throbber
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`_____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`_____________________
`
`JIAWEI TECHNOLOGY (HK) LTD., JIAWEI TECHNOLOGY (USA)
`LTD., SHENZHEN JIAWEI PHOTOVOLTAIC LIGHTING CO., LTD.,
`ATICO INTERNATIONAL (ASIA) LTD., ATICO INTERNATIONAL USA,
`INC., CHIEN LUEN INDUSTRIES CO., LTD., INC. (CHIEN LUEN
`FLORIDA), CHIEN LUEN INDUSTRIES CO., LTD., INC. (CHIEN LUEN
`CHINA), COLEMAN CABLE, LLC, NATURE’S MARK, RITE AID
`CORP., SMART SOLAR, INC., AND TEST RITE PRODUCTS CORP.
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`SIMON NICHOLAS RICHMOND
`Patent Owner.
`
`_____________________
`
`Case IPR2015-TBD
`Patent 7,429,827
`_____________________
`
`Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder to Related
`Inter Partes Review of U.S. Patent No. 7,429,827 (IPR2014-00938)
`
`

`

`Case IPR2015-TBD
`Patent 7,429,827
`
`APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULE................................................. 1
`I.
`RELIEF REQUESTED ............................................................................. 3
`II.
`STATEMENT OF FACTS........................................................................ 3
`III.
`IV. LEGAL STANDARD ................................................................................ 4
`V.
`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................. 5
`VI.
`35 U.S.C. § 315(C) ALLOWS FOR JOINDER OF ISSUES ................. 11
`VII. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 14
`
`

