Case 1:13-cv-00633-DEP Document 56 Filed 02/18/14 Page 1 of 31
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`ALBANY DIVISION
`
`
`
`
`Civil Action No.1:13-cv-00633-DNH-DEP
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC
`INSTITUTE AND
`DYNAMIC ADVANCES, LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`
`APPLE INC.,
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`
`
`
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`Apple Inc. v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
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`Case 1:13-cv-00633-DEP Document 56 Filed 02/18/14 Page 2 of 31
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`II. 
`
`III. 
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`
`D. 
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................... 3 
`The ’798 Patent’s claims—not its descriptions of exemplary
`I. 
`embodiments—define the patent’s scope. ................................................. 4 
`Any deviation from the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim
`term must be based on the patentee’s clearly and unequivocally
`expressed intent to change the meaning of the term. ................................ 6 
`The Court should reject Apple’s proposed claim constructions. ................. 7 
`The Court should reject Apple’s proposed construction of
`A. 
`“natural language query input [by the user]” because the
`construction is contrary to the plain meaning of the claim
`language. ........................................................................................ 7 
`The Court should reject Apple’s proposed constructions of
`Claim 1’s “[based on the input,] without augmentation” and
`Claim 9’s “[determination of a result] of the natural language
`input” because the constructions are contrary to the plain
`import of the claim language and would exclude an
`exemplary embodiment. .................................................................. 9 
`Based on the input, without augmentation ...................................... 9 
`Determination of a result of the natural language input ................. 13 
`The Court should reject Apple’s proposed construction of
`“metadata database” because the construction improperly
`imports limitations from an exemplary embodiment. ..................... 13 
`The Court should reject Apple’s proposed construction of
`“reference dictionary” because the construction improperly
`imports limitations from an exemplary embodiment and from
`elsewhere in the claims. ................................................................ 15 
`The Court should reject Apple’s proposed construction of
`“database objects” because the construction improperly
`contradicts the plain meaning of the claim language. .................... 17 
`The Court should reject Apple’s proposed construction of
`“information models” because the construction improperly
`imports limitations from an exemplary embodiment. ..................... 18 
`The Court should reject Apple’s proposed construction of
`“case” because the construction improperly imports
`limitations from an exemplary embodiment. .................................. 20 
`The Court should reject Apple’s proposed construction of
`“case information” because the construction improperly
`imports limitations from an exemplary embodiment. ..................... 22 
`
`E. 
`
`F. 
`
`G. 
`
`H. 
`
`i
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`I. 
`
`The Court should reject Apple’s proposed construction of
`Claim 1’s “determining a plurality of combinations of the finite
`number of database objects” and Claim 9’s “identifying a
`finite number of permutations of the plurality of database
`objects” because the constructions are contrary to the plain
`import of the claim language. ........................................................ 23 
`Determining a plurality of combinations of the finite number
`of database objects ....................................................................... 23 
`Identifying a finite number of permutations of the plurality of
`database objects ........................................................................... 25 
`CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 25 
`
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`Cases 
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp.,
`626 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ................................................................................. 13
`Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc.,
`540 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................................. 22
`K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A.,
`191 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ................................................................................... 6
`MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
`474 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ........................................................................... 12, 25
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................................. 13
`Omega Eng’g Inc. v. Raytek Corp.,
`334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ................................................................................... 6
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ....................................... 5, 6, 15, 16, 18, 19
`SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am.,
`775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) ................................................................. 24
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ......................................... 6, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22, 23
`Other Authorities 
`
`Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2111.01
`(8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012) .................................................................................. 10, 19
`Rules 
`
`L. Pat. R. 4.4 ................................................................................................................... 3
`
`
`
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` INTRODUCTION
`
`Professor Hsu and Professor Boonjing invented a method to make it easier for a
`
`human to communicate with a computer. Their invention was the result of their
`
`collaboration to create a natural language interface (“NLI”) to computer databases as
`
`part of Professor Boonjing’s doctoral research at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. The
`
`goal was to allow a computer user to verbally communicate with the computer in the
`
`same manner that the user would verbally communicate with another person. For
`
`example, Professor Hsu and Professor Boonjing created an NLI that would allow the
`
`user to input a query in the same language that the user would pose the query to
`
`another person (i.e., using “natural language”). By allowing the user to input queries free
`
`of computer-imposed—and unnatural—structural and semantic constraints, their NLI
`
`was to simplify computer-human communication. Simplify, that is, from the human’s
`
`perspective. Since such an NLI depended on the computer being able to interpret
`
`natural language input by the user, Professors Hsu and Boonjing invented a method for
`
`processing such natural language inputs. Their invention is claimed in U.S. Patent No.
