throbber
Paper 57
`Trials@uspto.gov
`Entered: January 6, 2016
`
`571–272–7822
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________
`
`AMAZON.COM, INC., HTC CORPORATION, ZTE (USA), INC.,
`PANTECH CO., LTD., PANTECH WIRELESS, INC.,
`LG ELECTRONICS, INC., LG ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC., and
`DELL INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`_______________
`
`Case IPR2014-01134
`Patent 7,941,174 B2
`_______________
`
`
`
`Before JENNIFER S. BISK, GREGG I. ANDERSON, and
`ROBERT J. WEINSCHENK, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`WEINSCHENK, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`IPR2014-01134
`Patent 7,941,174 B2
`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`Amazon.com, Inc., NEC Corporation of America, NEC Mobile
`Communications, Ltd.,1 HTC Corporation, ZTE (USA), Inc., Pantech Co.,
`Ltd., Pantech Wireless, Inc., LG Electronics, Inc., LG Electronics U.S.A.,
`Inc., and Dell Inc. (collectively, “Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 10,
`“Pet.”) requesting an inter partes review of claims 1, 6, 9, 14, 18, and 19 of
`U.S. Patent No. 7,941,174 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’174 patent”). Cellular
`Communications Equipment, LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary
`Response (Paper 15, “Prelim. Resp.”) to the Petition. On January 15, 2015,
`we instituted an inter partes review of claims 1, 6, 9, 14, 18, and 19 (“the
`challenged claims”) of the ’174 patent on the following grounds:
`Claim(s)
`Statutory Basis
`Applied References(s)
`1, 6, 9, 14,
`35 U.S.C. § 102(e) U.S. Patent Pub. No. 2008/0151840
`18, and 19
`A1 (published June 26, 2008) (Ex.
`1005, “Baker”)
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) U.S. Patent No. 7,689,239 B2 (issued
`Mar. 30, 2010) (Ex. 1004, “Reed”) and
`Baker
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Reed and U.S. Patent No. 7,321,780
`B2 (issued Jan. 22, 2008) (Ex. 1006,
`“Love”)
`
`1, 6, 9, 14,
`18, and 19
`
`1, 6, 9, 14,
`18, and 19
`
`Paper 16 (“Dec. on Inst.”), 17.
`After institution, Patent Owner filed a Response (Paper 33, “PO
`Resp.”) to the Petition, and Petitioner filed a redacted Reply (Paper 42, “Pet.
`Reply”) and a sealed Reply (Paper 43) to the Response. An oral hearing was
`
`
`1 NEC Mobile Communications, Ltd. was formerly known as NEC CASIO
`Mobile Communications, Ltd. Paper 14, 2. NEC Corporation of America
`and NEC Mobile Communications, Ltd. were dismissed on February 12,
`2015. Paper 21, 2–3.
`
`2
`
`

`
`IPR2014-01134
`Patent 7,941,174 B2
`
`held on August 26, 2015, and a transcript of the hearing is included in the
`record. Paper 56 (“Tr.”).
`We issue this Final Written Decision pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)
`and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner has not
`shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 6, 9, 14, 18, and 19
`of the ’174 patent are unpatentable.
`A.
`Related Proceedings
`The parties indicate that the ’174 patent is the subject of several cases
`in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Pet. 1–
`2; Paper 13, 2–3.
`B.
`The ’174 Patent
`The ’174 patent relates to a radio communication system in which a
`subscriber station is assigned a plurality of codes for transmitting messages.
`Ex. 1001, col. 1, ll. 14–17. According to the ’174 patent, when radio
`transmission conditions deteriorate while a subscriber station is transmitting
`a message, a base station may request that the subscriber station increase the
`transmit power. Id. at col. 4, ll. 47–50. However, a subscriber station can
`only increase the transmit power up to a maximum value for that subscriber
`station. Id. at col. 4, ll. 50–52. As a result, if a subscriber station reaches the
`maximum transmit power during transmission of a message and
`subsequently receives a request from the base station to increase the transmit
`power, the subscriber station may have to abort transmission of the message
`before completion. Id. at col. 5, ll. 54–61.
`To address this problem, the ’174 patent describes a system in which
`the subscriber station maintains a transmit power difference or “power
`headroom.” Id. at col. 6, ll. 40–44. The transmit power difference is a
`
`3
`
`

