Paper No.
`Filed: November 28, 2016
`
`Naveen Modi
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1990
`Facsimile: (202) 551-0490
`E-mail:
`PH-VirnetX-IPR@paulhastings.com
`
`
`Filed on behalf of: VirnetX Inc.
`By:
`
`Joseph E. Palys
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1996
`Facsimile: (202) 551-0496
`E-mail:
`PH-VirnetX-IPR@paulhastings.com
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BLACK SWAMP IP, LLC
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`VIRNETX INC.
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-00957
`Patent 7,921,211
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Patent Owner’s Response
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`
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`Case No. IPR2016-00957
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
`
`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art ................................................................... 1
`
`III. Overview of the ’211 Patent ............................................................................ 3
`
`IV. The Petition Lacks Required Expert Testimony ............................................. 6
`
`V.
`
`Claim Construction .......................................................................................... 9
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`“Domain Name Service System” (Claims 1, 5, 15, 16, 23, 27,
`36, 51 and 60) ......................................................................................10
`
`“Secure Communication Link” (Claims 1, 16, 27, 36, 40, 51,
`and 60) .................................................................................................11
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`“Authentication” and “Address Hopping” Alone Do Not
`Result in a “Secure Communication Link” ...............................12
`
`A “Secure Communication Link” Must Be Direct ...................14
`
`A “Secure Communication Link” Requires Encryption ...........18
`
`“Indicate”/“Indicating” (Claims 1, 36, and 60) ...................................21
`
`“Transparently” (Claims 27 and 51) ...................................................24
`
`VI. Kiuchi Does Not Anticipate Any of the Challenged Claims .........................25
`
`A. Overview of Kiuchi .............................................................................26
`
`B.
`
`Independent Claim 1 ...........................................................................29
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Kiuchi Does Not Disclose the Recited “Indication” .................29
`
`Kiuchi Does Not Disclose the Recited “Plurality of
`Domain Names and Corresponding Network Addresses”........31
`
`Kiuchi Does Not Disclose a System for Establishing the
`Recited “Secure Communication Link” ...................................33
`
`C.
`
`Independent Claims 36 and 60 ............................................................36
`
`i
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`Case No. IPR2016-00957
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`D. Dependent Claims 15 and 39 ..............................................................37
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`Dependent Claims 16 and 40 ..............................................................39
`
`Dependent Claims 27 and 51 ..............................................................40
`
`G. Dependent Claims 2, 5, 6, 23, 37, and 47 ...........................................43
`
`VII. Conclusion .....................................................................................................43
`
`
`
`ii
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`

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`Case No. IPR2016-00957
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Alexsam, Inc. v. IDT Corp.,
`715 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ............................................................................ 8
`
`Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc.,
`IPR2014-00403, Paper No. 42 (P.T.A.B. July 29, 2015) ................................. 2, 8
`
`Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc.,
`IPR2014-00404, Paper No. 42 (P.T.A.B. July 29, 2015) ................................... 38
`
`Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc.,
`IPR2015-00871, Paper No. 8 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2015) ....................................... 17
`
`Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Concepts In Optics, Inc.,
`111 F. App’x 582 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ....................................................................... 8
`
`Biogen Idec, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC,
`713 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .............................................................. 15, 16, 20
`
`Brand v. Miller,
`487 F.3d 862 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ........................................................................ 7, 31
`
`Centricut, LLC v. Esab Grp., Inc.,
`390 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................................................ 7
`
`Cf. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro,
`136 S.Ct. 2117 (2016) ......................................................................................... 17
`
`Cyber Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc.,
`138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) .......................................................................... 15
`
`Eon–Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp.,
`653 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .......................................................................... 19
`
`Garmin Int’l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC,
`IPR2012-00001, Paper No. 15 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 9, 2013) ..................................... 16
`
`K/S HIMPP v. Hear-Wear Techs., LLC,
`751 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ...................................................................... 7, 31
`
`iii
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`

