Paper No.
`Filed: January 25, 2016
`
`Naveen Modi
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1990
`Facsimile: (202) 551-0490
`E-mail: naveenmodi@paulhastings.com
`
`
`Filed on behalf of: VirnetX Inc.
`By:
`
`Joseph E. Palys
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1996
`Facsimile: (202) 551-0496
`E-mail: josephpalys@paulhastings.com
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
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`
`
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`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`
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`
`
`APPLE INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`VIRNETX INC.
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2015-00866
`Patent 8,458,341
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Patent Owner’s Response
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
` I.
`
`
`
` II.
`
`
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`Case No. IPR2015-00866
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
`
`Claim Construction .......................................................................................... 1
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`“Interception of the Request” (Claims 1, 11, 14, 15, 25, and 28) ......... 4
`
`“Provisioning Information” (Claims 1 and 15) ..................................... 5
`
`“Virtual Private Network Communication Link” (Claims 1, 3,
`15, and 17) ............................................................................................. 8
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`A “VPN Communication Link” Requires a Virtual
`Private Network .......................................................................... 9
`
`“Authentication” and “Address Hopping” Alone Do Not
`Result in a “Virtual Private Network Communication
`Link” .........................................................................................10
`
`A “Virtual Private Network Communication Link” Must
`Be Direct ...................................................................................12
`
`A “Virtual Private Network Communication Link”
`Requires a Network ...................................................................17
`
`A “Virtual Private Network Communication Link”
`Requires Encryption ..................................................................18
`
`D. Other terms ..........................................................................................20
`
` The Cited References Do Not Render Claims 1–11, 14–25, and 28 III.
`
`
`Unpatentable ..................................................................................................22
`
`A.
`
`Beser and RFC 2401 Do Not Render Claims 1–11, 14–25, and
`28 Unpatentable ...................................................................................22
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Beser’s Disclosure.....................................................................22
`
`Beser and RFC 2401 Do Not Disclose a “Send[ing] a
`Request to Look Up an Internet Protocol (IP) Address of
`a Second Network Device Based On a Domain Name
`Associated With the Second Network Device” ........................25
`
`i
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`

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`Case No. IPR2015-00866
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`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`6.
`
`7.
`
`8.
`
`9.
`
`Beser and RFC 2401 Do Not Disclose “Interception of
`the Request” ..............................................................................28
`
`Beser and RFC 2401 Do Not Disclose “Virtual Private
`Network Communication Link” ...............................................31
`
`The Petition’s Mapping of Beser and RFC 2401 Does
`Not Show the Features as Arranged in the Claims ...................32
`
`Beser and RFC 2401 Would Not Have Been Combined
`as the Petition Suggests .............................................................34
`
`Beser and RFC 2401 Do Not Render Obvious Dependent
`Claims 4-5 and 18-19 ................................................................40
`
`Beser in view of RFC 2401 Does Not Disclose the
`Features of Claim 17 .................................................................43
`
`Dependent Claims 2, 3, 6-11, 14, 16, 20-25, and 28 ................44
`
` Petitioner’s Expert Testimony Should be Accorded Little, If Any IV.
`
`
`Weight ............................................................................................................44
`
`
`
` V.
`
`The Instituted Ground Is Based on At Least One Reference That Does
`Not Qualify As Prior Art ...............................................................................48
`
`A.
`
`Petitioner Has Not Established that RFC 2401 Is a Prior Art
`Printed Publication ..............................................................................49
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`The Evidence Presented with the Petition Cannot
`Establish by a Preponderance of the Evidence that RFC
`2401 Was Publicly Accessible ..................................................49
`
`The Board’s Findings Are Insufficient to Establish by a
`Preponderance of the Evidence that RFC 2401 Was
`Publicly Accessible ...................................................................52
`
`The Supplemental Information Is Also Insufficient to
`Establish by a Preponderance of the Evidence that RFC
`2401 Was Publicly Accessible ..................................................55
`
`
`
` Conclusion .....................................................................................................57 VI.
`
`ii
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`

