throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`
`
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`
`
`
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`Paper 171
`Date: March 24, 2015
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`_____________
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________
`
`ARIOSA DIAGNOSTICS,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`ISIS INNOVATION LIMITED,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2012-000221
`Patent 6,258,540
`____________
`
`
`Before LORA M. GREEN, FRANCISCO C. PRATS, and
`JEFFREY B. ROBERTSON, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`GREEN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Request for Rehearing
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71
`
`I.
`
`SUMMARY
`
`
`
`Isis Innovation Limited (“Patent Owner”), requests rehearing of the
`
`Final Decision (“Dec.”), dated September 2, 2014 (Paper 166). Paper 168.
`
`Ariosa Diagnostics (“Petitioner”), also requests rehearing of the Final
`
`1 This Case has been joined with IPR2013-00250.
`
`

`
`IPR2012-00022
`Patent 6,258,540
`
`
`Decision. Paper 167. In the Final Decision, we determined that claims 1, 2,
`
`
`
`4, 5, 8, 19, 20, 24, and 25 were unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), but
`
`that claims 3, 12, 13, 15, 18, 21, and 22 were not shown to be unpatentable.
`
`See Dec. 56. We determined further that the joinder statute allows joinder of
`
`issues by the same party, as well as joinder of parties. Id. at 22.
`
`
`
`Patent Owner requests rehearing on a single issue. Specifically,
`
`Patent Owner argues that we must reconsider our determination that the
`
`joinder statute allows joinder of issues by the same party, as well as joinder
`
`of parties, in view of the expanded panel decision in Target Corp. v.
`
`Destination Maternity Corp., IPR2014-00508, slip. op. 7, 11 (PTAB Sept.
`
`25, 2014) (Paper 18).
`
`
`
`Petitioner requests rehearing of our determination that the
`
`combination of Simpson (Ex. 1025) and Kazakov (Ex. 1014) does not render
`
`unpatentable claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 19–22, 24, and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
`
`In particular, Petitioner contends that determination “was erroneously
`
`premised on the factual finding that the combined method of Kazakov . . .
`
`and Simpson . . . was limited to quantitative testing for chromosomal
`
`abnormalities, e.g., aneuploidy,” whereas the combination of those
`
`references would have rendered obvious a method of testing for fetal gender.
`
`Paper 167, 1.
`
`II.
`
`DISCUSSION
`
`
`
`A party challenging a Final Written Decision by way of request for
`
`rehearing must identify specifically all matters the party believes the Board
`
`misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The challenging
`
`party bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified.
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`

`
`IPR2012-00022
`Patent 6,258,540
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING
`
`A.
`
`
`
`
`
`We have carefully considered Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing
`
`based on the panel decision in Target Corp. v. Destination Maternity Corp.,
`
`IPR2014-00508, slip. op. 7, 11 (PTAB Sept. 25, 2014) (Paper 18), but do not
`
`find it persuasive. First, that decision is not a precedential decision, and thus
`
`is not binding. Second, an expanded panel of the Board granted rehearing of
`
`that decision, and agreed with our determination that the joinder statute
`
`allows joinder of issues by the same party, as well joinder of parties. See
`
`IPR2014-00508 (PTAB Feb. 12, 2015) (Paper 28).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`We, therefore, deny Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing.
`
`B.
`
`PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING
`
`Petitioner contends that, as set forth in the Petition filed in IPR2013-
`
`00250 (Paper 1, “the ’250 Petition”), “it would have been obvious to use the
`
`Y chromosome fetal sequence specific primers of Simpson or Bianchi to
`
`amplify fetal DNA of paternal origin in a male fetus for the purpose of
`
`identifying the sex of a male fetus.” Paper 167, 2. Petitioner points also to
`
`the claim chart as to claim 5 in the Petition filed in IPR2012-00022 (Paper 1,
`
`“the ’022 Petition”), which notes that Simpson taught the use of PCR to
`
`amplify Y sequences, and the experiments conducted by Kazakov would
`
`have resulted in the amplification of Y-specific sequences that were
`
`contained in Y-specific sequences. Paper 167, 2. (citing Ex. 1007
`
`(“Mansfield Declaration”), ¶¶ 51–69, 74)). According to Petitioner, such
`
`methods are qualitative rather than quantitative. Id.
`
`
`
`Petitioner contends further that our determination was premised on the
`
`finding that “in the combined method the objective was solely to test for
`
`3
`
`
`

