throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Paper 34
`Entered: June 25, 2015
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`TRW AUTOMOTIVE US LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`MAGNA ELECTRONICS INCORPORATED,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2014-00251
`Patent 6,097,023
`____________
`
`
`
`Before JUSTIN T. ARBES, PATRICK R. SCANLON, and
`JO-ANNE M. KOKOSKI, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`SCANLON, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00251
`Patent 6,097,023
`
`
`A.
`
`Background
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`Petitioner, TRW Automotive US LLC, filed a Petition (Paper 3,
`
`“Pet.”) to institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 8, 9, 13, 18, 29, 30,
`
`54, 62–64, and 70 of U.S. Patent No. 6,097,023 (Ex. 1002, “the ’023
`
`patent”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319. Patent Owner, Magna
`
`Electronics Inc., subsequently filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 9,
`
`“Prelim. Resp.”). On June 26, 2014, we instituted an inter partes review of
`
`claims 1, 8, 9, 18, 29, 30, 54, 62–64, and 70 on five grounds of
`
`unpatentability (Paper 14, “Dec. on Inst.”).
`
`After institution, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner Response (Paper
`
`20, “PO Resp.”), and Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 24, “Reply”).
`
`An oral hearing was held on February 18, 2015. A transcript of the
`
`hearing is included in the record. Paper 33 (“Tr.”).
`
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). This Final Written
`
`Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73.
`
`For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has not shown, by a
`
`preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 8, 9, 18, 29, 30, 54, 62–64, and
`
`70 are unpatentable.
`
`B.
`
`The ’023 Patent
`
`The ’023 patent, titled “Vehicle Headlight Control Using Imaging
`
`Sensor,” issued on August 1, 2000. The ’023 patent describes a system for
`
`“controlling [a] vehicle’s headlamps in response to sensing the headlights of
`
`oncoming vehicles and taillights of leading vehicles.” Ex. 1002, 1:17–20.
`
`According to the ’023 patent, prior attempts at automatic vehicle headlight
`
`controls included a single light sensor, wherein the headlights were dimmed
`
`
`
`
`2
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`

`

`IPR2014-00251
`Patent 6,097,023
`
`in response to sensed light exceeding a threshold. Id. at 1:35–38. Such
`
`systems are ineffective at detecting oncoming headlights at a distance and
`
`detecting taillights of leading vehicles. Id. at 1:39–47.
`
`The ’023 patent describes vehicle headlight dimming control 12
`
`comprising imaging sensor module 14, imaging control circuit or digital
`
`signal processor 13, and vehicle lighting control logic module 16. Id. at
`
`3:41–45, Fig. 2. Imaging sensor module 14 includes optical device 36, light
`
`sensing array 38, and spectral separation device 40 disposed between optical
`
`device 36 and array 38. Id. at 4:19–24, Fig. 2. Imaging sensor module 14
`
`may be mounted to, or near, the vehicle’s windshield via bracket 34. Id. at
`
`3:67–4:2, Fig. 2. This positioning provides an interior location that
`
`substantially eliminates environmental dirt and moisture problems, and
`
`provides a relatively clear view forward of the vehicle. Id. at 4:3–11.
`
`Light sensing array 38 includes a plurality of photosensor elements 42
`
`arranged in a matrix. Id. at 4:29–31, Fig. 4. Digital signal processor 13,
`
`which receives output 56 from light sensing array 38, includes taillight
`
`detection circuit 76 and headlight detection circuit 78. Id. at 4:50–55, Fig. 3.
`
`Taillight detection circuit 76 detects red light sources above a particular
`
`threshold, and headlight detection circuit 78 detects white light sources
`
`above a particular threshold. Id. at 4:65–5:15. Thus, “the control identifies
`
`light sources that are either oncoming headlights or leading taillights by
`
`identifying such light sources according to their spectral makeup.” Id. at
`
`2:36–38.
