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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`________________________
`AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.,
`HONDA OF AMERICA MFG., INC.,
`HONDA PATENTS & TECHNOLOGIES NORTH AMERICA, LLC,
`and HONDA MOTOR CO., LTD.,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`SIGNAL IP, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`________________________
`Case IPR2015-01003
`Patent 5,732,375
`________________________
`
`PATENT OWNER’S ADDITIONAL BRIEFING CONCERNING THE
`STIPULATION AND PARTIAL JUDGMENT OF INVALIDITY IN THE
`RELATED LITIGATION
`
`
`
`1  
`
`
`
`  
`
`

`
`Pursuant to the Board’s Order of September 2, 2015, Patent Owner submits
`
`the following additional briefing to address the issues raised by the parties’
`
`stipulation and the Court’s partial judgment of invalidity in the underlying
`
`litigations.
`
`
`
`(1) The challenged claims of the ‘375 patent implicated by the
`
`stipulation are not indefinite.
`
`Petitioner challenges the patentability of claims 1 and 7 of U.S. Patent
`
`5,732,375 (the “’375 patent”). In the Court’s order of partial summary
`
`judgment in the underlying litigation, claims 1 and 7 were found invalid as
`
`indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 2.1 This determination was
`
`made pursuant to the parties’ stipulation that,
`
`In light of the Court’s claim construction order, Plaintiff
`and Defendants stipulate to entry of a partial final
`judgment that the following claims are invalid due to
`indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 2: . . .
`(ii) claims 1 and 7 of the ’375 patent. . . .2
`
`                                                                                                                
`
`1 Ex. 3001 at 2.
`
`2 Ex. 2002 at 2. Reexamination Certificate US 5,732,375 C1, issued July 30,
`
`2015, confirms the patentability of claims 1 and 7, but directs attention to the
`
`Court’s decision.
`
`  
`
`2  
`
`

`
`Notably, this stipulation related to a procedural action concerning the “entry
`
`of a partial final judgment,” and not to the correctness of the Court’s
`
`determination concerning validity of the subject claims. This is evidenced by
`
`further provisions of the stipulation that,
`
`Plaintiff and Defendants reserve all appellate rights,
`including, but not limited to, the right to appeal the
`Court’s April 17, 2015 claim construction order to the
`United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
`Plaintiff reserves all rights as to claims not addressed by
`the Court’s claim construction order, or any new claims
`that may be issued by the United States Patent Office.3
`
`With respect to claim 1, the Court deemed the term “concentrated” to
`
`be indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 2.4 In context, this term is
`
`used in connection with calculations of forces in various seat areas:
`
`“determining the existence of a local pressure area when the calculated total
`
`force is concentrated in one of said seat areas,” and “calculating a local force
`
`as a sum of forces sensed by each sensor located in the seat area in which the
`
`                                                                                                                
`
`total force is concentrated.”5 The specification explains that,
`
`3 Id. at 2-3.
`
`4 Ex. 2001 at 41-43.
`
`5 Ex. 1001 at 5:52-57.
`
`  
`
`3  
`
`

`
`a check is made for force concentration in a localized
`area <56>. Four overlapping localized areas are defined
`as shown in FIG. 7. The front four sensors 1, 6, 7 and 12
`are in the front group, the rear eight sensors 2, 3, 4, 5, 8,
`9, 10 and 11 are in the rear group, the left eight sensors 1,
`2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 are in the left group, and the eight
`sensors 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 are in the right group.
`The algorithm determines if the pressure is all
`concentrated in one group by summing the load ratings of
`the sensors in each group and comparing to the total load
`rating. If the rating sum of any group is equal to the total
`rating, a flag is set for that group (all right, all front etc.).6
`
`Thus, force “concentration” is used consistently with the plain and ordinary
`
`meaning of that term (a relative measure of the amount of force detected by
`
`sensors in a given seat area) and, in this example, the total force may be
`
`“concentrated” in a seat area when the sum in that area is equal to the total.
`
`
`
`Based on the above, a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the
`
`‘375 patent would readily discern that the term “concentrated,” as used in
`
`claim 1, means that the check for force concentration described in the
`
`specification has determined that forces are such that “by summing the load
`
`ratings of the sensors in each group and comparing to the total load rating,”
`
`                                                                                                                
`  
`
`6 Id. at 4:18-29.
`
`4  
`
`