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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00866
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Alexsam, Inc. v. IDT Corp.,
`715 F.3d 1336, (Fed. Cir. 2013) ........................................................................ 47
`
`Apple Inc. v. DSS Technology Management, Inc.,
`IPR2015-00369, Paper No. 9 (June 25, 2015) ................................................... 50
`
`Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc.,
`IPR2014-00237, Paper No. 15 (May 14, 2014) .............................................. 4, 29
`
`Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc.,
`IPR2015-00811, Paper No. 8 (Sept. 11, 2015) .................................................... 6
`
`Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc.,
`IPR2015-00871, Paper No. 8 (Oct. 1, 2015) ..................................................... 15
`
`Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Concepts In Optics, Inc.,
`111 F. App’x 582 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .............................................................. 45, 47
`
`Becton, Dickenson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Group, LP,
`616 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ......................................................................... 33
`
`Biogen Idec, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC,
`713 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ......................................................................... 14
`
`Brand v. Miller,
`487 F.3d 862 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ........................................................................... 45
`
`Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc.,
`445 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ......................................................................... 49
`
`Centricut, LLC v. Esab Group, Inc.,
`390 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ......................................................................... 45
`
`In re Cuozzo,
`793 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ........................................................................... 3
`
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, No. 15-446,
`2016 WL 205946, (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016) ............................................................... 3
`
`iii
`
`

`
`
`Cyber Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc.,
`138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ......................................................................... 14
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00866
`
`Dish Network L.L.C. v. Dragon Intellectual Property, LLC,
`IPR2015-00499, Paper No. 7 (July 17, 2015) ................................................... 52
`
`Elec. Frontier Found. v. Pers. Audio, LLC,
`IPR2014-00070, Paper No. 21 (Apr. 18, 2014) ................................................. 54
`
`Eon–Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp.,
`653 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ......................................................................... 18
`
`Finnigan Corp. v. ITC,
`180 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .......................................................................... 57
`
`Ex Parte Weideman,
`Appeal No. 2008-3454, Decision on Appeal (BPAI Jan. 27, 2009) ................. 33
`
`In re Fulton,
`391 F.3d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ......................................................................... 39
`
`Garmin Int’l inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Tech, LLC,
`IPR2012-00001, Paper No. 15 (Jan. 9, 2013) .................................................... 16
`
`Google Inc. v. Art+Com Innovationpool GMBH,
`IPR2015-00788, Paper No. 7 (September 2, 2015) ........................................... 50
`
`In re Gurley,
`27 F.3d 551 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ............................................................................. 39
`
`Heart Failure Techs., LLC v. Cardiokinetix, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00183, Paper No. 12 (July 31, 2013) ................................................. 42
`
`Kinetic Technologies, Inc. v. Skyworks Solutions, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00690, Paper No. 43 (October 19, 2015) ..................................... 48, 57
`
`In re Klopfenstein,
`380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ......................................................................... 48
`
`Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech LLC,
`381 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ......................................................................... 45
`
`iv
`
`

`
`
`Lantech Inc. v. Keip Machine Co.,
`32 F.3d 542 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ............................................................................. 33
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00866
`
`In re Lister,
`583 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ................................................................... 53, 54
`
`Medichem, SA v. Rolabo, SL,
`437 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ......................................................................... 39
`
`Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Mobile Scanning Techs., LLC,
`IPR2013-00093, Paper No. 28 (Apr. 29, 2013) ................................................. 16
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ........................................................... 2
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.,
`789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ..................................................................... 7, 10
`
`Moses Lake Indus. v. Enthone, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00243, Paper No. 6 (June 18, 2014) ................................................... 42
`
`Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc.,
`536 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................... 45, 47
`
`In re Robertson,
`169 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ........................................................................... 33
`
`Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP,
`IPR2014-00514, Paper No. 18 (Sep. 9, 2014) ................................................... 54
`
`Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc.,
`308 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ................................................................... 45, 46
`
`In re Skvorecz,
`580 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ........................................................................... 2
`
`Straight Path IP Grp., Inc. v. Sipnet EU S.R.O.,
`No. 2015-1212, 2015 WL 7567492, (Fed. Cir. Nov. 25, 2015) ........................ 15
`
`Square Inc. v. Unwired Planet, LLC,
`CBM2014-00156, Paper No. 22 (Feb. 26, 2015) .............................................. 50
`
`v
`
`

