throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 90
`Entered: June 2, 2014
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`ACHATES REFERENCE PUBLISHING, INC.
`Patent Owner
`____________
`
`Case IPR2013-00080
`Patent 6,173,403 B1
`
`
`
`Before HOWARD B. BLANKENSHIP, JUSTIN T. ARBES, and
`GREGG I. ANDERSON, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`ARBES, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`

`

`Case IPR2013-00080
`Patent 6,173,403 B1
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`
`I. BACKGROUND
`
`Petitioner Apple Inc. (“Apple”) filed a Petition (Paper 2) (“Pet.)
`
`seeking inter partes review of claims 1-12 and 17-19 of U.S. Patent No.
`
`6,173,403 B1 (“the ’403 patent”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-19. On June
`
`3, 2013, we instituted an inter partes review of claims 1-12 and 17-19 on six
`
`grounds of unpatentability (Paper 22) (“Dec. on Inst.”).
`
`Patent Owner Achates Reference Publishing, Inc. (“Achates”) filed a
`
`Patent Owner Response (Paper 39) (“PO Resp.”), which included a
`
`statement of material facts. Apple filed a Reply (Paper 58) (“Pet. Reply”)
`
`and a response (Paper 59) (“Pet. SOF Resp.”) to the statement of material
`
`facts.
`
`Achates filed a Motion to Exclude1 (Paper 69) (“Mot. to Exclude”)
`
`certain testimony and evidence submitted by Apple in the proceeding, and
`
`included a statement of material facts. Apple filed an Opposition to the
`
`Motion to Exclude (Paper 70) (“Exclude Opp.”) and a response (Paper 71)
`
`(“Exclude SOF Resp.”) to the statement of material facts. Achates filed a
`
`Reply (Paper 72) (“Exclude Reply”).
`
`Apple filed a Motion for Observation (Paper 74) (“Obs.”) on certain
`
`email communications (Exhibits 1067 and 1068) between Achates’s two
`
`declarants, Mr. Dmitry Radbel and Dr. Xin Wang. Achates filed a response
`
`(Paper 79) (“Obs. Resp.”). Achates also filed a Motion to Seal (Paper 78)
`
`(“Mot. to Seal”) the email communications, and Apple filed an opposition
`
`(Paper 84) (“Seal Opp.”).
`
`
`1 Achates’s original motion was improper, and Achates was permitted to
`re-file its motion. See Paper 68.
`
`
`
`
`2
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`

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`Case IPR2013-00080
`Patent 6,173,403 B1
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`
`An oral hearing was held on February 26, 2014, and a transcript of the
`
`hearing is included in the record (Paper 89) (“Tr.”).
`
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(c). This final written
`
`decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73.
`
`For the reasons that follow, we determine that Apple has shown by a
`
`preponderance of the evidence that claims 1-12 and 17-19 of the ’403 patent
`
`are unpatentable.
`
`
`
`A. The ’403 Patent
`
`The ’403 patent2 relates to “distributing and installing computer
`
`programs and data.” Ex. 1039, col. 1, ll. 10-13. The ’403 patent describes a
`
`need in the art to prevent piracy of information products, such as, for
`
`example, when a user obtains a computer program improperly or when a
`
`user purchases one copy of a program and installs it on multiple computers
`
`without authorization. Id. at col. 1, ll. 16-64. The ’403 patent discloses
`
`methods of “distributing one or more information products together . . .
`
`while reserving to the publisher the ability to control which products are
`
`actually installed on an end-user’s computer.” Id. at col. 2, ll. 2-7.
`
`
`2 The ’403 patent is a continuation-in-part of U.S. Patent Application
`No. 08/845,805, which issued as U.S. Patent No. 5,982,889 (“the ’889
`patent”). The ’889 patent is the subject of related Case IPR2013-00081.
`
`
`
`
`3
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`

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`Case IPR2013-00080
`Patent 6,173,403 B1
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`
`Figure 1 of the ’403 patent, reproduced below, depicts the interaction
`
`between a publisher and end-user (e.g., an individual purchasing a piece of
`
`software).
