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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________
`
`QUALTRICS, LLC
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`OPINIONLAB, INC.
`Patent Owner
`
`_______________
`
`Case IPR2014-00366
`U.S. Patent 8,041,805
`
`_______________
`
`
`
`
`PETITIONER QUALTRICS, LLC’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
`
`
`
`FILED VIA PRPS
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Table of Contents
`
`I.
`
`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
`
`II. Motion to Exclude and Authorization ............................................................. 1
`
`III. Dr. Shamos’s Opinions Regarding Obviousness Should Be Excluded .......... 2
`
`IV. Dr. Shamos’s Opinions Regarding Secondary Considerations Should
`Also Be Excluded ............................................................................................ 6
`
`V.
`
`Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 10
`
`i
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00366
`U.S. Patent No. 8,041,805
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Petitioner Qualtrics, LLC moves to exclude the opinions of Patent Owner
`
`OpinionLab, Inc.’s expert Dr. Shamos regarding obviousness and secondary
`
`considerations. Dr. Shamos applied the wrong legal standard in determining the
`
`level of ordinary skill and thus his determinations on obviousness are flawed and
`
`inadmissible. Further, Dr. Shamos’s opinions on secondary considerations are also
`
`flawed and inadmissible because they (a) go beyond his qualifications, (b) fail to
`
`show the required nexus, and (c) ignore many other important factors relevant to
`
`secondary considerations. Thus, Qualtrics moves to exclude:
`
`• Dr. Shamos’s opinions regarding obviousness, including ¶¶ 26–32,
`
`37–100 of his declaration (Ex. 2002 (“Shamos Decl.”)) and the
`
`portions of his deposition testimony (Ex. 1028 (“Shamos Dep.”))
`
`regarding obviousness.
`
`• Dr. Shamos’s opinions regarding secondary considerations,
`
`including ¶¶ 101–114 of his declaration and the portions of his
`
`deposition testimony discussing secondary considerations.
`
`II. MOTION TO EXCLUDE AND AUTHORIZATION
`
`A “motion to exclude evidence” must be filed by each party to preserve any
`
`objection. 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c). The motion may be filed without prior
`
`authorization from the Board. Id. The Scheduling Order governing this IPR
`
`1
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00366
`U.S. Patent No. 8,041,805
`
`specifically authorizes each party to file a motion to exclude evidence by Due Date
`
`4 or February 27, 2015. (Paper 16.)
`
`III. DR. SHAMOS’S OPINIONS REGARDING OBVIOUSNESS SHOULD
`BE EXCLUDED
`
`The Federal Rules of Evidence apply to PTAB Proceedings. 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.62(a). And expert testimony that is premised on an incorrect legal standard is
`
`inadmissible under FRE 702. See, e.g., Hebert v. Lisle Corp., 99 F.3d 1109, 1117
`
`(Fed. Cir. 1996) (“We encourage exercise of the trial court’s gatekeeper authority
`
`when parties proffer, through purported experts, not only unproven science, but
`
`markedly incorrect law. Incorrect statements of law are no more admissible
`
`through ‘experts’ than are falsifiable scientific theories.”) (emphasis added).
`
`
`
`Dr. Shamos’s opinions regarding obviousness should be excluded because
`
`he applied the wrong legal standard in determining the level of ordinary skill. To
`
`do so, he considered only the ’805 Patent and failed to assess the prior art in the
`
`field in making his determination. Indeed, Dr. Shamos conceded in his deposition
`
`that he looked solely at the ’805 Patent specification and claims:
`
`I look at the field of the invention as defined by the inventor. I look at
`
`the specification to see what level of education and background would
`
`be needed to understand the specification. And then I look at the
`
`claims to see what one would need to know in order to implement the
`
`invention as claimed. And . . . I’m able to formulate a level of skill
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00366
`U.S. Patent No. 8,041,805
`
`from that.
`
`(Shamos Dep. at 70:1–9.)
`
`
`
`Dr. Shamos deemed the prior art “irrelevant” and confirmed his belief that
`
`the level of ordinary skill is determined by reference to the ’805 Patent alone:
`
`Q: Did you consider the prior art that was referenced in the petitions?
`
`. . .
`
`A: I don’t recall having done so. . . . It’s difficult for me to imagine
`
`how it would be relevant.