`
`IPR2014-01134
`Patent 7,941,174 B2
`
`difference between the total transmit power for a plurality of codes assigned
`to the subscriber station at the start of a message transmission and the
`maximum transmit power for a plurality of codes assigned to the subscriber
`station. Id. at col. 6, ll. 42–47. For example, if the maximum transmit
`power for a subscriber station is 18 dBm and a transmit power difference of
`8 dBm is maintained by the subscriber station, the subscriber station has 10
`dBm of transmit power at the start of a message transmission. Id. at col. 6, l.
`55–col. 7, l. 3. As a result, if the base station requests an increase in transmit
`power for one of the codes during transmission, the subscriber station has 8
`dBm of headroom to increase the transmit power without having to abort the
`transmission. Id. at col. 6, ll. 40–49. The amount of the transmit power
`difference maintained by a subscriber station can be determined based on a
`variety of factors, including current interference, type of service, network
`strategy, and subscriber class. Id. at col. 7, ll. 29–30, col. 7, ll. 54–55, col. 8,
`ll. 8–9, col. 8, l. 13.
`C.
`Illustrative Claim
`Claims 1, 9, and 18 are independent. Claim 1 is reproduced below.
`1. A method for operating a radio communication
`system in which a subscriber station is assigned a plurality of
`codes for transmitting messages, comprising:
`determining a transmit power difference which is to be
`maintained by the subscriber station between on one hand a
`total maximum transmit power of the subscriber station for the
`codes and on another hand a total transmit power of the
`subscriber station for the codes at a start of a message
`transmission using a first one of the codes.
`Id. at col. 9, ll. 56–64.
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`
`IPR2014-01134
`Patent 7,941,174 B2
`
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`A.
`Identification of Real Parties in Interest
`The Petition identifies several real parties in interest. Pet. 1. Based
`on the information in the Petition and Preliminary Response, we did not
`identify any issues under 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2) or § 315(b), and we
`instituted an inter partes review. See Dec. on Inst. 2. Patent Owner argues
`in its Response that NEC Corporation and HTC America are real parties in
`interest that are not identified in the Petition. PO Resp. 41. According to
`Patent Owner, the Decision on Institution should be vacated because, under
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2), a petition that does not identify all the real parties in
`interest cannot be considered. PO Resp. 42–44. For the reasons discussed
`below, we do not vacate the Decision on Institution.
`1.
`NEC Corporation
`The Petition identifies NEC Corporation of America (“NEC
`America”) and NEC Mobile Communications, Ltd.2 (“NEC Mobile”) as real
`parties in interest. Pet. 1. Patent Owner argues that the Petition also should
`have identified NEC Corporation as a real party in interest because NEC
`Corporation controlled the participation of NEC America and NEC Mobile
`in this case. PO Resp. 47–49. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that NEC
`Corporation executed a Settlement Agreement with Patent Owner that
`required NEC America and NEC Mobile to withdraw from this case. Id. at
`48. Patent Owner also argues that certain statements in the Motion to
`Terminate NEC America and NEC Mobile demonstrate that NEC
`
`
`2 NEC Mobile Communications, Ltd. was formerly known as NEC CASIO
`Mobile Communications, Ltd. Paper 14, 2.
`
`5
`
`

`
`IPR2014-01134
`Patent 7,941,174 B2
`
`Corporation controlled the participation of NEC America and NEC Mobile
`in this case. Id. at 47–48.
`Patent Owner and NEC Corporation executed the Settlement
`Agreement that allegedly demonstrates NEC Corporation’s control with
`respect to this case on November 17, 2014. Id. at 45. Because Patent Owner
`is a party to the Settlement Agreement, Patent Owner knew of its terms at
`that time. Id. Thus, Patent Owner could have raised the issue of whether
`NEC Corporation is a real party in interest when the Settlement Agreement
`was executed, but did not. Patent Owner, NEC America, and NEC Mobile
`filed the Motion to Terminate that allegedly demonstrates NEC
`Corporation’s control with respect to this case on February 5, 2015. Paper
`19. Because Patent Owner signed the Motion to Terminate, Patent Owner
`knew of the statements therein at that time. Id. at 7–8. Thus, Patent Owner
`also could have raised the issue of whether NEC Corporation is a real party
`in interest when the Motion to Terminate was filed, but did not.
`Patent Owner instead waited until after we granted the Motion to
`Terminate and dismissed NEC America and NEC Mobile from this case to
`argue that NEC Corporation had controlled their participation. Ex. 2002,
`19:18–25:18. The result of Patent Owner’s delay is that the parties whose
`conduct is in question no longer are involved in this case. Patent Owner
`previously assured the remaining parties and the Board that “NEC’s
`termination from the IPRs [would] have little, if any, impact on the
`remaining parties or the Board.” Paper 19, 5. Yet, now, Patent Owner seeks
`the extraordinary remedy of terminating this case in its entirety based on
`statements made in the documents that secured the dismissal of NEC
`America and NEC Mobile (documents which the remaining parties did not
`
`6
`
`

