UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`COALITION FOR AFFORDABLE DRUGS VII LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`POZEN INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S REQUEST FOR
`REHEARING OF THE DECISION TO INSTITUTE TRIAL
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`COALITION FOR AFFORDABLE DRUGS VII LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`POZEN INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S REQUEST FOR
`REHEARING OF THE DECISION TO INSTITUTE TRIAL
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS ................................................................................... 2
`
`III. ARGUMENT ................................................................................................... 4
`
`A.
`
`The Petition Does Not “Acknowledge” that the Final “Wherein”
`Clause Should Be Given Patentable Weight ......................................... 4
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Ground 1: The present record provides evidence that the final
`“wherein” clause is obvious over Plachetka in view of Graham
`and Goldstein. ............................................................................. 5
`
`Ground 2: The present record provides support that the final
`“wherein” clause is an inherent result of Plachetka. .................10
`
`B.
`
`The Fact that the Examiner Added the Final “Wherein” Clause During
`Prosecution Does Not Entitle It to Patentable Weight ........................12
`
`IV. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................13
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`Achates Reference Publ’g, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`803 F.3d 652 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ....................................................................... 1, 2, 3
`
`In re Pearson,
`494 F.2d 1399 (CCPA 1974) ...............................................................................10
`
`In re Schreiber,
`128 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ............................................................................10
`
`In re Spada,
`911 F.2d 705 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ..............................................................................10
`
`In re Zierden,
`411 F.2d 1325 (CCPA 1969) ...............................................................................11
`
`Minton v. National Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc.,
`336 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ............................................................................11
`
`Par Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharm., Inc.,
`773 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................11
`
`Redline Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc.,
`811 F.3d 435 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ................................................................................ 3
`
`Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n.,
`988 F.2d 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ............................................................................11
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) .................................................................................................2, 3
`
`Regulations
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(4) ................................................................................................ 5
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.120 ..................................................................................................... 2
`
`ii
`
`
`
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) ................................................................................................... 3
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) ..............................................................................................3, 4
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`
`
`iii
`
`
`
`
`
`As authorized by the Board by email on March 10, 2016, Petitioner files this
`
`Opposition to Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing of the Decision to Institute
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`Trial filed on March 4, 2016 (Paper 19).
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`There are two distinct phases of an IPR proceeding—an institution phase
`
`and a merits phase. See Achates Reference Publ’g, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 803 F.3d
`
`652, 654–55 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing is an attempt
`
`to short-circuit this two-part process and skip the merits phase of this proceeding.
`
`During the first phase of this proceeding, the Board considered the
`
`information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response and found that
`
`the “Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood” that claims 1–16 of the ’621
`
`patent are unpatentable on both Grounds 1 and 2 of the Petition. Decision at 21.
`
`The Board also raised the issue of whether the final “wherein” clause of the
`
`independent claims should be entitled to patentable weight. Decision at 15, 20.
`
`The second phase of this proceeding will conclude with the Board making a
`
`final determination—on the merits—as to the patentability of each claim. See
`
`Decision at 21 (“[W]e have not made a final determination with respect to the
`
`patentability of any claim.”). Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing urges the
`
`Board to bypass the merits phase and to prematurely conclude that the claims are
`
`1
`
`
`
`
`directed to patentable subject matter at this stage of the proceeding. Request for
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`Rehearing at 11.
`
`Patent Owner makes its Request for Rehearing without identifying any
`
`matters “misapprehended” or “overlooked” by the Board. Patent Owner’s request
`
`for relief, instead, is based on its disagreement with the Board’s interpretation of
`
`the claims. Specifically, Patent Owner’s request for relief is based on the Board’s
`
`“misinterpretation” of the final “wherein” clause of independent claims 1, 8, 15,
`
`and 16. Request for Rehearing at 4. This is not the purpose of a proper request for
`
`rehearing. Patent Owner will have a full opportunity to address its disagreements
`
`with the Board’s interpretation of the claims during the merits phase of this
`
`proceeding, particularly when it files its Patent Owner Response pursuant to
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.120.
`
`At this stage, the Board’s preliminary interpretation of the final “wherein”
`
`clause of the independent claims is supported by the record. Patent Owner has not
`
`met its burden of showing that the Board abused its discretion or that the
`
`Institution Decision should be modified in any way. As such, Patent Owner’s
`
`Request for Rehearing should be denied.
`
`II. LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`The Board has authority, under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), to decide whether there
`
`are sufficient grounds to institute an IPR proceeding. Achates, 803 F.3d at 654–55.
