throbber
Trials@uspto.gov Paper No. 74
`571.272.7822 Filed: November 28, 2017
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________________
`
`LUYE PHARMA GROUP LTD., LUYE PHARMA(USA) LTD.,
`SHANDONG LUYE PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD., and
`NANJING LUYE PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`ALKERMES PHARMA IRELAND LTD. and
`ALKERMES CONTROLLED THERAPEUTICS, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________________
`
`Case IPR2016-01096
`Patent 6,667,061 B2
`____________
`
`Before LORA M. GREEN, ROBERT A. POLLOCK, and
`JACQUELINE T. HARLOW, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`GREEN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`Determining That Claims 1‒13 and 17‒23 Have Not Been Shown to Be
`Unpatentable
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01096
`Patent 6,667,061 B2
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`Luye Pharma Group Ltd., Luye Pharma (USA) Ltd., Shandong Luye
`Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., and Nanjing Luye Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.
`(collectively “Petitioner”) filed a Petition requesting an inter partes review
`of claims 1‒13 and 17‒23 of U.S. Patent No. 6,667,061 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the
`’061 patent”). Paper 5 (“Pet.”). Alkermes Pharma Ireland Limited and
`Alkermes Controlled Therapeutics, Inc. (collectively, “Patent Owner”) filed
`a Preliminary Response to the Petition. Paper 11 (“Prelim. Resp.”). We
`determined that the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary
`Response demonstrated that there was a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner
`would prevail in challenging claims 1–13 and 17‒23 as unpatentable under
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we instituted trial on
`November 30, 2016, as to those claims of the ’061 patent. Paper 13
`(“Institution Decision” or “Dec. Inst.”).
`Patent Owner filed a Response (Paper 33, “PO Resp.”), to which
`Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 40). Patent Owner filed Observations on the
`Cross-Examination of Patrick DeLuca (Paper 50), to which Petitioner filed a
`Response (Paper 59). Patent Owner was authorized to file a paper
`identifying what it considered to be new and improper arguments in
`Petitioner’s Reply (Paper 44), to which Petitioner was allowed a response
`(Paper 46). Patent Owner filed a Motion to Exclude (Paper 51), to which
`Petitioner filed an Opposition (Paper 57), and Patent Owner filed a Reply
`(Paper 62). Petitioner also filed a Motion to Exclude (Paper 47), to which
`Patent Owner filed an Opposition (Paper 56), and Petitioner filed a Reply
`(Paper 61). With authorization from the Board, Petitioner filed a second
`Motion to Exclude (Paper 70), to which Patent Owner filed an Opposition
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`IPR2016-01096
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`
`(Paper 71), and Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 72). Oral hearing was held
`on August 28, 2017, and a transcript of that hearing has been entered into the
`record. Paper 73 (“Tr.”).
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. Petitioner bears the burden
`of proving unpatentability of the challenged claims, and the burden of
`persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l
`Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). To prevail, Petitioner
`must establish facts supporting its challenge by a preponderance of the
`evidence. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). This Final Written
`Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73.
`Based on the record before us, we conclude that Petitioner has failed
`to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–13 and 17‒
`23 of the ’061 patent are unpatentable. Moreover, we dismiss Patent
`Owner’s Motion to Exclude as improper. We also deny Petitioner’s Motions
`to Exclude in part, and dismiss in part.
`Related Proceedings
`A.
`Petitioner filed a second request for inter partes review seeking
`cancellation of claims 1‒13 and 17‒23 of the ’061 patent on other grounds.
`Pet. 1; Prelim. Resp. 1 n.1. That petition for inter partes review, IPR2016-
`01095, was denied. IPR2016-01095, Paper 13.
`The ’061 Patent
`B.
`The ’061 patent issued on December 23, 2003, with J. Michael
`
`Ramstack, M. Gary I. Riley, Stephen E. Zale, Joyce M. Hotz, and Olufunmi
`L. Johnson as the listed co-inventors. Ex. 1001. According to the ’061
`patent, it is drawn “to injectable suspensions having improved injectability.”