`
`the sum of a group is equal to the total rating.
`
`
`
`The Court mistakenly determined that the claim should have recited
`
`concentrations of 100% of forces and that because it did not the claim was
`
`invalid.7 Such a determination, however, was inappropriate. Simply because
`
`only one example of force concentration was provided in the specification is
`
`not a basis for finding a claim indefinite. Indeed, a single embodiment may
`
`provide broad support for the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in
`
`the art in cases involving predictable factors, such as mechanical or
`
`electrical elements.8 Here, the determination of relative displacements of
`
`forces over a defined sensor area involves predictable factors, hence the
`
`example provided in the specification was sufficient to inform persons of
`
`ordinary skill in the art of the boundaries of the claim.9 Accordingly, the
`
`                                                                                                                
`
`7 Ex. 2001 at 43.
`
`8 See, e.g., In re Vickers, 141 F.2d 522, 526-27 (CCPA 1944); In re Cook,
`
`439 F.2d 730, 734 (CCPA 1971).
`
`9 Cf. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) (a
`
`claim, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, need only
`
`inform with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of
`
`the invention to satisfy § 112); Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. M-I
`
`  
`
`5  
`
`

`
`claim is not indefinite. Claim 7 depends from claim 1 and is not indefinite
`
`for at least the same reasons as claim 1.
`
`
`
`(2) If the Board determines the challenged claims are indefinite, the
`
`Board should terminate this proceeding.
`
`As noted above, the parties have not stipulated to indefiniteness of the
`
`challenged claims. Rather, the parties stipulated to “entry of a partial final
`
`judgment,” but left open their options to appeal the Court’s determination of
`
`indefiniteness.10 No admissions or concessions were made concerning the
`
`validity of the challenged claims as a result of the parties’ stipulation.
`
`Notwithstanding the above, if the Board separately determines that the
`
`challenged claims are incapable of being construed, for example because the
`
`Board determines the claims are indefinite, then the Board should exercise
`
`its discretion and terminate this proceeding.11 Where a claim’s meaning is
`
`                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
`
`indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2, any rejection based on prior art is
`
`LLC, 514 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (indefiniteness requires that a skilled
`
`artisan could not discern the boundaries of a claim).
`
`10 Ex. 2002 at 2-3.
`
`11 See Blackberry Corp. v. MobileMedia Ideas, LLC, Case IPR2013-00036,
`
`slip op. at 20 (PTAB Mar. 7, 2014) (Paper 65).
`
`6  
`
`  
`
`

`
`improperly based on speculation.12 Accordingly, if the Board determines that
`
`the challenged claims are indefinite, then it would be improper to institute an
`
`inter partes review based on any comparison of those claims to the asserted
`
`prior art and termination of the proceeding would be appropriate.
`
`
`
`(3) If the Board determines the parties have stipulated that the
`
`challenged claims are indefinite, the Board should terminate this
`
`proceeding.
`
`Although Patent Owner believes that the parties’ stipulation is not an
`
`agreement that claims 1 and 7 are indefinite, if the Board determines
`
`otherwise then the Board should exercise its discretion under 35 U.S.C. §
`
`314 to deny the Petition and should proceed to terminate this proceeding
`
`pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. As indicated above, it would be improper to
`
`institute an inter partes review based on any comparison of claims deemed
`
`to be indefinite to the asserted prior art and termination of the proceeding
`
`would be appropriate.
`
`
`
`                                                                                                                
`  
`
`12 In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862–63 (CCPA 1962).
`
`7  
`
`

