UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
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`GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. ET AL.
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`Patent of CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES LLC
`Patent Owner
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`____________
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`Case IPR2012-00001
`Patent 6,778,074
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`____________
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`PETITIONER’S REPLY TO PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE
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`____________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
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`GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. ET AL.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`Patent of CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES LLC
`Patent Owner
`
`____________
`
`Case IPR2012-00001
`Patent 6,778,074
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`____________
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`PETITIONER’S REPLY TO PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I. The Board Properly Construed the Term “Integrally Attached” ......................... 1
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`II. Cuozzo’s Attempt to Swear Behind Aumayer and Awada Fails ........................ 4
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`A. Cuozzo’s Purported Conception of His Invention Is Not
` Commensurate with the Scope of the Claims ............................................. 4
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`
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`B. Cuozzo Did Not Diligently Reduce His Invention to Practice and
` Lacks Corroboration for His Purported Excuse ......................................... 5
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`III. Cuozzo’s Unpatentability Arguments Do Not Fairly Consider the Prior
` Art’s Teachings and Misapply the Law of “Teaching Away” ............................ 7
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`A. Aumayer Discloses Determining the Speed Limit at a “Vehicle’s Present
` Location” ..................................................................................................... 7
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`B. One of Ordinary Skill in the Art Would Have Had a Credible Rationale for
` Combining Aumayer, Evans, and Wendt ..................................................... 8
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`C. Tegethoff Discloses the Speed Limit at a Vehicle’s Location .................. 12
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`D. One of Ordinary Skill in the Art Would Have Had a Credible Rationale
` for Combining Tegethoff, Awada, Evans, and Wendt .............................. 13
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`IV. Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 15
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Cases
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`CIAS, Inc. v. Alliance Gaming Corp.
` 504 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .............................................................................. 3
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`Coleman v. Dines
` 754 F.2d 353 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ................................................................................ 5
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`Dawson v. Dawson
` 710 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .............................................................................. 5
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`Ex Parte Debendra Das Sharma
` No. 2009-000030, 2009 WL 1709135 (Pat. Bd. May 29, 2009) ............................ 5
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`Ex Parte Ruiz, et al.
` No. 2012-00974, App. No. 10/407,967 (Pat. Bd. Sept. 13, 2012) ................ 10, 11
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`Griffith v. Kanamaru
` 816 F.2d 624 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ................................................................................ 6
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`Illumina Inc. v. Complete Genomics Inc.
` 2013 WL 1282977 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) ....................................................... 5
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`In Re Fulton
` 391 F.3d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................................................ 10
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`Intellect Wireless, Inc. v. HTC Corp.
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` --- F. Supp. 2d ---, 2012 WL 4107232 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2012) ........................... 6
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`Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc.
` 485 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ............................................................................ 12
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`Stamps.com Inc. v. Endicia, Inc.
` 437 Fed. Appx. 897 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ...................................................................... 6
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`Rules
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`MPEP § 2138.06 ........................................................................................................ 6
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`MPEP § 2145(X)(D)(1) .............................................................................. 10, 13, 14
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`iii
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`I. The Board Properly Construed the Term “Integrally Attached”
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`The Board should reject Cuozzo’s request to broaden the construction of
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`“integrally attached.” Cuozzo’s proposed construction reads out the “attached”
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`limitation required by the plain language of the claims, it attempts to encompass
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`subject matter not disclosed or supported in the specification, and it is contrary to
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`Cuozzo’s reliance on
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`the ’074 Patent’s mechanical (i.e., non-graphical)
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`speedometer to support its amendment during prosecution.
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`First, Cuozzo’s construction is contrary to the plain language of the claims.
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`Claim 10 does not merely recite an “integrated” speedometer and colored display,
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`as Cuozzo’s construction proposes. Rather, claim 10 recites a speedometer
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`“integrally attached” to a colored display, meaning that each of these two
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`components has a separate identity. Cuozzo’s construction reads out the
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`requirement that the components be “attached.” Further, if they were merged into a
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`single, indivisible electronic display, as proposed by Cuozzo, the claimed colored
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`display being “adjusted independently of the speedometer” would be meaningless.
