`571-272-7822
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`Paper 13
`Entered: November 22, 2016
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`UNIFIED PATENTS INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`WILLIAM GRECIA,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2016-00602
`Patent 8,887,308 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Before GLENN J. PERRY, RAMA G. ELLURU, and
`MICHELLE N. WORMMEESTER, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`WORMMEESTER, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Denying Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`IPR2016-00602
`Patent 8,887,308 B2
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`Unified Patents Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Request for Rehearing
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`(Paper 12, “Req. Reh’g”) of our Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes
`
`Review (Paper 11, “Institution Decision” or “Inst. Dec.”) of U.S. Patent No.
`
`8,887,308 B2 (“the ’308 patent”). Petitioner seeks rehearing of our
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`determination not to institute inter partes review of the ’308 patent over
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`grounds based on DeMello1 as well as grounds based on Pestoni.2 See Req.
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`Reh’g 1–2. In our Institution Decision, we determined that Petitioner had
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`not explained sufficiently its arguments that DeMello teaches the recited
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`“credential assigned to the apparatus of (a),” (Inst. Dec. 9–10), or that
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`Pestoni teaches the recited step of “requesting the query data, from the
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`apparatus of (a),” (id. at 12–15). Petitioner asserts that we “overlooked and
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`misapprehended” the meaning of “credential.” Req. Reh’g 4 (emphasis
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`omitted). Petitioner also asserts that we overlooked its obviousness
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`argument with respect to the recited “requesting” step. Id. at 8. For the
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`reasons that follow, Petitioner’s request for rehearing is denied.
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`
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`I. BACKGROUND
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`The Petition challenged claim 1 of the ’308 patent on the following
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`grounds. Pet. 3, 19–52.
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`Reference(s)
`DeMello
`DeMello, Wieder,3 and “the admitted prior art”
`Pestoni
`Pestoni, Wieder, and “the admitted prior art”
`
`Basis
`§ 102
`§ 103
`§ 102
`§ 103
`
`
`1 DeMello, U.S. Patent No. 6,891,953 B1, issued May 10, 2005 (Ex. 1006).
`2 Pestoni, U.S. Publ’n No. US 2008/0313264 A1, published Dec. 18, 2008
`(Ex. 1007).
`3 Wieder, U.S. Patent No. 8,001,612 B1, issued Aug. 16, 2011 (Ex. 1008).
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`2
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`IPR2016-00602
`Patent 8,887,308 B2
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`For the asserted grounds based on DeMello, Petitioner relied solely on
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`DeMello as teaching the recited “credential assigned to the apparatus of (a).”
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`Pet. 30–33. Similarly, for the asserted grounds based on Pestoni, Petitioner
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`relied solely on Pestoni as teaching the recited step of “requesting the query
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`data, from the apparatus of (a).” Id. at 48–49. We denied institution of these
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`asserted grounds because we were not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments
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`regarding the teachings of DeMello or Pestoni.
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`
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`II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
`
`When rehearing a decision, the Board reviews the decision for an
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`abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs
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`when a “decision [i]s based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly
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`erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus.,
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`Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir.
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`1988). “The burden of showing that a decision should be modified lies with
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`the party challenging the decision.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77
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`Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). In its request for rehearing, the
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`dissatisfied party must (1) “specifically identify all matters the party believes
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`the Board misapprehended or overlooked” and (2) identify the place “where
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`each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); Office Patent
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`Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,768. We address Petitioner’s
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`arguments with these principles in mind.
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`
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`III. ANALYSIS
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`As an initial matter, we note that, in the “Relief Requested” section of
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`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing, Petitioner submits only that it “requests
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`IPR2016-00602
`Patent 8,887,308 B2
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`rehearing of the Decision and institution of an inter partes review (‘IPR’)
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`based on obviousness over Pestoni in view of Wieder.” Req. Reh’g 2. By
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`contrast, Petitioner later presents arguments about the recited “credential,”
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`which our Institution Decision addressed specifically with respect to
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`DeMello. Id. at 3–8; Inst. Dec. 9–10. Petitioner also presents arguments
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`about the recited step of “requesting the query data,” which our Decision
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`addressed specifically with respect to Pestoni. Req. Reh’g 12; Inst. Dec. 12–
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`15. It is not clear whether Petitioner requests rehearing as to only grounds
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`based on Pestoni. We give Petitioner the benefit of the doubt, however, and
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`assume that Petitioner intended to request rehearing on both the grounds
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`based on DeMello and the grounds based on Pestoni. Accordingly, we
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`address grounds based on both DeMello and Pestoni.