`

`Case IPR2015-TBD
`Patent 7,429,827
`Jiawei Technology (HK) Ltd., Jiawei Technology (USA) Ltd., and Shenzhen
`
`Jiawei Photovoltaic Lighting Co., Ltd., Atico International (Asia) Ltd., and Atico
`
`International USA, Inc., Chien Luen Industries Co., Ltd., Inc. (Chien Luen
`
`Florida), and Chien Luen Industries Co., Ltd., Inc. (Chien Luen China), Coleman
`
`Cable, LLC, Nature’s Mark, Rite Aid Corp., Smart Solar, Inc., and Test Rite
`
`Products Corp. (collectively “Petitioner”) respectfully requests the Board to join
`
`the trial resulting from the second petition for inter partes review of the ’827
`
`patent (filed with this motion) with IPR2014-00938 (“the ’938 IPR”) because the
`
`second petition is limited to one ground, which matches an instituted ground in the
`
`’938 IPR, relies on testimony from the same expert witness, involves the same
`
`patent with the same parties, and the petitioner expeditiously petitioned for review
`
`of the ’827 patent. Accordingly, there is good cause for granting this motion for
`
`joinder. In addition, joinder would enable a just, speedy, and efficient
`
`determination of the patentability of the claims of the ’827 patent.
`
`I.
`
`APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULE
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(b)
`
`(b) Considerations. —
`
`the Director shall
`In prescribing regulations under this section,
`consider the effect of any such regulation on the economy,
`the
`integrity of the patent system,
`the efficient administration of the
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case IPR2015-TBD
`Patent 7,429,827
`Office, and the ability of the Office to timely complete proceedings
`instituted under this chapter
`
`35 U.S.C. § 315(c)–(d)
`
`(c) JOINDER. —
`
`If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or
`her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any
`person who properly files a petition under section 311 that
`the
`Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 or
`the expiration of the time for filing such a response, determines
`warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314.
`
`(d) Multiple Proceedings. —
`
`Notwithstanding sections 135(a), 251, and 252, and chapter 30, during
`the pendency of an inter partes review, if another proceeding or matter
`involving the patent is before the Office, the Director may determine
`the manner in which the inter partes review or other proceeding or
`matter may proceed,
`including providing for
`stay,
`transfer,
`consolidation, or termination of any such matter or proceeding.
`
`35 U.S.C. § 325(d)
`
`(d) Multiple Proceedings. —
`
`Notwithstanding sections 135(a), 251, and 252, and chapter 30, during
`the pendency of any post-grant review under this chapter, if another
`proceeding or matter involving the patent is before the Office, the
`Director may determine the manner in which the post-grant review or
`other proceeding or matter may proceed, including providing for the
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case IPR2015-TBD
`Patent 7,429,827
`stay, transfer, consolidation, or termination of any such matter or
`proceeding. In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding
`under this chapter, chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take
`into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the
`same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were
`presented to the Office.
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b)
`
`Request for joinder. Joinder may be requested by a patent owner or
`petitioner. Any request for joinder must be filed, as a motion under
`§ 42.22, no later than one month after the institution date of any inter
`partes review for which joinder is requested. The time period set forth
`in § 42.101(b) shall not apply when the petition is accompanied by a
`request for joinder.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`RELIEF REQUESTED
`Petitioner requests the Board to join the second petition with the ’938 IPR.
`
`STATEMENT OF FACTS
`1.
`On or after June 11, 2013, patent owner served petitioners with a
`
`complaint alleging infringement of, inter alia, U.S. patent nos. 7,429,827 (“’827
`
`patent”) and 8,362,700 (“’700 patent”).
`
`2.
`
`On June 11, 2014, the petitioner filed petitions for inter partes review
`
`of the ’477 patent in IPR2014-00936, the ’700 patent in IPR2014-00937 (“’937
`
`IPR”), and ’827 patent in the ’938 IPR.
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case IPR2015-TBD
`Patent 7,429,827
`On June 30, 2014, the petitioner filed a revised petition for inter
`
`3.
`
`partes review of the ’827 patent (“first petition”).
`
`4.
`
`The petition asserted that, inter alia, Chliwnyj and Wu rendered
`
`obvious claims 27–29 and 31–35 of the ’827 patent, and that Chliwnyj, Wu and
`
`Lau rendered obvious claim 30.
`
`5.
`
`6.
`
`The patent owner filed a preliminary response on September 30, 2014.
`
`On December 16, 2014, the Board instituted review of claims 24–30
`
`and 35 of the ’827 patent. Importantly, the Board found that claim 30 was obvious
`
`over Chliwnyj in view of Wu, and Lau, but denied review of claims 31–34 on any
`
`of the proposed grounds.
`
`7.
`
`8.
`
`9.
`
`The petitioner requested rehearing on December 31, 2014.
`
`On January 13, 2015, the Board denied the request for rehearing.
`
`The petitioner filed a second petition for inter partes review of claims
`
`31–34 of the ’827 patent on January 16, 2015 (“second petition”), one month from
`
`the December 16, 2014, decision to institute.
`
`IV. LEGAL STANDARD
`Joinder may be authorized when warranted, but the decision to grant joinder
`
`is discretionary. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c); 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). When exercising that
`
`discretion, the Board is mindful that patent trial regulations, including the rules for
`
`joinder, must be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case IPR2015-TBD
`Patent 7,429,827
`every proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). As stated in the legislative history, the
`
`Board will determine whether to grant joinder on a case-by-case basis, considering
`
`of the particular facts of each case. See 157 Cong. Rec. S1376 (daily ed. Mar. 8,
`
`2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (when determining whether and when to allow
`
`joinder, the Office may consider factors including the breadth or unusualness of the