`
`Q: And why would that not be relevant?
`
`A: Because the person of ordinary skill in the art is determined by
`
`reference to the patent.
`
`(Id. at 70:10–25.)
`
`
`
`But since a person of ordinary skill is “presumed to know the relevant art,”
`
`such relevant prior art must be considered to properly assess the skill level. See In
`
`re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). To determine the skill level,
`
`the Federal Circuit and Patent Office have emphasized five factors: “[1] type of
`
`problems encountered in the art; [2] prior art solutions to those problems;
`
`[3] rapidity with which innovations are made; [4] sophistication of the technology;
`
`and [5] education level of active workers in the field.” Id.; MPEP § 2141.03;
`
`accord. Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 666–67 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Custom
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00366
`U.S. Patent No. 8,041,805
`
`Accessories v. Jeffrey-Allan Industries, 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
`
`
`
`For example, in In re GPAC, the Federal Circuit confirmed that the level of
`
`ordinary skill in the art is best determined by reference to the prior art of record.
`
`57. F.3d at 1579. There, the level of ordinary skill in the art of asbestos removal
`
`and contamination control was determined based on a book entitled Asbestos, the
`
`primary prior art reference at issue. Id. The Federal Circuit approved this approach,
`
`because the prior art “offers valuable insight” into the factors for determining the
`
`level of ordinary skill. Id.
`
`
`
`The Federal Circuit noted that the Asbestos book “explains the hazards
`
`associated with asbestos removal and discusses in detail the types of problems
`
`encountered in the art as well as possible solutions.” Id. The book also explains
`
`that an asbestos removal system “demands a technical sophistication . . .
`
`commensurate with the hazardous nature of the work.” Id. The book also explains
`
`that asbestos removal emphasizes “professional competence in ensuring regulatory
`
`compliance.” Id. Thus, the Federal Circuit found the Asbestos book instructive on
`
`at least four of the five factors used to determine the level of ordinary skill.
`
`
`
`In contrast, Dr. Shamos failed to consider any of the factors articulated by
`
`the Federal Circuit and Patent Office since he admittedly did not consider any the
`
`prior art in the field of the ’805 Patent at all. Because Mr. Shamos applied the
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00366
`U.S. Patent No. 8,041,805
`
`wrong legal standard, his obviousness opinions should be excluded.1 See, e.g.,
`
`Huang v. Marklyn Group Inc., 2014 WL 3559367, *5-*6 (D. Colo. 2014) (granting
`
`motion to exclude technical expert’s obviousness testimony where it was not
`
`grounded in proper methodology and failed to apply proper level of ordinary skill
`
`in the art); Am. Med. Sys., 712 F. Supp. 2d at 901 (holding patentee’s expert’s
`
`opinions were “inadmissible because they are based on incorrect legal standards”);
`
`Hebert v. Lisle Corp., 99 F.3d at 1117 (“Incorrect statements of law are no more
`
`admissible through ‘experts’ than are falsifiable scientific theories.”).
`
`
`
`Qualtrics moves to exclude Dr. Shamos’s opinions regarding obviousness,
`
`including ¶¶ 26–32, 37–100 of his declaration and the portions of his deposition
`
`testimony regarding obviousness.
`
`
`1 Dr. Shamos suggest that even if he adopted Qualtrics’s characterization of a
`
`person of ordinary skill, it would not impact his obviousness analysis. (Shamos
`
`Decl. at ¶ 32.) But Dr. Shamos’s opinions on whether a person of ordinary skill
`
`would have found the claims obvious or been motivated to combine the references
`
`necessarily depend on his characterization of what a person of ordinary skill would
`
`have known and considered, which is materially different from Qualtrics’s.
`
`Because Dr. Shamos applied the wrong legal standard and his opinions are from
`
`that erroneous perspective, they should be excluded.
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00366
`U.S. Patent No. 8,041,805
`
`IV. DR. SHAMOS’S OPINIONS REGARDING SECONDARY
`CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD ALSO BE EXCLUDED
`
`Dr. Shamos’s opinions regarding secondary considerations should also be
`
`excluded. Dr. Shamos (a) is not a financial expert, nor did he conduct an adequate
`
`investigation, (b) failed to show the required nexus between the claimed subject
`
`matter of the ’805 Patent and any alleged secondary consideration, and (c) ignored
`
`many other important factors relevant to the alleged secondary considerations.