`
`IPR2014-01134
`Patent 7,941,174 B2
`
`sign). Given Patent Owner’s delay and previous assurances regarding the
`dismissal of NEC America and NEC Mobile, we decline to terminate this
`case with respect to the remaining parties. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.12.
`2.
`HTC America
`Patent Owner argues that HTC America should have been identified
`as a real party in interest in the Petition because of the relationship between
`HTC America and HTC Corporation. PO Resp. 51–58. Specifically, Patent
`Owner argues that: 1) HTC America is a wholly owned subsidiary of HTC
`Corporation (id. at 51); 2) HTC America and HTC Corporation often act
`jointly in other cases (id. at 51–52, 54); 3) HTC America and HTC
`Corporation share inside and outside counsel (id. at 52–53); 4) the power of
`attorney for HTC Corporation in IPR2014-01135 was signed on behalf of an
`HTC America employee (id. at 53); and 5) HTC America is identified as a
`real party in interest in most other petitions for inter partes review that
`identify HTC Corporation as a real party in interest (id. at 54–55). Patent
`Owner’s argument is not persuasive.
`Whether a party is a real party in interest is a “highly fact-dependent
`question” that is evaluated “on a case-by-case basis.” Office Patent Trial
`Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759–60 (Aug. 14, 2012). Some of
`the common considerations for determining whether a party is a real party in
`interest include whether the party funds, directs, or controls the petition or
`proceeding. Id. at 48,760. Here, Patent Owner does not identify any
`evidence indicating that HTC America funds, directs, controls, or otherwise
`is involved in this petition or proceeding. Patent Owner’s argument that
`HTC America and HTC Corporation acted jointly in other cases and that
`HTC America is named as a real party in interest in other cases does not
`
`7
`
`

`
`IPR2014-01134
`Patent 7,941,174 B2
`
`indicate that HTC America is a real party in interest in this case. Similarly,
`Patent Owner’s argument that an employee of HTC America is identified on
`the power of attorney for HTC Corporation in IPR2014-01135 does not
`indicate that HTC America is a real party in interest in this case.3 Finally,
`Patent Owner’s argument that HTC America and HTC Corporation share
`counsel does not indicate that HTC America funds, directs, controls, or
`otherwise is involved in this case.
`B.
`Claim Construction
`The claims of an unexpired patent are interpreted using the broadest
`reasonable interpretation in light of the specification of the patent in which
`they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793
`F.3d 1268, 1278–79 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Claim terms generally are given their
`ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary
`skill in the art in the context of the specification. In re Translogic Tech.,
`Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). An applicant may provide a
`different definition of the term in the specification with reasonable clarity,
`deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir.
`1994). In the absence of such a definition, limitations are not to be read into
`the claims from the specification. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184
`(Fed. Cir. 1993).
`
`
`3 We also are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument because the power
`of attorney for HTC Corporation in IPR2014-01135 was signed by an
`employee of HTC Corporation (Pet. Reply 23–24; Ex. 2023, 24:20–25:6),
`and Petitioner represents that the reference to an HTC America employee
`was an oversight (Pet. Reply 24).
`
`8
`
`