`
`claim scope, claim construction issues, and consent of the patent owner).
`
`V.
`
`ARGUMENT
`The ’938 IPR includes review of claim 30 of the ’827 patent as obvious over
`
`Chliwnyj in view of Wu and Lau. The second petition, which the petitioner seeks
`
`to join with the ’938 IPR, relies on the same ground, but applied to different
`
`claims. Joinder would simply add three claims (31–34) to the already instituted
`
`ground applied to claim 30 in the ’938 IPR.
`
`The second petition strikes a balance between 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) (“the
`
`Director may … reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the
`
`same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office”) and 35
`
`U.S.C. § 316(d) (“the Director shall consider … the economy, the integrity of the
`
`patent system, the efficient administration of the Office, and the ability of the
`
`Office to timely complete proceedings”). The second petition relies on the same
`
`ground as applied to claim 30 in the ’938 IPR, but raises substantially different
`
`arguments that address the patent owner’s argument that unforeseeably imported a
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case IPR2015-TBD
`Patent 7,429,827
`repetition requirement, i.e., requiring one “continuous color changing cycle” to
`
`repeat, and the Board appeared to agree largely with this construction. ’938 IPR,
`
`paper 19 at 23–24, paper 20 at 7, and paper 27 at 3.
`
`The patent owner made inconsistent statements necessitating the second
`
`petition. The patent owner neither raised the issue of repetition in litigation nor
`
`expressly in the ’827 patent. Ex. 1112 at 34–35 (n.23). The patent owner raised this
`
`issue for the first time in the’938 IPR, and in the related ’937 IPR the patent owner
`
`supplied a dictionary definition of “cycle” that required repetition. ’938 IPR, paper
`
`19 at 23–24, and ’937 IPR, ex. 2011. The Board then seemed to agree with this
`
`argument when it cited a different definition of cycle also requiring repetition and
`
`stated, “A ‘cycle’ implies some pattern or scheme; some phenomenon that happens
`
`and can happen again.” ’938 IPR, paper 20 at 16 (citing ex. 1113 (ex. 3001 in the
`
`’938 IPR)). Because the patent owner’s change in position was unforeseeable, the
`
`petitioner could not have reasonably anticipated it, and the Board should grant this
`
`motion for joinder.
`
`In addition to relying on matching grounds, albeit different asserted claims,
`
`the ’938 IPR and second petition involve the same parties, the same patent, and the
`
`same expert. Indeed, the claims 31–34 recite many of the same limitations as, for
`
`example, claims 24–25, under review in the ’938 IPR. Although the second
`
`petition seeks review of new claims, the patent owner admitted that the slight
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case IPR2015-TBD
`Patent 7,429,827
`differences between the claims “mean[] substantially the same thing,” and he
`
`continues to argue them as if the stand or fall together. Ex. 1109 at 24. Though the
`
`second petition raises minimal new issues, much of the claim construction remains
`
`the same, the prior art and ground is the same, and as the same declarant provides
`
`related testimony in both cases, cross-examination can be accomplished with a
`
`single deposition. Thus, joinder will have minimal impact on the ’938 IPR.
`
`The petitioner expeditiously filed its second petition, which includes merely
`
`one new issue, i.e., “continuous color changing cycle,” to ensure the just, speedy,
`
`and inexpensive resolution of a proceeding joined with the ’938 IPR. The Board
`
`issued a scheduling order on December 22, 2014, less than one month before the
`
`filing date of the second petition. During the initial conference call for the ’938
`
`IPR, the petitioner notified the Board of its intent to file this second petition and is
`
`working proactively with the patent owner to ensure minimal impact on the ’938
`
`IPR. The expeditious filing of the second petition enables the Board to decide
`
`promptly whether to institute and join a second petition with the ’938 IPR. As
`
`such, the scheduling order requires minimal changes, proposed below, to dates that
`
`the rules already allow the parties change by stipulation; the remaining dates can
`
`stay unchanged.
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case IPR2015-TBD
`Patent 7,429,827
`
`Current
`
`Proposed
`
`Prelim. Resp. in Second IPR Late April
`
`Late Feb./Early March
`
`’938 IPR DUE DATE 1
`
`March 23, 2015 May 13, 2015
`
`’938 IPR DUE DATE 2
`
`June 22, 2015
`
`June 30, 2015
`
`’938 IPR DUE DATE 3
`
`July 22, 2015
`
`July 30, 2015
`
`The impact on the patent owner will be minimal as the only issues that differ
`
`from the ’938 IPR are the construction of “continuous color changing cycle” and
`
`the applying ground of Chliwnyj, Wu and Lau to three claims (31–34), instead of
`
`just claim 30. The almost two-month extension to the patent owner response in the
`
`’938 IPR gives the patent owner sufficient time to address a single issue that, by
`
`his own admission, is “substantially the same.” Ex. 1109 at 24. The patent owner
`
`has already argued this term in the ’937 IPR preliminary response regarding
`
`Chliwnyj and Wu and must already address the ground of Chliwnyj, Wu and Lau
`
`in the ’937 IPR. Therefore, though the arguments are not substantially the same,
`
`there are a small number of issues for the patent owner to address, and the Board
`
`may therefore reduce the time for the patent owner’s preliminary response to about
`
`one month. This timeline is consistent with similar joined IPRs, and therefore the
`
`Board previously agreed that this timeline will give the patent owner sufficient
`
`time to prepare a response and allow the Board to meet its one-year deadline. See,
`
`e.g., IPR2014-00557, papers 9 and 10. The petitioner is open to changing the
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case IPR2015-TBD
`Patent 7,429,827
`proposed schedule and will work with the patent owner to agree on stipulated
`
`changes. The minimal additional work to address one new issue is outweighed by
`
`the public interest in judicial economy and consistency of outcome concerning
`
`substantially the same subject matter.
`
`The only rationale reason for the patent owner to oppose joinder is that it
`