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`
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`A. “credential assigned to the apparatus of (a)”
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`In our Institution Decision, we agreed with Patent Owner that the
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`specification of the ’308 patent describes the recited “credential” as an API
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`Key that “[is] usually embedded in the source code of the apparatus,” which
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`“uses the API Key to establish a data exchange session with the API.” Inst.
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`Dec. 9 (citing Ex. 1003, 10:51–66); Prelim. Resp. 28–29.
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`Petitioner now contends that we “overlooked and misapprehended the
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`meaning of ‘credential.’” Req. Reh’g 3 (emphasis omitted). In particular,
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`Petitioner points out that the portion of the ’308 patent on which we relied
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`“nowhere uses the term ‘credential.’” Id. Petitioner further points out that
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`“[t]he term ‘credential’ . . . is everywhere consistently used in the ’308
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`Patent to refer to ‘membership credentials’ or ‘password credentials’ which
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`are provided by the ‘excelsior enabler’ (user).” Id. We are unpersuaded by
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`Patent 8,887,308 B2
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`Petitioner’s contention. While the portion of the ’308 patent on which we
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`relied does not use the term “credential,” it describes the API Key as a part
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`of an “access authentication system.” Ex. 1003, 10:52–53. Given this
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`description, the API Key may satisfy the recited credential, even though it is
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`not expressly referred to as a “credential” in the specification of the ’308
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`patent.
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`Petitioner further contends that the passage “following immediately
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`after the API discussion [in the ’308 patent] quoted by Patent Owner, makes
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`it clear that the API key is different from the credential.” Req. Reh’g 4
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`(citing Ex. 1003, 11:8–14). We are unpersuaded by Petitioner’s contention.
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`As Petitioner points out, this passage, as well as several other passages
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`throughout the ’308 patent, refers to “membership credentials.” Id. at 3–6.
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`That does not mean, however, that these membership credentials describe
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`the recited credential. Indeed, the membership credentials in the ’308 patent
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`are assigned to a user. See id. The recited credential, on the other hand,
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`must be assigned to an apparatus.
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`Petitioner further contends that “[t]he claim language, interpreted in
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`view of the specification, refers to a ‘credential assigned to the apparatus of
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`(a)’ as a user membership credential submitted through the user device
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`(apparatus), and thereby ‘assigned’ to the apparatus.” Id. at 6. We are
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`unpersuaded by Petitioner’s contention. As discussed above, the ’308 patent
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`describes both credentials assigned to a user and credentials assigned to an
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`apparatus. Claim 1 expressly requires the recited credential to be assigned to
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`an apparatus, not a user. This is supported by the specification of the ’308
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`patent, which describes an API Key that “[is] usually embedded in the
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`IPR2016-00602
`Patent 8,887,308 B2
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`source code of the apparatus,” which “uses the API Key to establish a data
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`exchange session with the API.” Ex. 1003, 10:51–66.
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`Petitioner further contends that the Petition defined the claim term
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`“credential” as “any information or data that permits access to a service,
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`such as a user name, phrase, e-mail address, certificate, other login or
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`password.” Req. Reh’g 6; Pet. 17–18. We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s
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`contention. As Patent Owner argued in its Preliminary Response,
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`Petitioner’s proposed construction “include[s] credentials assigned to a user
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`when the claim term language itself specifically limits the credential as one
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`assigned to the apparatus.” Prelim. Resp. 20–21. Given that claim 1
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`requires the “credential” to be assigned to an apparatus, rather than a user,
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`Petitioner has not explained persuasively why we should have adopted its
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`proposed construction of the recited credential.