`
`7,177,798 (the “’798 Patent”).
`
`The patented method for processing a user’s natural language input moves the
`
`burden of human-computer communications from the human to the computer. The
`
`method requires the computer to interpret natural—human—language as would another
`
`human. This means that the user does not need to take special steps to formulate
`
`queries in a particular computer form or language before the computer processes the
`
`query. The claimed process works by finding the meaning of the input through reference
`
`to language-based databases containing certain metadata.
`
`1
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`In the ’798 Patent, Professors Hsu and Boonjing describe their natural-language-
`
`processing invention in the context of an NLI to databases. They provide various
`
`exemplary embodiments of the claimed process, including, for example, an embodiment
`
`in which the process is part of an NLI to an enterprise database and an embodiment in
`
`which the language-based database is a special database previously designed by
`
`Professor Hsu, a “metadatabase.” Importantly, while they use the terms “enterprise
`
`database” and “metadatabase” in describing exemplary embodiments of their invention,
`
`they do not use those terms in claiming their invention—because their invention is not
`
`limited to the described exemplary embodiments.
`
`Apple’s proposed claim constructions should be rejected because they contradict
`
`the rules of claim construction as established by binding precedent. Apple’s disregard
`
`for binding precedent is compounded by its disregard for this Court’s rules of procedure
`
`as set forth in the Local Rules of Procedure for Patent Cases. Apple now tactically
`
`submits claim terms to the Court that were not properly or timely submitted to the Court
`
`in the Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement. Apple’s proposed erroneous
`
`constructions, like its improper submission of terms for construction, are calculated to
`
`gain an improper advantage in this litigation.
`
`But Apple’s proposed constructions do not represent the plain import of any of
`
`the terms. Indeed, many of Apple’s proposed construction run afoul of a bedrock
`
`principle of patent law—it is the claims, not the described exemplary embodiments of
`
`the invention, which define a patent’s scope. Apple’s proposed constructions should be
`
`universally rejected.
`
`2
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` ARGUMENT
`
`According to the Court’s Local Rules of Procedure for Patent Cases, the parties
`
`are: (i) to present the disputed claim terms to the Court in their Joint Claim Construction
`
`and Prehearing Statement (“JCCS”), L. Pat. R. 4.4(a), and (ii) are not to present more
`
`than ten terms for construction absent leave of the Court, L. Pat. R. 4.4(b). And while in
`
`the seven months since the parties filed the JCCS, Apple had time to prepare and file
`
`three petitions for inter partes review and a motion to stay this litigation, it apparently did
`
`not have time to seek leave of the Court either to stray from the JCCS or to present
`
`more than ten terms for construction. Instead of complying with the Court’s rules of
`
`procedure, Apple unilaterally decided it was proper to present eleven terms for
`
`construction, only seven of which were properly presented in the JCCS.
`
`Apple’s procedural shenanigans aside,1 each of Apple’s proposed constructions
`
`fails on the merits because it does not represent the plain import of claims. Apple’s
`
`proposed constructions each suffer from one fatal flaw or another. The proper
`
`constructions for the terms that Apple now proposes for construction, presented here in
`
`the order presented in Apple’s Opening Claim Construction brief, are:
`
`Term No.