`
`2
`
`
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`
`Based on the petition and any response, the Board decides whether there are
`
`sufficient grounds to institute a proceeding, i.e., whether there is a “reasonable
`
`likelihood” that the petition will prevail. See id.; 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
`
`A party dissatisfied with a decision to institute an IPR proceeding may file a
`
`request for rehearing. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The burden of showing a decision
`
`should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” Id. A request for
`
`rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board
`
`misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously
`
`addressed . . . .” Id.
`
`The applicable standard for a request for rehearing of an institution decision
`
`is abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The Federal Circuit has held that “[a]n
`
`abuse of discretion occurs if the decision (1) is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or
`
`fanciful; (2) is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) rests on clearly
`
`erroneous fact findings; or (4) involves a record that contains no evidence on
`
`which the Board could rationally base its decision.” Redline Detection, LLC v. Star
`
`Envirotech, Inc., 811 F.3d 435, 442 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Patent Owner, however, has
`
`not established any abuse of discretion by this Board.
`
`3
`
`
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`
`III. ARGUMENT
`
`Although Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing recites the proper legal
`
`standard of review,1 it fails to specifically identify any “matters . . .
`
`misapprehended or overlooked” by the Board. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Rather,
`
`Patent Owner’s request for relief is based on its disagreement with the Board’s
`
`interpretation of the claims. See Request for Rehearing at 4 (“The Patent Owner
`
`requests reconsideration of both grounds of the Decision to institute on claims 1-16
`
`. . . because the Decision misinterprets the final “wherein” clauses of independent
`
`claims 1, 8, 15, and 16.”). In support of its argument that the Board
`
`“misinterpreted” the final “wherein” clause of the independent claims, Patent
`
`Owner makes two fundamentally flawed points, discussed in detail below.
`
`A. The Petition Does Not “Acknowledge” that the Final “Wherein”
`Clause Should Be Given Patentable Weight
`
`Patent Owner asserts that the Petition and Preliminary Response
`
`“acknowledge” that the final “wherein” clause should be afforded patentable
`
`weight. Request for Rehearing at 5–6. This assertion mischaracterizes the
`
`Petition. Indeed, the Petition and supporting expert declaration show the
`
`
`1 Request for Rehearing at 3.
`
`4
`
`
`
`
`opposite—i.e., that the final “wherein” clause is obvious and should not be entitled
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`to any patentable weight.
`
`The fact that Petitioner and its expert declarant specifically addressed the
`
`final “wherein” clause in the Petition and in the supporting expert declaration is not
`
`an “acknowledgment” that this clause is entitled to patentable weight. The Petition
`
`included a section, in both Grounds 1 and 2, devoted to the “final wherein clause,”
`
`as it did for each and every other element of the challenged claims. Petitioner used
`
`this format to comply with the PTAB’s rules and regulations. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.104(4) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found
`
`in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.”).
`
`The format of the Petition is far from an admission that the final “wherein”
`
`clause should be afforded patentable weight. On the contrary, the Petition and
`
`supporting expert declaration provide evidence and legal support showing that the
`
`final “wherein” clause is obvious and should not be entitled to any patentable
`
`weight in both Grounds 1 and 2 of the Petition.
`
`1. Ground 1: The present record provides evidence that the
`final “wherein” clause is obvious over Plachetka in view of
`Graham and Goldstein.
`
`Ground 1 of the Petition asserts that the final “wherein” clause of the
`
`independent claims is disclosed by Plachetka in view of Graham and Goldstein:
`
`5
`
`
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`
`
`Specifically, Graham and Goldstein disclose that 6.25% of patients
`
`taking a combination of 15 mg of lansoprazole and an NSAID with
`
`LDA have gastric ulcers, while 23% of patients taking a combination
`
`of 15 mg of lansoprazole and an NSAID without LDA have gastric
`
`ulcers. ([Ex. 1003, Shargel Decl.], ¶ 83.) Similarly, Graham and
`
`Goldstein disclose that 0% of patients taking a combination of 30 mg
`
`of lansoprazole and an NSAID with LDA have gastric ulcers, while
`
`17% of patients taking a combination of 30 mg of lansoprazole and an
`
`NSAID without LDA have gastric ulcers. (Id.)
