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`Paper 9
`Date: August 14, 2015
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`UNDER ARMOUR, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`ADIDAS AG,
`Patent Owner.
`
`
`
`Case IPR2015-00697
`Patent 7,905,815 B2
`
`
`
`
`Before JENNIFER S. BISK, MICHAEL J. FITZPATRICK, and JUSTIN BUSCH,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`BISK, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
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`
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`IPR2015-00697
`Patent 7,905,815 B2
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`Petitioner, Under Armour, Inc., filed a Petition to institute an inter partes
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`review of claims 1–15 of U.S. Patent No. 7,905,815 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’815
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`patent”). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). Patent Owner, adidas AG, filed a Preliminary Response
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`pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 313. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”).
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`We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review.
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`35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Upon consideration of the Petition and
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`the Preliminary Response, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that
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`the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would
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`prevail with respect to at least one claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly,
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`we institute an inter partes review.
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`A. Related Matters
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`Patent Owner has asserted the ’815 patent along with additional patents,
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`against Petitioner in adidas AG, et. al. v. Under Armour, Inc. and MapMyFitness,
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`Inc., Case No. 14-130-GMS (D. Del.). Pet. 1; Paper 4, 1. Petitioner has filed
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`petitions to institute inter partes reviews of related patents, U.S. Patent
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`No. 8,092,345 B2 and U.S. Patent No. 8,579,767 B2. See Paper 8, 2–3 (citing
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`IPR2015-00698; IPR2015-00700).
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`2
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`B. The Asserted Grounds
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`Petitioner identifies the following as asserted grounds of unpatentability:
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`References
`Mault (Ex. 1004)1 and Guck (Ex. 1006)2
`Newell (Ex. 1005)3 and Guck
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`Basis
`§ 103
`
`Claims Challenged
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`1–15
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`§ 103
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`1–15
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`Pet. 5.
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`C. The ’815 Patent
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`The ’815 patent describes a system of individual portable personal devices
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`such as mobile phones, personal digital assistants (PDAs), medical monitoring
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`devices, personal entertainment systems, and athletic monitoring systems, used in
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`conjunction with a wireless personal network to provide flexibility in features,
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`capabilities, and extensibility. Ex. 1001, 1:27–52, 3:30–4:26. Figure 100 of the
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`’815 patent is reproduced below.
`
`
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`1 U.S. Patent No. 6,513,532 B2 (“Mault”).
`2 U.S. Patent No. 5,864,870 (“Guck”).
`3 U.S. Patent No. 6,466,232 B1 (“Newell”).
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`Figure 100 is an overview of a “modular personal network (MPN)” that
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`“allows multiple individual network components (INCs), each with one or more
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`primary functions, to be used in a wireless personal network, and that INCs may be
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`added and removed modularly to add or remove functions of the MPN.” Id. at
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`4
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`15:34, 3:32–38. The INCs “may be worn, carried, mounted on personal
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`equipment, or otherwise used in proximity to the person associated with the MPN.”
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`Id. at 3:40–42. The MPN is associated with user 1 and “[e]ach INC may include a
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`wireless transceiver for communicating with other INCs in the MPN.” Id. at
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`15:40–45.
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`Base station 15, a device more stationary than other INCs, may act as part of
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`the MPN when the MPN is within range and may include a wireless
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`communication device to communicate with one or more of the INCs in the
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`MPN—or by alternative means. Id. at 16:33–40. Personal computer 16 may
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`communicate with base station 15 or directly with one or more INCs, acting as a
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`base station. Id. at 16:40–43. The base station may download software, data,
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`settings, and other information to one or more INCs. Id. at 16:43–47. Data may
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`also be uploaded to personal computer 16 to be stored, displayed, saved in a
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`database, analyzed, or shared, for example, over the internet. Id. at 16:53–60,
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`41:8–17.
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`D. The Challenged Claims
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`Petitioner challenges claims 1–15. Pet. 2. Claims 1 and 15 are independent.
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`Claim 1 is illustrative and is reproduced below (line breaks and indentation added):
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`1. A personal data collection system comprising
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`a media recording device configured to be worn or carried by a
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`user,
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`a personal data collection device configured to be worn or
`carried by the user,
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`a storage device configured to be worn or carried by the user for
`storing media collected by the media recording device and data
`collected by the personal data collection device,
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`5
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`a base station,
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`a communications device for sending media and data from the
`storage device to the base station,
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`a database for storing user collected data,
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`wherein the personal data collection system is configured to
`allow the user to tag collected data with other collected data,
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`wherein at least two of the devices are separately worn or
`carried by the user when in use.
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`II. ANALYSIS
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`A. Claim Construction
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`“A claim in an unexpired patent shall be given its broadest reasonable
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`construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.”
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Pursuant to that standard, the claim language should be
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`read in light of the specification, as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill
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`in the art. In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus,
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`we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning. See In re
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`Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The ordinary and
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`customary meaning is the meaning that the term would have to a person of
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`ordinary skill in the art in question.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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`Petitioner proposes express constructions for several terms, one of which,
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`“common file format,” we discuss below. Pet. 6–8. Patent Owner does not
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`propose any express constructions. Prelim. Resp. 7. For purposes of this decision,
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`we determine that only the claim terms addressed below need explicit construction.
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`1. “common file format” (claim 13)
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`Petitioner proposes that the claim term “common file format” be construed
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`as “any well-known or standardized format that permits easy viewing or printing
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`with a computer, such as a personal computer.” Pet. 8. To support these
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`constructions, Petitioner relies on declaration testimony of Dr. Joseph Paradiso and
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`also the specification of the ’815 patent. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 25; Ex. 1001,
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`40:26–32).
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`Petitioner’s construction is overly narrow. For example, we note that the
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`specification of the ’815 patent describes that “[i]mages and audio segments may
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`also be stored in a common file format.” Ex. 1001, 40:30–31 (emphasis added). It
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`is not clear, from the limited discussion in the Specification, how or why a
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`common file format for an audio segment would permit easy viewing or printing.
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`Therefore, we reject Petitioner’s construction. For purposes of this decision, we
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`give the term its plain and ordinary meaning, which does not require an express
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`construction.
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`2. “text input means” (claim 5)
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`Because it uses the term “means,” modified by functional language, we
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`presume that the term “text input means” invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.4
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`Williamson v Citrix Online, LLC, No. 2013-1130, 2015 WL 3687459, *7 (Fed. Cir.
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`June 16, 2015) (en banc). As discussed in more detail below, Petitioner did not
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`identify how the term “text input means” is to be construed as required by our
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`4 Section 4(c) of the AIA re-designated 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 as 35 U.S.C. §§
`112(f). Because the ’815 patent has a filing date before September 16, 2012
`(effective date), we will refer to the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
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`Rules. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Specifically, Petitioner did not identify the
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`corresponding structure in the specification for the means-plus-function limitation.
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`B. Obviousness Over Mault and Guck
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`Petitioner asserts that claims 1–15 would have been obvious over Mault and
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`Guck under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Pet. 8–37.
`
`1. Overview of the Mault and Guck
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`Mault discloses a combination diet and activity monitoring device. Ex.
`
`1004, 3:9–11. Figure 1 of Mault is reproduced below:
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`
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`Figure 1 illustrates a wrist-mounted embodiment of diet and activity
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`monitoring device 10. Ex. 1004, 6:21–23. Monitoring device 12 is designed to be
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`worn or carried for continuous monitoring of activity and dietary consumption and
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`includes the capability to communicate with local and remote computers using
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`either wired or wireless techniques. Id. at 6:31–37. PDA 24 is also a computing
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`device that may communicate with monitoring device 12. Id. at 6:46–48. Device
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`10 includes a body activity monitor, which may take several forms, including a
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`global positioning system (GPS) antenna, heart rate monitor, and a motion sensor.
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`Id. at 7:1–22. Device 10 also includes a consumption notation control that
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`indicates when the user consumes food and may include audio and video recording
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`devices. Id. at 7:23–25, 5:3–14.
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`Figure 4 of Mault is reproduced below.
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`Figure 4 is a schematic of another embodiment of Mault’s monitoring
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`device. Id. at 3:63–64. Memory 92 stores position, time, and body activity data.
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`Id. at 8:60–61. Audio/video data may also be stored in memory 92. Id. at 9:17–21,
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`15:59–65.
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`Guck discloses a method for storing and retrieving files of various formats in
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`an object database coupled to a network using a virtual multimedia file system.
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`Ex. 1006, Abs. According to Guck, “using an object database, virtual file objects
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`can be interconnected with bi-directional references based on actual content
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`interdependencies (e.g., sub-documents, linked documents, etc.).” Id. at 2:51–55.
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`2. Claims 1 and 15
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`Petitioner relies on Mault for all the limitations recited by independent
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`claims 1 and 15 except “a database for storing user collected data” (“the database
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`limitation”). Id. at 8–23. According to Petitioner, Mault discloses storing
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`collected data for later access by a user, but Petitioner does not assert that Mault
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`specifically addresses how the data is stored. Id. at 16. Instead, Petitioner asserts
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`that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to use a database,
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`one of a limited known ways for storing data, for the storage of such collected data.
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`Id. Further, Petitioner explains that Guck discloses using databases to store data
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`collected from remote network-linked clients. Id. (citing Ex. 1006, Abs.). Patent
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`Owner does not contest, in its Preliminary Response, that the combination of
`
`references discloses all of the limitations recited in claims 1 and 15. We have
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`reviewed the Petition, and the evidence of record, and we determine Petitioner has
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`sufficiently established that the references disclose each of the limitations.
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`Petitioner also provides testimony from Dr. Joseph Paradiso (Ex. 1003) who
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`explains that it would have been an obvious design choice to store Mault’s
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`collected data in a database, such as the type disclosed by Guck. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 62–
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`63. Dr. Paradiso adds that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have chosen
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`such a solution because databases were known to be the preferred method for
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`storing such data and Guck, itself, teaches organizing collected data, similar to
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`Mault’s data. Id. ¶¶ 64–65.
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`Patent Owner argues that Petitioner does not demonstrate sufficiently that a
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`person of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to combine the two
`
`references because “Petitioner’s entire argument to combine the systems described
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`in Mault and Guck consists of a single sentence, in which Petitioner claims that
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`both references” relate to the same general subject matter. Prelim. Resp. 8 (citing
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`Pet. 17). As discussed above, however, Petitioner also relies on testimony from
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`Dr. Paradiso to explain that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known
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`that a database was one of a limited, indeed, a preferred, method for storing and
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`organizing information and data and thus would have found it obvious to turn to
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`the teachings of Guck to supplement the teachings of Mault for this aspect of the
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`invention. Pet. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 62–65). We are persuaded that, on this
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`record, Petitioner has supplied sufficient articulated reasoning with rational
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`underpinning.
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`Patent Owner further argues that Guck is not analogous art to Mault because
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`it is not in the same filed of endeavor or reasonably pertinent to the particular
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`problem with which the inventor was involved, and thus the two references should
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`not be considered in combination. Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing In re Bigio, 381 F.3d
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`1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). According
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`to Patent Owner, Mault’s field of endeavor is a diet and activity monitor, and it is
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`not at all concerned with the methodology for storing the captured data. Id. at 10.
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`In contrast, Patent Owner describes Guck as having “nothing to do with Mault,”
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`asserting that Guck’s primary focus is different than Mault’s because the data in
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`Guck is created by a client and transmitted to other clients having different types of
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`formats, while the data organized by Mault is simply captured by devices. Id. at
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`11.
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`We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument regarding analogous art.
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`For purposes of this decision, we are persuaded that a person skilled in the Mault
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`art knows how to use databases. Ex. 1003 ¶ 62. As conceded by Patent Owner,
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`Mault “was not at all concerned with the methodology for storing the captured
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`data” because these are implementation details, well-known to the person of skill
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`in the art and not pertinent to the invention of the diet and activity monitor
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`described by Mault. Prelim. Resp. 10. For purposes of this decision, we are
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`persuaded that a person of skill in the art would have found it obvious to look to
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`the teachings of the database described by Guck to implement the storage of
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`captured data in Mault. See Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1238 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2010):
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`The Supreme Court’s decision in KSR . . . directs us to construe the
`scope of analogous art broadly, stating that “familiar items may have
`obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and a person of ordinary
`skill often will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together
`like pieces of a puzzle.”
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`Finally, Patent Owner argues that despite pointing to Figure 5 of Mault as
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`information organized in table form, Petitioner does not explain how the specific
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`teachings of Guck—an object database involving sub-documents and linked
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`documents—would be utilized by Mault to present data in table form as shown in
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`Figure 5 of Mault. Prelim. Resp. 13–14. We do not find this argument persuasive.
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`The claimed subject matter requires only that the system include “a database for
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`storing user collected data,” and Petitioner has explained that Mault discloses a
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`system, which collects data and stores it in a format that would lead a person of
`
`skill in the art to find it obvious to implement using a database such as that
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`described by Guck. For purposes of this decision, we find this explanation
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`sufficient.
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`Under these circumstances, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown a
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`reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its assertion that claims 1 and 15 would have
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`been obvious over the combination of Mault and Guck.
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`3. Claim 5
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`Claim 5 recites the “personal data collection system of claim 1 wherein the
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`personal data collection device comprises text input means.” Petitioner has the
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`burden to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that claim
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`5 is unpatentable over the asserted prior art. An essential part of that showing is
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`identifying how each challenged claim is to be construed. 37 C.F.R.
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`§ 42.104(b)(3). Specifically, the rules require that “[w]here the claim to be
`
`construed contains a means-plus-function or step-plus-function limitation[,] . . . the
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`construction of the claim must identify the specific portions of the specification
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`that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each function.” Id.
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`As discussed above, Petitioner does not identify what structure in the
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`specification it believes corresponds to the means-plus-function limitation of claim
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`5, “text input means.” Indeed, Petitioner’s discussion of the asserted prior art
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`(Mault and Guck) in relation to claim 5, as well as the analysis of Dr. Paradiso,
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`does not address any corresponding structure in the specification of the ’815
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`patent. See Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 79–80). Petitioner’s analysis, therefore, is
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`insufficient to show that the prior art teaches “text input means.” Thus, we decline
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`to institute inter partes review on claim 5.
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`4. Claim 6
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`Claim 6 recites the “personal data collection system of claim 1 wherein the
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`personal data collection device comprises an electronic sketchpad.” Petitioner
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`concedes that “Mault does not explicitly disclose a personal data collection device
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`that comprises an electronic sketch pad.” Pet. 25. To remedy this deficiency,
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`Petitioner asserts that it would have been obvious to add a sketchpad to Mault’s
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`system because sketchpads were “well known in the art as a common and desirable
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`method for user input in portable computing systems.” Id. at 26 (citing Ex. 1003
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`¶ 81). Petitioner adds that Mault discloses that its monitoring device may be a
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`PDA and “it was known in the art that PDAs frequently included electronic
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`sketchpad functionality.” Id.
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`Patent Owner argues that Mault does not describe the input means used by
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`the PDA described as a potential monitoring device and does not suggest that a
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`user of a diet and activity monitor would have a need for electronic sketchpad
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`functionality. Prelim. Resp. 16. Patent Owner adds that Petitioner’s proffered
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`testimony on this issue is conclusory. Id. at 16–17.
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`We agree with Patent Owner. Dr. Paradiso does not provide support for his
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`conclusions with persuasive explanation or citation to objective evidence. For
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`example, Dr. Paradiso asserts that “[i]n a system like Mault’s, using electronic
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`sketch pads was one of a limited number of known ways for inputting data.”
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`Ex. 1003 ¶ 81. Dr. Paradiso, however, does not explain what a sketchpad is.
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`Moreover, Dr. Paradiso does not refer to evidence explaining how many other
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`solutions were available, what those solutions were, or specifically why a skilled
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`artisan would have chosen a sketchpad for use with a diet and activity monitor.
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`Because we are not persuaded that Petitioner’s argument—that it would
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`have been obvious to incorporate a sketchpad into Mault’s diet and activity
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`monitor—is based on anything other than hindsight, we are not persuaded that
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`Petitioner has established that there is a reasonable likelihood that claim 6 is
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`obvious over Mault and Guck.
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`5. Claim 13
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`Claim 13 recites the “personal data collection system of claim 1 further
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`configured to convert the media and data received by the base station to a common
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`file format.” Petitioner argues that because Mault discloses uploading data to a
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`personal computer a skilled artisan would have been motivated to adapt Mault to
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`provide the benefit of having data that can be used by common programs on the
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`personal computer. Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 98). Moreover, Petitioner relies on
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`Guck for teaching the value of using common file formats and of converting data
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`to common file formats. Id. (citing Ex. 1006, 11:32–37, 8:61–64; Ex. 1003 ¶ 98).
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`Petitioner argues that it would have been a simple design choice to convert files to
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`and use a common file format, as taught by Guck. Id. at 33–34 (citing Ex. 1003
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`¶ 98).
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`Patent Owner argues that Mault is silent on converting media and data into a
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`common file format and Petitioner fails to show any motivation to combine Mault
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`with Guck. Prelim. Resp. 18–19. Patent Owner, however, does not address
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`Petitioner’s rationale described above. For purposes of this decision, we are
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`persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a sufficient rationale for adapting Mault
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`to format its data to a common file format using the teachings of Guck.
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`Under these circumstances, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown a
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`reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its assertion that claim 13 would have been
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`obvious over the combination of Mault and Guck.
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`6. Claim 2–4, 7–12, and 14
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`Petitioner argues that claims 2–4, 7–12, and 14 would have been obvious for
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`the same reasons as those described for claim 1. Pet. 23–34. Patent Owner
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`similarly argues that for the same reasons as those described for claim 1, Petitioner
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`has not established that claims 2–4, 7–12, and 14 would have been obvious over
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`Mault and Guck. Prelim. Resp. 8–20.
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`Under these circumstances, for the reasons described above, we are
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`persuaded that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its
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`assertion that claims 2–4, 7–12, and 14 would have been obvious over the
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`combination of Mault and Guck.
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`C. Obviousness Over Newell and Guck
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`Petitioner asserts that claims 1–15 would have been obvious over Newell
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`and Guck under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Pet. 37–59.
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`1. Overview of the Newell
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`Newell discloses a system that monitors a user and the user’s environment,
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`creates and maintains an updated model of the current condition of the user, and
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`determines an appropriate output device and format with which to present the
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`information to the user. Ex. 1005, Abs. Some versions of Newell’s system include
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`a wearable computer having a variety of output display devices. Figure 3 of
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`Newell is reproduced below:
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`Figure 3 illustrates an example of a model of a current user condition in
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`Newell. Ex. 1005, 3:26–27. The “model reflects the condition of user X at time
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`14:22 hours on the displayed date” and “includes a variety of user condition
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`variables” that reflect “information directly from user sensors.” Ex. 1005, 14:51–
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`59.
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`2. Claims 1–15
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`Independent claims 1 and 15 require “wherein the personal data collection
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`system is configured to allow the user to tag collected data with other collected
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`data.” Petitioner asserts that “Newell discloses various examples of allowing a
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`user to tag collected data with other collected data.” Pet. 46–47. In particular,
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`Petitioner points to three alleged examples in Newell that disclose this limitation—
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`all of which rely on Newell’s Figure 3 for support. First, Petitioner points to
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`Figure 3 that illustrates the condition of user X at a specific time, and asserts that
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`“Newell’s system allows the user to tag collected personal data shown in the table
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`[of Figure 3] . . . with the collected user name.” Id. at 47–48 (citing Ex. 1005, Fig.
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`3, 9:10–12, 15:54–56). Second, Petitioner states that “Newell’s system collects
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`data on what sensors are available to it, and then a user can tag that collected data
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`with the data values for the variables that the user chooses to include in the
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`model.” Third, Petitioner states that “if a user chooses to include in the model a
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`variable such as speed, the user can cause the collected data value for that variable
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`to be tagged with a collected uncertainty value.” Id. at 48 (citing Ex. 1005, 7:52–
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`55).
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`Patent Owner argues, however, that the table shown in Figure 3 does not
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`disclose the user tagging collected data with other data, and Petitioner does not
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`point to any language in Newell that supports a user doing any tagging. Prelim.
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`Resp. 25–26. We agree with Patent Owner. None of Petitioner’s three examples
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`discloses that the user of Newell’s system does any tagging as required by the
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`claim language.
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`Petitioner, relying on testimony from Dr. Paradiso, also argues that “it would
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`have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to allow a user to tag collected
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`data with other collected data.” Pet. 48 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 146). According to
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`Petitioner, because Newell discloses “that its system includes speaker/voice
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`recognition to determine exactly who may be speaking in the room or on the
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`phone,” it would have been obvious “that for effective speaker/voice recognition, a
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`user would first need to tag a specific speaker’s voice with a name.” Id. at 49
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`(citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 146). Petitioner also asserts that “Newell expressly states that
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`the system has the capacity to learn from user suggestions and overrides” and “one
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`obvious use of user suggestions and overrides is to tag data.” Id. (citing Ex. 1005,
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`15:56–60; Ex. 1003 ¶ 146).
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`Patent Owner argues that Petitioner does not demonstrate sufficiently that
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`this claim limitation would have been obvious because Newell’s disclosure of user
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`input devices and automatically learning user preferences over time does not mean
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`that this learning necessarily involves the user tagging collected data with other
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`collected data. Prelim. Resp. 26–27.
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`We agree with Patent Owner. Dr. Paradiso does not provide support for his
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`conclusions with persuasive explanation or citation to objective evidence. For
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`example, Dr. Paradiso asserts that “Newell discloses that a user can input data
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`using, for example, keyboard or microphone input” and thus “[i]t would have been
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`obvious to tag that data with other data being collected.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 146. Dr.
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`Paradiso, however, does not even assert, much less explain why it would be
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`obvious for the user to do this tagging. Further, Dr. Paradiso simply concludes,
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`without explanation or evidence, that “[o]ne obvious use of user suggestions and
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`overrides is to tag data.” Id. We do not find these conclusory and unsupported
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`statements to be persuasive.
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`Because we are not persuaded that Petitioner’s argument—that it would
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`have been obvious to allow the user to tag collected data with other collected data
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`in Newell’s system—is based on anything other than hindsight, we are not
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`persuaded that Petitioner has established that there is a reasonable likelihood that
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`the claims 1–15 would have been obvious over Newell and Guck.
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, based on the information presented in the Petition
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`and the Preliminary Response, we are persuaded that there is a reasonable
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`likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing unpatentability of claims 1–4
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`and 7–15 of the ’815 patent.
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`At this stage of the proceeding, we have not made a final determination on
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`the patentability of the challenged claims.
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`Accordingly, it is
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`IV. ORDER
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`ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, an inter partes review of U.S.
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`Patent No. 7,905,815 B2 is hereby instituted on the ground that claims 1–4 and 7–
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`15 are asserted to be obvious over Mault and Guck;
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`FURTHER ORDERED that no other ground of unpatentability alleged in
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`the Petition for any claim is authorized for this inter partes review; and
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`FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and 37 C.F.R.
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`§ 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial; the trial commences on
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`the entry date of this decision.
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`Petitioner:
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`Brian E. Ferguson
`Anish R. Desai
`Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
`brian.ferguson@weil.com
`anish.desai@weil.com
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`Patent Owner:
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`Mitchell G. Stockwell
`Wab P. Kadaba
`Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
`mstockwell@kilpatricktownsend.com
`wkadaba@kilpatricktownsend.com
`
`
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