`
`IPR2014-01134
`Patent 7,941,174 B2
`
`
`1.
`
`at a start of a message transmission using a first one of
`the codes
`Petitioner argues that the phrase “at a start of a message transmission
`using a first one of the codes” does not require express construction. Pet.
`Reply 3. Patent Owner argues that we should clarify that the phrase “at a
`start of a message transmission using a first one of the codes” modifies the
`phrase “a total transmit power of the subscriber station for the codes” in the
`challenged claims. PO Resp. 15–17. We determine that Patent Owner’s
`proposed interpretation is the broadest reasonable interpretation.
`
`Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation is supported by the claim
`language and the specification. In the challenged claims, the disputed phrase
`“at a start of a message transmission using a first one of the codes”
`immediately follows the phrase “a total transmit power of the subscriber
`station for the codes.” Ex. 1001, col. 9, ll. 62–64, col. 10, ll. 38–40, col. 12,
`ll. 8–10. Further, the specification explains that a “transmit power
`difference” is a difference between “a first and a second transmit power.”
`Id. at col. 2, ll. 41–43. According to the specification, the first transmit
`power is “the total maximum transmit power of the subscriber station for the
`plurality of codes” (id. at col. 2, ll. 45–47), and “[t]he second of the two
`transmit powers is the total transmit power of the subscriber station for the
`plurality of codes at the start of a message transmission using a first of the
`codes” (id. at col. 2, ll. 59–61 (emphasis added)). Thus, the specification
`indicates that the phrase “at a start of a message transmission using a first
`one of the codes” modifies the total transmit power. Other portions of the
`specification also support Patent Owner’s interpretation. See, e.g., id. at col.
`6, ll. 42–47 (“The transmit power difference . . . is required to exist between
`the total transmit power for the two codes DCH and EDCH at the start of
`
`9
`
`

`
`IPR2014-01134
`Patent 7,941,174 B2
`
`the transmission of an EDCH message and the maximum transmit power for
`the two codes DCH and EDCH.” (emphasis added)), col. 8, ll. 51–63.
`Therefore, we determine that, when given the broadest reasonable
`interpretation, the phrase “at a start of a message transmission using a first
`one of the codes” in the challenged claims modifies the phrase “a total
`transmit power of the subscriber station for the codes.”
`C.
`Anticipation of Claims 1, 6, 9, 14, 18, and 19 by Baker
`Petitioner argues that claims 1, 6, 9, 14, 18, and 19 are anticipated by
`Baker. Pet. 20. A claim is anticipated if each limitation of the claim is
`disclosed in a single prior art reference arranged as in the claim. Net
`MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). We
`have considered the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence, and we
`determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence
`that claims 1, 6, 9, 14, 18, and 19 are anticipated by Baker.
`Independent claim 1 recites “determining a transmit power difference
`which is to be maintained by the subscriber station between on one hand a
`total maximum transmit power of the subscriber station for the codes and on
`another hand a total transmit power of the subscriber station for the codes at
`a start of a message transmission using a first one of the codes.” Ex. 1001,
`col. 9, ll. 56–64 (emphasis added). Independent claims 9 and 18 recite
`similar limitations, with independent claim 18 further reciting at least one
`processor that is programmed to determine the transmit power difference.
`Id. at col. 10, ll. 32–40, col. 12, ll. 1–10.
`Petitioner argues that Baker discloses a mobile station that transmits
`signals on two channels, DPDCH and DPCCH. Pet. 21; Ex. 1005 ¶ 23. The
`mobile station also transmits a positive (“ACK”) or negative (“NACK”)
`
`10
`
`

`
`IPR2014-01134
`Patent 7,941,174 B2
`
`acknowledgement using a third channel, HS-DPCCH. Pet. 21; Ex. 1005
`¶¶ 24–25. The transmit power for the signals on the DPDCH and DPCCH
`channels is reduced at the boundary of the frame or timeslot immediately
`preceding the ACK or NACK signal to ensure that there is enough transmit
`power available for the ACK or NACK signal. Pet. 22; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 27, 30.
`Petitioner argues that the mobile station in Baker determines a transmit
`power difference, as recited in the challenged claims, by determining how
`much to reduce the transmit power for the DPDCH and DPCCH channels at
`the boundary of the frame or timeslot immediately preceding the ACK or
`NACK signal. Pet. 22–23. Figure 4 of Baker, as annotated by Petitioner, is
`reproduced below.
`
`
`Id. at 26. Figure 4 of Baker is a timing diagram showing the signals sent by
`the mobile station. Ex. 1005 ¶ 15. According to Petitioner, the transmit
`power difference is the difference between Pmax and the total transmit power
`for PC2 and PD2 at the boundary of the frame or timeslot immediately
`preceding the ACK or NACK signal. Pet. 23–26.
`Patent Owner argues that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that the
`boundary of the frame or timeslot immediately preceding the ACK or
`NACK signal in Baker is the start of a message transmission. PO Resp. 35–
`36. Specifically, Patent Owner identifies evidence indicating that a message
`
`11
`
`