`
`IPR2012-00022
`Patent 6,258,540
`
`
`fetal aneuploidy.” Paper 167, 6–7 (citing Dec. 43–45). That erroneous fact
`
`
`
`finding, Petitioner asserts, led to the conclusion that Petitioner failed to
`
`demonstrate that the combination of Simpson and Kazakov rendered the
`
`claimed method obvious by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 7–8
`
`(citing Dec. 46). That is, Petitioner argues, the rarity of fetal DNA in
`
`maternal serum would not have been an issue as PCR is able to detect the
`
`equivalent of a single male cell. Id. at 9.
`
`
`
`Petitioner’s contentions do not persuade us that we overlooked or
`
`misapprehended any evidence or argument in the Final Decision. The claim
`
`chart as to claim 5 filed in the ’022 Petition states:
`
`Simpson teaches that PCR was used to amplify Y
`sequences from fetal cells in women to confirm the sex of a
`male fetus (Mansfield Decl. ¶74).
`Additionally, the experiments conducted by Kazakov
`would have resulted in the amplification of Alu repeats that
`contained Y-specific sequences, as demonstrated in the in silico
`genomic data provided in the Kazakov declaration as well as
`the scientific data provided in the Mansfield declaration
`(Mansfield Decl. ¶¶51-69).
`
`’022 Petition, 51. The ’022 Petition provides no further analysis as to that
`
`claim. In particular, we note that the claim chart does not state that such
`
`methods would have been qualitative, rather than quantitative. Paragraphs
`
`51–69 of the Mansfield Declaration were cited to demonstrate that the
`
`primers used in the Kazakov reference would have resulted in amplification
`
`of sequences from the Y chromosome. Paragraph 74 cites the Simpson
`
`reference for its teaching of primers specific for the Y chromosome. Thus,
`
`those portions of the Mansfield Declaration also do not state that such
`
`methods would have been qualitative rather than quantitative.
`
`4
`
`
`

`
`IPR2012-00022
`Patent 6,258,540
`
`
`
`Moreover, the issue of whether detecting fetal Y chromosomal
`
`
`
`sequences is qualitative rather than quantitative is irrelevant to our Decision,
`
`as we determined that the preponderance of the evidence did not support that
`
`the combination of Simpson and Kazakov provided a reasonable expectation
`
`of success that the fetal DNA would have been present in maternal serum in
`
`sufficient quantities for detection using amplification methods such as PCR.
`
`Dec. 43. In particular, as noted in the Final Decision, Petitioner relied on
`
`Simpson for its teaching that fetal cells, or at least fetal DNA, are present in
`
`maternal blood. Dec. 39 (citing ’022 Petition, 49). Kazakov was relied
`
`upon for its teaching that the level of extracellular DNA increases in the
`
`blood of pregnant females. Id. (citing ’022 Petition, 50). We noted that
`
`although Simpson suggested that DNA would be found in levels sufficient to
`
`be determined using amplification reactions, such as PCR, by teaching that
`
`Y chromosome specific signals were seen in women carrying a male fetus,
`
`we determined that a preponderance of the evidence supported the finding
`
`that the source of that DNA was fetal cells, and not cell-free DNA. Id. at 40.
`
`Thus, we considered specifically Simpson’s teaching of using PCR to detect
`
`Y-chromosome specific signals.
`
`
`
`In concluding that Petitioner had not established that the combination
`
`of Simpson and Kazakov rendered obvious challenged claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 19–
`
`22, 24, and 25, we noted that the evidence supported that the occurrence of
`
`fetal cells in maternal blood was a rare event. Id. at 42. The Decision noted
`
`also that Kazakov did not consider fetal DNA to be the only source of the
`
`increased DNA in maternal serum during the first trimester, but also
`
`considered maternal sources, and did not rule out the possibility that the
`
`DNA being amplified was only from maternal sources. Id. Those findings
`
`5
`
`
`