`
`1
`(Apple)
`
`2
`(JCCS 2)
`
`Disputed Term
`natural language query
`input [by the user]
`
`based on the input,
`without augmentation
`
`Proper Construction
`query that is articulated in a human language
`in a way that a native speaker could
`understand and use sensibly that was input
`[by the user]
`based on the natural language input provided
`by the user, without user supplementation of
`the input through the addition of information or
`structure
`
`
`1 Plaintiffs object to Apple’s improper presentation of the extra claim terms as it
`unnecessarily multiplies the litigation. Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude Apple from
`presenting any additional terms for construction, and to grant other further relief that
`this Court deems just and proper. Plaintiffs reserve the right to seek fees and costs
`associated with Apple’s improper presentation of terms.
`
`3
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`Term No.
`3
`(Apple)
`4
`(JCCS 4)
`5
`(JCCS 10)
`6
`(JCCS 8)
`7
`(JCCS 7)
`8
`(Apple2)
`9
`(JCCS 5)
`
`10
`(JCCS 9)
`
`11
`(Apple)
`
`
`
`Disputed Term
`[determination of a result]
`of the natural language
`input
`metadata database
`
`reference dictionary
`
`database objects
`
`information models
`
`case
`
`case information
`
`determining a plurality of
`combinations of the finite
`number of database
`objects
`identifying a finite number
`of permutations of the
`plurality of database
`objects
`
`Proper Construction
`[determination of a result] of the natural
`language input
`
`database including information about
`structuring, using, or interpreting data
`set of database entries or objects and their
`relations
`data structures, types, instances,
`relationships, or operators
`instances of concepts and their properties,
`structures, relationships, rules, operations, or
`semantics
`information about instances of use of the
`natural language processing method
`information about instances of use of the
`natural language processing method
`constructing or selecting a plurality of
`combinations of the identified database
`objects
`
`identifying a finite number of permutations of
`the plurality of database objects
`
`I.
`
`The ’798 Patent’s claims—not its descriptions of exemplary
`embodiments—define the patent’s scope.
`
`There should be no question that the scope of the ’798 Patent is defined by the
`
`claims—not by the exemplary embodiments of the invention described in the patent.
`
`The en banc Federal Circuit has stated:
`
`It is a “bedrock principle” of patent law that “the claims of a patent
`define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to
`exclude.” Innova[/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc.,
`
`2 In the JCCS, Apple agreed that “case” and “case information” had the same meaning
`and these terms were therefore presented as a single term for construction. Apple now
`proposes a construction for “case” that is different from what it proposes for “case
`information” and different from what it proposed in the JCCS.
`
`4
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`381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)]; see also Vitronics [Corp. v.
`Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)] (“we look to the
`words of the claims themselves ... to define the scope of the patented
`invention”); Markman [v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980
`(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)] (“The written description part of the
`specification itself does not delimit the right to exclude. That is the
`function and purpose of claims.”). That principle has been recognized
`since at least 1836, when Congress first required that the specification
`include a portion in which the inventor “shall particularly specify and point
`out the part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own
`invention or discovery.” Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119.
`In the following years, the Supreme Court made clear that the claims are
`“of primary importance, in the effort to ascertain precisely what it is that is
`patented.” Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570, 24 L. Ed. 235 (1876).
`Because the patentee is required to “define precisely what his invention
`is,” the Court explained, it is “unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of
`the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import of its
`terms.” White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52, 7 S. Ct. 72, 30 L. Ed. 303
`(1886); see also Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405,
`419, 52 L. Ed. 1122, 28 S. Ct. 748, 1908 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 594 (1908)
`(“the claims measure the invention”); McCarty v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co.,
`160 U.S. 110, 116, 40 L. Ed. 358, 16 S. Ct. 240, 1895 Dec. Comm'r Pat.
`721 (1895) (“if we once begin to include elements not mentioned in
`the claim, in order to limit such claim ..., we should never know
`where to stop”); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365
`U.S. 336, 339, 5 L. Ed.2d 592, 81 S. Ct. 599, 1961 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 635
`(1961) (“the claims made in the patent are the sole measure of the grant”).
