IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`Parrot S.A. and Parrot, Inc.
`
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`Drone Technologies, Inc.
`
`Patent Owner
`
`___________________
`
`Case IPR2014-00730
`U.S. Patent No. 7,584,071
`___________________
`
`
`
`Before HOWARD B. BLANKENSHIP, MATTHEW R. CLEMENTS, and
`CHRISTOPHER M. KAISER, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING OF THE FINAL WRITTEN
`DECISION OF OCTOBER 20, 2015, PAPER 27
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`Parrot S.A. and Parrot, Inc.
`
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`Drone Technologies, Inc.
`
`Patent Owner
`
`___________________
`
`Case IPR2014-00730
`U.S. Patent No. 7,584,071
`___________________
`
`
`
`Before HOWARD B. BLANKENSHIP, MATTHEW R. CLEMENTS, and
`CHRISTOPHER M. KAISER, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING OF THE FINAL WRITTEN
`DECISION OF OCTOBER 20, 2015, PAPER 27
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00730
`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
`
`Petitioner respectfully requests reconsideration of the Board’s Final Written
`
`Decision of October 20, 2015, Paper 27 (“Decision”) finding claims 4 and 15 of
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,584,071 (the ’071 Patent) not unpatentable.
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), Petitioner specifically identifies “all
`
`matters Petitioner believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place
`
`where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a
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`reply.” As discussed in more detail below, rehearing is warranted because the
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`Board overlooked record evidence showing that: (1) Smith (Ex. 1002) meets claim
`
`4’s “difference of motion” requirement; (2) Shkolnikov (Ex. 1009) is analogous
`
`art; and, that (3) all claims are obvious even if Shkolnikov is not considered
`
`analogous. Rehearing should also be granted because the Board misapplied the
`
`burdens of production and persuasion.
`
`Petitioner does not seek reconsideration of the PTAB’s decision that claims
`
`1-3 and 5-14 are unpatentable.
`
`I.
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
`
`The ’071 Patent is directed to the remote control of a device such as a model
`
`plane. The ’071 Patent teaches that such devices can be more easily controlled by
`
`using a “magnetic sensor” in the remote control and the device to “synchronize”
`
`the motion of the remote controller with the device. Ex. 1001, 2:62-3:3. To
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`synchronize motion, both the remote controller and the device measure and
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`1
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`Case IPR2014-00730
`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`compare changes in their orientations as detected by the magnetic sensors. Ex.
`
`1001, 4:5-48.
`
`At issue before the Board is whether the prior art satisfies two claim
`
`limitations of the ’071 Patent: (1) the “difference of motion” requirement of claim
`
`4, and (2) the “configuration switch” requirement of claim 15.
`
`A.
`
`“Difference of Motion”
`
`Claim 1, the sole independent claim, broadly claims a system for sensing
`
`“terrestrial magnetism” in a remote-controlled device and a remote controller to
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`control the motion of the remote-controlled device. The remote controller’s
`
`motion is communicated to the remote-controlled device as a “target motion
`
`signal.”
`
`Claim 4 further requires the calculation of the “difference of motion”
`
`between the remote-controlled device on one hand and the remote controller on the
`
`other. The term “difference of motion” does not appear anywhere in the ’071
`
`Patent Specification. The Patent specification only refers to the “difference”
`
`between “terrestrial magnetism” (orientation) measured in the device and the
`
`terrestrial magnetism in the remote controller, which is communicated to the
`
`device by the “target motion signal.” Ex. 1001, 4:42-48; Ex. 1010, ¶¶ 89-90.
`
`Petitioner challenged claim 4 as anticipated by Smith (Ex. 1002), and, in the
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`alternative, obvious based on the combination of Smith and Fouche (Ex. 1006), or
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`2
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`Case IPR2014-00730
`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner’s support included the
`
`prior art references and the Declaration of Prof. Raffaello D’Andrea (Ex. 1010),
`
`which expressly addressed both anticipation and obviousness of claim 4. Prof.