`
`IPR2014-01134
`Patent 7,941,174 B2
`
`transmission may include multiple frames and timeslots. Id.; Ex. 1015 ¶ 11;
`Ex. 2022 ¶ 87. Thus, according to Patent Owner, the boundary of the frame
`or timeslot immediately preceding the ACK or NACK signal in Baker is not
`necessarily the start of a message transmission. PO Resp. 35–36; Ex. 2022
`¶¶ 85–87. We agree with Patent Owner.
`Petitioner does not identify any express disclosure in Baker indicating
`that the boundary of the frame or timeslot immediately preceding the ACK
`or NACK signal is the start of a message transmission. Pet. 23–26; Pet.
`Reply 9–10; Tr. 11:3–10. Petitioner instead argues that “an EDCH message
`as described in the ’174 patent can be a single frame,” and, thus,
`“maintaining a transmit power difference at a start of a frame (i.e., at a start
`of an EDCH message transmission) must be equivalent to maintaining a
`transmit power difference at a start of a message.” Pet. Reply 9; Tr. 13:15–
`19. In other words, Petitioner argues that the start of a frame of an EDCH
`message inherently is the start of a message transmission.4
`Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive. First, Petitioner only argues
`that the mobile station in the ’174 patent transmits an EDCH message. Pet.
`Reply 9. Petitioner does not argue or identify evidence indicating that the
`mobile station in Baker transmits an EDCH message. Id. at 9–10; Tr. 12:6–
`
`
`4 Petitioner argued at the oral hearing that the term “message transmission”
`in the challenged claims refers to any frame in a message because the EDCH
`message described in the ’174 patent can be a single frame. Tr. 61:2–62:10.
`Petitioner’s argument is improper because it was presented for the first time
`at the oral hearing. See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg.
`48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). Further, we are not persuaded that, because
`an EDCH message sometimes can be a single frame, the phrase “at a start of
`a message transmission” refers to the start of any frame in a message
`transmission.
`
`12
`
`

`
`IPR2014-01134
`Patent 7,941,174 B2
`
`16. Therefore, Petitioner’s argument that the start of a frame of an EDCH
`message inherently is the start of a message transmission does not
`demonstrate that the start of a frame in Baker inherently is the start of a
`message transmission. Tr. 12:6–16. Second, Petitioner does not identify
`evidence indicating that the start of a frame of an EDCH message
`necessarily is the start of a message transmission. Pet. Reply 9–10.
`Petitioner argues that an EDCH message can be a single frame, and, thus,
`the start of a frame of an EDCH message can be the start of a message
`transmission. Id. at 9; Ex. 1015 ¶ 11. However, the mere possibility that the
`start of a frame may correspond to the start of a message transmission is not
`sufficient to show that Baker anticipates the challenged claims. See In re
`Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Inherency . . . may not be
`established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain
`thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.”).
`Further, Petitioner acknowledges that a message transmission in Baker may
`include more than one frame, and, as a result, the start of a frame in Baker
`does not necessarily correspond to the start of a message transmission. Tr.
`12:6–16, 16:19–19:13.
`Therefore, because Petitioner has not shown that Baker expressly or
`inherently discloses determining a transmit power difference between a
`maximum transmit power for the codes and a total transmit power for the
`codes at a start of a message transmission using a first one of the codes,
`Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Baker
`anticipates claims 1, 6, 9, 14, 18, and 19.
`
`13
`
`