`Id. at 1:13‒14.
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`
`
`The ’061 patent discloses:
`Injectable suspensions are heterogeneous systems that
`typically consist of a solid phase dispersed in a liquid phase, the
`liquid phase being aqueous or nonaqueous. To be effective and
`pharmaceutically acceptable, injectable suspensions should
`preferably be: sterile; stable; resuspendable; syringeable;
`injectable; isotonic; and nonirritating. The foregoing
`characteristics result in manufacturing, storage, and usage
`requirements that make injectable suspensions one of the most
`difficult dosage forms to develop.
`Id. at 1:17‒25.
`
`The ’061 patent teaches that viscosity enhancers are added to injection
`vehicles to prevent settling of particles, but notes that viscosity is kept low to
`facilitate mixing and make the suspension easier to inject. Id. at 2:25‒30.
`According to the ’061 patent, it was “unexpectedly discovered that
`injectability is improved, and in vivo injectability failures significantly and
`unexpectedly reduced, by increasing the viscosity of the fluid phase of an
`injectable suspension.” Id. at 4:57‒60. The ’061 patent teaches that “is in
`contrast to conventional teachings that an increase in the viscosity hinders
`injectability and syringeability.” Id. at 4:60‒62. The ’061 patent
`specifically teaches that carboxymethyl cellulose (“CMC”) is a viscosity
`enhancing agent. Id. at 12:14‒20.
`
`The ’061 patent specifically teaches the following injection vehicles:
`Vehicle A: 0.9% saline and 0.1% Tween 20; Vehicle B: 1.5% CMC, 30%
`sorbitol, and 0.2% Tween 20; and Vehicle C: 3% CMC, 0.1% Tween 20,
`and 0.9% saline. Id. at 9:38‒46. According to the ’061 patent, Vehicle A
`had a viscosity of 1.0 cp, Vehicle B had a viscosity of 24 cp, and Vehicle C
`had a viscosity of 56 cp. Id. at 10:Table 4.
`
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`IPR2016-01096
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`
`Illustrative Claim
`C.
`Petitioner challenges claims 1‒13 and 17‒23 of the ’061 patent.
`Claim 1, the only independent claim of the ’061 patent, is representative:
`1.
`A composition suitable for injection through a needle
`into a host, comprising:
`microparticles comprising a polymeric binder; and
`an injection vehicle, wherein said microparticles are suspended
`in said injection vehicle at a concentration of greater than about
`30 mg/ml to form a suspension, wherein a fluid phase of said
`suspension has a viscosity greater than about 20 cp and less
`than about 600 cp at 20º C., wherein the viscosity of said fluid
`phase of said suspension provides injectability of the
`composition through a needle ranging in diameter from 18–22
`gauge.
`Ex. 1001, 18:6‒17 (emphasis added).
`Instituted Challenges
`D.
`We instituted trial on the following grounds (Pet. 33):
`References
`Basis
`Claims Challenged
`Johnson1 and Kino2
`§ 103
`1‒13, 22, and 23
`Gustafsson,3 Ramstack,4 and
`§ 103
`1‒3, 6‒9, 12, 13, and
`the Handbook5
`17‒23
`
`
`1 Johnson et al., U.S. Patent No. 5,654,010, issued August 5, 1997
`(Ex. 1009) (“Johnson”).
`2 Kino et al., U.S. Patent No. 5,656,299, issued August 12, 1997 (Ex. 1010)
`(“Kino”).
`3 Gustafsson et al., WO 97/14408, published April 24, 1997 (Ex. 1011)
`(“Gustafsson”).
`4 Ramstack et al., WO 95/13799, published May 26, 1995 (Ex. 1005)
`(“Ramstack”).