`
`D’Andrea explained how Smith teaches a “difference” calculation related to
`
`motion that causes a change of orientation, resulting in a vehicle’s motion in a
`
`clockwise or counterclockwise direction. Ex. 1010, ¶¶ 90-92.
`
`In its decision instituting IPR, the Board construed “difference of motion” to
`
`require “relative motion” (Paper 8, 9-10), and found Petitioner had established a
`
`reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its anticipation challenge against claim 4
`
`(Id., 13). The Board declined to institute IPR on the alternative obviousness
`
`ground, exercising its discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) and citing
`
`“administrative necessity”
`
`to ensure
`
`timely completion of
`
`the
`
`instituted
`
`proceeding. Id., 18.
`
`In its Patent Owner Response (Paper 15, “POR”), Patent Owner argued that
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`Smith does not teach “difference of motion” because it does not convey any
`
`information about “changes in orientation” of the remote controller. Paper 15, 10.
`
`The Board properly rejected this same argument in the institution decision, relying
`
`on the specification of Smith to conclude, “when the claims are interpreted in light
`
`of the specification, as they must be, detecting the orientation of a remote
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`controller with respect to magnetic North is, at the least, within the scope of
`
`3
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`Case IPR2014-00730
`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`‘detect[ing] the remote controller’s motion’ as claimed.” Paper 8, 12 (emphasis in
`
`original).
`
`In its Final Decision, the Board stated that “Petitioner in its Reply does
`
`not . . . provide a persuasive explanation with respect to how the signal sent by the
`
`remote controller in Smith, or its ‘target motion signal’ in the terms of claim 4,
`
`may contribute to getting the relative motion between the remote controller and the
`
`remote-controlled device.” Paper 27, 17. In a footnote, the Board stated that,
`
`although trial had not been instituted on obviousness, that argument “would suffer
`
`from the same deficiency as the anticipation ground.” Id., 17 n.2.
`
`B.
`
`“Configuration Switch”
`
`In addition to the use of magnetic sensors in a remote controller and remote-
`
`controlled device to control the device’s motion, claim 15 requires a “configuration
`
`switch” in the remote controller that would allow users to switch between manual
`
`(prior art) remote control, remote control using magnetic sensors, or a combination
`
`of the two. The ’071 Patent describes the configuration switch only in summary
`
`language (Ex. 1001, 6:53-57). The “configuration switch” was not alleged to play
`
`any role in the solution to the problem addressed by the ’071 Patent.
`
`In instituting trial, the Board found that Petitioner had shown a reasonable
`
`likelihood it would prevail in its challenge of claim 15 as obvious over Smith,
`
`Spirov, Bathiche, and Shkolnikov. Paper 8, 18. Although Patent Owner had
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`4
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`Case IPR2014-00730
`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`argued that Bathiche and Shkolnikov were non-analogous art, the facts in the
`
`record were not sufficient to persuade the Board on that point. Id.
`
`In its POR, Patent Owner again argued that Bathiche and Shkolnikov were
`
`non-analogous citing the declaration of Prof. Sturges as support, but Prof. Sturges’
`
`declaration did not address the issue of analogous art. See Ex. 2013. In its Final
`
`Decision, the Board stated that “[w]e find no fault with Patent Owner’s position
`
`that Shkolnikov is non-analogous art.” Paper 27, 25.
`
`II. ARGUMENT
`
`A. The Board Overlooked Petitioner’s Evidence Demonstrating that
`Smith Teaches the “Difference Of Motion” Required by Claim 4
`
`In finding claim 4 “not unpatentable” over Smith, the Board: (1) overlooked
`
`evidence Petitioner submitted demonstrating that Smith taught the required
`
`“difference of motion;” and, (2) improperly applied the burdens of production and
`
`persuasion in concluding Petitioner had not carried its burden to show anticipation.
