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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`
` JIAWEI TECHNOLOGY (HK) LTD., JIAWEI TECHNOLOGY (USA) LTD.,
`SHENZHEN JIAWEI PHOTOVOLTAIC LIGHTING CO., LTD., ATICO
`INTERNATIONAL (ASIA) LTD., ATICO INTERNATIONAL USA, INC.,
`CHIEN LUEN INDUSTRIES CO., LTD., INC. (CHIEN LUEN FLORIDA),
`CHIEN LUEN INDUSTRIES CO., LTD., INC. (CHIEN LUEN CHINA),
`COLEMAN CABLE, LLC, NATURE’S MARK, RITE AID CORP., SMART
`SOLAR, INC., AND TEST RITE PRODUCTS CORP.
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`SIMON NICHOLAS RICHMOND
`Patent Owner.
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00938
`Patent 7,429,827
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S REPLY TO PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION
`TO THE PENDING MOTION TO TERMINATE
`THIS PROCEEDING FOR PETITIONER’S FAILURE
`TO IDENTIFY ALL REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
`
`
`
`

`
`Case No. IPR2014-00938
`Patent 7,429,827
`I. Coleman’s February 20, 2014 LLC Agreement – Giving Southwire
`“Full, Exclusive, and Complete...Control” Over Coleman’s “Business,
`Operations and Affairs” – Leaves No Doubt That Southwire Was An
`RPI When The Petition Was Filed.
`There is no dispute that, under applicable law, a non-party’s status as a real-
`
`party-in-interest (“RPI”) turns on whether there was “actual control or the
`
`opportunity for control” over the decision to file the inter partes review (IPR)
`
`petition and/or the arguments in it. See Ppr. 44, p. 2, 3, 6, 9, 13; see also Zoll
`
`Lifecor Corp. v. Philips Elec. North America Corp. et al., IPR2013-00616, Ppr. 17
`
`at 10 (“Factors for determining actual control or the opportunity for control include
`
`existence of a financially controlling interest in the petitioner [; …] the non-party’s
`
`relationship with the petitioner; the non-party’s relationship to the petition itself,
`
`including the nature and/or degree of involvement in the filing; and the nature of
`
`the entity filing the petition.”)
`
`Here, Southwire Company LLC’s (“Southwire’s) “control or the opportunity to
`
`control” over the IPR is definitively established by Coleman Cable LLC’s
`
`(Coleman’s) Limited Liability Company Agreement (the “LLC Agreement”),
`
`signed on Feb. 20, 2014 by Floyd Smith as Southwire’s “Secretary,” and disclosed
`
`for the first time in Petitioner’s opposition as Exhibit 1015. The LLC Agreement
`
`(1) names Southwire as Coleman’s sole managing “Member” and (2) provides:
`
`“The Member [Southwire] shall have full, exclusive and complete discretion
`to manage and control the business and affairs of the Company, to make all
`decisions affecting the business, operations and affairs of the Company and
`1
`
`
`
`