`
`Petition at 17–18. Quoting this same passage of the Petition and similar language
`
`in the Shargel Declaration, the Board—siding with Patent Owner—concluded that:
`
`Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Shargel identifies the basis for these
`
`purported results, much less the basis for the conclusion that an
`
`ordinary artisan “would have understood that a combination of
`
`lansoprazole and naproxen was more effective at reducing the
`
`incidence of the NSAID-associated ulcers in patients taking LDA than
`
`in patients not taking LDA.
`
`Decision at 15 (citing Petition at 18; Ex. 1003, Shargel Decl., ¶ 83).
`
`The Board’s conclusion is understandable in light of Patent Owner’s
`
`misleading Preliminary Response, which states: “while the Petition cites to a
`
`declaration from Dr. Leon Shargel, the declaration merely recites, word-for-word,
`
`the Petition and provides no independent analysis.” Prelim. Resp. at 18. This
`
`statement simply is not true. The Shargel Declaration, which includes 123 pages
`
`6
`
`
`
`
`of detailed claim charts in the appendices, does not recite the Petition “word-for-
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`word.”
`
`Indeed, Dr. Shargel’s full analysis—the basis for the conclusion that Graham
`
`and Goldstein render the final “wherein” clause obvious—is located in Appendix B
`
`to the Shargel Declaration,2 which discusses the Graham and Goldstein results in
`
`depth and provides in relevant part:
`
`Graham shows that, for the total study population of patients who
`
`were long-term users of NSAIDS, 49% of the patients in the placebo
`
`group had GUs (51% free), 21% of the patients in the lansoprazole 15
`
`mg group had GUs (79% free of GUs), and 17% of the patients in the
`
`lansoprazole 30 mg group had GUs (83% free of GUs). Goldstein
`
`shows that, for the total study population of patients who were long
`
`term users of NSAIDS and on LDA, 65% of the patients in the
`
`placebo group had GUs (35% free of GUs), 6.25% of the patients in
`
`the lansoprazole 15 mg group had GUs (93.75% free of GUs), and 0%
`
`of the patients in the lansoprazole 30 mg group had GUs (100% free
`
`of GUs).
`
`
`2 Ex. 1003, Shargel Decl., ¶ 55 (“I agree with and incorporate the claim chart for
`
`this ground, which is attached hereto as Appendix B . . . .”).
`
`7
`
`
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`
`Ex. 1003, Shargel Decl., Appendix B at 12. Dr. Shargel also provides, in
`
`Appendix B, that a POSA would have been able to use simple math to determine
`
`the number of patients in the study who were not on LDA:
`
`A POSA would have understood Graham and Goldstein to disclose
`
`the number of patients not on LDA to be 111 for those in the placebo
`
`group, 120 for those in the lansoprazole 15 mg group, and 125 for
`
`those in the lansoprazole 30 mg group. Thus, a POSA would have
`
`understood Graham and Goldstein to disclose the percentage of
`
`patients not on LDA with GUs to be 46% for the placebo group, 23%
`
`for the lansoprazole 15 mg group, and 18% for the lansoprazole 30
`
`mg group.
`
`Id. at 13. Dr. Shargel further provides that “a POSA would have arrived at the
`
`following table,” summarizing the simple math:
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`
`Id. at 13–14. Finally, Dr. Shargel ties the numbers in the table to the arguments
`
`
`
`made in the Petition:
`
`Graham and Goldstein show that, in the lansoprazole 15 mg group,
`
`those taking LDA had a less chance (6.25% versus 23%) of gastric
`
`ulcers compared to those not on LDA. Similarly, in the lansoprazole
`
`30 mg group, those taking LDA had a less chance (0% versus 18%) of
`
`gastric ulcers compared to those not on LDA. Thus, a POSA would
`
`have understood Graham and Goldstein to disclose this limitation
`
`given the structural, functional, and other similarities between
`
`Graham’s and Goldstein’s lansoprazole and Plachetka’s
`
`esomeprazole.
`
`Id. at 14.
`
`Although it is true that Petitioner did not quote Dr. Shargel’s full analysis of
`
`the Graham and Goldstein results in the body of the Petition due to page-limit
`
`constraints, the basis for Petitioner’s conclusion that Graham and Goldstein render
`
`the final “wherein” clause obvious is included in the present record. This evidence
`
`will be amplified during the merits phase of this proceeding to establish that the
`
`final “wherein” clause should not be afforded any patentable weight.
`
`9
`
`
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`
`
`2. Ground 2: The present record provides support that the
`final “wherein” clause is an inherent result of Plachetka.