`
`The Board found that Petitioner “in its Reply” did not explain “how the
`
`signal sent by the remote controller in Smith, or its ‘target motion signal’ in terms
`
`of claim 4, may contribute to getting the relative motion between the remote
`
`controller and the remote-controlled device.” Paper 27, 17. Petitioner, did,
`
`however, explain how Smith’s signal would contribute to getting the relative
`
`motion between the controller and the device in its Petition supported by Prof.
`
`5
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`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`D’Andrea’s declaration (see, e.g., Ex. 1010, ¶¶ 90-91), the substance of which was
`
`not disputed by Patent Owner or addressed by the Board.
`
`Prof. D’Andrea began his analysis by interpreting “difference of motion” to
`
`be “calculations related to motion that cause a change of orientation.” Id., ¶ 90.
`
`An interpretation was necessary because the term “difference of motion” does not
`
`appear anywhere in the patent, except in the language of claim 4, as explained in
`
`the Petition (Paper 1, 17). Prof. D’Andrea explained that the only reasonable way
`
`to interpret the “difference of motion” is a subtraction of orientations, because a
`
`subtraction of velocities based on terrestrial magnetism would be physically
`
`impossible. Ex. 1010, ¶ 90.
`
`In instituting the IPR, the Board did not take exception to Prof. D’Andrea’s
`
`suggested definition. Rather the Board interpreted “difference of motion” even
`
`more broadly, to require simply “relative motion.”1 Paper 8, 10. This construction
`
`was not disputed and was maintained in the Board’s Final Decision. Paper 27, 9.
`
`Having established a meaning for “difference of motion,” Prof. D’Andrea
`
`explained that Smith does in fact teach calculating the “difference of motion” of
`
`
`
`1 Though not at issue here, Petitioner submits that the term “difference of
`
`motion” is indefinite. The Board’s construction of “relative motion” does not
`
`resolve the problem.
`
`6
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`Case IPR2014-00730
`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`the remote-controlled device by subtracting the device’s current orientation:
`
`In Smith, the target motion signal is the desired orientation. In Smith,
`
`the comparison necessarily involves calculating a difference by
`
`subtraction, which involves subtracting the current orientation from
`
`the target orientation for motion in both the clockwise and
`
`counterclockwise directions. Fouche confirms that the calculation
`
`necessarily involves calculating a difference. It expressly states that
`
`the calculation required is the “difference” between the commended
`
`motion (attitude) and actual motion. Pet. Ex. 1002, 7:36-42.
`
`Ex. 1010, ¶ 91.
`
`Paragraph 91 of Prof. D’Andrea’s declaration indisputably demonstrates that
`
`Smith’s target motion signal contributes to the relative motion between the remote
`
`controller and the remote-controlled device. Patent Owner has never disputed that
`
`Smith teaches a difference calculation, nor is there any dispute that the result of
`
`this calculation is that the vehicle moves clockwise or counterclockwise as a result.
`
`This motion necessarily is motion relative to the remote controller—whether or not
`
`the remote controller itself moves. The Board overlooked this evidence in its Final
`
`Decision.
`
`The Board also misapplied the burdens of production and persuasion.
`
`Petitioner established a prima facie case of anticipation. Patent Owner thus had to
`
`provide rebuttal evidence sufficient to overcome the prima facie case. In re
`
`7
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`
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`Case IPR2014-00730
`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1295-97 (Fed. Cir. 2012). But Patent
`
`Owner did not.
`
`The only “evidence” provided by Patent Owner in rebuttal was Smith’s
`
`declaration stating that the “target motion signal” (direction control signal) in
`
`Smith is a summation of the angle of the joystick with the orientation (angle) of the
`
`remote controller with respect to magnetic north. According to Patent Owner, this
`
`means that the orientation of the remote controller is “no longer relevant.” Paper
`
`15, 11. Patent Owner implicitly argues, in other words, that the “target motion
`
`signal” must be identical to the orientation of the remote controller for purposes of
`
`claim 4.