`
`Vehicle lighting control logic module 16 receives input 20 from
`
`digital signal processor 13. Id. at 3:60–61, Fig. 2. Module 16 responds to
`
`the input by switching headlights 18 to an appropriate mode. Id. at 5:42–44.
`
`
`
`
`3
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`

`

`IPR2014-00251
`Patent 6,097,023
`
`For instance, the headlights might be switched from high-beam mode to
`
`low-beam mode in response to detecting oncoming headlights. Id. at 7:47–
`
`50.
`
`C.
`
`Illustrative Claims
`
`Of the challenged claims in the ’023 patent, claims 1, 18, 54, and 62
`
`are independent. Claims 1 and 18 are illustrative of the claims at issue:
`
`A vehicle headlamp control useful with a vehicle
`1.
`having a cabin and a windshield for controlling the vehicle’s
`headlamps in response to sensing headlights of oncoming
`vehicles and taillights of leading vehicles, said headlamp control
`comprising:
`
`a headlamp control assembly including a solid-state light
`sensor array comprising a plurality of sensors arranged in a
`matrix on at least one semiconductor substrate, a spectral
`separation filter to apply particular spectral regions to particular
`ones of said sensors, a lens directing light onto said sensor array
`and a control means for identifying headlights of oncoming
`vehicles and taillights of leading vehicles;
`
`wherein said headlamp control assembly is positioned in
`the vehicle cabin with said imaging array and said optical lens
`positioned to view scenes forward of the vehicle through a
`portion of the windshield.
`
`Ex. 1002, 12:60–13:9.
`
`18. A vehicle headlamp control, for controlling the
`vehicle’s headlamps in response to sensing headlights of
`oncoming vehicles and taillights of leading vehicles, said
`headlamp control comprising:
`
`an imaging sensor that senses light in a field of view
`forward of the vehicle in sequential image captures;
`
`a microprocessor-based control that is responsive to said
`imaging sensor in order to identify oncoming vehicle headlight
`signatures and leading vehicle taillight signatures; and
`
`
`
`
`4
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`

`

`IPR2014-00251
`Patent 6,097,023
`
`
`said control switching the vehicle headlamps to a low-
`beam state when at least one of headlights of an oncoming
`vehicle and taillights of a leading vehicle are identified from the
`presence of at least one of a headlight signature and a taillight
`signature in a plurality of sequential image captures captured by
`said imaging sensor and processed to identify the respective
`headlight signature or taillight signature.
`
`Ex. 1002, 13:64–14:14.
`
`D.
`
`Prior Art
`
`The pending grounds of unpatentability in this inter partes review are
`
`based on the following prior art:
`
`1. Japanese Kokai Application No. S62-131837, published
`June 15, 1987 (“Yanagawa”) (Ex. 1004)1;
`
`2. U.S. Patent No. 4,521,804, issued June 4, 1985
`(“Bendell”) (Ex. 1005);
`
`3. Oliver Vellacott, CMOS in camera, IEE Review, 111–
`114 (May 1994) (“Vellacott”) (Ex. 1006);
`
`4. U.S. Patent No. 5,177,606, issued January 5, 1993
`(“Koshizawa”) (Ex. 1007); and
`
`5. Applicant admitted prior art described in the ’023
`patent (“AAPA”).
`
`E.
`
`Pending Grounds of Unpatentability
`
`We instituted the instant inter partes review on the following grounds
`
`of unpatentability:
`
`
`1 Petitioner’s Exhibit 1004 contains both the Japanese patent document and an
`English translation of the document; Petitioner provided an affidavit attesting
`to the accuracy of the translation. See Ex. 1004; 37 C.F.R. § 42.63(b). Our
`references to Yanagawa in this decision refer to the English translation.