`5 HANDBOOK OF PHARMACEUTICAL EXCIPIENTS, 78‒81, 135‒138, 294‒298,
`329‒330, 375‒378, 420‒421, 439‒442, 477‒482 (Ainley Wade and Paul J
`
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`
`Petitioner relies on the Declaration of Patrick P. Deluca, Ph.D.
`(Ex. 1002), as well as his Supplemental Declaration (Ex. 1024).
`Patent Owner relies on the Declarations of Cory J. Berkland, Ph.D.,
`(Ex. 2014), Robson F. Storey, Ph.D. (Ex. 2054), and Stevin Gehrke, Ph.D.
`(Ex. 2059).
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`Petitioner bears the burden of proving unpatentability of the
`challenged claims, and that burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent
`Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1378. To prevail, Petitioner must
`establish the facts supporting its challenge by a preponderance of the
`evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). Below, we explain why
`Petitioner has failed to meet its burden with respect to the challenged claims.
`Claim Construction
`A.
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are
`interpreted according to their broadest reasonable construction in light of the
`specification of the patent in which they appear. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b);
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–45 (2016)
`(upholding the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard).
`Under that standard, we presume that a claim term carries its “ordinary and
`customary meaning,” which “is the meaning that the term would have to a
`person of ordinary skill in the art in question” at the time of the invention.
`In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). See also
`Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Under
`a broadest reasonable interpretation, words of the claim must be given their
`
`
`Weller, ed., Am. Pharm. Ass’n & Pharm. Press 2nd ed. 1994) (Ex. 1008)
`(“the Handbook”).
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`IPR2016-01096
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`plain meaning, unless such meaning is inconsistent with the specification
`and prosecution history.”). Any special definition for a claim term must be
`set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and
`precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`In the Institution Decision, we determined that none of the terms in
`the challenged claims require express construction at that time. Dec. Inst. 6
`(citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed.
`Cir. 1999) (noting that only claim terms which are in controversy need to be
`construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy));
`see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868
`F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Petitioner offers explicit constructions of
`several claim terms (Pet. 19‒22), as did Patent Owner in its Preliminary
`Response (Prelim. Resp. 9‒12). In its full Response, Patent Owner states
`that there is no need to expressly construe any of the claim terms. PO Resp.
`13‒14. On the present record, we agree with Patent Owner and determine
`that none of the claim terms require explicit construction for purposes of this
`Decision.
`
`B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`Petitioner contends that at the time of invention, the ordinary artisan
`would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree and/or a number of years of
`industry training or experience in one or more the following fields:
`pharmaceutical formulation, chemistry, pharmaceutical science, polymer
`chemistry, pharmaceutics, pharmaceutical technology, pharmacokinetics,
`and/or pharmacology.” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 8‒13).
`Patent Owner responds that the ordinary artisan “would have a
`bachelor’s degree in one of the following fields: pharmaceutical formulation,
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`IPR2016-01096
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`chemistry, polymer science, or a related field, and one or two years of
`industry training or experience in those field(s).” PO Resp. 8 (citing Ex.
`2014 ¶ 21; Ex. 2054 ¶ 27).
`
`We conclude that, for practical purposes, there is little difference
`between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s definitions of the ordinary artisan.
`Thus, our analysis would be the same under either Petitioner’s or Patent
`Owner’s definition. In addition, the level of ordinary skill in the art in this
`case is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau,
`261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
`C. Obviousness over Johnson and Kino
`Petitioner contends that claims 1‒13, 22, and 23 are rendered obvious
`by the combination of Johnson and Kino. Pet. 23‒38. Petitioner presents a
`claim chart demonstrating where the limitations of the challenged claims
`may be found in the relied upon references. Id. at 32‒38. Patent Owner
`disagrees with Petitioner’s contentions, asserting that the Petition fails to
`demonstrate the obviousness of the challenged claims by a preponderance of
`the evidence. PO Resp. 14‒34.
`i.