`
`
`
`As shown in Figure 1, in steps 101-102, the publisher creates a set of
`
`information products and other files. Id. at col. 3, ll. 32-38; col. 5, ll. 29-34.
`
`The ’403 patent describes a “plurality of web pages that constitute some of
`
`the legislative, administrative and judicial materials associated with patent
`
`law,” where the web pages include hyperlinks to each other, as an exemplary
`
`information product. Id. at col. 2, l. 64-col. 3, l. 1; col. 4, ll. 4-9. In step
`
`103, the publisher encrypts the information products with a string as the
`
`encryption key. Id. at col. 7, ll. 33-42. In step 104, the information products
`
`are distributed to the end-user (e.g., on a CD-ROM or electronically over the
`
`
`
`
`4
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`Case IPR2013-00080
`Patent 6,173,403 B1
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`Internet) along with an “installer” program that runs on the end-user’s
`
`computer and allows the publisher to “control how and under what
`
`circumstances the information products are installed on the end-user’s
`
`computer.” Id. at col. 2, ll. 37-47; col. 7, ll. 61-67. The installer knows the
`
`cryptosystem and key for decrypting the information products. Id. at col. 7,
`
`ll. 53-57.
`
`In steps 105-106, the end-user receives the information products and
`
`runs the installer. Id. at col. 8, ll. 1-12. In step 107, the installer checks to
`
`see whether the end-user’s computer has a previously-stored, encrypted
`
`“token” indicating that the publisher granted authorization earlier to install
`
`the information products (e.g., when an end-user has a subscription to
`
`receive multiple products over time). Id. at col. 8, ll. 13-27. In step 108, the
`
`end-user is asked whether he or she wants to subscribe to the information
`
`products. Id. at col. 9, ll. 51-57. If so, in steps 109-110, the end-user
`
`“acquires the installer’s cooperation to decrypt and install the respective
`
`information products” by transmitting information to the publisher, receiving
`
`a “launch code” from the publisher in response, and entering the “launch
`
`code” into the installer. Id. at col. 9, l. 58-col. 10, l. 4; Fig. 4. Specifically,
`
`the end-user contacts the publisher (e.g., via telephone or the Internet) and
`
`provides (1) the end-user’s name and address; (2) the end-user’s method of
`
`payment; (3) the name of the requested information products; and (4) a serial
`
`number R generated by the installer. Id. at col. 10, ll. 5-28.
`
`After verifying the payment, the publisher provides to the end-user a
`
`“launch code” comprising “(1) an authentication code; (2) an indicium of the
`
`name of the end-user; (3) a list of the information products to which the
`
`end-user has been granted access; and (4) an indicium of when the
`
`
`
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`5
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`Case IPR2013-00080
`Patent 6,173,403 B1
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`authorization for each information product expires,” encrypted using R as
`
`the key. Id. at col. 10, ll. 29-44. The end-user enters the launch code into
`
`the installer, and the installer decrypts the launch code using R as the key to
`
`extract the authentication code contained therein. Id. at col. 10, ll. 42-49. If
`
`the authentication code matches what the installer expects, the launch code
`
`is authentic. Id. at col. 10, ll. 45-60; col. 11, ll. 16-37. The information
`
`products can be installed in step 111 and, if necessary, the encrypted “token”
`
`on the end-user’s computer is updated in step 112 (the “token” contains the
`
`same four pieces of information as the launch code). Id.; col. 8, ll. 36-43.
`
`By generating a new R each time the installer requests a launch code, the
`
`disclosed method “prevent[s] the end-user from using a single launch code
`
`to install the information products on multiple computers.” Id. at col. 10,
`
`ll. 61-64.