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (emphasis
`
`added). The Phillips court went on to explain that this principle holds true, regardless of
`
`the diversity, or lack of diversity, of the described exemplary embodiments:
`
`[T]he line between construing terms and importing limitations can be
`discerned with reasonable certainty and predictability if the court's focus
`remains on understanding how a person of ordinary skill in the art would
`understand the claim terms. For instance, although the specification often
`describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly
`warned against confining the claims to those embodiments. In particular,
`we have expressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes
`only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be
`construed as being limited to that embodiment. That is not just
`because section 112 of the Patent Act requires that the claims themselves
`set forth the limits of the patent grant, but also because persons of
`ordinary skill in the art rarely would confine their definitions of terms to the
`exact representations depicted in the embodiments.
`
`5
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`Case 1:13-cv-00633-DEP Document 56 Filed 02/18/14 Page 10 of 31
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`Id. at 1323 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
`
`II.
`
`Any deviation from the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term
`must be based on the patentee’s clearly and unequivocally expressed
`intent to change the meaning of the term.
`
`The Federal Circuit has taken the bedrock principle that the claims, not the
`
`described embodiments, define a patent’s scope and distilled it into a roadmap to
`
`facilitate claim construction:
`
`1. The words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary
`meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art when
`read in the context of the specification and prosecution history.
`
`2. There are only two exceptions to this rule: 1) when a patentee sets out
`a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee
`disavows the full scope of the claim term either in the specification or
`during prosecution.
`
`3. The patentee is free to choose a broad term and expect to obtain the
`full scope of its plain and ordinary meaning unless the patentee
`explicitly redefines the term or disavows its full scope.
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365–67 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`
`To invoke either the lexicographer or the disavowal exception, Apple must
`
`overcome the heavy presumption that the term is given its full ordinary and customary
`
`meaning. K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“a party
`
`wishing to alter the meaning of a clear claim term must overcome the presumption that
`
`the ordinary and accustomed meaning is the proper one, demonstrating why such an
`
`alteration is required”). And to overcome this presumption, Apple must establish that in
`
`the course of prosecuting the ’798 Patent, the applicants clearly and unequivocally
`
`expressed an intent to deviate from the full ordinary and customary meaning of the
`
`disputed claim term. Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1367–68 (“both [the lexicography and the
`
`disavowal] exceptions require a clear and explicit statement by the patentee”); see also,
`
`Omega Eng’g Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating “claim
`
`6
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`Case 1:13-cv-00633-DEP Document 56 Filed 02/18/14 Page 11 of 31
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`terms carry their full ordinary and customary meaning unless the patentee unequivocally
`
`imparted a novel meaning to those terms or expressly relinquished claim scope during
`
`prosecution” and “prosecution disclaimer [does not apply] where the alleged disavowal
`
`of claim scope is ambiguous” (citations omitted)). Here, Apple necessarily fails to carry
`
`its burden to establish that the patentee deviated from the ordinary and customary
`
`meaning of the claim terms.
`
`III.
`
`The Court should reject Apple’s proposed claim constructions.
`
`A.
`
`The Court should reject Apple’s proposed construction of “natural
`language query input [by the user]” because the construction is
`contrary to the plain meaning of the claim language.
`
`Apple’s proposed construction of “natural language query input [by the user]” is a
`
`transparent attempt to improperly manufacture a divided-infringement issue
`
`unsupported either by the plain meaning of the claim language or the description of
`
`exemplary embodiments of the
`
`invention. The term “natural language
`
`query input [by the user]” appears in a
`
`step of Claim 1, to a “method for
`
`processing a natural language input
`
`provided by a user.” The dispute here is
`
`not over what constitutes “natural
`
`language,” Apple admits that natural
`
`’798 Patent Claim 1
`
`language is just language that humans
`
`normally use to communicate with each other. Rather, the dispute distills to whether
`
`“providing a natural language query input by the user” means: (i) “the user providing a
`
`natural language query-input,” or (ii) “providing a natural language query that was input
`
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`Case 1:13-cv-00633-DEP Document 56 Filed 02/18/14 Page 12 of 31
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`by the user.” The first construction (Apple’s) improperly requires the user to perform a
`
`step of the computer’s natural language processing even though the claimed method,
`
`and the described exemplary embodiments, assumes the user’s role is complete before
`
`the processing method begins—the input has already been “provided by a user.”