`
`Ground 2 of the Petition asserts that the final “wherein” clause is inherently
`
`present in the disclosure of the ’621 Patent itself and in Plachetka, which both
`
`disclose PN400, an existing composition for which the ’621 Patent purports to
`
`claim a new use. As discussed in the Petition, the ’621 Patent plainly discloses
`
`“PN400 (a combination therapy of 500 mg of enterically coated naproxen and 20
`
`mg of esomeprazole).” Petition at 38 (citing Ex. 1001, ’621 Patent, col. 12 l. 63–
`
`col. 13 l. 5). The Petition also discusses that “Plachetka discloses a composition
`
`comprising 500 mg of enterically coated naproxen and 20 mg of esomeprazole.”
`
`Petition at 37 (citing Ex. 1004, Plachetka, col. 3 ll. 39-59, col. 8 ll. 35-37, and col.
`
`7 ll. 7-18).
`
`It is well settled that the recitation of a new intended use for an existing
`
`composition, such as PN400, does not make a claim to that existing composition
`
`patentable. See In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing In re
`
`Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The discovery of a new property or
`
`use of a previously known composition, even when that property and use are
`
`unobvious from prior art, cannot impart patentability to claims to the known
`
`composition.”); In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1403 (CCPA 1974) (intended use of
`
`an old composition does not render a composition claim patentable); In re Zierden,
`
`10
`
`
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`
`411 F.2d 1325, 1328 (CCPA 1969) (“[M]ere statement of a new use for an
`
`otherwise old or obvious composition cannot render a claim to the composition
`
`patentable.”).
`
`The Petition provides a recent Federal Circuit decision that extends this
`
`well-settled law to method claims: “the application of an old process to a new and
`
`analogous purpose does not involve invention, even if the new result had not
`
`before been contemplated.” Petition at 39 (quoting Par Pharm., Inc. v. TWI
`
`Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). The Petition further provides
`
`that “inherency may supply a missing claim limitation in an obviousness analysis.”
`
`Id. (quoting Par Pharm., 773 F.3d at 1194–95).
`
`This is essentially the same argument that the Board makes in pointing out
`
`that “[a] ‘whereby’ clause that merely states the result of the limitations in the
`
`claim adds nothing to the patentability or substance of the claim.” Decision at 15–
`
`16 (citing Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n., 988 F.2d 1165,
`
`1172 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Minton v. National Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 336
`
`F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). The Board notes that this “underlying issue” is
`
`“not yet addressed on this record.” Decision at 15, 20. This issue will be
`
`addressed fully during the merits phase of this proceeding to establish that the final
`
`“wherein” clause should not be afforded any patentable weight.
`
`11
`
`
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`
`
`B.
`
`The Fact that the Examiner Added the Final “Wherein” Clause
`During Prosecution Does Not Entitle It to Patentable Weight
`
`Patent Owner further asserts that the final “wherein” clause is necessarily
`
`limiting—and is entitled to patentable weight—because it was added by the
`
`Examiner as a condition of allowance. Request for Rehearing at 8–10. Patent
`
`Owner essentially argues that the Board should not question the Examiner’s
`
`finding that the final “wherein” clause limits the claim scope to an unexpected
`
`result. Id. at 10.
`
`This assertion makes the false assumption that an Examiner can never make
`
`a mistake, which is not consistent with the PTAB’s record of finding hundreds of
`
`issued patent claims to be directed to unpatentable subject matter. According to
`
`the PTAB’s most recent statistics, in 719 of the 828 IPR trials that have reached a
`
`final written decision, at least one challenged claim was found to be unpatentable.3
`
`Thus, the Board has disagreed with an Examiner’s determination of patentability in
`
`87% of IPR trials that have reached a final written decision.4
`
`
`3 See Patent Trial and Appeal Board Statistics, 2/29/2016, available at
`
`http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016-2-29%20PTAB.pdf.
`
`4 See id.
`
`12
`
`
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`
`
`Moreover, in this case, the Examiner made the amendment, adding the final
`
`“wherein” clause, without considering material prior art. Patent Owner admits in
`
`its Preliminary Response that the Examiner added the final “wherein” clause, and
`
`allowed the claims, without considering Graham and Goldstein. See Prelim. Resp.
`
`at 11 (“[T]he Graham and Goldstein references relied upon in Ground 1 were not
`
`submitted to the Office during prosecution of the ’621 patent.”). For this reason,
`
`the Examiner’s reasons for allowance should be given less weight.