`
`
`Symantec Corp. v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y.,
`IPR2015-00371, Paper No. 13 (July 17, 2015) ..................................... 50, 53, 55
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00866
`
`Tempo Lighting, Inc. v. Tivoli, LLC,
`742 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ..................................................................... 15, 16
`
`In re Translogic Tech., Inc.,
`504 F.3d 1249(Fed. Cir. 2007) ............................................................................. 2
`
`Typeright Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`374 F.3d 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................................................... 57
`
`TRW Auto. US LLC v. Magna Elecs. Inc.,
`IPR2014-00293, Paper No. 19 (July 1, 2014) ................................................... 42
`
`VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.,
`767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ......................................................................... 15
`
`VirnetX Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`Case No. 6:07-CV-80 (E.D. Tex. Jul. 30, 2009) ............................................... 10
`
`Xilinx, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC,
`IPR2013-00112, Paper No. 14 (June 27, 2013) ................................................. 16
`
`In re Yamamoto,
`740 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ........................................................................... 3
`
`In re Young,
`927 F.2d 588 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ........................................................................... 39
`
`ZTE Corp. & ZTE (USA) Inc. v. ContentGuard Holdings Inc.,
`IPR2013-00134, Paper No. 12 (June 19, 2013) ................................................. 16
`
`Federal Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) .................................................................................................. 42
`
`35 U.S.C. § 311(b) .................................................................................................. 48
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(e) ..................................................................................................... 1
`
`Federal Rules
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) .......................................................................................... 56, 57
`
`vi
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`

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`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) ............................................................................................... 2
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`Case No. IPR2015-00866
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5) ......................................................................................... 51
`
`
`
`vii
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`

`
`
`
`I.
`
`
`Introduction
`
`
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`Case No. IPR2015-00866
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`Patent Owner VirnetX Inc. respectfully submits this Response to the Board’s
`
`decision to institute inter partes review (Paper No. 8, the “Decision”) and to the
`
`petition for inter partes review (the “Petition” or “Pet.”) filed by Petitioner Apple
`
`Inc. The Board instituted review of U.S. Patent No. 8,458,341 (“the ’341 patent”)
`
`on one ground: obviousness of claims 1–11, 14–25, and 28 over Beser and RFC
`
`2401. Petitioner has not carried its “burden of proving . . . unpatentability by a
`
`preponderance of the evidence” (35 U.S.C. § 316(e)) because the asserted
`
`references fail to disclose each of the claimed features. In addition, Apple has
`
`failed to show that RFC 2401 is a prior art printed publication. Apple’s submitted
`
`expert testimony should also be given little to no weight because it fails to describe
`
`how any of the claim features are taught or suggested in the asserted references.
`
`Accordingly, the Board should enter judgment against Apple and terminate this
`
`proceeding.
`
` Claim Construction II.
`
`
`The Petition identified seven terms for construction. In its Preliminary
`
`Response, Patent Owner addressed Petitioner’s constructions. The Decision did
`
`not provide a construction for any of the terms, finding that “no claim terms
`
`require express construction.” (Decision at 6.) Patent Owner respectfully
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` 1
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`disagrees and addresses
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`Case No. IPR2015-00866
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`the
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`terms below under
`
`the broadest reasonable
`
`interpretation (BRI) standard.
`
`In inter partes review, claims are to be given their “broadest reasonable
`
`construction in light of the specification.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this
`
`standard, terms are “generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,” which
`
`is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill1 at the time of
`
`the invention. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2007) (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
`
`(en banc)). Although VirnetX’s constructions represent the broadest reasonable
`
`interpretation (BRI) of the claims in light of the specification and prosecution
`
`history, the Board should apply the claim construction standard applied by the
`
`courts, especially given the litigations and prosecution histories of the patents in
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`the same family as the ’341 patent. The BRI standard “is solely an examination
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`expedient, not a rule of claim construction.” In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1267-
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`68 (Fed. Cir. 2009). It is certainly justified during the examination process
`
`because applicant has the opportunity to amend the claims during prosecution. In
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`1 A person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time would have had a
`
`master’s degree in computer science or computer engineering and approximately
`
`two years of experience in computer networking and computer security. (Ex. 2018
`
`at ¶¶ 13-14.)
`
`2
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`