`
`Apple’s construction strategically manufactures a divided-infringement issue where
`
`none exists based on the plain language of the claims. The second construction
`
`(Plaintiffs’) is the correct construction because it comports with the plain import of the
`
`claim, and with the description of embodiments of the invention.
`
`Apple’s proposed construction conflicts with the exemplary embodiments of the
`
`A
`
`B C
`
`’798 Patent exemplary embodiment
`
`claimed method in which the
`
`computer, not the user, provides the
`
`query input by the user to the search
`
`algorithm as part of processing the
`
`input. For example, in one
`
`embodiment of the processor, the
`
`computer: (i) represents a natural
`
`language query (A) as a “string of
`
`characters segmented by spaces” and
`
`(ii) provides (B) this string to the
`
`search algorithm (C). ’798 Patent
`
`col.19 l.1 – col.21 l.10.
`
`Apple’s proposed construction would turn the ’798 Patent’s invention on its head.
`
`It would require the user to play a role in the computer’s processing of the user’s input—
`
`something beyond the user simply inputting the query. This is not how humans naturally
`
`8
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`Case 1:13-cv-00633-DEP Document 56 Filed 02/18/14 Page 13 of 31
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`communicate. This is not the natural language interface that Professors Hsu and
`
`Boonjing created. It is not the natural language processing method they invented and
`
`claimed. Apple’s proposed construction is wrong.
`
`B.
`
`The Court should reject Apple’s proposed constructions of Claim 1’s
`“[based on the input,] without augmentation” and Claim 9’s
`“[determination of a result] of the natural language input” because the
`constructions are contrary to the plain import of the claim language
`and would exclude an exemplary embodiment.
`
`Apple’s proposed construction of “based on the input, without augmentation”
`
`should be rejected because it is contrary to the plain meaning of the term and would
`
`improperly exclude an exemplary embodiment. And Apple’s proposed construction of
`
`“[determination of a result] of the natural language input” should be rejected for the
`
`same reasons. These terms have ordinary and customary meanings and Apple has not
`
`presented evidence to stray from those meanings.
`
`Based on the input, without
`
`augmentation: Apple admitted in its petition
`
`for inter partes review that Plaintiffs’
`
`proposed construction for “based on the
`
`input, without augmentation” is the plain
`
`meaning of the term. Apple argued to the
`
`Patent Office that “Patent Owner’s
`
`construction contention[] in the litigation
`
`represent[s] the broadest reasonable
`
`construction” of this term. Gasser Decl. 3 Ex.
`
`MPEP § 2111.01, 2100-40 – 2100-41
`
`
`3 Declaration of Alexander E. Gasser In Support of Plaintiffs’ Opening Claim
`Construction Brief, Docket Entry No. 49.1.
`
`9
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`Case 1:13-cv-00633-DEP Document 56 Filed 02/18/14 Page 14 of 31
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`E4 at 10–11. And the Patent Office directive on claim construction is clear: except where
`
`the patent applicant specially defined a term otherwise, the “broadest reasonable
`
`construction” of the term is the “plain meaning” of the term. Manual of Patent
`
`Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2111.01 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012), Gasser Decl.
`
`Ex. F5 at 3–4. Now, Apple expediently reverses its position to argue to this Court that
`
`“Plaintiffs’ proposed construction is contrary to the plain meaning of the claim
`
`language.” Apple’s Brief at 8.
`
`Apple’s position in this litigation is based on tactics, not on evidence. Indeed,
`
`Apple submitted sworn expert testimony to the Patent Office in support of
`
`Plaintiffs’ proposed construction as the plain meaning of the term. See Gasser
`
`Decl. Ex. E at 10 (“The testimony regarding the proper construction of claims 1-21 in Ex.
`
`1005 ¶¶ 58-106 is incorporated herein.”). It is not enough that Apple wants to avoid
`
`infringement with a narrow construction in litigation, Apple’s Brief at 9 (“The accused
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`instrumentality [i.e., not the user] augments the user’s request”), or that Apple wants a
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`broad construction in a Patent Office proceeding challenging the validity of the patent.