`Overview of the Prior Art Relied Upon
`
`
`
`We find the following as to the teachings of the relevant prior art.
`a.
`Overview of Johnson (Ex. 1009)
`Johnson “relates to a composition, and methods of forming and using
`said composition, for the sustained release of biologically active, stabilized
`human growth hormone (hGH).” Ex. 1009, 1:42‒45. The method of
`forming the composition includes the steps of “dissolving a biocompatible
`polymer in a polymer solvent to form a polymer solution, dispersing
`particles of biologically active, stabilized hGH in the polymer solution, and
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`IPR2016-01096
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`
`then solidifying the polymer to form a polymeric matrix containing a
`dispersion of said hGH particles.” Id. at 1:52‒57.
`
`Example 7 of Johnson evaluated “the pharmacokinetic profiles of
`different hGH sustained release formulations as compared to more
`traditional methods of administering hGH.” Id. at 12:19‒24. Monkeys were
`administered a dose of 160 mg of hGH sustained release microspheres in
`1.2 ml of injection vehicle using a 20 gauge needle. Id. at 12:37‒42.
`Johnson teaches that the “injection vehicle was an aqueous vehicle
`containing 3% w/v Carboxymethyl Cellulose (sodium salt), 1% v/v Tween
`20 (Polysorbate 20) and 0.9% sodium chloride.” Id. at 12:42‒45.
`Overview of Kino (Ex. 1010)
`b.
`
`Kino teaches:
`With the aim of improvement in compliance at the time
`of maintenance therapy with hydrophobic antipsychotic drugs,
`the present inventors have conducted intensive studies on the
`development of a sustained release pharmaceutical preparation
`in which a drug itself is used as an active ingredient without
`modification. As the result, it was found that a drug can be
`released at an almost constant rate extending over 1 week or
`more by including a hydrophobic antipsychotic drug in the form
`of microcrystals having an average particle size of 10 µm or
`less, desirably 5 µm or less, into a base comprising a
`biodegradable high molecular weight polymer having in vivo
`histocompatibility to make a sustained release microsphere
`preparation and administrating it by subcutaneous or
`intramuscular injection.
`Ex. 1010, 1:66‒2:12.
`
`Kino teaches that the microspheres may be made into a sustained
`release injection by preparing an aqueous suspension along with a dispersing
`agent, such as polysorbate 80 or CMC, a preservative, and an isotonic agent,
`such as sodium chloride or sorbitol. Id. at 4:38‒44. Kino teaches also that
`
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`IPR2016-01096
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`
`when used as a suspension for injection, the particle size of the
`microparticles “may be a range which can satisfy their dispersibility and
`needle-passing property, for example, in the range of from about 0.5 to about
`400 µm, more preferably from about 0.5 to about 200 µm, most preferably
`from about 15 to 50 µm as an average particle size.” Id. at 4:32‒37.
`ii.
`Analysis
`A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if “the differences
`between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
`that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
`(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art;
`(3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness,
`i.e., secondary considerations. Id. (citing Graham v. John Deere Co.,
`383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)).
`
`In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
`acknowledged that “inherency may supply a missing limitation in an
`obviousness analysis.” PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d
`1186, 1194‒95 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The Federal Circuit has cautioned,
`however, that the use of inherency in an obviousness analysis must be
`carefully circumscribed. Id. at 1195. “To establish inherency, the extrinsic
`evidence ‘must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily
`present in the thing described in the reference.’” In re Robertson, 169 F.3d
`743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co.,
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`IPR2016-01096
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`
`948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Inherency “may not be established
`by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result
`from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d
`578, 581 (CCPA 1981). For example, where the practice of a prior art
`example sometimes, but not always, yields the claimed product, anticipation
`is not established. Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1047–48
`(Fed. Cir. 1995).