`
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`re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984). But, as the Board has noted,
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`Case No. IPR2015-00866
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`inter partes review is not an examination and is “more adjudicatory than
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`examinational, in nature.” Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., IPR2012-00027,
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`Paper No. 26 at 6 (June 11, 2013).
`
`The ability to amend claims during inter partes review is so severely
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`restricted that the rationale underpinning the BRI—the ability to freely amend
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`claims—does not apply especially given the litigations and prosecution histories of
`
`patents in the same family as the ’341 patent. As a result, to the extent the Board
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`would have adopted a narrower construction under the courts’ claim construction
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`standard than it has adopted here, it should adopt the narrower construction
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`because the BRI standard should not apply to this proceeding.
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`The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit refused to reconsider en banc
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`the application of the BRI standard in Board proceedings, but the Supreme Court
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`recently granted certiorari. In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Cuozzo
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`Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, No. 15-446, 2016 WL 205946, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 15,
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`2016). VirnetX respectfully submits that, given “the adjudicative nature and the
`
`limited amendment process of IPRs,” claims in IPR proceedings should be given
`
`their “actual meaning.” In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1299, 1301–02 (Prost, C.J.,
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`dissenting from denial of en banc rehearing). VirnetX preserves this argument in
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`3
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`

`
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`the event the Supreme Court reverses the Federal Circuit’s decision in Cuozzo and
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`Case No. IPR2015-00866
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`instructs that a different standard should be applied.
`
`No construction proposed
`
`“Interception of the Request” (Claims 1, 11, 14, 15, 25, and 28)2
`A.
`Patent Owner’s Proposed
`Apple’s Proposed
`Decision’s Construction
`Construction
`Construction
`No construction
`Receiving a request
`necessary; alternatively,
`pertaining to a first entity
`receiving a request to
`at another entity
`look up an internet
`protocol address and,
`apart from resolving it
`into an address,
`performing an evaluation
`on it related to
`establishing a virtual
`private network
`communication link
`
`
`Petitioner proposes that “interception of a request” be construed similarly to
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`an interpretation that the Board adopted in a related proceeding. (Pet. at 9-10,
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`citing Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2014-00237, Paper No. 15 at 12-13 (May 14,
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`2014).) Though the Board declined to preliminarily construe this term in this
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`proceeding, if the Board later deems construction necessary, it should construe the
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`term in its entirety as proposed by Patent Owner’s alternative construction. As
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`2 Patent Owner identifies only the challenged claims that expressly recite the
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`terms at issue. Claims that depend from the identified claims may also implicitly
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`contain the terms.
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`4
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`

