throbber
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`__________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________
`
`APPLE, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`IMMERSION CORPORATION,
`Patent Owner.
`__________
`
`Case IPR2016-01603
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
`__________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held: November 16, 2017
`__________
`
`
`
`
`
`Before MICHAEL R. ZECHER, BRYAN F. MOORE, and MINN
`CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2016-01603
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
`
`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`
`
`ROBERT C. WILLIAMS, ESQUIRE
`DLA Piper, LLP
`401 B Street, Suite 1700
`San Diego, California 92101
`(619) 699-2820
`robert.williams@dlapiper.com
`
`JAMES M. HEINTZ, ESQUIRE
`DLA Piper, LLP
`One Fountain Square
`11911 Freedom Drive, Suite 300
`(703) 773-4148
`jim.heintz@dlapiper.com
`
`
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
`
`
`RICHARD M. BIRNHOLZ, ESQUIRE
`Irell & Manella, LLP
`1800 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 900
`Los Angeles, California 90067
`(310) 277-1010
`rbirnholz@irell.com
`
`MICHAEL R. FLEMING, ESQUIRE
`Irell & Manella, LLP
`1800 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 900
`Los Angeles, California 90067
`(310) 277-1010
`mfleming@irell.com
`
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Thursday,
`
`November 16, 2017, commencing at 1:31 p.m., at the U.S. Patent and
`Trademark Office, 600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
`
`
`
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`Case IPR2016-01603
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
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`
`P R O C E E D I N G S
`- - - - -
`JUDGE ZECHER: Please be seated. All right. Good afternoon. I'm
`
`Judge Zecher. I have with me my colleagues, Judge Bryan Moore and Judge
`Minn Chung. He's attending remotely from San Jose.
`
`This is a hearing for Case IPR Number 2016-1601603. The patent at
`issue is Patent Number 8,581,710.
`
`In our order for trial hearing, we authorized the parties 30 minutes of
`oral argument in total. Petitioner will present their case first because they
`carry the burden of persuasion. They can reserve time for rebuttal. At
`which point, patent owner will present their case. And if petitioner has any
`rebuttal time remaining, they can use the remainder of that time.
`
`I'd like to begin by asking the parties to introduce themselves. Let's
`start with petitioner. And just a friendly reminder, if you can come to the
`microphone when you speak so Judge Chung can hear you.
`
`MR. WILLIAMS: Good afternoon, Your Honors. Rob Williams with
`DLA Piper for petitioner, Apple. With me today is James Heintz with DLA
`Piper and Ken Moore from Apple.
`
`
`JUDGE ZECHER: Okay. Thank you. Patent owner?
`
`MR. FLEMING: Yes, Your Honor. I'm Mike Fleming representing
`patent owner. And I also have with me Richard Birnholz, who will be
`presenting the argument today.
`
`MR. BIRNHOLZ: Good afternoon, Your Honors.
`
`JUDGE ZECHER: Good afternoon. Thank you. All right. So we'll
`turn the floor over to petitioner. And if you'll let us know how much rebuttal
`time you'd like to reserve, I'll go ahead and note that.
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`Case IPR2016-01603
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`MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Your Honors. I'd like to reserve about
`
`half of my time, 15 minutes.
`
`JUDGE ZECHER: 15 minutes. Okay. You may begin.
`
`MR. WILLIAMS: Good afternoon. Once again, Rob Williams with
`DLA Piper speaking for petitioner, Apple.
`
`Let's begin with Slide 2, please. There are two instituted grounds in
`this IPR, and both rely on Martin as the primary reference. Martin is another
`patent owned by patent owner, Immersion, and it ensures the same
`specifications as the '356 Patent, which Your Honors may recall from last
`month's hearing.
`
`Turn to Slide 3. Claim 1 is the only independent claim at issue today.
`And there's only one limitation in dispute, and that's the "otherwise"
`limitation.
`
`Now, the Board previously determined that a reference need not
`disclose the "otherwise" limitation to invalidate the claim, so it is undisputed
`that Martin invalidates Claim 1 under the Board's interpretation. Regardless,
`Martin clearly discloses the "otherwise" condition as we'll discuss today.
`
`On Slide 4, I've highlighted the two conditions of Claim 1 in two
`different colors. First in green, if the user input is recognized and the
`command is determined, a first haptic effect is generated. The second
`condition in orange is "otherwise" and a second haptic effect generated.
`
`And I'd like to note at the outset that there's nothing in Claim 1 that
`requires any particular first haptic effect or any relationship between the first
`haptic effect and the command. All that's required is that some first effect be
`generated when the conditions are satisfied and a different second effect be
`generated when the conditions are not satisfied.
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`Case IPR2016-01603
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
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`Turn to Slide 5. The two conditions of Claim 1 are both clearly
`
`illustrated in Figure 8. In Martin in Figure 8, the controller first monitors an
`input device, such as a touchpad, and obtains input signals, such as the
`position and pressure of the user's touch.
`
`Slide 6, Figure 8. In Figure 8, the next step is that the controller
`accesses the memory at Step 54, which stores associations between user
`inputs and corresponding functions or commands and corresponding tactile
`sensations or haptic effects. And Martin teaches that those associations may
`be stored in a table, such as the table at Figure 9.
`
`The next step, Step 55, the controller attempts to find user input in the
`table and an identifier will determine the corresponding command and tactile
`sensation.
`
`On Slide 7, I've included Figure 9, which is an exemplary table of
`associations between inputs, functions, and tactile sensations. And in this
`particular example highlighted in green, an input on input, Device 7 at the
`location, Location 1, with a pressure of Pressure 1, is associated with the
`command Function 1 and haptic effect Sensation 20.