`
`
`In re Man Machine Interface Technologies LLC,
`822 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 9
`
`Case No. IPR2016-00957
`
`Meitzner v. Mindick,
`549 F.2d 775 (C.C.P.A. 1977) .............................................................................. 7
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.,
`789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .............................................................. 16, 18, 20
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX Inc.,
`IPR2014-00615, Paper No. 9 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 15, 2014) ..................................... 24
`
`Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Mobile Scanning Techs., LLC,
`IPR2013-00093, Paper No. 28 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 29, 2013) .................................. 16
`
`PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC,
`815 F.3d 747 (Fed.Cir.2016) .............................................................................. 10
`
`Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc.,
`536 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ............................................................................ 7
`
`Sharp Corp. v. Surpass Tech Innovation LLC,
`IPR2015-00022, Paper No. 9 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 10, 2015) ...................................... 7
`
`Straight Path IP Grp., Inc. v. Sipnet EU S.R.O.,
`806 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .............................................................. 16, 17, 20
`
`Tempo Lighting, Inc. v. Tivoli, LLC,
`742 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ...................................................................... 17, 18
`
`VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .............................................................. 16, 20, 35
`
`Xilinx, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC,
`IPR2013-00112, Paper No. 14 (P.T.A.B. June 27, 2013) .................................. 17
`
`ZTE Corp. & ZTE (USA) Inc. v. ContentGuard Holdings Inc.,
`IPR2013-00134, Paper No. 12 (P.T.A.B. June 19, 2013) .................................. 17
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) ................................................................................................. 6
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(e) ........................................................................................... 1, 6, 42
`
`iv
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`

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`
`Other Authorities
`
`Case No. IPR2016-00957
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) ................................................................................................ 9
`
`77 Fed. Reg. 48,756 (Aug. 14, 2012)......................................................................... 7
`
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`v
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`Case No. IPR2016-00957
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`LIST OF EXHIBITS
`
`Description
`
`2002
`
`Exhibit
`No.
`2001 Right of Appeal Notice in Inter Partes Reexamination
`Control No. 95/001,856 (Jan. 9, 2015)
`Jury Verdict Form (E.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2012)
`2003 Memorandum Opinion and Order in VirnetX Inc. v. Mitel
`Networks Corp. et al., Case No. 6:11-CV-18 (E.D. Tex.
`Aug. 1, 2012)
`2004 Memorandum Opinion and Order in VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco
`Systems, Inc. et al., Case No. 6:10-CV-417 (E.D. Tex.
`Apr. 25, 2012)
`2005 Glossary for the Linux FreeS/WAN Project
`Transcript of Markman Hearing, VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco
`2006
`Systems, Inc. et al., Case No. 6:10-CV-417 (E.D. Tex. Jan.
`5, 2012)
`2007 Response in Application No. 11/679,416 (June 7, 2011)
`2008 Response in Application No. 11/839,987 (Jan. 10, 2011)
`2009 Response in Inter Partes Reexamination Control No.
`95/001,269 (Apr. 15, 2010)
`2010 Defendants’ Responsive Claim Construction Brief,
`VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc. et al., Case No. 6:10-
`CV-417 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2011)
`Joint Claim Construction Chart, VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco
`Systems, Inc. et al., Case No. 6:10-CV-417 (E.D. Tex.
`Dec. 21, 2011)
`2012 Order, VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc. et al., Case No.
`6:10-CV-417 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2012)
`2013 Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration of the
`Construction of the Term “Secure Communication Link,”
`VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc. et al., Case No. 6:10-
`CV-417 (E.D. Tex. June 21, 2012)
`Transcript of Trial, Afternoon Session, VirnetX Inc. v.
`Apple, Inc., Case No. 6:10-CV-417 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 5,
`2012)
`
`2011
`
`2014
`
`vi
`
`Previously
`Submitted
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`

`
`
`Exhibit
`No.
`2015 Declaration of Fabian Monrose, Ph.D. (November 28,
`2016)
`2016 Memorandum Opinion and Order in VirnetX Inc. v. Apple
`Inc., Case No. 6:12-CV-855 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2014)
`Patent Owner’s Response in Inter Partes Reexamination
`Control No. 95/001,789 (Dec. 26, 2012)
`2018 Apple’s Responsive Claim Construction Brief in VirnetX
`Inc. v. Apple Inc., Case No. 6:12-CV-855 (E.D. Tex. Apr.
`21, 2014)
`Petition for Inter Partes Review of United States Patent
`No. 7,490,151 in IPR2016-00167
`2020 Curriculum Vitae of Fabian Monrose, Ph.D.
`Patent Owner’s Response in Inter Partes Reexamination
`2021
`Control No. 95/001,789 (Apr. 18, 2012)
`Excerpt of Joint Appendix, VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`Case No. 2013-1489
`
`Description
`
`Case No. IPR2016-00957
`
`Previously
`Submitted
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2017
`
`2019
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`2022
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`vii
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`

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`
`
`I.