`
`(4) Even if the Board determines the parties have stipulated that the
`
`challenged claims are indefinite, the Board should not treat that
`
`stipulation as a disclaimer.
`
`As indicated above, Patent Owner believes that the parties’ stipulation
`
`is not an agreement that claims 1 and 7 are indefinite. Further, even if the
`
`Board determines otherwise, the Board should not treat the stipulation as a
`
`disclaimer of claims 1 and 7.
`
`A disclaimer is an unequivocal repudiation of a claim or a patent by
`
`the owner thereof.13 The stipulation entered into by the parties reflected no
`
`such repudiation. Instead,
`
`Plaintiff and Defendants reserve all appellate rights,
`including, but not limited to, the right to appeal the
`Court’s April 17, 2015 claim construction order to the
`United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
`Plaintiff reserves all rights as to claims not addressed by
`
`                                                                                                                
`
`13 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. 253 (a) (“A patentee . . . may . . . make disclaimer of
`
`any complete claim, stating therein the extent of his interest in such patent.
`
`Such disclaimer shall be in writing, and recorded in the Patent and
`
`Trademark Office; and it shall thereafter be considered as part of the original
`
`patent to the extent of the interest possessed by the disclaimant and by those
`
`claiming under him.”)
`
`  
`
`8  
`
`

`
`the Court’s claim construction order, or any new claims
`that may be issued by the United States Patent Office.14
`
`The reservation of rights to appeal the Court’s determinations set forth in the
`
`claim construction order is a clear indication that Patent Owner was not
`
`unequivocally repudiating any claim of the ‘375 patent. Accordingly, the
`
`Board should not treat the stipulation as a disclaimer even if it determines
`
`that the parties somehow agreed that claims 1 and 7 are invalid for being
`
`indefinite.
`
`
`
`Likewise, the Board should not treat the stipulation as a request for
`
`adverse judgment by Patent Owner. A request for adverse judgment may not
`
`be ambiguous and should not be subject to conditions.15 Here, the stipulation
`
`expressly reserved all rights of appeal and, therefore, was not a repudiation
`
`of any claim. Conditioning an adverse judgment on an appeal of an
`
`underlying claim construction would provide no finality to any
`
`determination in this proceeding. Accordingly, the Board should not treat the
`
`stipulation as a request for adverse judgment by Patent Owner.
`
`14 Ex. 2002 at 2-3 (emphasis added).
`
`15 Hyundai Motor Company v. American Vehicular Sciences LLC, Case
`
`                                                                                                                
`IPR2014-00629, slip op. at 2 (PTAB Feb. 6, 2015) (Paper 21).  
`  
`9  
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Dated: September 10, 2015
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Ascenda Law Group, PC
`333 W San Carlos St., Suite 200
`San Jose, CA 95110
`Tel: 866-877-4883
`Email: tarek.fahmi@ascendalaw.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/Tarek N. Fahmi/
`Tarek N. Fahmi
`Reg. No. 41,402
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`  
`
`10  
`
`

`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing
`PATENT OWNER’S ADDITIONAL BRIEFING CONCERNING THE
`STIPULATION AND PARTIAL JUDGMENT OF INVALIDITY IN THE
`RELATED LITIGATION
`
`was served on September 10, 2015, by filing this document though the
`Patent Review Processing System as well as by delivering a copy via email
`directed to the attorneys of record for the Petitioner at the following address:
`Joshua A. Griswold
`Daniel Smith
`Fish & Richardson P.C.
`3200 RBC Plaza
`60 South Sixth Street,
`Minneapolis, MN 55402
`
`griswold@fr.com
`IPR15625-0018IP1@fr.com
`
`
`
`
`The parties have agreed to electronic service in this proceeding.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`/Tarek N. Fahmi/
`Dated: September 10, 2015
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Tarek N. Fahmi
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Reg. No. 41,402
`Ascenda Law Group, PC
`333 W San Carlos St., Suite 200
`San Jose, CA 95110
`Tel: 866-877-4883
`Email: patents@ascendalaw.com
`
`
`
`  
`
`11  

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