`
`Patent Owner’s argument is directed to the meaning of “target motion
`
`signal,” not “difference of motion.” All claim 4 requires is that the target motion
`
`signal be subtracted from the remotely controlled device’s orientation. It does not
`
`require subtracting the remote controller’s orientation from the remote-controlled
`
`device’s orientation, yet the entirety of Patent Owner’s argument is directed to that
`
`irrelevant point.
`
`The term “target motion signal” is not limited, moreover, to the orientation
`
`of the remote controller. Indeed, as explained in Petitioner’s Reply, Figure 5
`
`shows that the target motion signal may include information in addition to the
`
`orientation of the remote controller. Paper 18, 7. The ’071 Patent states a third
`
`8
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`
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`Case IPR2014-00730
`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`target motion signal, STAR3, is a combination of the orientation of the remote
`
`controller and the input from the “manual input module” (joystick)—exactly as in
`
`Smith. Ex. 1001, 6:39-45. Petitioner did not argue, as the Board appeared to
`
`assume (Paper 27, 17) that the target motion signal in the ’071 Patent necessarily
`
`includes a summation. Petitioner merely argued that a target motion signal
`
`including a summation is within the scope of claim 4, contrary to the premise of
`
`Patent Owner’s argument.
`
`As explained in Petitioner’s Reply, the fact that the target motion signal
`
`(target orientation) may not be the same, in all cases, as the orientation of the
`
`remote controller in Smith has no bearing whatsoever on the only two issues that
`
`matter for claim 4: (1) whether Smith teaches a difference calculation, in which
`
`the vehicle’s target and actual orientations are subtracted; and, (2) whether the
`
`vehicle in Smith moves relative to the remote controller as a result. Paper 18, 7.
`
`The answers to those questions are, indisputably, “Yes.” Prof. D’Andrea’s
`
`testimony on these points (see Ex. 1010, ¶ 91) is uncontradicted. That should have
`
`ended the Board’s inquiry.
`
`It bears noting, moreover, that even under Patent Owner’s understanding of
`
`claim 4, Smith anticipates. In the case where the joystick is pointed up (0 degrees),
`
`Smith’s target motion signal is identical to the orientation of the remote controller.
`
`All motion of the vehicle is, in that case, relative to the motion of the remote
`
`9
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`Case IPR2014-00730
`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`controller as determined by its orientation. The law is settled that a single
`
`embodiment in the prior art is sufficient to anticipate. Titanium Metals Corp. v.
`
`Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Beloit Corp. v. J.M. Voith, GmbH,
`
`626 F. Supp. 991, 1009 (E.D.Va. 1986).
`
`B.
`
`The Board Overlooked Evidence that Shkolnikov is Analogous
`Art and that Claim 15 is Obvious even without Shkolnikov
`
`Claim 15’s requirement of a “configuration switch” is, as interpreted by the
`
`Board, substantially similar to the “configuration switch” required in all claims of
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,106,748, the subject of companion case IPR2014-00732.2 For
`
`claim 15 and all claims of the ’748 Patent, the Board found the claims not
`
`unpatentable on the sole ground that one prior art reference, Shkolnikov, is not
`
`“analogous art.” As in the companion case, the Board here overlooked evidence
`
`that Shkolnikov is analogous art, overlooked evidence of obviousness independent
`
`of Shkolnikov, and misapplied the burdens of production and persuasion.
`
`A reference is considered analogous prior art: (1) if the reference is from the
`
`same field of endeavor as the claimed subjected matter, regardless of the problem
`
`
`
`2 The language of the “configuration switch” of claim 15 differs from the
`
`language in claim 1 of the ’748 Patent. During prosecution of the ’748 Patent, the
`
`Examiner determined that language identical to that of claim 15 is indefinite.
`
`10
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`Case IPR2014-00730
`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`addressed, or (2) if “the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular
`
`problem with which the inventor is involved,” even though the reference is not
`
`within the field of the inventor’s endeavor. Scientific Plastic Products, Inc. v.
`
`Biotage, 766 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The Federal Circuit has explained:
`
`A reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a
`
`different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it. . . logically
`
`would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering
`
`his problem. Thus, the purposes of both the invention and the prior art
`
`are important . . . . If a reference disclosure has the same purpose as
`
`the claimed invention, the reference relates to the same problem, and
`
`that fact supports use of that reference in an obviousness rejection. . . .
`
`If it is directed to a different purpose, the inventor would accordingly
`
`have had less motivation or occasion to consider it.
`
`In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
`
`Prof. D’Andrea’s Declaration demonstrates that Shkolnikov meets both
`
`prongs of the analogous art test. First, Prof. D’Andrea explained that the relevant
`
`art is that of “control systems.” Ex. 1010, ¶¶ 20-21. Patent Owner did not dispute
`
`that in its POR. Shkolnikov, which also teaches a remote control, is in the same
`
`field of endeavor, regardless of whether the remote moves an object in real or
`
`virtual space. Ex. 1009, ¶¶ [0094], [0136].
`
`Second, in describing the state of the relevant art, Prof. D’Andrea explained
`
`that a person of ordinary skill in the art logically would look to remote controller
`
`11
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`Case IPR2014-00730
`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
`
`art directed to configuration switches:
`
`Remote controllers and their remotely controlled devices often operate
`
`in multiple modes of operation. To choose among multiple modes of
`
`operation for a single device, a switch must be deployed. Such
`
`switches have long been deployed in the art. See, e.g., U.S. Patent
`
`No. 7,145,551 (“Bathiche”. . .) (video game controller including
`
`configuration or mode switch to switch between sensed orientation
`
`based control and joystick control) and U.S. Patent Publication No.
`
`2004/0263479 (“Shkolnikov”. . .) (device, including remote control
`
`device, configured to use sensed movement of the remote control,
`
`manual control, or both).
`
`Ex. 1010, ¶ 52.
`
`Prof. D’Andrea further explained why a person of ordinary skill in the art
`
`would have been motivated to incorporate prior art configuration switches
`
`including manual-only modes of operation as well as sensed-control modes of
`
`operation into a remote-control system for a device. In addition to the fact that
`
`additional operating modes would have been a “routine design choice” (Id., ¶ 112),
`
`combinations of remote-control systems for controlling devices with configuration
`
`switches are both commonly deployed and expressly suggested in the prior art. Id.
`
`at ¶¶ 109-112.
`
`Prof. D’Andrea’s testimony demonstrating that Bathiche and Shkolnikov
`
`would have logically commended themselves to the person of ordinary skill in the
`
`12
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`Case IPR2014-00730
`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`art was not rebutted either by Patent Owner or Prof. Sturges. The only arguments
`
`Patent Owner’s Response made on the analogous art issue were: (1) neither
`
`Bathiche nor Shkolnikov addressed the problem of remotely controlled vehicles;
`
`(2) that Prof. D’Andrea had never heard of these references; and, (3) that
`
`Shkolnikov discloses entering alphanumeric text and data using one hand. Paper
`
`15, 19-20. In its Institution Decision, the Board already had found that the
`
`problem addressed is not limited to remote control of vehicles. Paper 8, 17-18.
`
`The second argument is plainly irrelevant, and was rejected by the Board. Paper
`
`27, 24. The third argument does not address the “configuration switch” or rebut
`
`Petitioner’s prima facie showing of Shkolnikov’s pertinence.
`
`Prof. Sturges’ testimony did not meet Patent Owner’s burden to rebut. With
`
`respect to Shkolnikov, Patent Owner cited only paragraphs 60 and 75 of his
`
`declaration. Paragraph 60 was not directed to the issue of whether a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art would have looked to a reference such as Shkolnikov for a
`
`configuration switch or multi-mode operation. It was directed instead to whether
`
`he himself would have used a Shkolnikov alphanumeric remote control in his own
`
`research efforts, (Ex. 2013, ¶ 60), which is not relevant to the analogous art test.