`
`First, Dr. Shamos is not a financial expert qualified to analyze commercial
`
`success or industry recognition. Dr. Shamos has a background in computer science,
`
`and does not claim to have any experience or expertise with financial analysis or
`
`the online survey industry. Nor did he conduct an investigation into whether the
`
`OpinionLab products achieved commercial success or industry recognition. Dr.
`
`Shamos testified that he “never talked to anybody at OpinionLab.” (Shamos Dep.
`
`315:23–316:2.) He admitted he did not know OpinionLab’s revenue, its
`
`competitors in the consumer feedback space, or its annual growth rate for the last
`
`several years. (Shamos Dep. at 317:25–318:1; 319:23–320:12; 321:1–8.)
`
`
`
`Without this basic information—or the necessary financial expertise—Dr.
`
`Shamos is not qualified to offer expert testimony that the relevant OpinionLab
`
`products achieved commercial success and industry recognition. See, e.g., AMO, v.
`
`Alcon, 2005 WL 782809 (D. Del. 2005) (granting motion to exclude patentee’s
`
`expert witness from testifying as to commercial success where he lacked expertise
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00366
`U.S. Patent No. 8,041,805
`
`in the financial aspects of patentee’s products); XpertUniverse v. Cisco Sys., 2013
`
`WL 865974, *3-*4 (D. Del. 2013) (striking patentee’s technical expert’s testimony
`
`on secondary considerations, holding “most of Dr. Nourbakhsh's opinions about
`
`secondary considerations of non-obviousness go beyond his computer science and
`
`call center expertise and are therefore not reliable.”).
`
`
`
`Second, Dr. Shamos fails to show the required nexus between the claimed
`
`subject matter of the ’805 Patent and any alleged related commercial success or
`
`industry recognition. “[E]vidence of commercial success alone is not sufficient to
`
`demonstrate nonobviousness of a claimed invention.” In re DBC, 545 F.3d 1373,
`
`1384 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Rather, “the proponent must offer proof ‘that the sales were
`
`a direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention . . . . ’” Id.
`
`(emphasis added). Likewise, “[i]ndustry praise must also be linked to the patented
`
`invention.” Geo M. Martin v. All. Mach, 618 F.3d 1294, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
`
`
`
`To meet this requirement, Dr. Shamos must show that the claimed subject
`
`matter of the ’805 Patent was responsible for OpinionLab’s alleged commercial
`
`success and industry recognition. But he never talked to anybody at OpinionLab,
`
`or conduct any independent research or analysis, to find out what drove demand
`
`for the products and which customers, if any, practice the claimed subject matter of
`
`the ’805 Patent. (Shamos Dep. at 315:23–316:2.) Nor did he investigate which of
`
`OpinionLab customers, if any, actually practice the claimed features of the ’805
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00366
`U.S. Patent No. 8,041,805
`
`Patent. For example, he did not review the websites of alleged customers Bank of
`
`America, Wal-Mart, Ford, Dell, IBM, or other customers to determine whether
`
`they practice the ’805 Patent. (Id. at 291:10–292:20.). Nor did Dr. Shamos conduct
`
`any formal or informal interviews or surveys regarding the specific claimed
`
`features of the ’805 Patent to determine which features, if any, drove sales. (See
`
`Shamos Dep. at 313:18–24 (“No, [I did not conduct any surveys].”); 314:21–24
`
`“No, [OpinionLab] did not provide me with [any surveys].”).)
`
`
`
`Because Dr. Shamos fails to support the legally required nexus, his opinions
`
`should be excluded. See, e.g., Medicines Company v. Mylan Inc., 2014 WL
`
`1227214, *4–*6 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (granting motion to strike expert testimony on the
`
`issue of commercial success since the expert applied an incorrect legal
`
`methodology and failed to show a nexus for the alleged commercial success);
`
`Lutron Electronics Co., Inc. v. Crestron Electronics, Inc., WL 4881570, *8–*10
`
`(D. Utah 2013) (refusing to permit two technical experts to testify as to the nexus
`
`of the alleged commercial success where the experts did not undertake any analysis
`
`to show it was the features of the asserted patent that drove sales).