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`Petitioner further contends that Patent Owner’s discussion of the
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`prosecution history for the ’308 patent is misleading. We are not persuaded
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`by Petitioner’s contention, however, because we did not rely on Patent
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`Owner’s discussion of the prosecution history in our Institution Decision.
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`Lastly, Petitioner contends that:
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`[C]laim 1 must be interpreted, as was done in the claim
`construction in the Petition, to consider the whole point of the
`’308 Patent – an existing (unmodified) password, e-mail, etc. is
`used to verify the user by a 3rd party (e.g., an Amazon or
`Facebook login), and then a verification token or “query data”
`(e.g., Facebook ID) is written to an “authorization object” (e.g.,
`media metadata) to restrict the digital content to the users with
`such password, e-mail, etc.
`
`Req. Reh’g 8. We are unpersuaded by Petitioner’s contention. Using a
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`password or e-mail to verify a user is only a part of the claimed invention of
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`the ’308 patent. See Ex. 1003, 14:42–43 (claim 1 reciting “verification data
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`provided by at least one user”). As discussed above, claim 1, which defines
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`the invention of the ’308 patent, further recites a “credential assigned to the
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`apparatus of (a).” Petitioner does not give sufficient weight to this part of
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`the invention, which uses a credential (e.g., API Key) to verify an apparatus.
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`
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`B. “requesting the query data, from the apparatus of (a)”
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`In our Institution Decision, we determined that Petitioner did not
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`demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that claim
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`1 would have been obvious over Pestoni, Wieder, and the admitted prior art
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`because “we [we]re not persuaded that Petitioner ha[d] provided adequately
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`articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
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`conclusion of obviousness” as to the recited step of “requesting the query
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`data, from the apparatus (a).” Inst. Dec. 14–15. We noted that Petitioner did
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`not, for example, proffer any reason for combining Pestoni and any other
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`patent or printed publication to arrive at the claimed invention. Id. at 14.
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`Petitioner now contends that we “overlooked the obviousness
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`argument for ‘requesting the query data.’” Req. Reh’g 8 (emphasis
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`omitted). According to Petitioner, “[t]he Petition certainly offers reasons to
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`combine with Wieder for the token database . . . , but [the requesting step]
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`doesn’t require combination because it is obvious from Pestoni alone.” Id.
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`at 9. We disagree with Petitioner’s contention. As we noted in our
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`Institution Decision, an obviousness analysis requires “‘some articulated
`
`reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
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`obviousness.’” Inst. Dec. 14 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2006)). Even if the recited requesting step “doesn’t require
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`Patent 8,887,308 B2
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`combination” with another patent or printed publication, Petitioner did not
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`explain sufficiently why one of ordinary skill in the art would have
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`considered modifying Pestoni to arrive at the claimed invention. See id. For
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`instance, Petitioner merely asserted, without further explanation, that “it
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`would be obvious to one of skill in the art to implement Pestoni with a
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`request and corresponding reception.” Pet. 49. Accordingly, we are not
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`persuaded that Petitioner has provided adequately articulated reasoning with
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`some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness as
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`to the recited requesting step. See Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988.
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`Petitioner further contends that the recited requesting step “is certainly
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`obvious because it is explicitly mentioned as an option in Pestoni.” Req.
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`Reh’g 9. In support of this contention, Petitioner points out that “[t]he
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`Federal Circuit has held that trying one of multiple options mentioned in a
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`reference is obvious.” Id. (citing Bayer Schering Pharam A.G. v. Barr
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`Labs., Inc., 575 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009). This is a new argument,
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`however, which does not address what was overlooked or misapprehended
`
`in our Institution Decision, and is not appropriate in a request for rehearing.
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`See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).
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`We, nonetheless, find Petitioner’s contention unpersuasive. Claim 1
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`recites “requesting the query data, from the apparatus of (a), . . . wherein the
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`query data request is a request for the at least one verified web service
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`[account] identifier.” As explained in our Institution Decision, “the device
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`(apparatus of (a)) in Pestoni sends to the license server a content license
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`request (query data), which includes various parameters such as a domain ID
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`(web service account identifier).” Inst. Dec. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 72).