`
`Regardless, the Board considered the fact that the Examiner added the final
`
`“wherein” clause during prosecution in an attempt to limit the claim scope to the
`
`unexpected result. Thus, the Board did not “misapprehend” or “overlook” this
`
`information. Decision at 19–20. Considering this information, and the record as it
`
`presently stands, the Board found a “reasonable likelihood” that claims 1–16 of the
`
`’621 patent are unpatentable on both Grounds 1 and 2 of the Petition. Id. at 20–21.
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`Patent Owner has not met its burden of showing that the Institution Decision
`
`should be modified. As such, Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing should be
`
`denied.
`
`
`
`
`
`13
`
`
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`Date: March 24, 2016
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`
`
`/Jerry C. Harris, Jr./
`Jerry C. Harris, Jr. (Reg. No. 66,822)
`Amy E. LaValle (Reg. No. 51,092)
`WICK PHILLIPS GOULD & MARTIN, LLP
`3131 McKinney Avenue, Suite 100
`Dallas, TX 75204
`(214) 692-6200 (phone)
`(214) 692-6255 (fax)
`jerry.harris@wickphillips.com
`amy.lavalle@wickphillips.com
`
`Counsel for Petitioner
`Coalition for Affordable Drugs VII LLC
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`14
`
`
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), I hereby certify that on March 24, 2016 a
`
`copy of the foregoing PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S
`
`REQUEST FOR REHEARING OF THE DECISION TO INSTITUTE TRIAL was
`
`provided via email to the following counsel of record for Patent Owner:
`
`Counsel for Horizon Pharma USA, Inc.
`Back-Up Counsel
`Lead Counsel
`Dennis Bennett
`Lauren L. Stevens, Ph.D.
`GLOBAL PATENT GROUP, LLC
`GLOBAL PATENT GROUP, LLC
`1005 N. Warson Road, Suite 404
`1005 N. Warson Road, Suite 404
`St. Louis, MO 63132
`St. Louis, MO 63132
`Tel: (314) 812-8018
`Tel: (650) 387-3813
`Fax: (314) 685-2300
`Fax: (314) 685-2300
`dennisbennett@globalpatentgroup.com
`lstevens@globalpatentgroup.com
`Back-Up Counsel
`Back-Up Counsel
`Thomas A. Blinka, Ph.D.
`Ricardo Rodriguez
`COOLEY LLP
`COOLEY LLP
`1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
`3175 Hanover Street
`Suite 700
`Palo Alto, CA 94304-1130
`Washington, DC 20004-2400
`Tel: (650) 843-5046
`Tel: (202) 842-7800
`Fax: (650) 843-7400
`Fax: (202) 842-7899
`rr@cooley.com
`tblinka@cooley.com
`zIPR2015-01718@cooley.com
`Counsel for Pozen Inc.
`Back-Up Counsel
`Margaret J. Sampson, Ph.D.
`BAKER BOTTS LLP
`98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
`Austin, TX 78701-4078
`Tel: (512) 322-2552
`Fax: (512) 322-3652
`margaret.sampson@bakerbotts.com
`
`Lead Counsel
`Stephen M. Hash, Ph.D.
`BAKER BOTTS LLP
`98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
`Austin, TX 78701-4078
`Tel: (512) 322-2587
`Fax: (512) 322-3687
`stephen.hash@bakerbotts.com
`PozenVimovoBB@bakerbotts.com
`
`15
`
`
`
`IPR2015-01718
`Patent 8,945,621
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/Amy E. LaValle/
`Back-Up Counsel for Petitioner
`Coalition for Affordable Drugs VII LLC
`
`
`Back-Up Counsel
`Jeffrey S. Gritton
`BAKER BOTTS LLP
`98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
`Austin, TX 78701-4078
`Tel: (512) 322-2624
`Fax: (512) 322-3652
`Jeff.Gritton@bakerbotts.com
`
`
`
`Date: March 24, 2016
`
`
`
`16
Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.
After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.
Accept $ Charge
Still Working On It
This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.
Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.
A few More Minutes ... Still Working
It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.
Thank you for your continued patience.
This document could not be displayed.
We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
Set your membership
status to view this document.
With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll
get a whole lot more, including:
- Up-to-date information for this case.
- Email alerts whenever there is an update.
- Full text search for other cases.
- Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.
One Moment Please
The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.
Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.
Your document is on its way!
If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.
Sealed Document
We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.
If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.
Access Government Site