`
`Case No. IPR2014-00938
`Patent 7,429,827
`to take all such actions as it deems necessary or appropriate to accomplish the
`purpose of the Company as set forth herein. Subject to the provisions of this
`Agreement, the Member shall have general and active management of the
`business and operations of the Company.” Id. at ¶ 7. (Emphasis added).
`Since “full, exclusive, and complete…control…to make all decisions
`
`
`
`affecting [Coleman’s] business, operations and affairs” certainly includes
`
`Coleman’s legal “affairs,” such as deciding whether to file an IPR petition and
`
`what arguments to advance, it could hardly be clearer that when the Petition was
`
`filed, Southwire possessed the “actual control or the opportunity for control” over
`
`Coleman’s decisions necessary to establish Southwire’s RPI status. Id. The “full,
`
`exclusive, and complete…control” language, ignored by Petitioner, renders moot
`
`the question of whether Smith was wearing a Coleman “hat” or a Southwire “hat”
`
`when he executed the Power of Attorney (“POA”) that authorized the filing of the
`
`IPR petition; under either scenario, that “decision” was under Southwire’s “full,
`
`exclusive and complete . . . control.” Id.
`
`
`
`Petitioner’s other newly-introduced evidence is fully consistent with
`
`Southwire possessing the “control or opportunity for control” necessary to
`
`establish RPI status. Petitioner admits that: (1) when Southwire acquired Coleman
`
`in February 2014, it immediately replaced Coleman’s Directors and Officers with
`
`Southwire’s Officers. Ex. 1044, ¶¶ 5-7; (2) From February 11, 2014, when
`
`Southwire acquired Coleman, through February 20, 2014, when Southwire’s Smith
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`
`Case No. IPR2014-00938
`Patent 7,429,827
`executed the LLC Agreement, Ex. 1015, p.3; through June 2014, when Smith
`
`signed the POA authorizing the filing of the IPR Petition; and through January
`
`2015, when Smith retired, Smith was responsible for handing legal affairs for both
`
`Coleman and Southwire. Ex. 1044, ¶ 13; (3) In March 2014, Southwire adopted a
`
`Resolution (also signed by Smith) granting certain of Southwire’s officers power to
`
`bind the companies managed by it, including Coleman.1 Ex. 1044, ¶ 9, citing Ex.
`
`1016; (4) Coleman’s agreement to participate in and contribute $150,000.00
`
`toward the IPRs was after its acquisition by Southwire and thus under Southwire’s
`
`control. Ex. 1044, ¶ 16; and (5) The stubs for checks used to pay for the IPR, Ex.
`
`1042, though drawn from an account nominally bearing Coleman’s name, bore
`
`Southwire’s name and address.
`
`
`
`Southwire’s control of Coleman’s bank accounts is inherent to Southwire’s
`
`“full, exclusive, and complete” control over Coleman’s “business, operations, and
`
`affairs.” Id. Thus, the decision to contribute $150,000.00 toward the IPRs is
`
`attributable “full[y], exclusive[ly], and compete[ly]” to Southwire. Id. The printing
`
`of Southwire’s name and address on checks ostensibly drawn on accounts in
`
`1 The Resolution adds further proof of Southwire’s exclusive control and whether
`
`or not Coleman “approved” it is irrelevant: Since Southwire was in “full, exclusive
`
`and complete . . . control” of all decisions by Coleman, Southwire’s passing of the
`
`Resolution in the first place made Coleman’s “approval” a fait accompli.
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`
`Case No. IPR2014-00938
`Patent 7,429,827
`Coleman’s name is further proof of such control, not a software “glitch” happening
`
`without Southwire’s direction. Ex. 1042. The admitted sharing of employees, the
`
`joint press releases (on Southwire letterhead), and additional evidence discussed in
`
`Patent Owner’s moving papers, likewise support Southwire’s exercise of its control
`
`over Coleman in all aspects of its “business, operations and affairs.”
`
`
`
`This case presents an even clearer cut picture of control by an unnamed RPI
`
`than ZOLL, IRP2013-00616, ppr. 17 at 5, 10, 12, where the evidence was indirect.
`
`Here, Southwire’s control is established by direct evidence (i.e., the LLC
`
`Agreement). The indirect evidence merely confirms Southwire’s control already
`
`definitively established by the LLC Agreement.
`
`
`
`Southwire’s “full, exclusive, and complete” control over Coleman as its sole
`
`managing member renders Petitioner’s “changing hat” argument legally irrelevant.
`
`See Direct Marketing Concepts, Inc. v. Trudeau, 266 F.Supp.2d 794, 797 (N.D.
`
`Ill., 2003) (An argument that a sole managing-member “has somehow worn one
`
`hat individually and has worn another hat in his exclusive and total control of [his
`
`LLC] companies, is precisely the kind of manipulative litigation tactic that justifies
`
`judicial rejection.”); see also Kramer v. Stelter, 588 F. Supp.2d 862, 867 (N.D. Ill.
`
`2008) (LLCs “are in privity with their individual owners, particularly, as is the case
`
`here, when the owner has exclusive control over the LLC.”)
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`
`Case No. IPR2014-00938
`Patent 7,429,827
`In light of the foregoing, Petitioner has failed to carry its burden to prove
`
`
`
`that all RPIs existing at the time the Petition was filed were named.
`
`II. Termination Is Not Unfair To Petitioner.
`Termination at this stage, which is mandated by Petitioner’s failure to name
`
`Southwire as an RPI prior to the one-year bar date of 35 U.S.C. §§ 312 and 315, is
`
`not unfair to Petitioner. It bears repeating that on June 6, 2014, when Smith
`
`executed the POA, Ppr. 5, enabling Coleman’s participation in this IPR, he knew
`
`that Southwire had “full, exclusive, and complete . . . control” over Coleman’s
`
`“business, operations, and affairs” – because he had signed the LLC Agreement.2
`
`These facts were not known to Patent Owner until Petitioner filed its opposition.
`
`Because Petitioner filed its Petition near the statutory one-year deadline, even if
`
`Patent Owner had raised the issues in its preliminary response, it would have been
`
`too late to cure. As such, responsibility for the statutory consequences of
`
`Petitioner’s conscious decision to omit Southwire as an RPI when the Petition was
`
`filed, near the end of the statutory one-year period, rests solely with Petitioner.3
`
`II. Conclusion
`This IPR proceeding should be terminated for Petitioner’s failure to identify
`
`
`
`Southwire as a real party-in-interest, as required by 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2), prior to
`
`expiration of the one-year statutory bar of 35 U.S.C. § 315.
`
`
`2 Despite multiple extensions, Petitioner did not present a declaration by Smith.
`
`3 Since Southwire has been an RPI since day one, 37 C.F.R. § 42.8 is inapplicable.
`5
`
`
`
`

`
`Case No. IPR2014-00938
`Patent 7,429,827
`
`Respectfully Submitted,
`SHIELLS LAW FIRM, P.C.
`
`__/Theodore F. Shiells______
`Theodore F. Shiells
`Reg. No. 31,569
`
`
`
`Dated: July 28, 2015
`
`
`
`SHIELLS LAW FIRM P.C.
`Pacific Place Building
`1910 Pacific Avenue - Suite 14000
`Dallas, Texas 75201
`Attorneys for Patent Owner
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00938
`Patent 7,429,827
`
`
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.6(e)(4)(i) et seq. and 42.105(b), the undersigned
`
`certifies that on July 28, 2015, a copy of the PATENT OWNER’S REPLY TO
`
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO THE PENDING MOTION TO
`
`TERMINATE THIS PROCEEDING FOR PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO
`
`IDENTIFY ALL REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST was served on Lead and
`
`Backup Attorneys for Petitioner, via the consented to method of email to the
`
`following email addresses:
`
`mark.nelson@dentons.com, lissi.mojica@dentons.com,
`
`kevin.greenleaf@dentons.com, daniel.valenzuela@dentons.com, and
`
`iptdocketchi@dentons.com,
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`______/Theodore F. Shiells/________
`Theodore F. Shiells
`
`
`
`
`Dated: July 28, 2015
`
`
`
`
`
`
`7

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