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`Apple’s proposed construction must be justified by the evidence—and it is not.
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`Professors Hsu and Boonjing’s patent-prosecution attorney amended Claim 1
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`and argued to distinguish a reference (Szabo) raised by the patent examiner, but he did
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`not disclaim all pre-search augmentation—he simply clarified for the patent examiner
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`that if the user must augment his input before the computer can process the input, then
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`the computer is not processing a natural language input. Gasser Decl. Ex. I6 at 36–37.
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`In fact, such user preprocessing (e.g., user structuring of the input in a computer- or
`
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`4 Docket Entry No. 49.6.
`5 Docket Entry No. 49.7.
`6 Docket Entry No. 49.10.
`
`10
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` IPR2014-00320
` RPI Ex. 2011 PAGE 14
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00633-DEP Document 56 Filed 02/18/14 Page 15 of 31
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`application-specific form) is exactly what Professors Hsu and Boonjing disparaged in
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`the prior art because an interface that required such preprocessing is not a truly natural
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`interface:
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`As applied in the database areas, existing natural language interfaces
`(NLIs) place severe restrictions on the syntax with which users articulate
`their natural queries. Users typically balk at such restrictions.
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`’798 Patent col.1 ll.54–57. In initially rejecting filed claim 2 (which issued, as amended,
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`as Claim 1), the patent examiner misinterpreted the Szabo user-augmented query as
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`the ’798 Patent’s claimed natural language query input by the user:
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`Szabo reads on the feature of providing a natural language query input to
`the user (by graphically augmenting natural language – see column 6 lines
`55–60).
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`Gasser Decl. Ex. I at 8 (emphasis in original). But Szabo discloses a system for
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`formulating a query. Szabo col.3 ll.1–5, Tiller Decl.7 Ex. A1 at 19 (“The present
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`invention pertains to a system for formulating and refining a search, by employing a
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`‘live’ graphic icon representing set operators that may be modified and/or linked.”). The
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`Szabo user preprocesses the query by establishing logical connections between parts
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`of the query:
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`To generate a typical query, producing a resultant data set, the user
`defines a plurality of input sets, and then establishes a logical relationship
`between the inputs. The input set definitions may be produced in known
`manner, such as by explicit definition, or through use of assistive
`technologies, such as natural language translators. The formulated search
`may then be presented to the user for tuning, fine control, or modification.
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`Szabo col.6 ll.55–60, Tiller Decl. Ex. A1 at 20. The prosecuting attorney simply pointed
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`out to the examiner that a graphical tool that helps the user format an otherwise natural
`
`
`7 Declaration of Donald E. Tiller In Support of Plaintiffs’ Responsive Claim Construction
`Brief.
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`11
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` RPI Ex. 2011 PAGE 15
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`Case 1:13-cv-00633-DEP Document 56 Filed 02/18/14 Page 16 of 31
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`language query into a computer-acceptable format is not a natural language interface.
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`As the prosecuting attorney stated, the Szabo query is not a natural language query,
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`[i]t is an augmented query which provides structure and content not
`present in a true natural language input.
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`Gasser Decl. Ex. I at 37.
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`To speed issuance of the ’798 Patent, the prosecuting attorney amended the
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`claim to clarify that the claimed processing method is performed based on the user’s
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`input without the user first augmenting the input. The attorney’s argument and
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`amendment do not support Apple’s proposed bar on all augmentation (including,
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`presumably, computer augmentation as part of the natural language processing). See
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`Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366–67 (“To constitute disclaimer, there must be a clear and
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`unmistakable disclaimer.”).
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`Apple’s proposed construction not only fails to capture the plain meaning of the
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`claim language, the essence of the prosecuting attorney’s argument, or the spirit of the
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`’798 Patent’s invention, it would impermissibly exclude exemplary embodiments. And “a
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`claim interpretation that excludes a preferred embodiment from the scope of the claim is
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`rarely, if ever, correct.” MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 47