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00251
`Patent 6,097,023
`
`
`Reference(s)
`
`Yanagawa
`
`Yanagawa, AAPA, Bendell,
`and Koshizawa
`Yanagawa, AAPA, and
`Bendell
`Yanagawa and Vellacott
`
`Yanagawa, AAPA, Bendell,
`and Vellacott
`
`Basis
`
`Claim(s) Challenged
`
`§ 102(b)
`
`18
`
`§ 103
`
`1, 8, and 9
`
`§ 103
`
`30, 54, and 62–64
`
`§ 103
`
`§ 103
`
`29
`
`70
`
`Dec. on Inst. 27.
`
`A.
`
`Claim Construction
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`
`Petitioner contends, and Patent Owner does not dispute, that the ’023
`
`patent has expired. Pet. 1. The Board’s interpretation of the claims of an
`
`expired patent is similar to that of a district court’s review. See In re
`
`Rambus, Inc., 694 F.3d 42, 46 (Fed. Cir. 2012). We are guided, therefore,
`
`by the principle that the words of a claim “are generally given their ordinary
`
`and customary meaning” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the
`
`art in question at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
`
`1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “In determining the meaning of
`
`the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of
`
`record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the
`
`prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic
`
`Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips,
`
`415 F.3d at 1312–17).
`
`Limitations arising under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, are
`
`interpreted in light of the corresponding structure, material, or acts described
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00251
`Patent 6,097,023
`
`in the specification. In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1193 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1994) (“[P]aragraph six applies regardless of the context in which the
`
`interpretation of means-plus-function language arises, i.e., whether as part of
`
`a patentability determination in the PTO or as part of a validity or
`
`infringement determination in a court.”). The sixth paragraph of § 112 states
`
`that a claim limitation expressed in means-plus-function language “shall be
`
`construed to cover the corresponding structure . . . described in the
`
`specification and equivalents thereof.”2
`
`In the Decision on Institution, we interpreted certain claim terms as
`
`follows:
`
`
`2 Section 4(c) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
`125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”) re-designated 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph,
`as 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Because the ’023 patent has a filing date prior to
`September 16, 2012, the effective date of the AIA, we refer to the pre-AIA
`version of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00251
`Patent 6,097,023
`
`
`Claim Term
`
`Construction
`
`“control means for identifying
`headlights of oncoming vehicles
`and taillights of leading vehicles”
`
`“spectral separation filter”
`
`Dec. on Inst. 7–11.
`
`Function: “identifying headlights of
`oncoming vehicles and taillights of
`leading vehicles”;
`Corresponding structure: digital
`signal processor 13 implementing
`the algorithm described at pages 9–
`10 of the Decision on Institution3
`a device that separates light into a
`plurality of spectral bands
`
`Neither party has expressed disagreement with these constructions,
`
`and we see no reason to modify these constructions based on the evidence
`
`introduced during trial. We maintain these constructions for this Final
`
`Written Decision.
`
`
`3 Specifically, the disclosed algorithm has the following steps:
`
`(1) grabbing a frame captured by the imaging sensor;
`(2) determining whether the intensity of light sensed by each
`“red” pixel is greater than a threshold and, if so, incrementing a
`“red” counter; (3) determining for each pixel whether an
`adjacent set of “red,” “green,” and “blue” pixels each exceeds a
`particular threshold and whether the pixel intensity levels all
`fall within a particular range and, if so, incrementing a “white”
`counter; (4) incrementing a high-beam counter and setting a
`low-beam counter to zero if both the “red” and “white” counters
`are below respective high-beam thresholds; (5) setting the
`high-beam counter to zero and incrementing the low-beam
`counter if either one of the “red” and “white” counters exceeds
`respective low-beam thresholds; (6) setting both the low-beam
`and high-beam counters to zero if neither one of the “red” and
`“white” counters exceeds respective low-beam thresholds; and
`(7) determining that a headlight or taillight has been detected if
`the low-beam counter exceeds a particular threshold.
`
`Dec. on Inst. 9–10.
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00251
`Patent 6,097,023
`
`B.