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`Second, the ’074 Patent consistently describes the colored display and
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`speedometer as separate components that are attached. (Paper 15 at 8; ’074 Patent
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`at 5:9–12.) Cuozzo proffers that the two components can be “integrated” because
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`the specification discusses a speedometer that “has” a colored display. (Paper 31 at
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`3–4 (citing ’074 Patent at 5:8–10).) But this disclosure is entirely consistent with a
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`speedometer that has an attached colored display and never suggests that the two
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`components are merged into a single, indivisible electronic display. Indeed, the
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`specification never once discloses a single electronic display that itself operates as
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`both a speedometer and a colored display.
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`Third, importantly, when Cuozzo amended the claims to add the “integrally
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`attached” requirement, he cited to these very same portions of the specification that
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`describe the speedometer and colored display as separate and discrete elements.
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`(Paper 15 at 8 (citing Ex. 1013 at 7:23–25).) Indeed, Cuozzo concedes that this
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`disclosure describes the components “as separate and discrete elements.” (Paper 31
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`at 6.) This is further evidence that Cuozzo’s proposed construction of “joined or
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`combined to work as a complete unit” is incomplete and overbroad, because it
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`captures only the “integrally” aspect of the limitation and reads out the “attached”
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`requirement. The Board’s construction properly requires that each part retain its
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`own separate identity.
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`Cuozzo’s reliance on claim differentiation also fails. (Paper 31 at 9–13.)
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`Cuozzo and its expert, Dr. Morris, rely on dependent claims 12 and 18 to argue
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`that the ’074 Patent discloses an “electronic embodiment” of the invention in
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`which a single electronic display operates as both a speedometer and a colored
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`display. (Paper 31 at 5; Ex. 2002 at ¶¶ 23, 28, 29 (opining that electronic
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`embodiment is “implie[d]” and it would be “natural” to combine both on a single
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`LCD).) Garmin respectfully disagrees. First, claim 18 does not depend from claim
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`12 and thus does not disclose that the speedometer comprises the same LCD that is
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`the colored display in claim 12. And notably, while claim 12 recites that the
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`colored display “is” an LCD, claim 18 uses different language, namely that the
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`speedometer “comprises” an LCD.1 This means the speedometer includes, but is
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`not limited to, an LCD. CIAS, Inc. v. Alliance Gaming Corp., 504 F.3d 1356, 1360
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`(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“In the patent claim context the term ‘comprising’ is well
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`understood to mean ‘including but not limited to.’”). This claim language is
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`entirely consistent with the Board’s construction and the specification in which the
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`speedometer can be integrally attached to an LCD but nonetheless remains a
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`separate component that retains its own identity and is not itself an LCD.
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`Second, Dr. Morris’s deposition
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`testimony supports
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`the Board’s
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`construction. He concedes the claims themselves never recite that the speedometer
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`and the colored display are implemented on the same LCD. (Ex. 1021 at 11,
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`tr. 41:2–12.) Dr. Morris also notes in his declaration that an LCD “is described in
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`only two passages of the ’074 patent” (Ex. 2002 at ¶ 19), and “neither of those two
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`passages indicates that the speedometer is itself an LCD” (Ex. 1021 at 14,
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`1 An exemplary embodiment where the speedometer “comprises” the LCD and the
`colored display “is” the LCD is the LCD sitting behind a mechanical speedometer
`needle and changing colors as the speed limit changes.
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`tr. 55:14–17). Thus, the specification provides no support for a construction in
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`which the speedometer and colored display are graphically displayed on a single
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`LCD, as Cuozzo proposes.