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`explained in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response, in contrast to Petitioner’s
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`Case No. IPR2015-00866
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`proposal, Patent Owner’s alternative construction appropriately captures the notion
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`of performing an additional evaluation on a request to look up an IP address related
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`to establishing an encrypted communications channel, beyond conventionally
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`resolving it and returning the address. (Prelim. Resp. at 24-28.) The independent
`
`claims support this construction, for example, by reciting that a determination is
`
`made as a result of the request [to look up an IP address] that the second network
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`device is a device with which a secure communication link can be established.
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`(Ex. 1001, claims 1 and 15.) Additionally, dependent claims 11 and 25 expressly
`
`specify the evaluation, reciting that the “interception” involves “receiving the
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`request to determine that the second network device is available for the secure
`
`communications service.” (Ex. 1001, claims 1 and 15.)
`
`“Provisioning Information” (Claims 1 and 15)
`
`Apple’s Proposed
`Construction
`Information that enables
`communication in a
`virtual private network
`
`Decision’s Construction
`
`No construction proposed
`
`B.
`Patent Owner’s Proposed
`Construction
`Information that is used
`to establish a virtual
`private network
`communication link
`
`
`As discussed in the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner’s construction is
`
`more consistent with the general notion that provisioning refers to setting up or
`
`establishing a connection or service. (Prelim. Resp. at 28-30; Ex. 2018 at ¶¶ 15-
`
`17.) As the Board noted in a related proceeding involving U.S. Patent No.
`
`5
`
`

`
`
`8,868,705, IPR2015-00811 (“the ’811 proceeding”), one dictionary explains that
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`Case No. IPR2015-00866
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`provisioning is “[s]etting up a telecommunications service for a particular
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`customer,” and that “[c]ommon carriers provision circuits by programming their
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`computers to switch customer lines into the appropriate networks.” Apple,
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`IPR2015-00811, Paper No. 8 at 9 (citing Ex. 2007 at 6, McGraw-Hill Computer
`
`Desktop Encyclopedia (9th ed. 2001).). Applying these principles to provisioning
`
`in the context of the ’341 patent, virtual private network communication link
`
`provisioning refers to setting up or establishing a virtual private network
`
`communication link—not merely the sending of any and all information that may
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`“enable or aid in” communication. Thus, in the context of the ’341 patent, the
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`“provisioning information” is “information that is used to establish a virtual private
`
`network communication link.” (Ex. 2018 at ¶ 16.)
`
`In
`
`the related ’811 proceeding,
`
`the Board preliminarily construed
`
`“provisioning information” to be “information that is provided to enable or aid in
`
`establishing a secure communications channel.” Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc.,
`
`IPR2015-00811, Paper No. 8 at 9 (Sept. 11, 2015). To the extent the Board
`
`considers construing “provisioning information” in a manner consistent with that
`
`proposed in the ’811 proceeding, such a construction would be incorrect. First, the
`
`construction in the ’811 proceeding refers to a secure communication channel,
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`which is not recited in the claims. Instead, Patent Owner’s construction accurately
`
`6
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`

`
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`identifies a “virtual private network communication link,” which is consistent with
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`Case No. IPR2015-00866
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`the claims, which recite “provisioning information for a virtual private network.”
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`(See e.g., Ex. 1001 at 56:16-18.). Second, such a construction would be overly
`
`broad in that it encompasses any information that “enables or aid[s] in”
`
`communication using a virtual private network communication link, even if that
`
`information has nothing to do with provisioning. For example, it would
`
`encompass source and destination information for individual packets of data that
`
`are traveling over a pre-existing channel. While this type of information may
`
`“enable or aid in” communication using a secure communication link, it has no
`
`relationship to the traditional notions as would be understood by one of ordinary
`
`skill in the art. Indeed, one of ordinary skill in the art would not have understood a
`
`virtual private network communication link to be provisioned every time a data
`
`packet is sent across it, but the Decision’s construction inaccurately encompasses
`
`this scenario. (Ex. 2018 at ¶ 17); see Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d
`
`1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that a construction is “unreasonably
`
`broad” where it is not “consistent with the one that those skilled in the art would
`
`reach”) (citation omitted).
`
`Accordingly, the BRI of “provisioning information” means “information that
`
`is used to establish virtual private network communication link.”
`
`7
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`

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`
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`C.
`
`“Virtual Private Network Communication Link” (Claims 1, 3, 15,
`and 17)
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`Case No. IPR2015-00866
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`Patent Owner’s Proposed
`Construction
`A communication path
`between two devices in a
`virtual private network
`
`Decision’s Construction
`
`No construction proposed
`
`Petitioner’s Proposed
`Construction
`A transmission path
`between two devices that
`restricts access to data,
`addresses, or other
`information on the path,
`generally using obfuscation
`methods to hide
`information on the path,
`including, but not limited
`to, one or more of
`authentication, encryption,
`or address hopping
`
`
`
`As discussed in the preliminary response, a “virtual private network
`
`communication link” (or “VPN communication link”) in view of the specification
`
`is “a communication path between two devices in a virtual private network,” where
`
`a virtual private network is a network of computers which privately and directly
`
`communicate with each other by encrypting traffic on insecure paths between the
`
`devices where the communication is both secure and anonymous. (Prelim. Resp. at
`
`33-44; see also Ex. 2018 at ¶¶ 18-33.) Petitioner’s proposed construction
`
`contradicts the plain language of the claims, is internally inconsistent, and is
`
`inconsistent with the ’341 patent specification and prosecution history.
`
`8
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`

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`Case No. IPR2015-00866
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`1.
`
`A “VPN Communication Link” Requires a Virtual Private
`Network
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`Petitioner’s proposed construction does not require that the virtual private
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`network communication link be between devices in a virtual private network. (Pet.
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`at 14-15.) However, the ’341 patent discloses that a VPN communication link is a
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`communication path between devices in a virtual private network. (Ex. 2018 at ¶
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`20.)
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`As explained in the ’341 patent, a VPN communication link does not exist
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`outside of a virtual private network. For example, when a secure domain name
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`service (SDNS) receives a query for a secure network address, it “accesses VPN
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`gatekeeper 3314 for establishing a VPN communication link between software
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`module 3309 [at the querying computer 3301] and secure server 3320.” (Ex. 1001
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`at 51:54-56.) Then, “VPN gatekeeper 3314 provisions computer 3301 and secure
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`web server computer 3320 . . . thereby creating the VPN” between the devices.
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`(Ex. 1001 at 51:57-60.) Notably, secure server 3320 “can only be accessed
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`through a VPN communication link.” (Ex. 1001 at 51:56-57.) And “[f]urther
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`communication between computers 3301 and 3320 occurs via the VPN” through
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`the VPN link. (Ex. 1001 at 52:20-22; Ex. 2018 at ¶ 20.)
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`Patent Owner’s adversaries and
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`their experts agree
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`that a VPN
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`communication link refers to a link in a virtual private network. Specifically,
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`Petitioner itself has understood and construed a VPN communication link to be
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`“any communication link between two end points in a virtual private network.”
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`(See, e.g., IPR2014-00481, Paper No. 1 at 6 (Mar. 7, 2014).) In district court,
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`Microsoft proposed a similar construction requiring the link to be in a virtual
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`private network. (Ex. 2001 at 25, Memorandum Opinion in VirnetX Inc. v.
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`Microsoft Corp., Case No. 6:07-CV-80 (E.D. Tex. Jul. 30, 2009), a
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`“communication link in a virtual private network.”) There, the court relied on its
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`construction of VPN, finding it unnecessary to separately construe VPN
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`communication link, suggesting that a VPN communication link is not separate
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`from a VPN. (Id. at 25-26.)
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`Thus, parties and courts have universally understood that a VPN
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`communication link exists in a VPN. This is the BRI, and Petitioner’s proposed
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`construction incorrectly deviates from this understanding.
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`2.
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`“Authentication” and “Address Hopping” Alone Do Not
`Result in a “Virtual Private Network Communication Link”
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`Petitioner’s proposed construction is also internally inconsistent and
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`technically flawed. (Pet. at 14-15.) Of the obfuscation methods in the proposed
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`construction—authentication, encryption, and address hopping—only encryption
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`restricts access to “data, addresses, or other information on the path,” as required
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`by the first portion of the construction. (Ex. 2018 at ¶¶ 21-24.) The other