`
`Asserted Anticipation of Claim 18 by Yanagawa
`
`Petitioner asserts that claim 18 is anticipated by Yanagawa under
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 3, 19–23; Reply 4–6. To support this assertion,
`
`Petitioner relies on the Declarations of Jeffrey A. Miller, Ph.D. (Exs. 1010,
`
`1013). To prevail on this patentability challenge, Petitioner must establish
`
`facts supporting the challenge by a preponderance of the evidence.
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). Patent Owner disagrees with
`
`Petitioner’s assertion and relies on the Declaration of Matthew A. Turk,
`
`Ph.D. (Ex. 2003). PO Resp. 19–24.
`
`1.
`
`Overview of Yanagawa
`
`Yanagawa discloses a “traveling vehicle recognition device capable,
`
`for example, of automatically controlling headlight beams to high and low
`
`beams according to the state of whether there is a vehicle ahead.” Ex. 1004,
`
`2. The device includes color television camera 11 mounted to image the
`
`forward direction of vehicle 12. Id. A video signal from television camera
`
`11 is supplied to decoder 13, which separates the video signal into R (red), G
`
`(green), and B (blue) color image signals that are supplied to image signal
`
`processor 14. Id. Image signal processor 14 processes the color image
`
`signals to recognize or detect the presence of taillights or headlights within
`
`the imaged video. Id. at 2–3. Image signal processor 14 extracts and stores
`
`image data at regular intervals, such as every 0.05 seconds. Id. at 3. In the
`
`event taillights or headlights are recognized, executing part 15 executes tasks
`
`for controlling the vehicle’s headlight beams. Id.
`
`2.
`
`Analysis
`
`Petitioner contends that Yanagawa discloses all elements of the
`
`claimed vehicle headlamp control. Pet. 19. In particular, Petitioner asserts
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00251
`Patent 6,097,023
`
`that Yanagawa’s color television camera 11 corresponds to the claimed
`
`imaging sensor. Id. at 21–22. Regarding the claimed control responsive to
`
`the imaging sensor, Petitioner asserts that image signal processor 14
`
`identifies headlight and taillight signatures, and executing part 15 controls
`
`the vehicle’s headlight beams based on the recognition of oncoming
`
`headlights or leading taillights. Id. at 22–23.
`
`Patent Owner argues that Yanagawa does not disclose a
`
`microprocessor-based control as required by claim 18. PO Resp. 20;
`
`Tr. 35–36. In particular, Patent Owner argues that “Yanagawa is entirely
`
`silent as to any details about its [image] signal processor 14 or its executing
`
`part 15,” and “Yanagawa’s disclosure of an image signal processor does not
`
`inherently imply or suggest a microprocessor-based control.” PO Resp. 20
`
`(citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 41). Patent Owner contends that neither Petitioner nor its
`
`expert point to any disclosure in Yanagawa of a microprocessor-based
`
`control. Id.; see also id. at 21 (“Nowhere is there any reference by
`
`[Petitioner] or its expert to any portion of Yanagawa that allegedly discloses
`
`a microprocessor-based control, as claimed.”). Patent Owner further argues
`
`that because claim 1 of the ’023 patent, in contrast to claim 18, does not
`
`require a microprocessor-based control,4 the doctrine of claim differentiation
`
`“provides further evidence that a control for switching a headlamp state need
`
`not necessarily be—and is not inherently—a microprocessor-based control.”
`
`Id. at 21.
`
`In response, Petitioner argues that “Yanagawa does teach the use of a
`
`microprocessor as claimed when read from the perspective of ordinary
`
`
`4 Claim 1 recites “a control means for identifying headlights of oncoming
`vehicles and taillights of leading vehicles.” Ex. 1002, 13:3–5.