`desires parallel proceedings in a forum that he perceives to be more favorable. This
`
`is because the patent owner admitted that, to the extent that the overlapping
`
`limitations did not make it obvious, the claims “mean[] substantially the same
`
`thing.” Ex. 1109 at 24. The patent owner gains by having the patentability of
`
`substantially the same claims finally decided at the PTAB because, if successful,
`
`the petitioner will be estopped from raising any ground it “raised or reasonably
`
`could have raised.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1). If parallel proceedings exist, the
`
`petitioner will attack the claims using at least some of the arguments contained in
`
`the second petition. It would be more efficient for the Board to provide one just,
`
`speedy, and inexpensive proceeding, instead of force the parties to litigate
`
`substantially the same issues in multiple forums, which would favor the patent
`
`owner due to the possibility of inconsistent results.
`
`The petitioner respectfully requests that the Board joins the IPRs to
`
`eliminate the burdens that parallel proceedings would impose on the petitioner, the
`
`patent owner, the Patent Office, and the District Court. Parallel proceedings could
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case IPR2015-TBD
`Patent 7,429,827
`happen in two ways. First, the accused infringers will offer a defense challenging
`
`the validity of claims 31–34 in District Court, which are similar to, for example,
`
`claims 24–45 currently under review in the ’938 IPR. Granting and joining the
`
`second petition will decrease the likelihood of parallel proceedings in District
`
`Court, thus achieving judicial economy and minimizing the opportunity of
`
`obtaining inconsistent results. Second, the petitioner plans to request ex parte
`
`reexamination of at least claims 31–34 of the ’827 patent. If the Board grants the
`
`second petition, the petitioner will request authorization to file a motion to stay the
`
`ex parte reexamination. Accordingly, the petitioner urges the Board to join the
`
`’938 IPR with the trial resulting from the second petition in the interest of judicial
`
`economy and to avoid parallel proceedings that might reach inconsistent results.
`
`Congress enacted the AIA trials to allow for a just, speedy, and inexpensive
`
`resolution to questions of patentability. The Board cannot accomplish this
`
`objective without comprehensively reviewing all asserted claims of the ’827
`
`patent, which by the patent owner’s own admission are substantially the same. Ex.
`
`1109 at 24. Conducting a trial for some claims of the ’827 patent in the Patent
`
`Office while litigating the validity of substantially the same claims in District
`
`Court is not in the best interest judicial economy and the efficient administration of
`
`the Patent Office. Thus, the petitioner urges the Board to grant this motion for
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case IPR2015-TBD
`Patent 7,429,827
`joinder to conserve not only the Patent Office’s resources, but also those of the
`
`District Court and the parties.
`
`VI.
`
`35 U.S.C. § 315(c) ALLOWS FOR JOINDER OF ISSUES
`Target Corp. v. Destination Maternity Corp., held that § 315(c) does not
`
`allow for joinder of issues, but two prior and three subsequent opinions agree that
`
`it does. IPR2014-00508, paper 18; see also Samsung Electronics Co Ltd. V.
`
`Virginia Innovation Sciences, Inc., IPR2014-00557, paper 10, Ariosa Diagnostics
`
`v. Isis Innovation Ltd., IPR2012-00022, paper 166; Medtronic, Inc. et al. v. Norred,
`
`IPR2014-00823, paper 12, Medtronic, Inc. et al. v. Endotach LLC, IPR2014-
`
`00695, paper 18; and Standard Innovation Corp. v. Lelo, Inc., IPR2014-00907,
`
`paper 10. The petitioner agrees with and relies on the Board’s analysis from
`
`IPR2014-00823, paper 12, quoted below:
`
`[T]he majority in Target found that the use of the word “any” did not
`render the statute ambiguous, and concluded that the language in §
`315(c) excludes from “any person” at least two persons from among
`those who may be joined to a proceeding. Specifically, the phrase
`“who properly files a petition under section 311” excludes the patent
`owner, and “as a party,” excludes persons who are already a party.
`Target, Paper 18 at 5. n.2. The phrase “as a party,” however, does not
`render the joinder provision of § 315(c) unambiguous. The only
`person excluded unambiguously from the scope of “any person” under
`§ 315(c) is the patent owner, via reference to § 311. Otherwise, §
`315(c) simply is labeled “Joinder”—as opposed to “Joinder of parties”
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case IPR2015-TBD
`Patent 7,429,827
`as in 35 U.S.C. § 299—and, while the phrase “join as a party” is used,
`§ 315(c) also contains language that suggests that the decision on
`whether to join is made after consideration of issues presented in a
`petition.
`
`… Section 315(c), via reference to § 314, only includes language
`referring to challenges of patent claims and makes no reference to
`other procedural requirements discussed in Target. In any case, the
`statute does not clearly guide us away from considering challenges to
`the claims of the patent. On the contrary, § 315(c) asks the Director to
`consider whether the petition contains information showing that the
`petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one claim, and gives
`the Director discretion to join the party if there is merit
`to the
`information presented in the petition.
`
`The majority in Target further reasoned that the one-year time bar
`under § 315(b) does not apply “to a request for joinder,” such that a
`time-barred petitioner may be permitted to join an existing inter partes
`review, but may not successfully petition for inter partes review.
`Target, Paper 18 at 10. In reaching this conclusion,
`the Target
`majority reads the request for joinder as a separate filing, one that
`does not require a petition. Again, however, the joinder statute itself
`makes reference to both the petition and preliminary response,
`indicating that the merits of the petition that accompanies the request
`for joinder are to be considered—that is, a motion for joinder must
`include a petition satisfying the threshold of § 314 before a party
`successfully may be joined. The request for joinder cannot be treated
`as a separate filing because a properly filed request for joinder must
`
`12
`
`

`

`Case IPR2015-TBD
`Patent 7,429,827
`be accompanied by a petition that meets the standard of § 314. Section
`315(c) gives discretion as to whether to join a person who properly
`files a petition, and it is the Director’s discretion that guards against
`patent owner harassment and/or over-burdening Office resources.
`
`to joinder under
`in contrast
`The concurrence also reasons that,
`§ 315(c), § 315(d) relates to the consolidation of issues. A review of
`the legislative history of the America Invents Act (“AIA”), however,
`does not clearly lead one to conclude that Congress used “joinder”
`narrowly to refer solely to party joinder. Rather, throughout the Senate
`Debates “joinder” is used in the context of issue joinder. See e.g., 157
`Cong. Rec. S 1376 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
`(“If a party seeking joinder also presents additional challenges to
`validity that satisfy the threshold for instituting a proceeding, the
`Office will either join that party and its new arguments to the existing
`proceeding, or institute a second proceeding for the patent.”); 157
`Cong. Rec. S 9988 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
`(“[A]dditional petitions can be joined only if, among other things,
`they are properly filed.”); id. (“[A] procedurally proper successive
`petition for second-period review may be joined to a pending
`proceeding at the discretion of the Director, even if the 329(b)(2)
`deadline has not been met, so long as the Director determines that the
`petition
`satisfies
`the
`threshold
`set
`in
`section
`327(c).”)
`“Consolidation,” as used in § 315(d), on the other hand, is used to
`refer to the consolidation of different proceeding before the Office.
`See 157 Cong. Rec. S 9988 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of
`Sen. Kyl)
`(“Section 325(c) gives the PTO broad discretion to
`
`13
`
`

`

`Case IPR2015-TBD
`Patent 7,429,827
`consolidate, stay, or terminate any PTO proceeding involving a patent
`if that patent is the subject of a post-grant review proceeding. It is
`anticipated,
`for example,
`that
`if a second-period proceeding is
`instituted and reexam is sought, the Director would be inclined to stay
`the post-grant review during exhaustion of the reexam. On the other
`hand, if a post-grant review is near completion, the Director may
`consolidate or terminate any other PTO proceeding that is initiated
`with regard to that patent.”) Thus, the legislative history does not
`unambiguously support a conclusion that Congress clearly intended to
`address joinder of parties under § 315(c) and consolidation of issues
`under § 315(d).
`
`(some internal citations omitted, decision joined by Judge Grossman). The Board is
`
`currently deciding a request for rehearing in Target. The petitioner agrees with and
`
`has nothing to add to the Board’s thorough analysis above.
`
`VII. CONCLUSION
`There is good cause to grant this motion for joinder because the second
`
`petition and the ’938 IPR addresses substantially the same claim limitations with
`
`matching grounds. Having parallel proceedings wastes the Office’s resources and
`
`those of the petitioner, patent owner, and the District Court. Separate proceedings
`
`also might cause inconsistent decisions in either the Central Reexamination Unit or
`
`the District Court. Granting this motion to join will ensure a just, speedy, and
`
`inexpensive resolution to whether the claims of the ’827 patent are unpatentable.
`
`14
`
`

`

`Case IPR2015-TBD
`Patent 7,429,827
`
`Dated: __January 16, 2015______
`
`233 South Wacker Drive
`Suite 7800
`Chicago, IL 60606-6306
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`DENTONS U.S. LLP
`
`____Mark Nelson_________
`Mark C. Nelson
`Reg. No. 43,830
`Lissi Mojica
`Reg. No. 63,421
`Kevin Greenleaf
`Reg. No. 64,062
`Daniel Valenzuela
`Reg. No. 69,027
`
`15
`
`

`

`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e))
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing Petitioner’s Motion to
`
`Join Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b) was served on the
`
`Attorney of record in U.S. Patent No. 7,429,827 and IPR2014-00938 via Fedex
`
`Priority Overnight on January 16, 2015.
`
`THEODORE SHIELLS
`SHIELLS LAW FIRM P.C.
`1201 Main Street - Suite 2470
`Dallas, Texas 75202
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`Dated: __January 16, 2015_______
`
`___/Nona Durham/_________
`Nona Durham
`
`

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