`
`In paragraph 75, Prof. Sturges states that a person of ordinary skill in the art
`
`would not have used Shkolnikov to modify Smith because Shkolnikov is directed
`
`to entry of alphanumeric text. Ex. 2013, ¶ 75. This too does not address
`
`13
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`Case IPR2014-00730
`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`pertinence. In any event, Shkolnikov is not limited to alphanumeric text entry.
`
`Shkolnikov indisputably shows the use of manual and sensed-motion remote
`
`control applications to manipulate objects. Ex. 1009, ¶¶ [0135], [0136]. This
`
`includes Fig. 46, showing the use of the “tilt” feature to manipulate a gunsight.
`
`Indeed, he ignores the expressly disclosed gaming applications altogether. The
`
`Board, too, overlooked this aspect of Shkolnikov. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek
`
`LLC, No. 2014-1575, 1576, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19307, *22-23 (Fed. Cir. Nov.
`
`5, 2015) (reversing PTAB finding of non-obviousness because a prior art reference
`
`must be considered for everything it teaches and not just the invention it claims).
`
`The overlooked disclosures in Shkolnikov render it indistinguishable from
`
`Bathiche, which the Board held to be analogous art in the companion case.
`
`IPR2014-00732, Paper 29, 8 n.2. Thus the Board’s determination that Shkolnikov
`
`is not analogous cannot logically be squared with the finding that Bathiche is
`
`analogous. Nor can it be squared with the case law governing “analogous art.”
`
`See, e.g., Scientific Plastic, 766 F.3d at 1358 (caps used to seal “beverage
`
`containers” analogous art for detachable cartridge with tube and cap for use in field
`
`of liquid chromatography systems); In re Ontjes, 587 F. App’x 641, 643-45 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2014) (beer koozie analogous art for propane tank); In re Icon Health &
`
`Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379-80 (Fed Cir. 2007) (folding bed analogous art
`
`14
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`Case IPR2014-00730
`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`for folding treadmill); In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
`
`(toothbrush analogous art for hairbrush).
`
`The Board also overlooked alternative obviousness grounds that do not
`
`require Shkolnikov. As explained in the Petition (Paper 1), the combination of
`
`Smith, Spirov, and Bathiche’s undisputably analogous art render claim 15 obvious
`
`because all three modes are taught. Paper 1, 35-40. Other than its incorrect
`
`argument that Spirov teaches only one mode of operation (see Paper 25, 72-74),
`
`Patent Owner did not rebut the substance of this obviousness challenge.
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`
`For the above reasons, Petitioner requests rehearing of the Board’s Final
`
`Written Decision (Paper 27) with respect to claims 4 and 15, and requests the
`
`Board find these claims unpatentable.
`
`Dated: November 19, 2015
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`/James E. Hopenfeld/
`James E. Hopenfeld (Reg No. 47,661)
`Hopenfeld@oshaliang.com
`Tammy J. Terry (Reg No. 69,167)
`Terry@oshaliang.com
`OSHA LIANG LLP
`909 Fannin Street, Suite 3500
`Houston, Texas 77010
`Tel: 713-228-8600/Fax: 713-228-8778
`Counsel for Petitioner
`
`15
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`Case IPR2014-00730
`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned certifies service pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e) on the
`
`Patent Owner by email and U.S. Mail a copy of the Petitioner’s Request for
`
`Rehearing of Final Written Decision as follows:
`
`Gene Tabachnick
`James Dilmore
`gtabachnick@beckthomas.com
`jdilmore@beckthomas.com
`docket@beckthomas.com
`BECK & THOMAS, P.C.
`1575 McFarland Road, Suite 100
`Pittsburgh, PA 15216-1808
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`Dated: November 19, 2015
`
`/James E. Hopenfeld/
`James E. Hopenfeld (Reg No. 47,661)
`Hopenfeld@oshaliang.com
`Tammy J. Terry (Reg No. 69,167)
`Terry@oshaliang.com
`OSHA LIANG LLP
`909 Fannin Street, Suite 3500
`Houston, Texas 77010
`Tel: 713-228-8600/Fax: 713-228-8778
`Counsel for Petitioner
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