`
`
`
`Third, Dr. Shamos also ignores many other important factors relevant to
`
`secondary considerations, rendering his analysis fatally flawed. For example, he
`
`did not consider how other factors may have contributed or were responsible for
`
`the alleged commercial success and industry recognition, including:
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00366
`U.S. Patent No. 8,041,805
`• OpinionLab’s other bundled products and services unrelated to the
`
`’805 Patent, such as its mobile, in store, and product feedback
`
`solutions, and its implementation design, data collection, analysis,
`
`and reporting services provided to customers. (See Shamos Dep. at
`
`298:16–299:6 (“I don’t know what the range of products and
`
`services that’s provided by OpinionLab is.”).)
`
`• OpinionLab’s trademarks, including its [+] feedback symbol. (See
`
`Shamos Dep. at 307:19–309:2. (acknowledging that the [+] symbol
`
`is a “contributing factor” to OpinionLab’s success).)
`
`• Other economic and commercial factors such as OpinionLab’s
`
`marketing and sales efforts, market share factors, and trends in the
`
`online survey market. (See Shamos Dep. at 317:25–321:22.)
`
`By failing to account for any of these factors, Dr. Shamos has no basis to assert
`
`that any alleged secondary consideration is directly attributable to the claimed
`
`subject matter of the ’805 Patent.
`
`
`
`Instead, Dr. Shamos’s opinions on secondary considerations merely serve as
`
`a mouthpiece for OpinionLab’s counsel and present attorney argument under the
`
`guise of “expert testimony.” Nor did Dr. Shamos conducted any rigorous analysis
`
`whatsoever of the alleged secondary considerations here. Such opinions should be
`
`excluded. See e.g., Advanced Medical Optics, v. Alcon, 2005 WL 782809 (D. Del.
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00366
`U.S. Patent No. 8,041,805
`
`2005) (granting motion to exclude patentee’s expert witness from testifying as to
`
`commercial success where the expert did not disclose any basis supporting his
`
`opinion except for information provided by patentee’s counsel); Rambus Inc. v.
`
`Hynix Semiconductor Inc., 2008 WL 5411571, *13 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (granting
`
`accused infringer's motion in limine to preclude patentee's technical expert from
`
`opining on secondary considerations, holding “[t]o give expert testimony, Mr.
`
`Murphy must use his expertise to rigorously analyze an issue and present his
`
`opinion. He has not done that in connection with most of his opinions on secondary
`
`considerations. Rambus may not put on its closing argument through Mr. Murphy
`
`as ‘expert testimony.’”).
`
`
`
`Qualtrics moves to exclude Dr. Shamos’s opinions regarding secondary
`
`considerations, including ¶¶ 101–114 of his declaration and the portions of his
`
`deposition testimony discussing secondary considerations.
`
`V. CONCLUSION
`
`For the reasons above, Qualtrics respectfully requests that Dr. Shamos’s
`
`opinions on obviousness and secondary considerations be excluded.
`
`
`
`Dated: February 27, 2015
`
`
`/s/ Robert Steinberg
`By:
`Latham & Watkins LLP, Counsel for Petitioner
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00366
`U.S. Patent No. 8,041,805
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e) and the parties’ agreement to electronic service
`
`on August 21, 2014, I certify that on February 27, 2015, a copy of:
`
`PETITIONER QUALTRICS, LLC’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
`
`was served by e-mail on Patent Owner’s lead and backup counsel, as follows:
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`Christopher W. Kennerly
`chriskennerly@paulhastings.com
`Paul Hastings LLP
`1117 S. California Ave.
`Palo Alto, CA 94304
`
`
`
`Naveen Modi
`naveenmodi@paulhastings.com
`Timothy P. Cremen
`timothycremen@paulhastings.com
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20005
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` By: /s/ Robert Steinberg
`
` Robert Steinberg
`
` Reg. No. 33144
`
` Neil A. Rubin
`
` Reg. No. 67030
`
` Jonathan M. Jackson (admitted pro hac vice)
`
` Philip X. Wang (admitted pro hac vice)
`
` Latham & Watkins LLP
`
` 355 South Grand Avenue
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` Los Angeles, CA 90071-1560
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` 213.485.1234
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` 213.891.8763 (Fax)
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` Counsel for Petitioner
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