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`Dr. Morris also confirms that “‘attached’ is not a common term of art in
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`software” and that it would be “uncommon” to “refer to two things displayed on a
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`common display as ‘attached.’” (Ex. 1021 at 17–18, tr. 68:17–20, 69:2–6.) Finally,
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`when asked if he would “ever use the term ‘attached’ to refer to the relationship
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`between two items that are graphically displayed on the same display,” Dr. Morris,
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`as one skilled in the art, candidly responded: “I don’t think I would.” (Ex. 1021 at
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`18, tr. 70:23–71:1.)
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`II. Mr. Cuozzo’s Attempt to Swear Behind Aumayer and Awada Fails
`A. Mr. Cuozzo’s Purported Conception of His Invention
`Is Not Commensurate with the Scope of the Claims
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`Although claim 10 does not recite an electronic display that itself operates as
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`both a speedometer and a colored display, Cuozzo now attempts to construe claim
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`10 as incorporating this electronic embodiment. (Paper 31 at 5.) But Mr. Cuozzo’s
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`swear-behind declaration does not mention such an embodiment. Instead, the
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`relied-upon disclosure document to Invention Submission Corporation describes
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`only “wir[ing] the speedometer to the GPS” and nothing about graphically
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`displaying a speedometer. (Ex. 3001 at ¶¶ 12–13.) As Mr. Cuozzo later confirmed
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`in his deposition, this description in his disclosure incorporated “the fundamentals”
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`of his invention as he conceived it in November 1999. (Ex. 1023 at 15–16,
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`tr. 58:4–61:5.) Indeed, Cuozzo admits that the drawings submitted to ISC
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`contemplated an “analog speedometer output” with the “delineation changing”
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`based on GPS information. (Paper 31 at 18 (emphases added).) This is inconsistent
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`with the electronic-display limitation that he now advocates for claim 10.
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`To establish prior conception, a swear-behind declaration must demonstrate
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`with factual evidence that the inventor “was in possession of each limitation
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`recited in the appealed claims at the time of alleged conception.” Ex Parte
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`Debendra Das Sharma, No. 2009-000030, 2009 WL 1709135, at *6 (Pat. Bd. May
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`29, 2009) (emphasis added); see also Dawson v. Dawson, 710 F.3d 1347, 1358
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`(Fed. Cir. 2013); Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Because
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`Mr. Cuozzo’s declaration lacks any evidence that he conceived of an electronic,
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`LCD embodiment, he has not shown that he possessed each limitation of his
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`preferred construction of claim 10 at the alleged conception date. Accordingly,
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`Cuozzo’s attempt to swear behind Aumayer and Awada fails.
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`B. Mr. Cuozzo Did Not Diligently Reduce His Invention to Practice
`and Lacks Corroboration for His Purported Excuse
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`Cuozzo’s attempt to swear behind Aumayer and Awada also fails because
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`Mr. Cuozzo did not diligently reduce his invention to practice and has no
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`legitimate excuse for his inactivity. See Illumina Inc. v. Complete Genomics Inc.,
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`No. C-10-05542 EDL, 2013 WL 1282977, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013);
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`Intellect Wireless, Inc. v. HTC Corp., --- F. Supp. 2d ----, 2012 WL 4107232, at *4
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`(N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2012); MPEP § 2138.06. Further, Mr. Cuozzo does not
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`corroborate the supposed reasons for his lack of diligence. See Stamps.com Inc. v.
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`Endicia, Inc., 437 Fed. Appx. 897, 908 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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`Although Mr. Cuozzo learned on March 20, 2001, that his invention was
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`potentially patentable, he did not start the patent-application process until August
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`8, 2001. Mr. Cuozzo avers that the patent-application costs presented a “significant
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`financial obstacle” to him, and that it “took a few months” to convince his parents
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`to let him use money from his trust account. (Ex. 3001 at ¶¶ 17, 19.)
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`Mr. Cuozzo’s excuse that he needed time to gather funds is “more in the
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`nature of commercial development, not accepted as an excuse for delay, than the
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`‘hardship’ cases most commonly found” in the case law. Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816
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`F.2d 624, 625 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Intellect Wireless, 2012 WL 4107232,
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`at *4. The Federal Circuit has held that inventors who take time off to raise money
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`are not reasonably diligent in reducing to practice. Griffith, 816 F.2d at 629.