`
`
`
`B. Illustrative Claims
`
`Claims 1 and 17 of the ’403 patent are the only independent claims at
`
`issue:
`
`1. A method comprising:
`
`receiving an encrypted launch code;
`
`decrypting said encrypted launch code with a string, R, as
`the key to recover a first candidate authentication code and an
`indicium of a first information product; and
`
`installing said first information product onto said
`computer when said candidate authorization code matches a
`first known authorization code.
`
`
`
`
`6
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`Case IPR2013-00080
`Patent 6,173,403 B1
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`
`17. A method comprising:
`
`reading an encrypted token from a computer;
`
`decrypting said encrypted token with a string, T, as the
`key to recover a token that comprises an indicium of a first
`information product;
`
`modifying said token to comprise an indicium of a
`second information product;
`
`encrypting said token with said string, T, as the key to
`create a newly encrypted token; and
`
`storing said newly encrypted token on said computer.
`
`
`
`C. Prior Art
`
`The pending grounds of unpatentability in this inter partes review are
`
`based on the following prior art:
`
`1. U.S. Patent No. 5,864,620, filed Apr. 24, 1996, issued
`Jan. 26, 1999 (“Pettitt”) (Ex. 1006);
`
`2. U.S. Patent No. 5,933,497, filed Jan. 29, 1993, issued
`Aug. 3, 1999 (“Beetcher”) (Ex. 1007) (claims priority to U.S.
`Patent Application No. 07/629,295, filed Dec. 14, 1990);
`
`3. U.S. Patent No. 5,949,876, filed Jan. 8, 1997, issued
`Sept. 7, 1999 (“Ginter”) (Ex. 1005) (claims priority to U.S.
`Patent Application No. 08/388,107, filed Feb. 13, 1995); and
`
`4. U.S. Patent No. 6,134,324, filed May 29, 1997, issued
`Oct. 17, 2000 (“Bohannon”) (Ex. 1008) (claims priority to U.S.
`Patent Application No. 07/739,206, filed July 31, 1991).
`
`
`
`D. Pending Grounds of Unpatentability
`
`This inter partes review involves the following grounds of
`
`unpatentability:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`7
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`Case IPR2013-00080
`Patent 6,173,403 B1
`
`
`Reference(s)
`
`Basis
`
`Claim(s)
`
`Pettitt
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102(e) 1
`
`Pettitt and Beetcher
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 2, 4, 5, 7, and 9
`
`Beetcher
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102(e) 17-19
`
`Beetcher, Ginter, and
`Bohannon
`
`Ginter
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 1-12
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102(e) 1-7, 9-12, and
`17-19
`
`Ginter and Beetcher
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 8
`
`
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`
`A. Claim Interpretation
`
`In the Decision on Institution, we interpreted various claim terms of
`
`the ’403 patent as follows:
`
`Term
`
`Interpretation
`
`“authentication code” (claim 1)
`
`a code for authenticating data
`
`“candidate authorization code”
`(claim 1)
`
`“known authorization code”
`(claim 1)
`
`“installing” (claim 1)
`
`candidate authentication code
`
`known authentication code
`
`placing in a position so as to be
`ready for use
`
`“launch code” (claim 1)
`
`password
`
`“token” (claims 4 and 17)
`
`a data structure indicating that
`an end-user’s computer is
`granted access to certain
`information products
`
`
`
`
`8
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`Case IPR2013-00080
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`Dec. on Inst. 8-14. The parties agree with these interpretations, see PO
`
`Resp. 1, and we incorporate our previous analysis for purposes of this
`
`decision.
`
`
`
`B. Section 315(b)
`
`Achates argues in its Patent Owner Response that Apple’s Petition is
`
`time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), which provides that an inter partes
`
`review may not be instituted based on a petition “filed more than 1 year after
`
`the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the
`
`petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.”
`
`PO Resp. 46-52. Achates contends that QuickOffice, Inc. (“QuickOffice”),
`
`one of Apple’s co-defendants in Achates Reference Publishing, Inc. v.