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00251
`Patent 6,097,023
`
`skill.” Reply 1. Petitioner asserts that Yanagawa discloses binarizing or
`
`digitizing image signals prior to processing by image signal processor 14,
`
`and the use of binary signals “proves conclusively that the processor is not
`
`analog.” Id. at 2 (citing Ex. 1004, 3). Petitioner then asserts that “digital
`
`processing by Yanagawa’s image signal processor conclusively establishes
`
`the use of a microprocessor from the perspective of ordinary skill.” Id. at 3.
`
`Petitioner relies on the testimony of Dr. Miller to support this
`
`position. See Reply 2–3; Tr. 27. Dr. Miller testifies that processing of the
`
`image data in Yanagawa
`
`logic gates,
`requires such hardware components as
`integrated circuits, and transistors, but those components
`comprise a microprocessor. Of course not all of the
`features of a microprocessor will need to be used for every
`application, but it is crystal clear from the disclosure of
`Yanagawa that this would be the means for processing the
`data.
`
`Ex. 1013 ¶ 5. Dr. Miller also testifies that the image signal processing in
`
`Yanagawa “is all digital, which in this application requires the use of a
`
`microprocessor.” Id. ¶ 6. Furthermore, according to Dr. Miller:
`
`If this isn’t done by a microprocessor, then nothing
`else is apparent to do this. We know that it is done by
`some sort of a processor because it is referred to as a
`“video signal processor” in Yanagawa. Dealing with
`digital data, which is both the input and output of the video
`signal processor in practical terms from the perspective of
`ordinary skill in the art, this can only be a microprocessor.
`
`Id. ¶ 10.
`
`These contentions by Dr. Miller, however, are conclusory statements
`
`not supported sufficiently by any objective evidence or analysis and, thus,
`
`are not persuasive. See Perreira v. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 33
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00251
`Patent 6,097,023
`
`F.3d 1375, 1377 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“An expert opinion is no better than
`
`the soundness of the reasons supporting it.”). Dr. Miller does not point to
`
`any specific disclosure in Yanagawa indicating that use of a microprocessor
`
`(as opposed to another type of device) is “crystal clear.” Moreover, there is
`
`no explanation why digital processing necessarily requires the use of a
`
`microprocessor. Instead, we are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that
`
`Yanagawa provides insufficient detail as to the structure and functionality of
`
`its image signal processor 14 and executing part 15, and that the two
`
`components “could be analog circuitry-based or digital circuitry-based
`
`without necessarily employing or being based upon a microprocessor.” PO
`
`Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 41).
`
`Generally, microprocessors are distinguished from other processors in
`
`that they are contained on an integrated chip. See, e.g., DICTIONARY OF
`
`COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY: TERMS, DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS,
`
`WILEY (John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 1998), available at
`
`http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/wileycommtech/microproces
`
`sor/0 (last visited June 17, 2015) (defining “microprocessor” as “[a]n
`
`electronic circuit on the surface of a small silicon chip which can be
`
`programmed to perform a wide variety of functions within the computer
`
`system or terminal”).5 Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Miller addresses how
`
`Yanagawa’s image signal processor 14 and/or executing part 15 constitute a
`
`microprocessor-based control in this sense.
`
`Yanagawa provides little detail on the makeup of image signal
`
`processor 14, stating only that is configured as shown in Figure 4 (which
`
`shows characteristics extraction unit 141, memory 142, recognition unit 143,
`
`
`5 We include this definition of “microprocessor” in the record as Exhibit 3002.
`
`12
`
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`

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`IPR2014-00251
`Patent 6,097,023
`
`and computation unit 144). Ex. 1004, 3, Fig. 4. We agree with Patent
`
`Owner that Yanagawa provides no additional details on the nature of image
`
`signal processor 14. See PO Resp. 20; see also Tr. 35–38 (Patent Owner
`
`arguing that, based on the disclosure of Yanagawa, “[w]e just don’t know”
`
`exactly how it is structured). Also, we credit the testimony of Dr. Turk that
`
`image signal processor 14 may or may not be a microprocessor, as it is
`
`consistent with the limited disclosure in the reference. See Ex. 2003 ¶ 41.