`
`IPR2014-01134
`Patent 7,941,174 B2
`
`
`D. Obviousness of Claims 1, 6, 9, 14, 18, and 19
`Petitioner argues that claims 1, 6, 9, 14, 18, and 19 would have been
`obvious over Reed and Baker and over Reed and Love. Pet. 27, 36. A claim
`is unpatentable as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences
`between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject
`matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
`made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter
`pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The
`question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual
`determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level
`of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) any objective indicia of non-obviousness.
`Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). We have considered
`the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence, and we determine that
`Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1,
`6, 9, 14, 18, and 19 would have been obvious over Reed and Baker or over
`Reed and Love.
`1.
`Reed and Baker
`Petitioner argues that Reed teaches a mobile station that determines its
`maximum transmission power, subtracts a headroom, and uses the remaining
`available transmit power to determine a maximum data rate for the data in its
`buffer. Pet. 32; Ex. 1004, col. 1, ll. 32–36. Petitioner argues that the
`headroom in Reed corresponds to the transmit power difference recited in
`the challenged claims. Pet. 30–32.
`Petitioner acknowledges that Reed does not teach expressly that the
`mobile station is assigned a plurality of codes for transmitting messages,
`
`14
`
`

`
`IPR2014-01134
`Patent 7,941,174 B2
`
`and, thus, also does not teach expressly a transmit power difference between
`a maximum transmit power for the codes and a total transmit power for the
`codes, as recited in the challenged claims. Id. at 28–29, 32–33; Ex. 1001,
`col. 9, ll. 56–64, col. 10, ll. 32–40, col. 12, ll. 1–10. Petitioner argues that:
`[A]lthough Reed does not explicitly disclose that a mobile
`station can be assigned a plurality of codes, Reed discloses that
`the mobile station can transmit two or more data streams or
`signals at the same time. Reed also discloses that the described
`communication system is a CDMA (Code Division Multiple
`Access) system in which signals are transmitted using codes.
`Baker explicitly discloses that “[a]s is customary with spread
`spectrum signaling several signals can be transmitted
`simultaneously each signal having its own signature or
`spreading code selected from a set of signatures.” Thus, Baker
`discloses that the plurality of data streams mentioned in Reed
`can each have its own code. Indeed, as described above, Baker
`discloses a subscriber station is assigned a plurality of codes.
`It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art to
`understand that the two or more data streams transmitted by the
`mobile station in Reed can be transmitted on different channels
`using different codes.
`Id. at 29 (internal citations omitted). In other words, Petitioner argues that
`Reed teaches a mobile station that can transmit two or more data streams,
`and it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art based on
`Baker that each data stream in Reed could be assigned a different code. Id.
`
`Patent Owner argues that, even assuming each data stream in Reed is
`assigned a different code, Petitioner still has not shown sufficiently that the
`challenged claims would have been obvious over Reed and Baker. PO Resp.
`39–41. The challenged claims recite determining a single transmit power
`difference for a plurality of codes assigned to the subscriber station. Id. at
`39; Ex. 1001, col. 9, ll. 56–64, col. 10, ll. 32–40, col. 12, ll. 1–10. Patent
`
`15
`
`

`
`IPR2014-01134
`Patent 7,941,174 B2
`
`Owner argues that, in contrast, Reed teaches determining a separate
`headroom for each data stream (and thus each code), not a single headroom
`for a plurality of codes. PO Resp. 39–41. We agree with Patent Owner that
`Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the
`challenged claims would have been obvious over Reed and Baker.
`
`As discussed above, Petitioner argues that Reed teaches a mobile
`station that can transmit two or more data streams. Pet. 28–29 (citing Ex.
`1004, col. 4, ll. 14–21). The portion of Reed cited by Petitioner states that:
`If the mobile station desires to send two or more data streams
`(or hold voice and data connections at the same time), an
`addition [sic] degree of freedom allows the mobile station to
`deliberately increase the headroom on one of the data streams
`to de-prioritize that data stream. This would result in, for
`example, a longer time to transmit a text message from the
`mobile station but allow a digital picture to be transmitted at an
`optimum data rate.
`Ex. 1004, col. 4, ll. 14–21 (emphases added). This portion of Reed indicates
`that the headroom for one data stream can be adjusted independently of the
`headroom for the other data streams, and, thus, demonstrates that each data
`stream has its own headroom. Id.; Ex. 1003 ¶ 110; Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 100–101.
`As a result, assuming that each data stream in Reed is assigned a different
`code, Reed teaches determining a separate headroom for each code, not
`determining a single headroom for a plurality of codes. Ex. 1003 ¶ 110; Ex.
`2022 ¶¶ 101–104.
`Petitioner argues that Patent Owner’s interpretation of Reed is
`incorrect. Pet. Reply 12–14. Specifically, Petitioner argues that:
`The disclosure in Reed that Patent Owner refers to describes
`that one data stream can be de-prioritized for the benefit of
`another data stream (for example, the system can de-prioritize a
`text message transmission in order to reserve transmission
`
`16
`
`