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`Moreover, Mr. Cuozzo’s declaration contains the requisite corroboration
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`only of his eventual fee payment, not of any fundraising efforts he undertook. He
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`does not corroborate his “insufficient income,” why financing through ISC “was
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`not an option,” or why it “took a few months” to get money from an extant trust
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`fund. (See Ex. 3001 at ¶ 19.)
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`Indeed, Mr. Cuozzo later testified—inconsistent with his declaration—that
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`he merely borrowed the money directly from his parents and later paid them back
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`with money from his trust fund, which his parents did not control. (Ex. 1024 at 2–
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`4, tr. 100:20–105:20, 106:4–10.) He did not try to borrow money from anyone else
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`or look for sources of the money other than his parents. (Id. at 4, tr. 106:11–16.)
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`Rather, Mr. Cuozzo’s only activity for nearly five months was talking to his
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`parents about a loan—and he cannot even remember how many times he talked to
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`them about it. (Id. 4, tr. 105:21–106:3.) Because Mr. Cuozzo was not reasonably
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`diligent in reducing to practice and has no good excuse for it, and because his
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`corroboration is at best inconsistent and at worst nonexistent, Cuozzo’s attempt to
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`swear behind Aumayer and Awada fails.
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`III. Cuozzo’s Unpatentability Arguments Do Not Fairly Consider the Prior
`Art’s Teachings and Misapply the Law of “Teaching Away”
`A. Aumayer Discloses Determining the Speed Limit at a “Vehicle’s
`Present Location”
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`Cuozzo argues that Aumayer does not disclose displaying the speed limit for
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`a vehicle’s present location, because Aumayer’s disclosed speed limit is “for a
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`certain class of road in a given region.” (Paper 31 at 25.) This argument fails on its
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`face. Aumayer states that “speed limits at the current location may be displayed on
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`the speed scale itself,” and the “current location may be obtained from an on-board
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`GPS.” (Ex. 1001, Abstract (emphases added).)
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`Aumayer also discloses an embodiment wherein the GPS determines the
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`“current geographic position of the vehicle,” which is in turn used to determine
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`“[t]he region or area (having the same predetermined speed limits and/or physical
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`units for speed values).” (Id. at 7:2–9, 4:48–53.) A “region” is an area having the
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`same speed limit for the same type of streets or roads. (Id. at 8:1–6.) Aumayer
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`“determines the speed limits for the individual classes of streets and roads.” (Id. at
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`7:22–26.) As the vehicle travels from one class of street or road to another, the
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`speed-limit information on the speed-display device 101 is updated. (See id. at 5:2–
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`5, 5:63, 2:57–59.) Thus, Aumayer teaches displaying the speed limit for the
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`vehicle’s current position.
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`Another Aumayer embodiment adjusts the displayed speed limit to account
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`for vehicle data, such as whether a trailer is attached, but Aumayer also recognizes
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`that such an adjustment may not be necessary. (Id. at 4:64–66.) Hence, Aumayer
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`teaches an additional step beyond what is claimed in claim 10. But this teaching
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`does not negate that Aumayer discloses an embodiment wherein the speed limit for
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`the vehicle’s present location, without adjustment, is displayed on the speedometer.
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`B. Applying the Board’s Construction, One of Ordinary Skill in the
`Art Would Have Had a Credible Rationale for Combining
`Aumayer, Evans, and Wendt
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`Applying the Board’s construction, Cuozzo argues that one of ordinary skill
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`in the art (“OSA”) would not combine Aumayer’s dynamic, continuously
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`controlled display system with the immovable colored plate of Evans and the
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`manually rotatable pointer and rubber suction cup unit of Wendt. (Paper 31 at 26–
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`27.) Garmin respectfully disagrees. It would have been obvious to one of OSA to
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`modify Evans’s colored plate to be rotatable, as taught by Wendt’s rotatable
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`pointer. Evans already recognizes the problem that the speed limit may change and
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`teaches that its colored plate can be “adjustable for changes in the speed limits.”