`
`Accordingly, we conclude that although image signal processor 14 might be
`
`microprocessor-based, there is simply not enough detail in the reference for
`
`us to conclude that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood it
`
`to be a microprocessor-based control.
`
`Based on the foregoing discussion and the record, we conclude that
`
`Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Yanagawa
`
`discloses a microprocessor-based control. As such, Petitioner has failed to
`
`establish that claim 18 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
`
`anticipated by Yanagawa.
`
`C.
`
`Asserted Obviousness of Claims 1, 8, and 9 over Yanagawa,
`AAPA, Bendell, and Koshizawa
`
`A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if the differences
`
`between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
`
`that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
`
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the
`
`subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`
`(2007). In the Petition, Petitioner proposed that a person having ordinary
`
`skill in the art of the ’023 patent at the time of the invention would have had
`
`at least the qualifications of, or equivalent to, either (1) a master’s degree in
`
`electrical engineering or computer science, with course work or research in
`
`
`
`
`13
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`

`IPR2014-00251
`Patent 6,097,023
`
`vision systems, or (2) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering or
`
`computer science with at least two years of work making optical vision
`
`systems. Pet. 25. Patent Owner argued that this definition was incorrect
`
`because it failed to make any mention of expertise in vehicle technologies.
`
`Prelim. Resp. 16. In our Decision on Institution, we found Patent Owner’s
`
`argument unpersuasive because Patent Owner did not explain how the
`
`allegedly incorrect definition led to an incorrect obviousness analysis. Dec.
`
`on Inst. 17–18. The parties have not disputed this definition further, and we
`
`see no reason to modify it in light of the record developed during trial.
`
`Therefore, we adopt the above-mentioned definition of a person having
`
`ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of this Final Written Decision.
`
`With respect to claim 1, Petitioner asserts that Yanagawa discloses a
`
`headlamp control having a control means and a light sensor array (i.e., color
`
`television camera 11), but does not disclose explicitly the claimed spectral
`
`separation filter. Pet. 25–28. Petitioner also concedes that Yanagawa’s
`
`television camera 11 “is not necessarily ‘a solid-state light sensor array
`
`comprising a plurality of sensors arranged in a matrix on at least one
`
`semiconductor substrate’” as recited in claim 1. Id. at 28. Petitioner
`
`contends, however, that such a solid-state light sensor array is taught in the
`
`AAPA, as “further evidenced” by Bendell, which discloses a color television
`
`camera having a solid-state charge-coupled device (CCD)-type sensor array
`
`matrix and in which prism 22 provides spectral separation filtering. Id. at
`
`28–29. Regarding the control means, Petitioner contends that Yanagawa’s
`
`image signal processor 14 “extracts the feature of red as the color of
`
`taillights and the feature of white as the color of headlights” and “determines
`
`
`
`
`14
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00251
`Patent 6,097,023
`
`the ‘[e]xistence or non-existence of taillight and headlight.’” Id. at 26–27
`
`(quoting Ex. 1004, 2, Fig. 2).
`
`In view of these contentions, Petitioner asserts that “the substitution of
`
`the television camera of Bendell for the unspecified type of television
`
`camera of Yanagawa, is an equivalent (and unpatentable) interchange of
`
`television cameras.” Id. at 29 (referring to KSR). As a further reason for
`
`combining the references, Petitioner submits that Bendell’s CCD camera has
`
`the “known advantages of low power consumption and smaller size.” Id.
`
`(citing Ex. 1005, 2:4–7).
`
`Regarding the claim 1 requirement that the headlamp control
`
`assembly be positioned in the vehicle cabin, Petitioner appears to take the
`
`position that this is either “a matter of equivalent design choice” or,
`
`alternatively, disclosed by Koshizawa. Id. at 30. Petitioner argues that
`
`Koshizawa is properly combinable with Yanagawa, AAPA, and Bendell in
`
`view of the advantages of in-cab mounting disclosed in Koshizawa. Id.