`
`
`Introduction
`
`
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`Case No. IPR2016-00957
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`Patent Owner VirnetX Inc. respectfully submits this Response to the Board’s
`
`decision to institute inter partes review (Paper No. 8, the “Inst. Dec.”) and to the
`
`petition for inter partes review (the “Petition” or “Pet.”) filed by Petitioner Black
`
`Swamp IP, LLC (“Black Swamp” or “Petitioner”). The Board instituted review of
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,921,211 (“the ’211 patent”) on one ground: anticipation of
`
`claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 15, 16, 23, 27, 36, 37, 39, 40, 47, 51, and 60 over Kiuchi. Black
`
`Swamp has not carried its “burden of proving … unpatentability by a
`
`preponderance of the evidence” under 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Black Swamp fails to
`
`offer any record evidence to support unpatentability over Kiuchi, including any
`
`expert declaratory evidence, even though the technology at issue is complex.
`
`Indeed, Kiuchi fails to disclose each of the claimed features in as complete detail as
`
`set forth in the claims, as confirmed by the testimony of Dr. Fabian Monrose (Ex.
`
`2015) who is an expert in the field of the ’211 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons
`
`below, the Board should reject Black Swamp’s unsupported patentability challenge
`
`and enter judgment against Black Swamp.
`
` Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art II.
`
`
`The petition offers no indication of the level of skill of a person of ordinary
`
`skill in the art at the relevant time. In fact, the petition never even mentions a
`
`person of ordinary skill in the art. As explained by Dr. Monrose, a person of
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` 1
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`

`
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`ordinary skill in the art would have had a master’s degree in computer science or
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`Case No. IPR2016-00957
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`computer engineering and approximately two years of experience in computer
`
`networking and computer security. (Ex. 2015 at ¶ 13; see also id. at ¶¶ 4-12.) In
`
`litigation involving the ’211 patent, this level of skill has been adopted by
`
`numerous companies operating in this field, including Apple, Inc.; Cisco Systems,
`
`Inc.; NEC Corporation; NEC Corporation of America; Aastra USA, Inc.; Aastra
`
`Technologies Ltd.; Mitel Networks Corp.; Mitel Networks, Inc.; Siemens
`
`Enterprise Communications GmbH & Co. KG; Siemens Enterprise
`
`Communications, Inc.; and Avaya Inc. (Ex. 2003 at 4, Memorandum Opinion
`
`and Order in VirnetX Inc. v. Mitel Networks Corp. et al., Case No. 6:11-CV-18
`
`(E.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2012); Ex. 2004 at 5, Memorandum Opinion and Order in
`
`VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc. et al., Case No. 6:10-CV-417 (E.D. Tex. Apr.
`
`25, 2012).) Commenting on another patent from the same family as the ’211
`
`patent, the Board itself has acknowledged that “the skill level involved here is
`
`moderately high” and noted the parties’ agreement with a level of ordinary skill in
`
`the art substantially the same as that discussed above. Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc.,
`
`IPR2014-00403, Paper No. 42 at 35 (P.T.A.B. July 29, 2015).
`
`Because VirnetX’s expert’s proposed level of skill is consistent with the
`
`same level of skill addressed in other proceedings involving the ’211 patent or
`
`patents from the same family before the Board and district court, and because
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`2
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`Black Swamp fails to even propose a level of skill, much less support its petition
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`Case No. IPR2016-00957
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`with any testimony from an expert who can opine from that perspective, the Board
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`should adopt VirnetX’s proposed level of skill.
`
` Overview of the ’211 Patent III.
`
`
`The ’211 patent discloses several embodiments of a domain name service
`
`(“DNS”) system for establishing a secure communication link, such as a virtual
`
`private network (“VPN”) communication link, between devices connected to a
`
`network. In one embodiment, a novel, specialized DNS system receives a DNS
`
`request and automatically facilitates the establishment of a secure communication
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`link between two devices. (Ex. 2015 at ¶ 14; Ex. 1001 at 39:30-35.)