`
`IPR2012-00022
`Patent 6,258,540
`
`
`support our conclusion that the ordinary artisan would not have had a
`
`
`
`reasonable expectation of success of using maternal serum or plasma, as
`
`taught by Kazakov, as the source of fetal DNA in the fetal DNA analysis
`
`methods of Simpson. Id. at 43. Stated differently, as any fetal cells, if
`
`present, would have been removed in the samples of Kazakov, and as
`
`Simpson teaches that it is the fetal cells that are the source of fetal DNA, the
`
`ordinary artisan would not have reasonably expected that the samples of
`
`Kazakov would have contained sufficient levels of fetal DNA, such that
`
`PCR-based methods could be used detect fetal DNA, including Y-
`
`chromosome specific signals, in view of Kazakov’s uncertainty as to the
`
`source of the DNA being amplified.
`
`
`
`Petitioner contends further that the overwhelming evidence of record
`
`demonstrates that “the use of the Simpson gender detection technique on an
`
`alternative source suggested by Kazakov—maternal serum—‘would require
`
`at most only routine adjustments to the PCR protocols.’” Paper 167, 8
`
`(quoting Ex. 1215 ¶ 43). In particular, Petitioner argues that that the “a
`
`person of ordinary skill would have understood that the ability to detect
`
`fetal-specific sequences from cell-free DNA present in maternal DNA
`
`present in maternal serum or plasma did not require fetal cell-free DNA to
`
`be any more prevalent than fetal cells.” Id. at 9–10 (citing Ex. 1008, ¶ 63).
`
`
`
`Petitioner argues that although Kazakov does not confirm the origin of
`
`cell-free DNA, Kazakov does teach that the overall level of extracellular
`
`DNA in maternal blood increases during pregnancy. Id. at 10. Thus,
`
`Petitioner argues, the ordinary artisan would have expected that there would
`
`be sufficient levels of cell-free DNA from fetal cells to allow for the
`
`detection of Y-chromosomal sequences. Id. (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 63).
`
`6
`
`
`

`
`IPR2012-00022
`Patent 6,258,540
`
`
`
`
`
`Although we do not disagree with Petitioner’s contention that it would
`
`have only required routine experimentation to analyze maternal serum or
`
`plasma, as taught by Kazakov, that does not address the question as to
`
`whether the ordinary artisan would have expected there to be sufficient
`
`quantities of cell-free DNA in maternal DNA for the detection of fetal
`
`chromosomes, such as fetal chromosomal abnormalities, as taught by
`
`Simpson. See Dec. 45. Moreover, as already discussed, Petitioner did not
`
`demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the ordinary artisan
`
`would have had a reasonable expectation of success of using maternal serum
`
`or plasma as a source for fetal DNA in the methods of testing fetal DNA,
`
`including determination of chromosome specific sequences, as taught by
`
`Simpson. The mere fact that Kazakov teaches that the overall level of
`
`extracellular DNA in maternal blood increases during pregnancy at best begs
`
`the question of whether that increase reflects increases in fetal DNA, given
`
`Kazakov’s uncertainty as to the source of that DNA.
`
`
`
`
`
`We, therefore, deny Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing.
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`
`For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that both Patent
`
`Owner’s and Petitioner’s Requests for Rehearing are denied.
`
`7
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2012-00022
`Patent 6,258,540
`
`For PETITIONER:
`
`Greg Gardella
`cpdocketgardella@oblon.com
`
`Scott McKeown
`cpdocketmckeown@oblon.com
`
`Kevin Laurence
`klaurence@oblon.com
`
`Dianna DeVore
`DDeVore@ariosadx.com
`
`Sarah Brashears
`sbrashears@convergentlaw.com
`
`Amir Naini
`anaini@irell.com
`
`
`
`For PATENT OWNER:
`
`Eldora Ellison
`eellison@skgf.com
`
`Helene Carlson
`hcarlson@skgf.com
`
`
`
`8

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