`
`(citing Ex. 1007, 1:30–35).
`
`Patent Owner presents several arguments against this asserted ground
`
`of unpatentability. PO Resp. 24–42. We focus on Patent Owner’s argument
`
`that “none of the asserted references disclose or suggest ‘a control means for
`
`identifying headlights of oncoming vehicles and taillights of leading
`
`vehicles,’ as this term has been construed by the Board.” Id. at 27 (citing
`
`Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 56–65). In support of this argument, Patent Owner contends the
`
`Board has interpreted claim 1 to require, among other steps
`
`(2) determining whether the intensity of light sensed by
`each “red” pixel is greater than a threshold and, if so,
`incrementing a “red” counter… [and] (3) determining for
`each pixel whether an adjacent set of “red,” “green,” and
`
`
`
`
`15
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00251
`Patent 6,097,023
`
`
`“blue” pixels each exceeds a particular threshold and
`whether the pixel intensity levels all fall within a particular
`range and, if so, incrementing a “white” counter.
`
`Id. at 29 (citing Dec. on Inst. 9–10). Patent Owner then argues that
`
`Yanagawa does not disclose these features because the reference “never
`
`actually explains how images may be obtained at a pixel-by-pixel level.” Id.
`
`(citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 62). Patent Owner further argues that none of the
`
`additional references cure this deficiency of Yanagawa. Id. at 31.
`
`In the Reply, Petitioner asserts that “[i]n addition to ‘corresponding
`
`structure’ disclosed in the specification, 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 also covers
`
`‘equivalents’ to the corresponding structure.” Reply 8. Petitioner argues
`
`“Yanagawa discloses an equivalent within the ambit of § 112 ¶ 6 because
`
`there is an insubstantial change with respect to what is claimed.” Id. at 9.
`
`Specifically, Petitioner argues “[w]hether the detection concerns individual
`
`pixels that are later grouped or initially sensed using larger areas of the
`
`sensor is immaterial; Yanagawa recognizes the pattern of taillights in pairs
`
`(1004-003), and so also does the ’023 Patent in an embodiment utilizing
`
`enhanced detection by pattern recognition.” Id. Petitioner further contends
`
`that “Yanagawa operates in substantially the same way [as the ’023 patent],
`
`which is to detect red or white light indicative of taillight[s] or headlights
`
`through use of an intensity/ ratio analysis.” Id.
`
`We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments. In instituting trial on
`
`this ground, we found that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable
`
`likelihood that Yanagawa’s image signal processor 14 is the same or
`
`equivalent to the corresponding structure of the “control means” in the ’023
`
`patent, i.e., digital signal processor 13 performing the algorithm identified in
`
`our claim construction. Dec. on Inst. 15. In view of the entire record,
`
`
`
`
`16
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00251
`Patent 6,097,023
`
`however, we now are persuaded Petitioner fails to show that image signal
`
`processor 14 performs an algorithm equivalent to the algorithm implemented
`
`by digital signal processor 13 of the ’023 patent. Petitioner’s assertions of
`
`similarities in how the controls of Yanagawa and the ’023 patent operate are
`
`insufficient to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
`
`Yanagawa’s processor implements an equivalent algorithm, particularly
`
`given that there is no evidence that Yanagawa processes image data pixel-
`
`by-pixel or uses counters, as required by multiple steps of the disclosed
`
`algorithm, such as steps 2 through 6. See Dec. on Inst. 9–10. In that regard,
`
`we have reviewed the disclosure of Yanagawa and credit Dr. Turk’s
`
`explanation as to why the reference does not disclose steps 2 through 6
`
`specifically, or even pixel light thresholds, pixel light counters, or comparing
`
`adjacent pixel light levels generally. See Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 62–64. Absent some
`
`comparison between the algorithm of Yanagawa and the steps of the
`
`algorithm disclosed in the ’023 patent, we cannot say that Yanagawa
`
`discloses structure equivalent to the “control means” in claim 1. It is not
`
`enough to show merely that Yanagawa, at a high level, operates in
`
`“substantially the same way” as the ’023 patent to identify headlights and
`
`taillights, as Petitioner suggests. See Reply 9.
