]he Director may institute a transitional
`proceeding only for a patent that is a covered business method
`patent.” (Emphases added). In other words, the decision at the time of
`institution is based upon on what “is a covered business method patent,” id.
`(emphasis added), instead of what was “a covered business method patent”
`prior to the disclaimer. See also AIA § 18(d)(1) (using the present tense
`“claims”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(e) (when a patent owner files a statutory
`disclaimer, “[n]o post-grant review will be instituted based on disclaimed
`claims”). Petitioner’s proposed rule would require the Director to institute a
`CBM patent review “for a patent that is [not] a covered business method
`patent,” contrary to AIA § 18(a)(1)(E).
`Petitioner’s “time-of-filing” rule also would require the Board to
`ignore 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) and its effect, as interpreted by the Federal
`Circuit. 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) authorizes statutory disclaimer of claims as
`follows:
`A patentee, whether of the whole or any sectional interest therein,
`may, on payment of the fee required by law, make disclaimer of
`any complete claim, stating therein the extent of his interest in
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`such patent. Such disclaimer shall be in writing, and recorded in
`the Patent and Trademark Office; and it shall thereafter be
`considered as part of the original patent to the extent of the
`interest possessed by the disclaimant and by those claiming
`under him.
`The Federal Circuit has held consistently that claims disclaimed under
`§ 253(a) should be treated as though they never existed. See Vectra Fitness,
`Inc. v. TWNK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“This court has
`interpreted the term ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in section 253
`to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never
`existed.”); Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A statutory
`disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 253 has the effect of canceling the claims from
`the patent and the patent is viewed as though the disclaimed claims had
`never existed in the patent.”); see also Genetics Inst., LLC v. Novartis
`Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc., 655 F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding
`that the Board’s interference jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 291 required
`“the existence of an interference, and a claim that ‘never existed’ [due to a
`statutory disclaimer] cannot form the basis for an interference”).
`According to Petitioner, Rembrandt clarifies that disclaimers under 35
`U.S.C. § 253(a) extinguish only a patent owner’s legal rights—not the rights
`of others—with regard to the disclaimed claims, pointing to the following
`language in the decision:
`[W]hile we have held that a disclaimer relinquishes the rights of
`the patent owner, we have never held that the patent owner’s
`disclaimer relinquishes the rights of the public. Indeed, our
`precedent and that of other courts have not readily extended the
`effects of disclaimer to situations where others besides the
`patentee have an interest that relates to the relinquished claims.
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`Reh’g Req. 3–4 (quoting Rembrandt, 853 F.3d at 1383–84 (emphases by
`Petitioner)). Petitioner argues that the principle annunciated in Rembrandt
`“squarely applies to the rights Congress and the PTO granted to accused
`infringers under the Covered Business Method patent review program.” Id.
`at 4.
`
`Contrary to Petitioner’s arguments, Rembrandt does not address the
`AIA § 18(a)(1)(E) provision requiring CBM institution to be based on what
`“is a covered business method patent.” Rather, it involves the patent
`marking statute, which pertains to giving “notice to the public” that an
`article is patented. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a); Rembrandt, 853 F.3d at 1382–
`84. In Rembrandt, the plaintiff disclaimed claims to avoid a limitation on
`damages due to a failure to mark in accordance with the marking statute.
`853 F.3d at 1382–84. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the district
`court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to bar recovery of pre-notice
`damages based on the disclaimer, emphasizing the purpose of the marking
`statute—to protect the public from liability for unknown infringement. Id.
`Because the purpose of marking is to provide public notice, the court
`reasoned that it was “irreconcilable” for a disclaimer to extinguish the right
`of the public to utilize unmarked features of a product until receiving notice.
`Id. Protecting the public’s rights was central to the decision, as reflected in
`the court’s narrow holding:
`the marking statute’s focus is not only the rights of the
`patentee, but the rights of the public . . . . Considering these
`rights held by the public, we hold that disclaimer cannot serve
`to retroactively dissolve the § 287(a) marking requirement for a
`patentee to collect pre-notice damages.
`
`
`Id. at 1384.
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`In contrast to the patent marking statute at issue in Rembrandt, which
`expressly pertains to rights of the “public,” as well as a defendant’s statutory
`right to patent infringement defenses and counterclaims, the public generally
`does not have an analogous right to institution of a CBM patent review.1
`See Rembrandt, 853 F.3d at 1383–84. Although certain individuals or
`entities who have standing and otherwise meet the statutory requirements
`may petition for CBM patent review, institution is discretionary, and in
`exercising this discretion, “[t]he Director may institute a transitional
`proceeding only for a patent that is a covered business method patent.” See
`AIA § 18(a)(1) (emphases added); 35 U.S.C. § 324(a):
`The Director may not authorize a post-grant review to be
`instituted unless the Director determines that the information
`presented in the petition filed under section 321, if such
`information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more
`likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the
`petition is unpatentable.
`
`
`(emphasis added); AIA §§ 18(a)(1)(B), 18(d)(1) (standing–– petitioner must
`be “charged with infringement”); 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.4(a) (“The Board
`institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”), 42.208(b) (“At any time prior
`to institution of post-grant review, the Board may deny some or all grounds
`for unpatentability for some or all of the challenged claims.”), 42.208(b)
`(petitioner must be “charged with infringement”).
`
`
`1 In Secure Axcess, LLC v. PNC Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 859 F.3d 998 (Fed. Cir.
`2017), the court did not decide the issue controlling the outcome here (i.e.,
`the effect of a pre-institution statutory disclaimer). See 859 F.3d at 1003 n.5
`(Taranto, J., concurring), 1005 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
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`Petitioner’s arguments do not show that Rembrandt requires claims
`disclaimed prior to institution to be considered when determining whether a
`patent is eligible for CBM patent review at the time of institution.
`Based on the foregoing discussion, Petitioner has not carried its
`burden of demonstrating that we abused our discretion in not considering
`disclaimed claims 1–7 and 9 and denying institution in this proceeding.
`III. ORDER
`It is ORDERED that Petitioner’s Rehearing Request is denied.
`
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`10
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`Patent 9,203,870 B2
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`PETITIONER:
`
`Heidi Keefe
`Andrew Mace
`COOLEY LLP
`hkeefe@cooley.com
`amace@cooley.com
`
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`Ryan M. Schultz
`Andrew J. Kabat
`ROBINS KAPLAN LLP
`rschultz@robinskaplan.com
`akabat@robinskaplan.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`kis
`
`11
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`