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`(Ex. 1009 at 2:19–20, 3:37–44.) It is well within the skill of one of OSA to make
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`Evans’s plate rotatable, especially when presented with Wendt’s rotatable pointer.
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`Wendt further teaches mounting its rotatable pointer to the glass cover of the
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`speedometer via a suction-cup unit. (Ex. 1011 at 2:30–41.) In solving the problem
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`of adjusting for changes in speed limits, as noted by Evans, it would have been
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`obvious to one of OSA to mount, as taught by Wendt, the colored plate of Evans to
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`the glass cover of a speedometer so that the colored plate is rotatable. A credible
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`rationale for doing so is that one of OSA would want to adjust for changes in the
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`speed limit while still being able to determine, by glancing at the dial, whether the
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`speed limit is being exceeded, as taught by Evans. (Ex. 1009 at 2:10–15.)
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`It also would have been obvious to one of OSA to mount the rotatable
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`colored plate of Evans and Wendt to the glass cover of Aumayer’s LCD. Although
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`Aumayer’s preferred embodiment is a combined instrument having a display
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`screen on which the speed limit and current speed are both displayed, Aumayer
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`also allows for the use of “mechanical display elements.” (Ex. 1001 at 2:45–
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`53, 7:42–44.) One such “mechanical display element” is a rotatable colored plate
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`mounted to a glass cover. One of OSA would have had a credible rationale to
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`mount the suction-cup unit of Wendt to the LCD of Aumayer to be able to
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`determine the range of speed values that are in excess of the speed limit, as taught
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`by Evans. (Ex. 1009 at 2:9–15.) This does not otherwise prevent Aumayer from
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`continuing to illustrate its red speed-limit tick mark on the LCD. Instead, mounting
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`the rotatable colored plate to Aumayer’s LCD adds another feature.
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`Aumayer also does not teach away from its disclosed mechanical
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`embodiment simply because the disclosed electronic embodiment is described as
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`“preferred” (Ex. 1001 at 2:49–53, 7:42–44). See In Re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1200
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`(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[O]ur case law does not require that a particular combination
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`must be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art
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`in order to provide motivation for the current invention.”). A reference’s teaching
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`of a preferred embodiment does not necessarily teach away from other
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`embodiments—especially when, as here, the other embodiments are called out in
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`the reference’s specification. Ex Parte Ruiz, No. 2012-00974, App. No.
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`10/407,967, at 9–10 (Pat. Bd. Sept. 13, 2012) (“[The prior art] cannot ‘teach away’
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`from a disclosure that [the prior art] provides.”). To teach away, the prior art must
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`criticize, discredit, or discourage the claimed solution, MPEP § 2145(X)(D)(1)
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`(and references cited therein), leading one of OSA “in a direction divergent from
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`the path that was taken by the applicant.” Ruiz, No. 2012-00974, at 9. Aumayer
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`does not do this with respect to the mechanical display.
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`Further, Evans and Wendt disclose a mechanical speedometer behind a glass
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`cover and a colored filter (Evans) or rotatable pointer (Wendt) mounted to the glass
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`cover. This teaching does not discourage mounting a rotatable colored plate to the
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`glass cover of an LCD. In fact, mounting the rotatable plate to the LCD is similar
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`to Wendt’s teaching of mounting the rotatable pointer to the speedometer’s glass
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`cover via the suction-cup unit.
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`C. Applying Cuozzo’s Construction, One of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`Would Have Had a Credible Rationale for Combining Aumayer,
`Evans, and Wendt
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`If the Board adopts Cuozzo’s claim construction, the obviousness analysis is
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`trivial. Under Cuozzo’s single electronic-display construction, Aumayer anticipates
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`claim 10. For an electronic embodiment of the rotatable colored display of claims
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`14 and 17, collectively, one of OSA would have found it obvious to modify the
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`graphical display of the Aumayer/Tegethoff LCD to include a graphical
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`representation of a colored plate, as taught by Evans, and rotate the colored plate,
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`as taught by Wendt. (Ex. 2002 at ¶¶ 23, 28, 29.) Under Cuozzo’s construction, the
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`alleged invention becomes a mere application of known modern electronics to
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`prior art mechanical devices. See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485
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`F.3d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Accommodating a prior art mechanical device
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`that accomplishes that goal to modern electronics would have been reasonably
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`obvious to one of ordinary skill in designing children’s learning devices. Applying
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`modern electronics to older mechanical devices has been commonplace in recent
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`years.”). “[U]sing modern electronic components in order to gain the commonly
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`understood benefits of such adaptation, such as decreased size, increased
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`reliability, simplified operation, and reduced cost” is obvious. Id. at 1162.
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`D. Tegethoff Discloses the Speed Limit at a Vehicle’s Location
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`Cuozzo argues that Tegethoff’s disclosure of a “maximum permissible
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`speed” (herein “max speed”) is not equivalent to the claimed “speed limit.” (Paper
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`31 at 30.) First, claim 12 of Tegethoff recites that a “marking shows a currently
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`permitted maximum speed (5) on a road section on which the vehicle is currently
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`located.” One of OSA would understand that Tegethoff discloses a speed limit of
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`the road section. Second, claim 13 of Tegethoff further differentiates that the max
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`speed is determined by an element for navigation and traffic-control information or
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`by sensors for receiving traffic information. Applying claim differentiation, claim
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`12 is broader than a max speed determined solely by the methods of claim 13,
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`which would be understood by one of OSA reviewing claims 12 and 13.
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`Additionally, Cuozzo’s argument that the max speed could be set at 45 mph,
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`even though the legal speed limit is actually 65 mph, is mere supposition.
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`Tegethoff does not state this or give such an example. Even if the max speed
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`accounts for traffic and is therefore lowered, this does not exclude a circumstance
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`where the max speed is the legal speed limit. Such may be the case when no traffic
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`warrants lowering the speed limit. A reference that teaches A + B can be used for
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`A, even if B is an additional feature.
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`E. One of Ordinary Skill in the Art Would Have Had a Credible
`Rationale for Combining Tegethoff, Awada, Evans, and Wendt
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`Cuozzo argues that Tegethoff and Awada teach away from being combined
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`because Tegethoff teaches an embodiment wherein the max speed can be manually
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`set, while Awada determines the speed limit via a GPS. (Paper 31 at 33.) This
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`argument misses the point, because Awada is being used only for teaching GPS.
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`One of OSA could easily substitute a GPS for the “element for navigation” taught
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`in Tegethoff. (Ex. 1003 at 6, col. 1.) Regardless, Tegethoff’s teaching of multiple
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`methods to set the max speed (e.g., manually and by the navigation element and
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`traffic information) does not rise to the level of discouraging, discrediting, or
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`criticizing determining the legal speed limit from the GPS. See MPEP
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`§ 2145(X)(D)(1) (and references cited therein).
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`Cuozzo further argues that one of OSA would not combine Awada’s
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`electronic apparatus with Evans’s or Wendt’s mechanical apparatus. (Paper 31 at
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`34–35.) Again, Awada is being used only for GPS. But in any event, this is
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`essentially the same argument Cuozzo makes against Aumayer. Wendt mounts a
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`Patent No.: 6,778,074
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`rotatable pointer to a mechanical speedometer. It is an obvious step to mount the
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`same rotatable pointer, modified to be a colored plate as taught by Evans, to the
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`glass cover of an LCD, as taught by Tegethoff. The reason for doing so is to
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`provide “connections between different driving parameters [that] can be clarified
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`to the driver in a very clear and intuitively comprehensible manner.” (Ex. 1003 at
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`3, col. 1.) This is also one of the reasons advanced by Cuozzo for allowance during
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`original prosecution. (Ex. 1013 at 7 (distinguishing Awada because the driver is
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`“forced to look in two separate locations”).)