`
`IPR2014-01134
`Patent 7,941,174 B2
`
`
`power for more data intensive transmissions such as digital
`pictures). (See Williams Decl. ¶¶ 13–14.) This provides “an
`addition[al] degree of freedom” because more power can be
`allocated to higher-priority transmissions by reducing power
`allocated to lower- priority transmissions. (See Williams Decl.
`¶¶ 13–14.) If Reed disclosed independently establishing
`headroom for each code, as Patent Owner contends, there
`would be no “degree of freedom” for this prioritization of
`transmissions because the reserved power on one stream could
`not be used for transmission on any other stream. (See
`Williams Decl. ¶¶ 13–14.)
`Pet. Reply 13. Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive. Petitioner’s
`argument cites exclusively to the second declaration of Dr. Tim Williams.
`Id. In his first declaration, Dr. Williams states that “[o]ne skilled in the art
`would understand that the data streams disclosed in Reed are assigned
`different codes, each code having its own headroom.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 110.
`Thus, Dr. Williams’ first declaration supports Patent Owner’s argument. In
`his second declaration, Dr. Williams takes the opposite position and states
`that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that Reed teaches
`determining a single headroom for more than one code. Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 13–14.
`Because the statements in Dr. Williams’ second declaration cited by
`Petitioner are inconsistent with Dr. Williams’ first declaration, we determine
`that those statements lack credibility and we afford them little weight.
`Further, even if we afforded significant weight to the cited statements
`in Dr. Williams’ second declaration, Petitioner’s argument still is not
`persuasive. Petitioner argues that Reed teaches that one data stream can be
`deprioritized relative to another data stream. Pet. Reply 13. Petitioner
`argues that, to deprioritize a data stream, power must be reallocated from
`one data stream to another data stream, which allegedly cannot be
`
`17
`
`

`
`IPR2014-01134
`Patent 7,941,174 B2
`
`accomplished if each data stream has its own headroom.5 Id. However,
`Petitioner does not identify any portion of Reed that mentions reallocating
`power between data streams. Id. Rather, Reed teaches that, if the headroom
`for one data stream is increased, then the maximum data rate for that data
`stream is decreased. Ex. 1004, col. 2, ll. 13–19. Reed explains that, as a
`result, a particular data stream can be deprioritized by increasing the
`headroom for that data stream until its data rate is less than the data rate of
`the other data streams. Id. at col. 4, ll. 11–21. Thus, contrary to Petitioner’s
`argument, Reed teaches that a data stream can be deprioritized relative to
`other data streams, even when each data stream has its own headroom. Ex.
`2022 ¶ 101.
`Petitioner also argues that Reed teaches determining “headroom for
`the entire device, rather than just for an individual code the mobile station
`may be transmitting.” Pet. Reply 13–14 (citing Ex. 1004, col. 2, l. 56–col. 4,
`l. 13, Fig. 2). Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive. The portions of Reed
`cited by Petitioner refer to a first preferred embodiment that describes
`transmitting one data stream. Ex. 1004, col. 2, ll. 22–25, col. 2, ll. 56–57. In
`that embodiment, where the mobile station only transmits one data stream,
`the headroom for that data stream would correspond to the headroom for the
`entire device. However, the portions of Reed cited by Petitioner do not
`demonstrate that there is a single headroom for the entire device when the
`mobile station transmits two or more data streams. Also, Petitioner does not
`argue or identify evidence indicating that it would have been obvious to a
`
`5 Petitioner acknowledged at the oral hearing that this argument is premised
`on an assumption that the headroom in Reed is fixed. Tr. 25:1–27:12. That
`assumption is inconsistent with the express teaching in Reed that the
`headroom can be increased. Ex. 1004, col. 4, ll. 9–21.
`
`18
`
`

`
`IPR2014-01134
`Patent 7,941,174 B2
`
`person of ordinary skill in the art to modify Reed to use a single headroom
`when the mo

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket