`IPR2015-00698
`U.S. Patent No. 8,092,345
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`UNDER ARMOUR, INC.
`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`ADIDAS AG,
`Patent Owner.
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`Case No. IPR2015-00698
`U.S. Patent No. 8,092,345
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`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO
`PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`PUBLIC VERSION – CONTAINS REDACTIONS
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
`IPR2015-00698
`U.S. Patent No. 8,092,345
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`
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`INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1
`I.
`II. THE DAVIS DECLARATION IS ADMISSIBLE ..................................... 3
`A. Ms. Davis’s Opinions Meet the Standards of FRE 702 and
`Daubert Because She Is Qualified as an Expert, Applied a
`Reliable Methodology, and Used Sufficient Facts and Data
`to Reach Her Conclusions ................................................................... 3
`1. Ms. Davis’s 37 years of experience as a CPA and
`hundreds of opinions on the commercial success of
`products—at least—qualify her as an expert. ........................ 3
`2. Ms. Davis used the same methodology she has used in
`hundreds of past cases—which has withstood
`previous Daubert motions—to measure commercial
`success by the sales and revenue of the product. ................... 4
`3. Ms. Davis’s review of MMF’s annual revenues,
`profits, and growth over six years, along with
`opinions from Dr. Winer, were sufficient facts and
`data to determine the lack of commercial success. ................ 7
`To the Extent Any Evidence of the Commercial Success of
`the MMF Apps Is Relevant in This Matter, Ms. Davis’s
`Opinion That MMF Was Not Commercially Successful Is
`Also Relevant ....................................................................................... 9
`III. NEITHER UA-1012 NOR TESTIMONY FROM DR.
`MICHALSON’S OCTOBER 21, 2015 DEPOSITION SHOULD
`BE EXCLUDED ........................................................................................... 11
`IV. UA-1008 IS RELEVANT AND ADMISSIBLE ........................................ 15
`V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 15
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`B.
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,092,345
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
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`Cases
`Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
`509 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1993) .............................................................................passim
`
`Gator Tail, LLC v. Mud Buddy LLC,
`618 F. App'x 992 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ...................................................................... 10
`
`Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.,
`318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ..................................................................... 4
`
`Gnosis S.P.A. et al. v. South Alabama Med. Sci. Foundation,
`Case No. IPR2013-00116 ................................................................................... 13
`
`i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp.,
`598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .............................................................................. 7
`
`Int’l Business Machines v. Intellectual Ventures II, LLC,
`Case No. IPR2014-00180 ................................................................................... 14
`
`Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l, Inc.,
`128 F. 3d 802 (3d Cir. 1997) ............................................................................ 1, 8
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`Lg Chem, Ltd. v. Celgard. LLC,
`Case No. IPR2014-00692, 2015 WL 5896170 (Oct. 5, 2015) ....................... 5, 13
`
`MicroStrategy Inc. v. Business Objects, S.A.,
`429 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ........................................................................... 9
`
`PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Communs RF, LLC,
`815 F.3d 734 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 10
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`Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc.,
`No. 07-551 (GMS) ............................................................................................ 5, 6
`
`Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB,
`178 F.3d 257 ......................................................................................................... 8
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`ii
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
`IPR2015-00698
`U.S. Patent No. 8,092,345
`PETITIONER’S EXHIBIT LIST
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`Exhibit
`Description
`Number
`1001 U.S. Patent No. 8,092,345 to Ellis et al.
`1002 Docket Report for Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-00130-GMS (excerpt)
`1003
`Expert Declaration of Dr. Joseph Paradiso
`1004 U.S. Patent No. 6,513,532 to Mault et al.
`1005 U.S. Patent No. 6,321,158 to DeLorme et al.
`Ari T. Adler, A Cost-Effective Portable Telemedicine Kit for Use in
`Developing Countries (May 2000) (M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute
`of Technology) (on file with MIT Libraries) (“Telemedicine Kit”)
`1007 U.S. Patent no. 6,790,178 to Mault et al.
`1008 NavTalk™ Cellular Phone/GPS Receiver, Owner’s Manual and
`Reference Guide (January 2000)
`1009
`Toshiba Satellite 2530CDS Product Specifications (February 2000)
`1010 U.S. Patent No. 5,864,870 to Guck et al.
`1011
`Reply Expert Declaration of Dr. Joseph Paradiso
`1012
`Transcript of February 5, 2016 deposition of Dr. William Michalson
`MapMyFitness, Inc.’s non-infringement contentions (Excerpt of
`Defendant MapMyFitness, Inc.’s Supplemental Objections and
`Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories (Nos. 3, 6-12))
`Expert Declaration of Julie Davis
`Biography of Zac Garthe
`Biography of Robert T. Vlasis
`Transcript of October 21-22, 2015 deposition of Dr. William Michalson
`(Part I)
`Transcript of October 21-22, 2015 deposition of Dr. William Michalson
`(Part II)
`Petitioner’s September 9, 2015 Responses to Patent Owner’s
`Objections to Admissibility of Evidence
`Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc., No. 07-551 (GMS),
`Document 163 (D. Del. June 26, 2009)
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`1006
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`1013
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`1014
`1015
`1016
`1017
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`1018
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`1019
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`1020
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`iii
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
`IPR2015-00698
`U.S. Patent No. 8,092,345
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`INTRODUCTION
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`In its motion, Patent Owner requests that the Board exclude the declaration
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`I.
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`of Ms. Julie Davis (UA-1014) under Federal Rules of Evidence (“FREs”) 702, 402,
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`and 403, the February 5, 2016 deposition testimony of Dr. William Michalson
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`(UA-1012) under FRE 901, the October 21, 2015 deposition testimony of Dr.
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`Michalson under 37 C.F.R. § 42.53, and the NavTalk Cellular Phone/GPS
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`Receiver Owner’s Manual and Reference Guide (UA-1008) under FRE 402 and
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`403.
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`The crux of Patent Owner’s argument that Ms. Davis’s declaration should be
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`excluded under FRE 702 stems from a disagreement over her opinion about
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`whether any commercial success of the MapMyFitness apps can be attributed to
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`(1) the number of users and (2) the purchase price of the MapMyFitness company.
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`This disagreement, however, does not render Ms. Davis’s opinion inadmissible.
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`Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (“The focus, of
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`course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that
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`they generate.”); Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 128 F. 3d 802, 807, 809 (3d
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`Cir. 1997) (reversing exclusion of expert and cautioning that the “trial judge must
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`be careful not to mistake credibility questions for admissibility questions”)
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`Moreover, as detailed below, Ms. Davis is qualified as an expert, applies a reliable
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`methodology (which has withstood the rigors of Daubert in past cases), and relies
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`1
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
`IPR2015-00698
`U.S. Patent No. 8,092,345
`on sufficient facts and data. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s challenge to her
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`declaration under FRE 702 is meritless. Patent Owner’s relevancy objection to her
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`declaration is similarly flawed, since, for example, it relies on an incorrect
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`interpretation and application of the law.
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`Patent Owner’s request to exclude Dr. Michalson’s testimony from two
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`depositions is flawed and should be denied. First, Patent Owner challenges the
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`authenticity of the February 5, 2016 deposition transcript of Dr. Michalson, despite
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`the fact that it was signed and certified by the court reporter. Second, Patent
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`Owner separately seeks to exclude October 21, 2015 deposition testimony under
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.53, even though it did not properly preserve this objection. Finally,
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`even if Patent Owner had preserved its objection, Patent Owner misapplies section
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`42.53 in trying to exclude what is often admitted in IPR proceedings, and its
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`articulation of alleged prejudice (undue or not) is questionable.
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`Patent Owner also attempts to exclude the NavTalk Owner’s Manual as
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`irrelevant, despite noting that its publication date precedes the earliest possible
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`priority date of the 345 Patent. Further, its relevance for showing knowledge of
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`route guidance is undisputed. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s request should be
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`denied.
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`2
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
`IPR2015-00698
`U.S. Patent No. 8,092,345
`II. THE DAVIS DECLARATION IS ADMISSIBLE
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`Patent Owner challenges the Davis Declaration’s admissibility under FREs
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`702 and 402.1 Paper 42 at 1. Neither challenge should succeed.
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`A. Ms. Davis’s Opinions Meet the Standards of FRE 702 and
`Daubert Because She Is Qualified as an Expert, Applied a Reliable
`Methodology, and Used Sufficient Facts and Data to Reach Her
`Conclusions
`1. Ms. Davis’s 37 years of experience as a CPA and hundreds of
`opinions on the commercial success of products—at least—
`qualify her as an expert.
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`To Patent Owner, who claims Ms. Davis is not an expert on commercial
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`success, the hallmark of expertise rests on her published articles and her
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`knowledge of treatises. Paper 42 at 5-6. But the requirements of the Federal Rules
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`are not so narrow. Experts may be qualified by their “knowledge, skill, experience,
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`training, or education.” FRE 702. Under this standard, Ms. Davis is unquestionably
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`an expert on commercial success. Ms. Davis has “been providing audit and
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`1 Although Patent Owner also challenges UA-1014 under FRE 403, it offers only
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`this: “[a]dditionally, the exhibit should be excluded because … its probative value
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`to any ground upon which trial was instituted is substantially outweighed by the
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`danger of confusing the issues.” Paper 42 at 1, 4. This unsupported, conclusory
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`sentence cannot sustain Patent Owner’s challenge. Cf. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c) (“The
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`moving party has the burden of proof to establish that it is entitled to the requested
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`relief.”).
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`3
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
`IPR2015-00698
`U.S. Patent No. 8,092,345
`financial consulting services … for over thirty-seven years” and has “spent the last
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`twenty-eight years consulting extensively with companies involved in …
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`intellectual property disputes.” UA-1014.002. Although she has not published
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`articles “address[ing] commercial success specifically,” she co-authored a book on
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`valuing intellectual property, and has published eight articles addressing patent
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`infringement damages relating to commercial success of accused products.2 See
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`UA-1014.024, Ex. 2025 at 14:1-5. Patent Owner also protests that Ms. Davis has
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`never testified before the Patent Office. Paper 42 at 5. But that complaint has little
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`merit since she opined on commercial success in almost 350 district court cases.
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`Ex. 2025 at 12:14-23, 17:3-19. Given her education and experience, Ms. Davis
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`qualifies as an expert on commercial success.
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`2. Ms. Davis used the same methodology she has used in hundreds
`of past cases—which has withstood previous Daubert
`motions—to measure commercial success by the sales and
`revenue of the product.
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`Patent Owner complains that Ms. Davis did not use “any reliable principle or
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`method to evaluate commercial success.” Paper 42 at 6. This is without merit. Her
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`methodology is clear, and time-tested: “the measure of commercial success of a
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`2 See generally Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116,
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`1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (identifying commercial success as a factor in the
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`reasonable royalty analysis of patent infringement damages).
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`4
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
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`product is reliant on sales of the product ….” UA-1014.017 (emphasis in original).
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`Lg Chem, Ltd. v. Celgard. LLC, Case No. IPR2014-00692, 2015 WL 5896170, at
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`*29 (Oct. 5, 2015) (denying Patent Owner’s motion to exclude expert opinions on
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`commercial success where the expert analyzed the factors used by economists—
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`including sales, market share, advertising, and price—as applied to the facts in
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`that case).
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` Further, when Ms. Davis has used this same
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`methodology in the past, courts admitted her testimony over Daubert challenges.
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`See, e.g., Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc., No. 07-551 (GMS),
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`3
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`5
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,092,345
`Document 163 (D. Del. June 26, 2009) (excerpt) (denying Daubert challenge to
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`Ms. Davis’s testimony during pre-trial hearing) (attached hereto as UA-1020), Ex.
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`2025 at 19:10-20:15 (testifying that she used revenues, sales, and market share to
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`evaluate commercial success in Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc.).
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`To bolster its position, Patent Owner relies on General Elec. Co. v. Joiner.
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`Paper 42 at 6 (citing 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)). But once again, Patent Owner’s
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`legal case is hollow. In Joiner, the expert reviewed studies of infant mice with one
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`type of cancer that “were so dissimilar” to the adult humans with a different type of
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`cancer in the case that the court excluded the opinion. 522 U.S. at 144-45. That is a
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`far cry from our case, in which Ms. Davis
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`Patent Owner’s factual representations are as flawed as its legal analyses.
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`For example, when Patent Owner asked Ms. Davis,
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`3. Ms. Davis’s
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
`IPR2015-00698
`U.S. Patent No. 8,092,345
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`along with opinions from Dr. Winer,
`were sufficient facts and data to determine the lack of
`commercial success.
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`Patent Owner argues that Ms. Davis does not apply her method “to the
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`relevant facts and data.” Paper 42 at 6-7. But admissibility does not turn on
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`whether the expert considered “the relevant facts and data,” only “sufficient facts
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`or data” as required by law. FRE 702 (b) (emphasis added); see also i4i Ltd. P'ship
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`v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 856 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Questions about what
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`facts are most relevant or reliable to calculating a reasonable royalty are for the
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`jury.”) (emphasis added). Patent Owner’s complaints about the facts examined by
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`Ms. Davis are veiled attempts to shore-up its own expert’s methodology.
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`Specifically, instead of focusing on the sufficiency of facts examined by Ms. Davis,
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`Patent Owner highlights information supposedly relevant to Patent Owner’s theory
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`of commercial success:
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` This analysis is inappropriate.
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`By arguing that Ms. Davis did not consider facts concerning the number of
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`users and the mere purchase price of a company, Patent Owner is really just
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`disagreeing with Ms. Davis’s opinion that
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`7
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
`IPR2015-00698
`U.S. Patent No. 8,092,345
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` Just because Patent Owner disagrees with Ms. Davis’s opinion does
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`not make her opinion inadmissible. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S.
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`579, 595 (U.S. 1993) (“The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and
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`methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”); Kannankeril v.
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`Terminix Int'l, Inc., 128 F. 3d 802, 807, 809 (3d Cir. 1997) (reversing exclusion of
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`expert and cautioning that the “trial judge must be careful not to mistake credibility
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`questions for admissibility questions”). That simply is not the law.
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`Ms. Davis’s opinion easily meets the requirement for sufficient facts and
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`data. See Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 265 (holding that an
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`expert's conclusions “should not be excluded because he or she has failed to rule
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`out every possible alternative cause”). She considered
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
`IPR2015-00698
`U.S. Patent No. 8,092,345
`Patent Owner’s reliance on MicroStrategy Inc. v. Business Objects, S.A., 429
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`F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005), is misplaced. The expert in MicroStrategy “did not link
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`a single loss to a specific misconduct” and “ignored any significant factor … other
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`than the torts,” but Ms. Davis reviewed a wealth of factors
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` See MicroStrategy, 429 F.3d 1344, 1354-56 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2005) (emphasis added); see also UA-1014.012-18, .020-022, Ex. 2025 at
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`45:24-46:6. MicroStrategy made clear the “pre-admission determination [is]
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`whether or not enough factors have been considered to make an expert report
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`sufficiently reliable.” 429 F.3d at 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original). Yet
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`again, Patent Owner stands on an incorrect legal argument.
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`B.
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`To the Extent Any Evidence of the Commercial Success of the
`MMF Apps Is Relevant in This Matter, Ms. Davis’s Opinion
` Is Also Relevant
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`Patent Owner objects that Ms. Davis’s opinion is inadmissible because it
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`“addresses only the commercial success of the MMF apps
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`” and is not
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`tied to the features embodying the 345 Patent; thus, it cannot be relevant. Paper 42
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`at 10. Patent Owner also claims that because the MMF apps “embody” some
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`claims of the 345 Patent, Patent Owner is entitled to the presumption that any
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`commercial success of the product stems from the patented claims. Paper 42 at 10
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`(citing “PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns, [sic] (Fed. Cir. Feb.
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`9
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
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`22, 2016) at 19.”). Essentially, Patent Owner’s relevance argument boils down to
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`this: Patent Owner is entitled to rely on a presumption that the commercial success
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`of the MMF apps is due to the patented claims, but Petitioner is not. This is
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`incorrect.
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`Patent Owner has (again) misquoted the law. It is not enough for the product
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`to partly embody the claims; the product must be coextensive with the patented
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`invention to warrant the presumption that commercial success is attributable to the
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`claimed features. E.g., PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Communs RF,
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`LLC, 815 F.3d 734, 747 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Because the [accused products] are the
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`invention disclosed and claimed in the patent, we presume that any commercial
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`success of these products is due to the patented invention.”) (emphasis added)
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`(internal quotations omitted), Gator Tail, LLC v. Mud Buddy LLC, 618 F. App'x
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`992, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Where the marketed product is coextensive with the
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`claimed features, then the court should presume that commercial success of the
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`product is due to the patented invention.”). Petitioner disputes that the MMF apps
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`embody—much less are coextensive with—the invention claimed in the 345
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`Patent. Paper 27 at 19-20, 23,5 UA-1011 at ¶¶ 209-235. Therefore, no party is
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`5 Petitioner maintains its position that the legal determination of commercial
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`success is beyond the purview of the Board in this specific matter. See Paper 27 at
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`19-20.
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`10
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
`IPR2015-00698
`U.S. Patent No. 8,092,345
`entitled to this presumption, and the relevance of both parties’ experts is equally
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`impacted.6 Alternatively, if a presumption exists (which it does not because the
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`MMF apps are not coextensive with the claims), then that presumption applies to
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`Ms. Davis’s opinions as well, obviating the basis for Patent Owner’s relevance
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`objection. Patent Owner may not have its cake and eat it too.
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`III. NEITHER UA-1012 NOR TESTIMONY FROM DR. MICHALSON’S
`OCTOBER 21, 2015 DEPOSITION SHOULD BE EXCLUDED
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`Patent Owner seeks to exclude evidence on the basis of what amounts to an
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`inadvertent citation error. Petitioner intended UA-1012 to be the October 21, 2015
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`deposition transcript of Dr. William Michalson from the co-pending litigation
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`(“October Deposition”). Petitioner’s exhibit list in its Reply identifies UA-1012 as
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`the October Deposition. See Paper 27 at 26. This intention is also clear from the
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`fact that the citations following the quoted testimony do not match up with the
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`testimony in UA-1012. Instead, the citations correspond with the testimony in the
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`October Deposition, served contemporaneously herewith as UA-1017.7 Moreover,
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`Patent Owner’s generic objection, which closely copies the language of FRE
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`6 Indeed, Patent Owner cannot demonstrate that the purchase price of a company is
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`attributable to specific features of the company’s products.
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`7 UA-1018 is the second part of that deposition of Dr. Michalson, which occurred
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`on October 22, 2015.
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`11
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
`IPR2015-00698
`U.S. Patent No. 8,092,345
`901(a) without more, did not put Petitioner on notice of this inadvertent error.
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`Indeed, in its Response to Patent Owner’s objection, Petitioner complained that
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`Patent Owner failed to comply with 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b), which states that “[t]he
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`objection must identify the grounds for the objection with sufficient particularly to
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`allow correction in the form of supplemental evidence.” See UA-1019.002. Patent
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`Owner did not file or serve more detailed objections regarding UA-1012.
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`Further, Patent Owner has not met its burden of demonstrating that UA-1012
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`as filed and served is inadmissible under FRE 901.8 Specifically, FRE 901(b)
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`states that an example of evidence that satisfies the requirement of authenticity
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`includes “[a]ny method of authentication or identification allowed by a federal
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`statute or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court.” FRE 901(b)(1) (emphasis
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`added). As the advisory committee explains: “[This] example makes clear that
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`methods of authentication provided … by the Rules of Civil and Criminal
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`Procedure … are not intended to be superseded. Illustrative are the provisions …
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`for authentication of depositions in Civil Procedure Rule 30(f).” FRE 901,
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`advisory committee notes (2011). Patent Owner has not argued, and cannot show,
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`that UA-1012 is not authentic under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”)
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`30(f). Indeed, the officer who transcribed the deposition, Suzanne Beasley,
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`8 Note, Petitioner correctly identifies and relies upon UA-1012 in its motion to
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`exclude. See Paper 38 at 10-11.
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`12
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
`IPR2015-00698
`U.S. Patent No. 8,092,345
`certified that Dr. Michalson was duly sworn and that the deposition accurately
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`records the witness’s testimony. See UA-1012 at 4:3-5, 21:1-27:19.
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`Patent Owner’s further requests to exclude the October Deposition testimony
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`under 37 C.F.R. § 42.53 should be denied. As an initial matter, Patent Owner did
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`not preserve this objection under 37 C.F.R. § 42.53. Instead, it lodged an objection
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`under 37 C.F.R. § 42.65, which concerns expert testimony.
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`Even if Patent Owner has not waived its objection under 37 C.F.R. § 42.53,
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`its reliance on this section is misplaced. Section 42.53 governs “[t]aking
`
`testimony” in an IPR proceeding, but the evidence Patent Owner seeks to exclude
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`covers testimony taken in a separate action. That section 42.53 does not forbid
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`submission of deposition transcripts from a separate action is consistent with the
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`Board’s allowance of this type of evidence in the past. See, e.g., Gnosis S.P.A. et
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`al. v. South Alabama Med. Sci. Foundation, Case No. IPR2013-00116, Paper 51 at
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`10 (Feb. 11, 2014) (motion to exclude an ITC deposition transcript), Gnosis S.P.A.
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`et al. v. South Alabama Med. Sci. Foundation, Case No. IPR2013-00116, Paper 68
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`at 43 (Jun. 20, 2014) (denying motion to exclude ITC deposition transcript), LG
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`Chem, Ltd. v. Celgard, LLC, Case No. IPR2014-00692, Paper 64 at 15 (Jun. 5,
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`2015) (motion to exclude a deposition transcript of an expert witness taken in a
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`separate proceeding), LG Chem, Ltd. v. Celgard, LLC, Case No. IPR2014-00692,
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`Paper 76 at 50 (Oct. 5, 2015) (denying motion to exclude deposition transcript of
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`
`
`13
`
`
`
`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
`IPR2015-00698
`U.S. Patent No. 8,092,345
`an expert witness from a separate proceeding), Int’l Business Machines v.
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`Intellectual Ventures II, LLC, Case No. IPR2014-00180, Paper 34 at 3-7 (Dec. 9,
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`2014) (motion to exclude deposition transcript from co-pending litigation), Int’l
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`Business Machines v. Intellectual Ventures II, LLC, Case No. IPR2014-00180,
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`Paper 50 at 10 (Apr. 3, 2015) (denying motion to exclude deposition transcript
`
`from co-pending litigation).
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`
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`Nonetheless, Patent Owner cites two specific portions of section 42.53 in
`
`support of its argument that the October Deposition testimony should be excluded.
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`First, Patent Owner’s reliance on section 42.53(a) fails (aside from the reasons
`
`given above), because Dr. Michalson’s transcript is not uncompelled direct
`
`testimony. Indeed, Dr. Michalson is Patent Owner’s, not Petitioner’s, witness.
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`Second, Patent Owner relies on section 42.53(d)(5)(iii), which concerns the scope
`
`of content of deposition notices in an IPR proceeding. But as explained above, the
`
`testimony Patent Owner seeks to exclude is from a deposition in a separate
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`proceeding. Patent Owner is simply taking a sentence from section 42.53 out of
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`context and misapplying it to other evidence. Moreover, the prejudice Patent
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`Owner claims to suffer from being unable to redirect Dr. Michalson is
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`questionable. In fact, Patent Owner had the opportunity to redirect Dr. Michalson
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`on the subject of selective availability in the October Deposition, but it did not.
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`See UA-1018 at 401:7-19.
`
`
`
`14
`
`
`
`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
`IPR2015-00698
`U.S. Patent No. 8,092,345
`Accordingly, Patent Owner’s request to exclude UA-1012 under FRE 901
`
`
`
`and the October Deposition testimony under 37 C.F.R. § 42.53 should be denied.
`
`IV. UA-1008 IS RELEVANT AND ADMISSIBLE
`Patent Owner only seeks to exclude UA-1008 under FREs 402 and 403. See
`
`
`Paper 42 at 15. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that UA-1008 is irrelevant
`
`because Petitioner has not established that it was publicly accessible before the
`
`earliest priority date of the 345 Patent (i.e., February 20, 2001). Nonetheless,
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`Patent Owner seemingly recognizes that the “January 2000” shown on the second
`
`page of UA-1008 is the “publication date.” See Paper 42 at 15. In view of this
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`publication date, UA-1008 is indeed probative of the fact that GPS-enabled route
`
`guidance was well-known before February 20, 2001. Moreover, this probative
`
`value is not outweighed by any undue prejudice and confusion. Indeed, Patent
`
`Owner has not articulated any such prejudice and confusion. Accordingly, Patent
`
`Owner’s request to exclude UA-1008 should be denied.
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`V. CONCLUSION
`
`For the reasons provided above, Petitioner respectfully requests that the
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`Board deny Patent Owner’s motion to exclude.
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`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/ Brian E. Ferguson /
`Brian E. Ferguson
`Lead Counsel for Petitioner
`Registration No. 36,801
`
`
`
`Dated: April 20, 2016
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`
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`15
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`
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that on April 20, 2016, the foregoing
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`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO
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`EXCLUDE was served via electronic mail, upon the following:
`
`Mitchell G. Stockwell
`Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
`1100 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 2800
`Atlanta, GA 30309-4528
`mstockwell@kilpatricktownsend.com
`
`Wab P. Kadaba
`Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
`1100 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 2800
`Atlanta, GA 30309-4528
`wkadaba@kilpatricktownsend.com
`
`Jonathan D. Olinger
`Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
`1100 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 2800
`Atlanta, GA 30309-4528
`jolinger@kilpatricktownsend.com
`
`/ Timothy J. Andersen / c
`Timothy J. Andersen
`Case Manager
`Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
`1300 Eye Street NW, Suite 900
`Washington, DC 20005
`T: 202-682-7075
`timothy.andersen@weil.com