`
`The ’211 patent distinguishes the claimed DNS service system from a
`
`conventional DNS scheme that merely returns a requested IP address and/or public
`
`key:
`
`Conventional Domain Name Servers (DNSs) provide a
`look-up function that returns the IP address of a
`requested computer or host. For example, when a
`computer user types in the web name “Yahoo.com,” the
`user’s web browser transmits a request to a DNS, which
`converts the name into a four-part IP address that is
`returned to the user’s browser.
`
`. . .
`
`3
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`Case No. IPR2016-00957
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`One conventional scheme that provides secure virtual
`private networks over the Internet provides the DNS
`server with the public keys of the machines that the DNS
`server has the addresses for. This allows hosts to retrieve
`automatically the public keys of a host that the host is to
`communicate with so that the host can set up a VPN
`without having the user enter the public key of the
`destination host. One implementation of this standard is
`presently being developed as part of the FreeS/WAN
`project (RFC 2535).
`
`certain
`from
`suffers
`scheme
`conventional
`The
`drawbacks. For example, any user can perform a DNS
`request. Moreover, DNS requests resolve to the same
`value for all users.
`
`invention, a
`the
`to certain aspects of
`According
`specialized DNS server traps DNS requests and, if the
`request is from a special type of user (e.g., one for which
`secure communication services are defined), the server
`does not return the true IP address of the target node, but
`instead automatically sets up a virtual private network
`between the target node and the user.
`
`(Id. at 38:58-39:35; Ex. 2015 at ¶ 15.)
`
`Compared with a conventional DNS known at the time of filing the ’211
`
`patent—which is described as merely returning a requested IP address and/or
`
`public key—the claimed DNS system of the ’211 patent supports establishing a
`
`4
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`

`
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`secure communication link and provides an indication of the same. (See, e.g., Ex.
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`Case No. IPR2016-00957
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`1001 at 55:38-46, 57:38-46, 59:9-60:8.) For example, in FIGS. 26 and 27 of the
`
`’211 patent, reproduced below, a DNS server 2602 including a DNS proxy
`
`2610 supports establishing a VPN link between a computer 2601 and a secure
`
`target site 2604. (Id. at 39:51-41:44; Ex. 2015 at ¶ 16.)
`
`
`Here, the DNS server 2602 receives a DNS request for a target site from
`
`computer 2601. (Ex. 1001 at 40:32-35.) A DNS proxy 2610 at the DNS
`
`server 2602 determines whether the target site is a secure site. (Id. at 3 9:57-59,
`
`40:32-39.) If access to a secure site has been requested, the DNS proxy 2610
`
`determines whether the computer 2601 is authorized to access the site. (Id. at
`
`5
`
`

`
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`40:40-42.) If so, the DNS proxy 2610 transmits a message to gatekeeper 2603 to
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`Case No. IPR2016-00957
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`create a secure communication link (e.g., a VPN link) between computer 2601
`
`and secure target site 2604. (Id. at 39:62-65.) In this example, the gatekeeper
`
`2603 allocates resources (in this case, IP hop blocks) for the secure communication
`
`link to the computer 2601 and secure target site 2604. (Id. at 3 9 :66-40:3.) The
`
`DNS proxy 2610 then responds to the computer 2601’s DNS request with an
`
`address received from the gatekeeper 2603. (Id. at 40:3-6.) In this manner, the
`
`specialized DNS service system supports establishing a secure communication
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`link, doing more than a conventional DNS server at the time of the invention. (Ex.
`
`2015 at ¶ 17.)
`
` The Petition Lacks Required Expert Testimony IV.
`
`
`Black Swamp cannot carry its “burden of proving … by a preponderance of
`
`the evidence” under 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) that any of the challenged claims of the
`
`’211 patent are unpatentable. Even though the technology to which the ’211 patent
`
`is directed is complex, Black Swamp failed to present any expert evidence to
`
`explicate this technology or support its contention that Kiuchi anticipates the
`
`invention in question. (See supra, Section III.)
`
`Section 312(a)(3) explicitly considers that inter partes review petitions will
`
`challenge patent claims based on affidavits or declarations of experts, 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 312(a)(3), and the Office Patent Trial Practice Guide notes that the “Board
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`6
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`
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`expects that most petitions and motions will rely upon affidavits of experts.” 77
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`Case No. IPR2016-00957
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`Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,763 (Aug. 14, 2012). As the Trial Practice Guide observes,
`
`the Federal Circuit has instructed that the fact-finder is not required to credit
`
`unsupported assertions of an expert witness, id. (citing Rohm & Haas Co. v.