`
`After considering Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s positions, as well as
`
`their supporting evidence, we determine that Petitioner has not shown, by a
`
`preponderance of the evidence, that claim 1, or claims 8 and 9 depending
`
`therefrom, are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the
`
`combination of Yanagawa, AAPA, Bendell, and Koshizawa.
`
`
`
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00251
`Patent 6,097,023
`
`D. Obviousness of Claims 30, 54, and 62–64 over Yanagawa,
`AAPA, and Bendell
`
`1.
`
`Overview of Bendell
`
`Bendell discloses a television camera including four-port color-
`
`splitting prism 22 and four solid-state imagers: blue-responsive imager 14,
`
`red-responsive imager 16, and green-responsive imagers 18, 20. Ex. 1005,
`
`3:23–25, 46–52, Fig. 1a. Bendell further discloses that each “solid-state
`
`imager may be of the CCD type.” Id. at 3:53.
`
`2.
`
`Overview of AAPA
`
`Regarding the alleged AAPA, the ’023 patent states “[p]hotosensing
`
`array 38 may be a charge couple device (CCD) array of the type commonly
`
`utilized in video camcorders and the like.” Ex. 1002, 8:40–42.
`
`3.
`
`Claim 30
`
`Claim 30 depends from claim 18. As discussed above, Petitioner fails
`
`to show that Yanagawa discloses a microprocessor-based control as recited
`
`in claim 18. See supra Section II.B.2. Petitioner does not assert that a
`
`microprocessor-based control would have been obvious in view of the
`
`combination of Yanagawa, AAPA, and Bendell. As such, we determine that
`
`Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 30
`
`is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of
`
`Yanagawa, AAPA, and Bendell.
`
`4.
`
`Claim 54
`
`Petitioner contends that Yanagawa discloses all the limitations of
`
`independent claim 54 except spectral separation filtering and a solid-state
`
`sensor array. Pet. 38–43. Petitioner contends, however, that a solid-state
`
`light sensor array is taught in the AAPA, and that Bendell discloses a solid-
`
`state color television camera that includes zoom lens 10 and prism 22, which
`
`
`
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00251
`Patent 6,097,023
`
`provides spectral separation filtering. Id. at 40. Petitioner argues it would
`
`have been obvious “to substitute the television camera of Bendell for the
`
`unspecified type of television camera of Yanagawa” because such
`
`modification “is an equivalent interchange of television cameras” and “a
`
`simple substitution of one known element for another to obtain predictable
`
`results.” Id. As a further reason for combining the references, Petitioner
`
`submits that Bendell’s CCD camera has the “known advantages of low
`
`power consumption and smaller size.” Id. (citing Ex. 1005, 2:4–7).
`
`Similar to claim 18, claim 54 recites “a microprocessor-based control
`
`identifying light levels sensed by said sensors.” Petitioner relies solely on
`
`Yanagawa for this limitation, arguing that “Fig. 3 shows the extraction
`
`processing of Yanagawa” and that “[t]he circuitry assembled to perform
`
`the[] functions [of detecting red, blue, and green luminescence signals]
`
`meets the construction of ‘control means’ as provided above [in the
`
`Petition], especially where the signal extraction analysis assesses the relative
`
`signal strengths as a difference and applies a ratio/threshold analysis and
`
`processing occurs by sequential image captures.” Pet. 38. For the same
`
`reasons explained above with respect to claim 18, Petitioner has failed to
`
`show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Yanagawa discloses a
`
`microprocessor-based control. See supra Section II.B.2. Petitioner further
`
`does not assert that a microprocessor-based control would have been
`
`obvious, e

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