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`That is, Pestoni describes receiving the domain ID from the device.
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`Petitioner asserts that the recited requesting step “is explicitly mentioned as
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`an option in Pestoni,” but Petitioner does not direct us to any portion of
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`Pestoni that discusses requesting the domain ID from the device. See Req.
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`Reh’g 9. Instead, Petitioner points out that we noted in our Institution
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`Decision that “Pestoni describes the content license request (query data)
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`from the device as ‘optionally’ including the domain ID (web service
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`account identifier).” See Req. Reh’g 9; Inst. Dec. 13. That the content
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`license request optionally includes the domain ID does not suggest that the
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`license server may request the domain ID; rather, it suggests that the license
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`server may receive the domain ID.
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`Petitioner further contends that “the Petition articulates that the
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`generated content license of Pestoni has the domain ID, which would make
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`it obvious to obtain the domain ID from the ‘apparatus of (a),” which is the
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`apparatus providing the request for digital content.” Req. Reh’g 9. We are
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`unpersuaded by Petitioner’s contention. As discussed above, Petitioner has
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`not directed us to any portion of Pestoni that teaches or suggests requesting
`
`the domain ID from the device. Moreover, for the reasons discussed above,
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`we are not persuaded that Petitioner has provided adequately articulated
`
`reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
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`obviousness as to the recited requesting step. See Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988.
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`Petitioner further contends that our Institution Decision “also
`
`overlooks the discussion of element c), which is somewhat redundant with
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`element d).” Req. Reh’g 10. Element c) recites, in part, “wherein the data
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`exchange session is also capable of an exchange of query data, wherein the
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`query data comprises at least one verified web service account identifier,”
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`while element d) refers to the recited requesting step (i.e., “requesting the
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`query data, from the apparatus of (a), . . . wherein the query data request is a
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`request for the at least one verified web service [account] identifier”). See
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`Pet. 48–49. According to Petitioner, “to the extent the request isn’t explicit,
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`it is certainly obvious” based on the cited portions of Pestoni on which
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`Petitioner relies for element c). Req. Reh’g 11. We disagree with
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`Petitioner’s contention. As with element d), the cited portions of Pestoni on
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`which Petitioner relies for element c) teach receiving the domain ID, not
`
`requesting the domain ID. See id.; Req. Reh’g 10–11. Moreover, we are not
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`persuaded that Petitioner has provided adequately articulated reasoning with
`
`some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness as
`
`to element c). See Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988.
`
`We note that Petitioner asserts that “[t]he opinion of expert Mr.
`
`Cherukuri is that, upon reading Pestoni, one of skill in the art would
`
`understand that the content license generator 260 [of the license server]
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`requests and receives the domain ID before generating the content license.”
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`Req. Reh’g 11. Petitioner further contends that “[t]his demonstrates that one
`
`of skill in the art would find such a request to be obvious from Pestoni.” Id.
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`(citing Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 98–101). Again, we are not persuaded that Petitioner or
`
`Mr. Cherukuri has provided adequately articulated reasoning with some
`
`rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness as to
`
`the recited requesting step. See Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988.
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`Lastly, Petitioner contends that, “[a]s presented in the Petition, each
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`element is shown by, and obvious in light of, Pestoni alone.” Req. Reh’g
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`12. For the reasons discussed above with respect to the recited requesting
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`step, we disagree with Petitioner’s contention.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not demonstrated that we
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`abused our discretion by not instituting inter partes review of the challenged
`
`claim of the ’308 patent on grounds that were based on DeMello or Pestoni.
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`
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`V. ORDER
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`Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Petitioner’s request for rehearing is
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`11
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`denied.
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`
`
`PETITIONER:
`
`Kevin Jakel
`kevin@unifiedpatents.com
`
`Scott Kolassa
`skolassa@kilpatricktownsend.com
`
`Paul Haughey
`phaughey@kilpatricktownsend.com
`
`Jonathan Stroud
`jonathan@unifiedpatents.com
`
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`Clare Frederick
`clare@richardspatentlaw.com
`
`Patrick Richards
`patrick@richardspatentlaw.com