`
`Brotech Corp., 127 F.3d 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1997))—let alone unsupported
`
`assertions in attorney argument. Indeed, as the Board’s and the Federal Circuit’s
`
`precedents hold, “[a]rgument of counsel cannot take the place of evidence lacking
`
`in the record.” Sharp Corp. v. Surpass Tech Innovation LLC, IPR2015-00022,
`
`Paper No. 9 at 8 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 10, 2015); Meitzner v. Mindick, 549 F.2d 775, 782
`
`(C.C.P.A. 1977). The Board must make patentability findings not on the basis of
`
`conclusory statements, but using “concrete evidence in the record to support these
`
`findings.” K/S HIMPP v. Hear-Wear Techs., LLC, 751 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2014). The Board cannot use its own expertise as a substitute for evidence of
`
`knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art. See Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862,
`
`869-71 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
`
`Where the involved “subject matter is sufficiently complex to fall beyond
`
`the grasp of an ordinary layperson,” the required record evidence includes expert
`
`testimony to establish invalidity. Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc.,
`
`536 F.3d 1256, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Centricut, LLC v. Esab Grp., Inc.,
`
`390 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding a failure of proof in the absence of
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`7
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`
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`relevant expert testimony where the patent involved “complex technology”); Aspex
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`Case No. IPR2016-00957
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`Eyewear, Inc. v. Concepts In Optics, Inc., 111 F. App’x 582, 588 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
`
`(summary judgment of invalidity “could not have been granted without expert
`
`testimony clearly explaining how each claim element is disclosed”). It is the “rare
`
`case[] where the invention is so simple that expert testimony is not required,”
`
`Aspex Eyewear, 111 F. App’x at 588, and this case is not one of them. Indeed,
`
`prior to the current petition, every inter partes review petition on the ’211 patent
`
`was accompanied by expert testimony; Black Swamp cannot—and does not—
`
`credibly contend that the technology here is so simple as to not require it. See
`
`Alexsam, Inc. v. IDT Corp., 715 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The Board
`
`itself has recognized the high degree of complexity of the technology disclosed by
`
`way of this patent family. Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2014-00403, Paper No.
`
`42 at 35 (finding that “the skill level involved here is moderately high”).
`
`As such, in view of the complex technology at issue in this case, Petitioner
`
`cannot meet its burden of proving unpatentability by a preponderance of evidence
`
`without expert testimony. Petitioner’s unsupported attorney arguments cannot
`
`support its claim constructions, its interpretation of the Kiuchi reference, and its
`
`anticipation arguments. That is particularly so here, where the only expert
`
`evidence presented to the Board is that of VirnetX’s expert, Dr. Monrose, and that
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`8
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`evidence supports VirnetX’s position that Kiuchi does not anticipate. As such, the
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`Case No. IPR2016-00957
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`Board should enter judgment against Black Swamp.1
`
` Claim Construction V.
`
`
`The Petition identified four terms for construction, albeit (as noted above)
`
`without any support from an expert. (Pet. at 7-14.) In its Preliminary Response,
`
`Patent Owner addressed Petitioner’s constructions. (Prel. Resp. at 18-30.) The
`
`Decision declined to provide a construction for any terms, finding that “no claim
`
`term needs express construction.” (Inst. Dec. at 5.) Nevertheless, the terms should
`
`be construed as advocated below by Patent Owner.
`
`In IPR proceedings, the Board construes claim terms of an unexpired patent
`
`under the broadest reasonable interpretation (“BRI”) standard. 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.100(b). Under this standard, “[w]hile the Board must give the terms their
`
`broadest reasonable construction, the construction cannot be divorced from the
`
`specification and the record evidence.” In re Man Machine Interface Technologies
`
`LLC, 822 F.3d 1282, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation
`
`omitted); see also PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC,
`
`1 In IPR2014-00237, the Board disagreed with similar arguments. But VirnetX
`
`respectfully submits that the determination in that case is incorrect, and that issue
`
`is currently pending before the Federal Circuit on appeal from IPR2014-00237 in
`
`Case No. 2015-1934 (argued Nov. 7, 2016).