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`Cuozzo further asserts that the prior art teaches away from combining
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`Tegethoff or Awada with Evans or Wendt. Cuozzo highlights Tegethoff’s
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`statement that its display system has good readability and provides additional
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`information. (Paper 31 at 35.) Cuozzo argues that Tegethoff is “expressly stat[ing]
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`that
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`its computer display system
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`is meant
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`to replace
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`the conventional
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`speedometers” of Evans and Wendt. (Paper 31 at 35.) But a reference touting
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`advantages of a described invention is not a discouragement, discredit, or criticism
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`of other inventions. See MPEP § 2145(X)(D)(1) (and references cited therein).
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`As another example, Wendt identifies the advantage that its invention
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`disciplines a driver to observe speed-limit signs. Cuozzo argues that Tegethoff’s
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`automatic adjustments would “frustrate the purpose of the Wendt device, because
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`the driver would not observe speed-limit signs but would rely on the automatic
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`Patent No.: 6,778,074
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`adjustments.” (Paper 31 at 37.) Not only is this pure conjecture, it is also irrelevant.
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`One of OSA would not completely discredit Wendt’s rotatable pointer simply to
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`ensure manual adjustment, as opposed to Tegethoff’s automatic adjustment.
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`It is important to not lose sight of the question at hand: would one of OSA,
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`reviewing Tegethoff, Awada, Evans, and Wendt, deem the claimed invention
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`obvious? Tegethoff discloses a red tick mark for displaying a max speed. Awada
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`discloses displaying the legal speed limit. Evans discloses a red colored filter, and
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`Wendt discloses a rotatable speed-limit pointer. This is not such an overly
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`complicated invention that one of OSA would not have found it obvious to mount
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`a rotatable colored plate, as taught by Evans and Wendt, to the glass cover of an
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`LCD that continuously adjusts the speed-limit readings, as taught by Tegethoff, so
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`as to display the legal speed limit, as taught by Awada.
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`IV. Conclusion
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`In view of the above, Garmin requests that claims 10, 14, and 17 be found
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`unpatentable. Should the Board adopt Cuozzo’s construction, Garmin requests that
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`the Board reconsider institution of the IPR against all claims with all rejections
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`originally proposed by Garmin.
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`Case No.: IPR2012-00001
`Patent No.: 6,778,074
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`HOVEY WILLIAMS LLP
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` By: s/ Jennifer C. Bailey
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`Jennifer C. Bailey, Reg. No. 52,583
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`Scott R. Brown, Reg. No. 40,535
`10801 Mastin Blvd., Suite 1000
`Overland Park, KS 66210
`P: (913) 647-9050
`F: (913) 647-9057
`jcb@hoveywilliams.com
`srb@hoveywilliams.com
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`Eric A. Buresh, Reg. No. 53,394
`Jason R. Mudd, Reg. No. 57,700
`ERISE IP, P.A.
`6201 College Blvd., Suite 300
`Overland Park, KS 66211
`P: (913) 777-5600
`F: (913) 777-5601
`Eric.Buresh@EriseIP.com
`Jason.Mudd@EriseIP.com
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`ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER
`(IPR Trial No. 2012-00001)
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`Case No.: IPR2012-00001
`Patent No.: 6,778,074
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I certify that on May 21, 2013, a true and correct copy of Petitioner’s Reply
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`to Patent Owner’s Response has been provided, via electronic mail, to counsel of
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`record as follows:
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`Email: john.kasha@kashalaw.com
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`Email: cconnor@reedscardino.com
`Email: jdeats@reedscardino.com
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`Email: skeels@fsclaw.com
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`John Robert Kasha, Esq.
`KASHA LAW LLC
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`Cabrach J. Connor
`Jason W. Deats
`REED & SCARDINO LLP
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`David A. Skeels
`FRIEDMAN, SUDER & COOKE
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`ATTORNEYS FOR PATENT OWNER CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES LLC
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`s/ Jennifer C. Bailey
`Jennifer C. Bailey
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`17
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