`
`Symantec Corp., Case No. 2:11-cv-00294-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex.) (“the
`
`related litigation”), was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the
`
`’403 patent on June 20, 2011—more than one year before December 14,
`
`2012, the filing date of the Petition in this proceeding. PO Resp. 46, 57.
`
`Achates made a substantially similar argument in its Preliminary Response,
`
`and we concluded that the Petition was not time-barred. See Paper 14 at
`
`6-21; Dec. on Inst. 14-21. We reach the same conclusion now.3
`
`Whether a non-party is a “privy” for purposes of an inter partes
`
`review proceeding is a “highly fact-dependent question” that takes into
`
`account how courts generally have used the term to “describe relationships
`
`and considerations sufficient to justify applying conventional principles of
`
`estoppel and preclusion.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg.
`
`
`3 Also, in an earlier Order, we denied Achates’s request for additional
`discovery on the Section 315(b) issue. Paper 18.
`
`
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`Case IPR2013-00080
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`48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“Trial Practice Guide”). Whether parties
`
`are in privity depends on whether the relationship between a party and its
`
`alleged privy is “sufficiently close such that both should be bound by the
`
`trial outcome and related estoppels.” Id. Depending on the circumstances,
`
`a number of factors may be relevant to the analysis, including whether the
`
`non-party “exercised or could have exercised control over a party’s
`
`participation in a proceeding” or whether the non-party is responsible for
`
`funding and directing the proceeding. Id. at 48,759-60. We also find
`
`guidance in the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880
`
`(2008), which sets forth the general rule under federal common law that a
`
`person not a party to a lawsuit is not bound by a judgment in that suit,
`
`subject to certain exceptions, including the following:
`
`[N]onparty preclusion may be justified based on a variety of
`pre-existing “substantive legal relationship[s]” between the
`person to be bound and a party to the judgment. Qualifying
`relationships include, but are not limited to, preceding and
`succeeding owners of property, bailee and bailor, and assignee
`and assignor. These exceptions originated “as much from the
`needs of property law as from the values of preclusion by
`judgment.”
`
`553 U.S. at 894 (citations omitted); see Trial Practice Guide at 48,759 (citing
`
`Taylor).
`
`Achates contends that QuickOffice had a pre-existing substantive
`
`legal relationship with Apple and, therefore, is a privy of Apple under
`
`Taylor. PO Resp. 46-52. In support of its position, Achates cites a publicly
`
`available software development kit (SDK) agreement that Apple allegedly
`
`enters into with iPhone application developers like QuickOffice. Id. at 48.
`
`The SDK agreement includes a clause requiring the developer to indemnify
`
`Apple for third party patent infringement claims:
`
`
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`10
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`Patent 6,173,403 B1
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`
`To the extent permitted by law, You agree to indemnify,
`defend and hold harmless Apple, its directors, officers,
`employees, independent contractors and agents (each an
`“Apple Indemnified Party”) from any and all claims, losses,
`liabilities, damages, expenses and costs (including without
`limitation attorneys
`fees and court costs)
`(collectively
`“Losses”) incurred by an Apple Indemnified Party as a result
`of Your breach of this Agreement, a breach of any certification,
`covenant, representation or warranty made by You in this
`Agreement, any claims that Your Applications violate or
`infringe any third party intellectual property or proprietary
`rights, or otherwise related to or arising from Your use of the
`SDK, Your Application(s) or Your development of
`Applications.
`
`. . .
`
`In no event may You enter into any settlement or like
`agreement with a third party that affects Apple’s rights or binds
`Apple in any way, without the prior written consent of Apple.
`
`Ex. 2006 § 6 (emphasis added). According to Achates, the fact that
`
`co-defendant QuickOffice would be obligated to indemnify Apple for
`
`infringement claims against the “same accused instrumentality” (i.e., a
`
`QuickOffice application), and would be prevented from settling in the
`
`litigation without Apple’s consent, means that QuickOffice and Apple are in
`
`privity with each other. PO Resp. 47-52. Apple acknowledges that it
`
`entered into “at least one form of an agreement related to app[lication]
`
`development with [QuickOffice],” but does not admit that the agreement
`
`included the indemnification provision cited by Achates. Pet. SOF Resp.
`
`¶¶ 129-30.
`
`
`
`We first note that Achates provides no evidence that QuickOffice had
`
`any role in the filing or funding of the Petition in this proceeding, or that
`
`QuickOffice exercised control or could have exercised control over Apple’s
`
`
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`Case IPR2013-00080
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`participation in this proceeding. See Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at
`
`48,759. Achates’s sole evidence is the indemnification language in the SDK
`
`agreement and the fact that Apple and QuickOffice were co-defendants.
`
`Even assuming that the specific indemnification provision of the SDK
`
`agreement applies to QuickOffice (and Achates has not shown that it does),
`
`we are not persuaded that the provision is indicative of QuickOffice being a
`
`privy of Apple. The agreement does not give the developer the right to
`
`intervene or control Apple’s defense to any charge of patent infringement,
`
`nor has Achates argued that to be the case for QuickOffice in the related
`
`litigation. Notably, indemnification is not one of the “substantive legal
`
`relationships” cited in Taylor (e.g., assignee-assignor), and is significantly
`
`different from those relationships, which involve successive interests in the
`
`same property.
`
`Further, as Apple points out, Achates’s actions in the related litigation
`
`refute its allegations of privity. See Pet. Reply 15. Achates accuses Apple
`
`of infringing the ’403 patent based on Apple’s own actions as well as those
`
`of QuickOffice, and likewise accused QuickOffice of infringement based on
`
`activities relating to the Apple App Store as well as other systems (e.g., the
`
`Amazon Appstore for Android). See Ex. 1037 ¶¶ 51-52; Ex. 1038 at 84-90.
`
`Achates also is continuing to assert the ’403 patent against Apple in the
`
`related litigation even after settling with the co-defendant application
`
`developers, including QuickOffice. See PO Resp. 58. Thus, at least
`
`according to Achates, there is a distinct basis for liability against Apple,
`
`different from that against the developers. As such, it does not appear that
`
`Apple would be estopped by any judgment against the developers. For
`
`instance, even if a judgment were obtained against one or more of the
`
`
`
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`developers, Apple would still be exposed to an adverse judgment based on
`
`its own actions and would assert its own defenses independent of the
`
`developers. This further indicates that the relationship between Apple and
`
`the developers, such as QuickOffice, is not of the type that would make the
`
`developers privies of Apple.
`
`We are not persuaded that the Petition is time-barred under Section
`
`315(b) on the basis that QuickOffice is a privy of Apple.
`
`
`
`C. Credibility of Mr. Schneier
`
`As an initial matter, Achates in its Patent Owner Response challenges
`
`the credibility of Apple’s declarant, Bruce Schneier. PO Resp. 52-56.
`
`Mr. Schneier provided testimony regarding the ’403 patent and the prior art
`
`in a declaration submitted with Apple’s Petition. Ex. 1041.4 Achates argues
`
`that Mr. Schneier is not credible for two reasons. First, Mr. Schneier billed
`
`Apple for less than 45 hours of work, which is “nowhere near enough time
`
`to read and analyze all of the references cited in his declarations at the level
`
`of diligence that this proceeding requires,” according to Achates. PO Resp.
`
`52-54. For instance, Achates points to the size of Ginter (324 pages) and the
`
`declarations themselves (931 numbered paragraphs) to argue that
`
`Mr. Schneier “could not have performed his obligation to this matter
`
`conscientiously in the time spent.” Id. Achates’s estimate of 45 hours,
`
`
`4 Apple submitted its Petition, and Exhibits 1003 and 1041 (declarations
`from Mr. Schneier regarding the ’403 patent and related ’889 patent), on
`December 14, 2012. In response to an instruction from Board administrative
`staff that documents should be in portrait rather than landscape orientation,
`Apple submitted revised copies on December 17, 2012, also numbered as
`Exhibits 1003 and 1041. See Paper 4. To ensure the clarity of the record,
`the original versions filed on December 14, 2012 will be expunged.
`
`
`
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`however, is based on an estimate from Mr. Schneier as to the total amount
`
`Mr. Schneier billed to Apple. Ex. 1045 at 63:15-24; see PO Resp. 53.
`
`Achates does not point to any statement from Mr. Schneier regarding the
`
`number of hours he actually spent reviewing the prior art and performing the
`
`analysis in his declaration. Mr. Schneier testified that he read the prior art
`
`references at issue (Ginter, Pettitt, Beetcher, and Bohannon) multiple times
`
`and fully understood them. Ex. 1045 at 76:16-22, 77:21-78:5. Moreover,
`
`Achates’s contention is not that Mr. Schneier lacks knowledge of the prior
`
`art or did not in fact perform the analysis in his declaration—just that
`
`Mr. Schneier did not spend sufficient time on the matter. We decline
`
`Achates’s invitation to give Mr. Schneier’s testimony less weight on that
`
`basis.
`
`Second, Achates argues that Mr. Schneier has “hostility towards the
`
`patent system” and is a member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF),
`
`which shows a “level[] of bias that should be more than sufficient to raise
`
`concerns about his qualifications to serve as an unbiased technology expert.”
`
`PO Resp. 54-56 (citing a book co-authored by Mr. Schneier, Ex. 2016, and
`
`various EFF web pages, Exs. 2017-2020). We have reviewed Mr.
`
`Schneier’s curriculum vitae (Exhibit 1004) and find that he is well qualified
`
`to testify regarding the matters addressed in his declaration (Exhibit 1041).
`
`Indeed, Achates’s declarant, Mr. Radbel, testified that Mr. Schneier is a “top
`
`cryptologist” and has a “great reputation as a cryptologist.” Ex. 2032 at
`
`167:9-25. As explained herein, we find Mr. Schneier’s testimony persuasive
`
`and give it substantial weight. We do not give it less weight based on a
`
`purported bias against patents in general.
`
`
`
`
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`
`D. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`
`In its Petition, Apple contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art
`
`at the time of the ’403 patent (April 1997, when the application that issued
`
`as the parent ’889 patent was filed) would have had “extensive familiarity
`
`with cryptographic techniques published in the literature and known in the
`
`field,” and “would have gained this level of familiarity through graduate
`
`level studies in mathematics, engineering or computer science, or through
`
`work experience in academia (either as a professor or a graduate student),
`
`for a technology company or for a government,” relying on the testimony of
`
`Mr. Schneier. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1041 ¶¶ 37-39). Achates does not dispute
`
`this argument in its Patent Owner Response.5 Mr. Radbel, however,
`
`concludes that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “the
`
`ability to select and make use of well-known cryptographic techniques at a
`
`high level,” but not “comprehensive knowledge of cryptography, including
`
`Mr. Schneier’s book on the subject.” Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 17, 19. Mr. Radbel
`
`further testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “an
`
`undergraduate degree in engineering or computer science plus two years of
`
`experience in software engineering,” but not necessarily “graduate level
`
`training.” Id. Dr. Wang agrees with Mr. Radbel’s assessment of the level of
`
`ordinary skill. Ex. 2014 ¶ 8.
`
`
`5 Achates argued in its Preliminary Response that “the proper level of
`skill should be a person with at least five years of experience and[/]or
`academic training in professional software development having experience
`with client-server software and operating systems, and at least a basic
`working knowledge of computer security and cryptography.” Paper 14
`at 23.