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`815 F.3d 747, 755 (Fed.Cir.2016) (“the broadest reasonable interpretation must be
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`Case No. IPR2016-00957
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`reasonable in light of the claims and specification”). VirnetX’s proposed
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`constructions are consistent with the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in
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`the art in light of the specification and prosecution history. (Ex. 2015 at ¶ 18.) By
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`contrast, Black Swamp’s proposed constructions are divorced from
`
`the
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`specification; are contrary to the prosecution history; and are wholly unsupported
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`by expert testimony.
`
`A.
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` “Domain Name Service System” (Claims 1, 5, 15, 16, 23, 27, 36,
`51 and 60)
`
`Patent Owner’s Proposed
`Construction
`No construction necessary
`
`
`
`Petitioner’s Proposed
`Construction
`Any system with the
`features of the claims,
`where the system may
`include one or more
`computers or devices.
`
`Decision’s
`Construction
`No construction
`proposed
`
`“Domain name service system” need not be construed. It is the subject of
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`independent claim 1, for example, which already defines its characteristics: “a
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`domain name service system configured and arranged to be connected to a
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`communication network, store a plurality of domain names and corresponding
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`network addresses, receive a query for a network address, and indicate in response
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`to the query whether the domain name service system supports establishing a
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`secure communication
`
`link.”
`
` Since
`
`the claims
`
`themselves define
`
`the
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`characteristics of the domain name service system, no further construction is
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`Case No. IPR2016-00957
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`necessary. (Ex. 2015 at ¶¶ 19-20.) Moreover, Black Swamp’s proposed
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`construction is vague. For example, Black Swamp’s proposed construction is
`
`unclear regarding which features of the claims would be interpreted as part of the
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`domain name service system. Black Swamp’s construction also does not specify
`
`the claims whose features should be considered to interpret the claimed domain
`
`name service system term.
`
`B.
`
`“Secure Communication Link” (Claims 1, 16, 27, 36, 40, 51, and
`60)
`
`Patent Owner’s Proposed
`Construction
`A direct communication
`link that provides data
`security through
`encryption
`
`Decision’s Construction
`
`No construction proposed
`
`Petitioner’s Proposed
`Construction
`A transmission path that
`restricts access to data,
`addresses, or other
`information on the path,
`generally using obfuscation
`methods to hide
`information on the path,
`including, but not limited
`to, one or more of
`authentication, encryption,
`or address hopping.
`
`
`
`A “secure communication link” in view of the specification is “a direct
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`communication link that provides data security through encryption.” (Ex. 2015 at
`
`¶¶ 21-22.) Black Swamp’s proposed construction contradicts the plain language of
`
`the claims, is internally inconsistent, and is contrary to the ’211 patent
`
`specification and prosecution history. As discussed below, security in the claimed
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`“secure communication link” in the context of the ’211 patent is accomplished
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`Case No. IPR2016-00957
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`through encryption—encryption is not an optional means of securing the
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`communication link as proposed by Black Swamp’s construction.
`
`1.
`
`“Authentication” and “Address Hopping” Alone Do Not
`Result in a “Secure Communication Link”
`
`Black Swamp’s proposed construction (Pet. at 12-14) is internally
`
`inconsistent and technically flawed. Of the obfuscation methods in the proposed
`
`construction—authentication, encryption, and address hopping—only encryption
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`restricts access to “data, addresses, or other information on the path,” as required
`
`by the first portion of Black Swamp’s construction. The other techniques alone do
`
`not “hide information on the path,” as Black Swamp’s construction requires. (Ex.
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`2015 at ¶ 23.)
`
`Authentication merely “[e]nsur[es] that a message originated from the
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`expected sender and has not been altered on route.” (Ex. 2005 at 3, Glossary for
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`the Linux FreeS/WAN Project.) It does not prevent an eavesdropper from
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`accessing data
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`transmitted over an unsecure communication
`
`link.
`
` The
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`specification supports this fact by describing at least one scenario where an
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`authenticated transmission occurs “in the clear”—i.e., over an unsecured
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`communication link:
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`SDNS [secure domain name service] 3313 can be
`accessed through secure portal 3310 “in the clear”, that
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`Case No. IPR2016-00957
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`is, without using an administrative VPN communication
`link. In this situation, secure portal 3310 preferably
`authenticates the query using any well-known technique,
`such as a cryptographic technique, before allowing the
`query to proceed to SDNS [3313].
`
`(Ex. 1001 at 51:37-42.) (Ex. 2015 at ¶ 24.)