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`techniques alone do not “hide information on the path,” as Petitioner’s construction
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`requires. (Id.)
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`Case No. IPR2015-00866
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`Authentication merely “[e]nsur[es] that a message originated from the
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`expected sender and has not been altered on route.” (Ex. 2008 at 3, Glossary for
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`the Linux FreeS/WAN Project.) It does not prevent an eavesdropper from
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`accessing data transmitted over an unsecure communication link. (Ex. 2018 at
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`¶ 22.) The specification supports this fact by describing at least one scenario
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`where an authenticated transmission occurs “in the clear”—i.e., over an unsecured
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`communication link:
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`SDNS [secure domain name service] 3313 can be accessed
`through secure portal 3310 “in the clear”, that is, without using
`an administrative VPN communication link. In this situation,
`secure portal 3310 preferably authenticates the query using any
`well-known technique, such as a cryptographic technique,
`before allowing the query to proceed to SDNS [3313].
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`(Ex. 1001 at 52:1-6.)
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`Address hopping alone also does not provide the claimed security, as there is
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`nothing inherent in moving from address to address that hides information on the
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`path or precludes an eavesdropper from reading the details of a communication.
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`(Ex. 2018 at ¶ 23.) This is why the ’341 patent discloses embodiments that use
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`encryption in conjunction with address hopping to protect, for example, the next
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`address in a routing scheme from being viewed by eavesdroppers. (See, e.g., Ex.
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`1001 at 3:36-50, stating in part that “[e]ach TARP packet’s true destination is
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`concealed behind a layer of encryption generated using a link key.”) It is the
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`encryption that hides information on the path while moving from address to
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`address. (See, e.g., Ex. 1001 at 3:16-4:40; Ex. 2018 at ¶ 23.)
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`While authentication and address hopping may be used in conjunction with
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`encryption as an “obfuscation method,” this fact does not make them sufficient by
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`themselves to “hide information on the path,” as Petitioner’s construction requires.
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`(Ex. 2018 at ¶ 23-24.) Because Petitioner’s construction presents them as
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`alternatives, allowing each to be sufficient, Petitioner’s construction must be
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`rejected.
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`Petitioner asserts, however, that Patent Owner’s expert agrees that address
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`hopping hides information on the path. (Pet. at 13, citing Ex. 1055 at 113:16-
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`114:12.) But, as Patent Owner’s expert explained, address hopping simply makes
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`it such that “[y]ou may not be able to determine in isolation who is speaking to
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`whom.” (Ex. 1055 at 114:1-6.) In other words, address hopping may make it more
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`difficult to determine the originating and terminating devices, but it alone does not
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`“hide” the addresses. (Ex. 2018 at ¶ 24.) Thus, Petitioner’s proposed construction
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`of “secure communication link” should be rejected.
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`3.
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`A “Virtual Private Network Communication Link” Must Be
`Direct
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`Petitioner’s construction incorrectly encompasses links that are not direct.
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`The ’341 patent specification describes a virtual private network link as “direct”
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`between a client and target device and the prosecution history of related VirnetX
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`Case No. IPR2015-00866
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`patents supports this understanding.
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`For instance, in one embodiment, the ’341 patent describes the link between
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`an originating TARP terminal and a destination TARP terminal as direct. (See,
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`e.g., Ex. 1001 at 10:9-18, Fig. 2; see also id. at 34:7-12 (describing a variation of
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`the TARP embodiments as including a direct communication link); 38:34-37
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`(describing the embodiment of Figure 24 in which a first computer and second
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`computer are connected directly).) The ’341 patent similarly describes direct
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`communications in later embodiments as well. (See, e.g., id. at 40:32-35, 41:25-28
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`(describing a virtual private network as being direct between a user’s computer and
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`target), 42:32-36, 43:25-29 (describing a load balancing example in which a virtual
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`private network