`
`
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`15
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`

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`Case IPR2013-00080
`Patent 6,173,403 B1
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`
`The parties’ declarants appear to agree that the person of ordinary
`
`skill in the art would have been familiar with the basic cryptographic
`
`techniques of the time, but dispute the depth of that knowledge. A skilled
`
`artisan would have been aware of basic cryptographic techniques and also
`
`the predominant literature on cryptography of the time. See In re GPAC
`
`Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The person of ordinary skill in
`
`the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to know the relevant prior
`
`art.”). As to that person’s level of education or equivalent experience, we
`
`are persuaded that Mr. Radbel understates the appropriate level of skill. The
`
`’403 patent describes various problems with software piracy and various
`
`technical solutions to such problems. Ex. 1039, col. 1, ll. 16-63. It also
`
`assumes a fairly deep knowledge of encryption, decryption, and the use of
`
`keys for performing those functions. See id. at col. 7, l. 32-col. 11, l. 37.
`
`Contrary to Mr. Radbel’s assertion that a person of ordinary skill only would
`
`have needed a “high level” knowledge of cryptographic techniques,
`
`sufficient, for example, to call software routines “without necessarily
`
`understanding how such routines work,” see Ex. 2013 ¶ 17, a skilled artisan
`
`would need some knowledge of how the cryptographic techniques work to
`
`choose the appropriate techniques and properly use them. We also take into
`
`account the sophistication of the technology at the time, as exemplified by
`
`the prior art references of record and Mr. Schneier’s book from 1996
`
`(Exhibit 1024). Based on all of the evidence, we conclude that a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’403 patent would have been
`
`familiar with the basic cryptographic techniques and literature of the time,
`
`and would have had some graduate-level or equivalent experience working
`
`with such techniques.
`
`
`
`
`16
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`Case IPR2013-00080
`Patent 6,173,403 B1
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`E. Grounds Based on Pettitt
`
`With respect to the alleged grounds of unpatentability based on Pettitt,
`
`we have reviewed Apple’s Petition, Achates’s Patent Owner Response, and
`
`Apple’s Reply, as well as the evidence discussed in each of those papers.
`
`We are persuaded, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 1 is
`
`anticipated by Pettitt under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), and claims 2, 4, 5, 7, and 9
`
`are unpatentable over Pettitt and Beetcher under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
`
`
`
`1. Pettitt
`
`Pettitt discloses a system for “controlling distribution of software in a
`
`multitiered distribution chain” and “distinguishing authorized users from
`
`unauthorized users.” Ex. 1006, col. 1, ll. 7-10. Figure 2 of Pettitt is
`
`reproduced below.
`
`
`
`
`17
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`

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`Case IPR2013-00080
`Patent 6,173,403 B1
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`Figure 2 depicts the entities involved in providing software 13: author 12,
`
`license clearing house (LCH) 14, distributor 16, reseller 17, and user 18.
`
`Software 13 is packed into a digital shipping container 20, encrypted with a
`
`master key, and provided to user 18 (e.g., sold by reseller 17 to the public).
`
`Id. at col. 3, ll. 28-56. To purchase a license and unlock the container, user
`
`18 sends authorization request 30, which includes information identifying
`
`the software, user, and desired method of payment. Id. at col. 4, ll. 10-19.
`
`The distribution entities communicate with each other to validate the user’s
`
`payment and authorize the transaction. Id. at col. 4, ll. 20-62. If authorized,
`
`LCH 14 creates a reply envelope 34 including:
`
`1. information identifying the software,
`
`2. information identifying the user,
`
`3. the digital signature of the reseller,
`
`4. the digital signature of the distributor,
`
`5. a master key that unlocks the software container 20 (if the
`transaction has been authorized), and
`
`6. a digital authorization certificate.
`
`Id. at col. 4, l. 63-col. 5, l. 5.