`
`Address hopping alone also does not provide the claimed security, as there is
`
`nothing inherent in moving from address to address that hides information on the
`
`path or precludes an eavesdropper from reading the details of a communication.
`
`This is why the ’211 patent discloses embodiments that use encryption in
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`conjunction with address hopping to protect, for example, the next address in a
`
`routing scheme from being viewed by eavesdroppers. (See, e.g., Ex. 1001 at 3:30-
`
`44, stating in part that “[e]ach TARP packet’s true destination is concealed behind
`
`a layer of encryption generated using a link key.”) It is the encryption that hides
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`information on the path while moving from address to address. (See, e.g., id. at
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`3:10-4:34.) (Ex. 2015 at ¶ 25.)
`
`While authentication and address hopping may be used in conjunction with
`
`encryption as an “obfuscation method,” this fact does not make either sufficient by
`
`itself to “hide information on the path,” as Black Swamp’s construction requires.
`
`(Ex. 2015 at ¶ 26.) Because Black Swamp’s construction presents them as
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`alternatives, allowing each to be sufficient, Black Swamp’s construction must be
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`Case No. IPR2016-00957
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`rejected.
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`A “Secure Communication Link” Must Be Direct
`
`2.
`Black Swamp’s construction incorrectly encompasses links that are not
`
`direct. The ’211 patent specification describes a secure communication link as
`
`“direct” between a client and target device and the prosecution history of related
`
`VirnetX patents supports this understanding. (Ex. 2015 at ¶ 27.)
`
`For instance, in one embodiment, the ’211 patent describes the link between
`
`an originating TARP terminal and a destination TARP terminal as direct. (See,
`
`e.g., Ex. 1001 at 9:37-46, Fig. 2; see also id. at 33:35-41 (describing a variation of
`
`the TARP embodiments as including a direct communication link); 37:61-64
`
`(describing the embodiment of Figure 24 in which a first computer and second
`
`computer are connected directly).) The ’211 patent similarly describes direct
`
`communications in later embodiments as well. (See, e.g., id. at 39:63-66, 40:55-58
`
`(describing a virtual private network as being direct between a user’s computer and
`
`target), 41:63-67, 42:56-60 (describing a load balancing example in which a virtual
`
`private network is direct between a first host and a second host), 48:43-45, 48:51-
`
`66 (describing a secure communication link that is direct between a first computer
`
`and a second computer), Figs. 24, 26, 28, 29, 33.) (Ex. 2015 at ¶ 28.) In each of
`
`these embodiments, the ’211 patent specification discloses that the link traverses a
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`network (or networks) through which it is simply passed or routed via various
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`Case No. IPR2016-00957
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`network devices such as Internet Service Providers, firewalls, and routers. (Id.; see
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`also, e.g., Ex. 1001 at Figs. 2, 24, 28, 29, 33; see also Ex. 2006 at 44:13-45:12
`
`(VirnetX’s adversary explaining that the claims should be limited to “direct”
`
`communication because the specification teaches direct communication between
`
`the client and target).)
`
`Moreover, VirnetX clearly and unambiguously disclaimed a secure
`
`communication link that is not direct in connection with the prosecution of a
`
`related VirnetX patent. (Ex. 2007 at 8.) In particular, VirnetX distinguished
`
`another prior art reference, arguing that it “has not been shown to disclose a secure
`
`communication link because computers connected according to [the reference] do
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`not communicate directly with each other.” (Id.; see also Ex. 2008 at 8; Ex. 2009
`
`at 7.) A disclaiming statement is unambiguous when “a competitor would
`
`reasonably believe that the applicant had surrendered the relevant subject matter.”
`
`Cyber Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Here,
`
`Patent Owner’s disclaimer “show[s] reasonable clarity and deliberateness.”
`
`Biogen Idec, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 713 F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
`
`(citation omitted). Indeed, a district court recognized this disclaimer at the urging
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`of VirnetX’s adversaries. (Ex. 2004 at 6, 11-12; Ex. 2010 at 5-7, 10-11.)
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`Case No. IPR2016-00957
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`When a patentee has “unequivocally and unambiguously disavow[ed] a
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`certain meaning,” as VirnetX did here, the doctrine of prosecution history
`
`disclaimer overcomes any ordinary meaning of the term and the term must be
`
`construed “consistent with the scope of the claim being surrendered.” Biogen Idec,
`
`Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline, 713 F.3d 1090, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2013.). Where a “patent
`
`has been brought back