`Petitioner relies on Johnson for teaching “microspheres suspended in
`an aqueous injection vehicle.” Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1009, 10:64‒66; Ex. 1002
`¶¶ 54, 59). Petitioner contends that “Johnson teaches a solution of 3% w/v
`carboxymethyl cellulose (low viscosity), polysorbate 20, and sodium
`chloride used as the injection vehicle; the same components as used in
`Vehicle C of the ’061 Patent.” Id. (citing Ex. 1009, 12:39‒42; Ex. 1002
`¶¶ 55, 59). Petitioner asserts further that Johnson teaches that a
`concentration of microparticles of 133 mg/ml, which, Petitioner argues, is
`greater than the concentration of a minimum of 30 mg/ml required by the
`challenged claims. Id. at 24‒25 (citing Ex. 1009, 12:39‒42; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 54,
`59). In addition, Petitioner notes that the “formulation is suitable for
`injection into a patient via a 20 gauge needle, which is within the claimed
`range of 18–22 gauge.” Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 1009, 12:39-42; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 54,
`59).
`Petitioner acknowledges that “Johnson is silent as to the viscosity of
`
`the . . . formulation.” Id. Petitioner contends, however, that the ordinary
`artisan would understand that CMC is a viscosity enhancing agent, and that
`it “would be considered the viscosity-controlling component of an injection
`vehicle.” Id. (citing Ex. 1008, 78; Ex. 1002 ¶ 61).
`
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`Petitioner notes further that during prosecution, the applicants relied
`
`on the Declaration of Dr. Mark A. Tracy (Ex. 1018), in which Dr. Tracy
`“offered the conclusion that Kino taught a viscosity less than 7 cp based
`solely on the amount of CMC present in the Kino examples.” Pet. 25. Thus,
`Petitioner asserts, the ordinary artisan “would appreciate that the injection
`vehicle disclosed in Johnson would have substantially the same viscosity of
`the preferred embodiment of the ’061 Patent and as a result fall within the
`scope of claim 1.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 60, 61).
`According to Petitioner:
`Based on the Patent Owner’s admission during prosecution of
`the ‘061 Patent, the Tracy Declaration, and what would be
`known to [the ordinary artisan], [the ordinary artisan] would
`reasonably expect the injection vehicle of Johnson — having
`3% CMC — to have a viscosity greater than 27cp at 20°C and
`certainly within the claimed range of 20-600cp at 20°C.
`Johnson therefore teaches every limitation of claims 1-3. (Ex.
`1002 ¶ 60, 61).
`Id. at 25‒26; see also id. at 33 (claim chart) (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27, 54, 59,
`61).
`
`Petitioner is, therefore, relying on the doctrine of inherency in
`contending that the injection vehicle of Johnson inherently has the viscosity
`required by the challenged claims. See Tr. 116 (Petitioner’s counsel noting
`that they are relying inherency to meet the viscosity limitation); see also PO
`
`
`6 Petitioner also argued during the oral hearing that it would have been
`obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to optimize viscosity. Tr. 16‒17.
`Petitioner pointed to pages 7‒9 of its Petition to support that assertion.
`Tr. 23. Those pages, however, as noted during the argument (Tr. 23‒24),
`were in the Background section of the Petition discussing improving
`injectability, and did not explain how the combination of Johnson and Kino
`rendered the claimed viscosity obvious.
`
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`Resp. 2 (“Petitioners argue that the injection vehicle formulations disclosed
`in the primary references of both grounds, Johnson and Gustafsson, would
`inherently have viscosities between 20 cp and 600 cp at 20ºC as claimed in
`the ’061 patent.”).
`
`Patent Owner responds that Petitioner has not met the high burden of
`establishing inherency, and, in particular, has “failed to establish that the
`type or grade of CMC used in the Johnson or Gustafsson vehicles would
`necessarily have achieved the claims viscosity.” PO Resp. 2; id. at 14
`(“Johnson does not expressly or inherently meet the viscosity limitations of
`the claims.”).
`
`Patent Owner argues that, as acknowledged by both the Petition (Pet.