`
`LCH 14 encrypts the contents of the reply envelope with the reseller’s
`
`public key and “digitally signs the envelope with the signature of LCH 14 by
`
`hashing the contents of the reply envelope and encrypting the result of the
`
`hash with the LCH’s private key.” Id. at col. 5, ll. 14-24. LCH 14 then
`
`sends the reply envelope back through the distribution chain. Id. at col. 5,
`
`ll. 24-28. Reseller 17 authenticates the digital signature, decrypts the reply
`
`envelope using the reseller’s public key, and sends the contents of the reply
`
`envelope to user 18. Id. at col. 5, ll. 45-55. User 18 then “uses the
`
`authorization certificate and the master key to unlock the software container
`
`
`
`
`18
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2013-00080
`Patent 6,173,403 B1
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`20 and install the software.” Id. at col. 5, ll. 56-63. Because the digital
`
`authorization certificate is derived from the user’s information and,
`
`therefore, is different for each user, possession of the digital authorization
`
`certificate is “the user’s proof of purchase, and proof that s/he is an
`
`authorized user.” Id. at col. 5, ll. 58-63.
`
`
`
`2. Claim 1 is Anticipated by Pettitt
`
`Pettitt discloses receiving and decrypting an encrypted “launch code”
`
`(the reply envelope) with a “string, R” (the reseller’s public key) to recover
`
`an “indicium of a first information product” (information identifying the
`
`software), and installing the first information product, as recited in claim 1.
`
`See Pet. 26-28. Achates does not argue these limitations of claim 1, but
`
`contends that Pettitt fails to disclose “decrypting said encrypted launch code
`
`. . . to recover a first candidate authentication code.” PO Resp. 3-9. Achates
`
`argues that the LCH digital signature, cited by Apple in the Petition as a
`
`“first candidate authentication code,” is not recovered by decrypting the
`
`reply envelope because (1) the LCH digital signature is not included within
`
`the reply envelope, (2) the LCH digital signature is available to the reseller
`
`before and independently of the decryption of the reply envelope, and (3) the
`
`reply envelope is encrypted before the LCH digital signature of the reply
`
`envelope is created. Id.
`
`Apple responds that it identified two “first candidate authentication
`
`codes” in Pettitt in its Petition—the LCH digital signature and the digital
`
`authorization certificate—and Achates overlooks the latter. Pet. Reply 1-2.
`
`The primary structure identified by Apple in the Petition is the LCH digital
`
`signature, see, e.g., Pet. 27, and we referenced the LCH digital signature in
`
`
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`19
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`

`Case IPR2013-00080
`Patent 6,173,403 B1
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`summarizing Apple’s allegations in the Decision on Institution, Dec. on Inst.
`
`28. Achates argued at the oral hearing that Apple improperly asserted that
`
`the digital authorization certificate was a “first candidate authentication
`
`code” for the first time in its Reply, and that the “ground” of unpatentability
`
`for this trial is based on the LCH digital signature alone. See Tr. 30:17-32:6.
`
`We agree with Apple, however, that the Petition sufficiently identified
`
`each of the digital authorization certificate and the LCH digital signature as
`
`a “first candidate authentication code.” Apple included, as part of the
`
`document identified as its Petition, a statement of material facts, two of
`
`which are:
`
`80. The digital signature of the LCH described in Pettitt
`is an “authentication code” within Patent Owner’s construction
`of the ’403 claims. Ex. 1041 at ¶ 446.
`
`81. The digital authorization certificate described in
`Pettitt is an “authentication code” within Patent Owner’s
`construction of the ’403 claims. Ex. 1041 at ¶ 447.
`
`Pet., Attachment C ¶¶ 80-81; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a)(1) (statements of
`
`material facts, although not required, count against the page limit for the
`
`petition). Apple explains in the Petition that the reply envelope includes
`
`“information identifying the software, the user, the digital signature of the
`
`LCH and a digital authorization certificate,” and that the reply envelope is
`
`decrypted and its contents passed to the user for unlocking the software
`
`product. Pet. 26-27. Apple further cites Mr. Schneier’s testimony that the
`
`digital authorization certificate is an “authentication code” included in the
`
`reply envelope. See Pet. 26-27; Ex. 1041 ¶¶ 440-41, 447. The applicable
`
`ground of unpatentability in this inter partes review is the alleged
`
`anticipation of claim 1 by Pettitt, based on the allegations of unpatentability
`
`in the Petition. Dec. on Inst. 35-3

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