`25) and the Decision on Institution (Dec. Inst. 9‒10), Johnson does not
`specify the viscosity of its injection vehicle. PO Resp. 16. Moreover, Patent
`Owner asserts, Johnson “provides insufficient information to ascertain the
`viscosity of its injection vehicle or to conclude that it is necessarily the same
`as that of a preferred embodiment of the ’061 patent.” Id. (citing Ex. 2014
`¶¶ 81, 87.)
`
`In particular, Patent Owner notes that “Petitioners rely on Johnson’s
`disclosure of an injection vehicle comprised of 3% CMC, 1% polysorbate
`20, and 0.9% sodium chloride.” Id. at 18 (citing Pet. 24). Patent Owner
`states that it “asked Dr. Stevin Gehrke to make the Johnson vehicle using
`commercially available CMCs.” Id. (citing Ex. 2059 ¶¶ 5-12; Ex. 2014
`¶¶ 47-50). According to Patent Owner, “Dr. Gehrke recorded the viscosity
`at 20ºC as 6.03 cp when the vehicle was made with Ashland 7ULC CMC
`and 9.41 cp when the vehicle was made with Ashland 7ELC1 CMC,
`
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`which both fall below the claimed range.” Id. (citing Ex. 2059 ¶¶ 7, 12; Ex.
`2014 ¶¶ 47-50).
`
`Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner did not offer any testing data of
`its own, but rather, asserts based on the Tracy Declaration that CMC is the
`viscosity controlling component, and, thus, the ordinary artisan could predict
`the viscosity based only on the amount of CMC in the formulation. Id. at
`18‒19 (citing Pet. 25; Ex. 2016, 252:18‒253:7; Ex. 2014 ¶¶ 76‒86).
`
`Patent Owner argues further that Petitioner has not demonstrated that
`“Johnson disclosed a specific type and grade of CMC that would necessarily
`cause the viscosity of its vehicle to fall within the claimed range at 20ºC,” or
`that “all available grades and types of CMC would necessarily cause
`Johnson’s vehicle to fall within the claimed viscosity range.” PO Resp. 20‒
`21. Patent Owner notes in particular that Johnson does not specify the type
`or grade of CMC that it used. Id. at 21 (citing Ex. 2014 ¶¶ 51‒56; Ex. 2016,
`227:9‒11, 230:14‒231:21). The claimed injection vehicle, Patent Owner
`asserts, requires a particular viscosity, that is, a viscosity greater than about
`20 cp and less than about 600 cp at 20º C. Id. Petitioner has not shown,
`Patent Owner asserts, “that the Johnson vehicle is inevitably such a vehicle.”
`Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 2014 ¶¶ 81, 87).
`
`Patent Owner argues additionally that even if the CMC of Johnson is
`considered to be the viscosity controlling component, the absence of any
`disclosure in Johnson as to the grade and type of CMC used in its injection
`vehicle “makes it impossible to establish that the viscosity is necessarily in
`the claimed range.” Id. (citing Ex. 2014 ¶¶ 51‒61; Ex. 2016, 147:10‒16,
`176:2‒24). There were a wide variety of grades and types of CMC that were
`available at the time of invention, which, Patent Owner argues, “could yield
`
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`a wide-range of possible viscosities for CMC solutions, even at a fixed
`concentration.” Id. (citing Ex. 1008, 79; Ex. 2034, 15; Ex. 2014 ¶¶ 37‒41,
`51‒61; Ex. 2016, 183:1‒6).
`
`According to Patent Owner, Petitioner’s own reference, the
`Handbook, supports that many viscosities are possible, as its states that
`“aqueous 1% w/v solutions [of CMC] with viscosities of 5-4000 mPas (5-
`4000 cP) may be obtained.” PO Resp. 22 (quoting Ex. 1008, 79). Patent
`Owner also cites the 1999 Aqualon brochure (Ex. 2034) as well as Dow
`Chemical (Ex. 2036) as demonstrating that a range of viscosities for
`solutions containing the products are possible. Id. at 23 (citing Ex. 2034, 6,
`15; Ex. 2036; Ex. 2014 ¶¶ 41, 53‒55). In addition, Patent Owner argues, as
`supported by the 1999 Aqualon brochure, if medium or high grade CMC
`were used in the injection vehicle of Johnson, viscosities higher than those
`claimed could result. Id. at 23‒24 (citing Ex. 1008, 79, Table 1; Ex. 2014
`¶¶ 60‒61; Ex. 2034, 15; Ex. 2014 ¶¶ 60‒61; Ex. 2016, 230:14‒231:21).
`
`As to the Tracy Declaration, Patent Owner notes that it was originally
`submitted with Application No. 09/577,875 (“the ’875 Application”), “Dr.
`Tracy explained that ‘CMC is the viscosity-controlling component of the
`injection vehicle of Test Example 2’” of Kino, as it used a 0.5% CMC
`solution isotonized with mannitol. PO Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 1018 ¶ 5). Table
`1 of the Tracy Declaration, which Patent Owner states “summarizes the
`information Dr. Tracy relied upon in reaching his conclusions regarding
`Kino test Example 2,” is reproduced below:
`
`15
`
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`

`IPR2016-01096
`Patent 6,667,061 B2
`
`
`
`
`Id. at 11‒12.
`
`According to Patent Owner, “[b]ecause Kino did not disclose the
`viscosity of its Test Example 2, in order to make a comparison between
`Kino Test Example 2 and the ’875 application, Dr. Tracy had to assume that
`the Kino CMC was the same as that used in the ’875 application.” Id. at 12
`(citing Ex. 2014 ¶¶ 83-85; Ex. 2016, 176:2-24). Patent Owner asserts “[t]hat
`assumption and conclusion were also consistent with Kino’s use of
`physiological saline alone in three of the four exemplified vehicles, all of
`which had a viscosity of 1 cp—far below the claimed viscosity range.” Id.
`at 12‒13 (citing Ex. 1010, 6:19, 6:43‒44, 7:8‒9; Ex. 2014 ¶¶ 78‒85).
`
`Patent Owner contends that the Tracy Declaration does not support
`that CMC is the viscosity controlling components of Johnson’s injection
`vehicle, as the declaration does not relate to Johnson. Id. at 20 (citing Ex.
`2014 ¶¶ 77‒81). Patent argues further that “the grade and type of CMC in
`Johnson’s vehicle and how the vehicle is prepared are . . . highly relevant to
`the viscosity of the injection vehicle.” Id. That is, Patent Owner argues,
`although “the grade and type of CMC and preparation of the vehicles may be
`the same in Johnson as in the ’875 application, Johnson provides no such
`
`16
`
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`

`IPR2016-01096
`Patent 6,667,061 B2
`
`information and Petitioners do not and cannot establish that this is
`necessarily the case.” Id.
`Challenged independent claim 1 requires that the “fluid phase of said
`suspension has a viscosity greater than about 20 cp and less than about 600
`cp at 20º C.” As noted in the Decision on Institution and discussed above,
`Johnson does not specifically teach that viscosity limitation. Dec. Inst. 10.
`Petitioner relies on Johnson’s teaching an injection vehicle comprising 3%
`w/v CMC, 1 % polysorbate 20, and 0.9% sodium chloride. Pet. 24. As we
`noted further in the Decision on Institution, the ’061 patent teaches Vehicle
`C, which comprises 3% CMC, 0.1% Tween 20 (i.e., polysorbate 20), and
`0.9% saline, and has a viscosity of 56 cp. Dec. Inst. 11 (citing Ex. 1001,
`9:45; 10:Table 4). In the Decision on Institution, we determined that the
`evidence of record at that time sufficiently established a reasonable
`likelihood that as the injection vehicle of Johnson and Vehicle C are
`substantially the same, except for the concentration of polysorbate 20, the
`injection vehicles would be expected to have similar, if not the same
`viscosities, especially as the ’061 patent teaches that CMC is a viscosity
`enhancing agent. Id. Based on the argument and evidence developed during
`trial, however, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a
`preponderance of the evidence that the Johnson vehicle inherently has the
`viscosity required by the challenged claims.
`
`In that regard, we note that Petitioner must “meet a high standard in
`order to rely on inherency to establish the existence of a claim limitation in
`the prior art in an obviousness analysis—the limitation at issue necessarily
`must be present, or the natural result of the combination of elements
`
`17
`
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`

`IPR2016-01096
`Patent 6,667,061 B2
`
`explicitly disclosed by the prior art.” PAR Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d at 1195‒
`96.
`As noted by Dr. Berkland, Dr. Gehrke7 made the vehicle of Johnson
`
`using “two different types of low viscosity CMC: 7ULC and 7ELCI from
`Ashland.” Ex. 2014 ¶ 48; Ex. 2059 ¶¶ 6‒7. According to Dr. Berkland:
`each of these Ashland CMCs yielded a Johnson vehicle with a
`viscosity below 20 cp when measured at 20ºC and thus fall
`outside the range claimed in the ’061 patent. ([Ex. 2059] ¶ 12.)
`
`
`
`Ex. 2014 ¶ 50.
`
`The testing performed by Dr. Gehrke is the only data provided during
`the proceeding of testing of the vehicle of Johnson, and demonstrates that
`viscosities lower than those required by the claim were obtained. The data
`provided by Dr. Gehrke, therefore, is evidence that the injection vehicle of
`Johnson would not necessarily have the viscosity required by the challenged
`claims.
`
`Moreover, the Handbook (Ex. 1008), supports the finding that a
`solution having the same percentage of CMC may not necessarily all have
`the same viscosity. Specifically, the Handbook teaches:
`Viscosity: various grades of carboxymethylcellulose sodium are
`commercially available which have differing aqueous
`
`7 We note that Petitioner elected not to take the deposition of Dr. Gehrke.
`Tr. 63.
`
`18
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`

`IPR2016-01096
`Patent 6,667,061 B2
`
`
`viscosities; aqueous 1% w/v solutions with viscosities of 5-
`4000 mPa s (5-4000 cP) may be obtained. An increase in
`concentration results in an increase in aqueous solution
`viscosity. Viscosities of various grades of
`carboxymethylcellulose sodium are shown in Table I. . . .
`
`
`Ex. 1008, 79 (footnote omitted). Thus, the Handbook is further evidence
`that the percentage of CMC used is not determinative of the viscosity of the
`solution, but that a solution with various viscosities may be obtained.
`Petitioner has not presented any evidence demonstrating that even if these
`difference in viscosities were taken into account, the solution of Johnson
`would necessarily have the viscosity required by the challenged claims. See
`Tr. 14 (Petitioner’s counsel acknowledging that it has not performed any
`testing).
`
`That finding is also supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s expert,
`Dr. DeLuca. Dr. DeLuca testifies:
`Q. Okay. Is it because the CMC that comes from two different
`suppliers can have different characteristics?
`A. They could, yes.
`Q. They could have different viscosity ranges?
`A. They could vary in viscosity range, yeah.
`Q. So it was important to you to consider different suppliers of
`CMC in coming up with your opinion today because the
`characteristics of the CMC can vary from supplier to supplier,
`right?
`A. Yes.
`
`
`
`19
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`

`IPR2016-01096
`Patent 6,667,061 B2
`
`Ex. 2081, 102:22‒103:13; see also Paper 50, 5 (pointing out Dr. DeLuca’s
`testimony in this regard). Again, as the viscosity can change depending not
`just on its grade, but also on the supplier, the preponderance of the evidence
`does not support Petiti

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