`
`JUDGE ZECHER: Counsel, can I ask you a question? So I know in
`reading the briefs there's some arguments made about various input devices
`in this figure, as well as some functions, particularly the search function.
`But from my understanding, the highlighted portion you have in green here,
`that was your position that you articulated in the petition, correct?
`
`MR. WILLIAMS: That's correct, Your Honor. Martin discloses a
`number of different embodiments, in which differently numbered input
`devices are monitored in different embodiments. For example, in one
`embodiment, the one that petitioner relied upon, the controller monitors
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`Case IPR2016-01603
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`Input Device 7, you can see in the first row of the table, Input Device 1 is
`associated with the search command. And Martin teaches that that is a
`different embodiment.
`
`JUDGE ZECHER: So you're relying on the embodiment for Input
`Device 7?
`
`MR. WILLIAMS: That's correct, Your Honor.
`
`JUDGE ZECHER: And only that embodiment?
`
`MR. WILLIAMS: That's correct, Your Honor. In combination with
`the other teachings in the Martin disclosure. If we could turn to Slide 8. So
`after we've looked up in the table to see whether the user input matches an
`entry in the table, the next step is Step 71, which is labeled input ambiguous.
`If the user input matches an entry in the table at Step 71, and the
`corresponding command has been determined, then the input is not
`ambiguous and the flowchart proceeds downward, as shown in green.
`
`Now, what's important to realize is at this point, the user's input has
`been recognized as an entry in the table and the corresponding command or
`function has been determined. In other words, we're in the "if" branch of
`Claim 1. And then certain steps are then performed. Ultimately at Step 56 a
`first haptic effect is generated.
`
`Turn to Slide 9. Otherwise, if the user input doesn't match an entry in
`the table, it's considered ambiguous and we instead move to the right, as
`shown in orange on Slide 9.
`
`Slide 10. If the user input is ambiguous, Martin teaches that the
`controller goes back to the table and obtains a different tactile sensation. It's
`the ambiguous Sensation 22.
`
`Slide 11, please. So --
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`Case IPR2016-01603
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
`
`JUDGE CHUNG: Counsel? MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, Your Honor?
`
`JUDGE CHUNG: This is Judge Chung. I have a question on your
`
`Slide 10 and Slide 9. So if Martin's device determines that input is
`ambiguous, would you agree then at that point that a command has not been
`recognized?
`
`MR. WILLIAMS: That's correct, Your Honor. No command has been
`determined in that instance because the user input was not recognized as an
`entry in the table with a corresponding command.
`
`JUDGE CHUNG: So you'd just be arguing that the “otherwise”
`conditional limitations encompass the situation where no command has
`been recognized?
`
`MR. WILLIAMS: That's exactly right. The condition of the "if", the
`"if" condition in Claim 1, is evaluated at Step 71 by determining whether the
`input is ambiguous or not. If the input is not ambiguous, the user input has
`matched an entry in the table and the corresponding command has been
`determined, and you go down. Otherwise, we go right.
`
`JUDGE CHUNG: I understand. Thank you.
`
`MR. WILLIAMS: Slide 11, please. And that's exactly what's shown
`on Slide 11. At Step 71, the conditions of the "if" branch are evaluated. If
`the user input is recognized and the command is determined, we're in the "if"
`branch of Claim 1. The method proceeds down as shown in green.
`Otherwise, the input is ambiguous; the user input was not recognized or a
`command was not determined and proceed to the right.
`
`Now, there's only two possible outcomes here; either a first haptic
`effect is generated or a second ambiguous haptic effect is generated. And
`again, the key point is that the determination or the evaluation of the
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`Case IPR2016-01603
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`conditions in the "if" branch happen at Step 71.
`
`Slide 12, please. And I'll note that patent owner's expert doesn't
`dispute this operation of Figure 8. In fact, Dr. Visell, patent owner's expert,
`admitted that in the first highlighted block of Slide 12, if the determination
`at Step 71 is yes, meaning that the input is ambiguous, we proceed to the
`right. The second highlighted block, question, "Otherwise, at Step 71, if the
`user input is not ambiguous, the flowchart proceeds downward with a
`different haptic effect being generated, correct?" And there's some
`intervening clarifications. Dr. Visell testified, "I'd say that's accurate." Slide
`13, please. Now, patent owner argues that there's allegedly multiple
`additional alternative paths in addition to the two conditions that are set forth
`in Claim 1. One of them relates to the function failure row highlighted in
`green on Slide 13. The function failure is another row in the table that's
`associated with Tactile Sensation 23.
`
`Slide 14, please. The function failure, as Martin explains, is an effect
`that's generated if the function associated with the user input fails. For
`example, if a user selects the redial feature on a telephone when there's no
`numbers stored in the redial memory, or if a user attempts to initiate a phone
`call having entered an incomplete phone number, the function failure -- the
`function would fail and the function failure haptic effect would be generated.
`
`What's important to recognize is that the function failure
`determination occurs only after the conditions of the "if" branch have been
`satisfied. In other words, the user input has been recognized, the command
`or function has been determined. Only then will the function failure
`determination occur. We can see that because it's in the downward branch,
`the "no" branch, of the input ambiguous determination at Step 71.
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`Case IPR2016-01603
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`We can also see that from the examples provided in Martin. For
`
`example, in order to determine whether the redial function failed, first the
`user input would have to be recognized. In this case, the user selecting the
`redial feature and the corresponding command being determined. In this
`case, the redial function in order to determine whether the redial somehow
`failed.
`
`Turn to Slide 15. So in other words, the function failure
`determination occurs in the "if" branch of Claim 1. If the function fails, a
`function failure effect is generated. If the function doesn't fail, then the
`tactile sensation from the table associated with that user input is generated.
`But either way, a first haptic effect is generated. The function failure is not
`somehow an alternative path to the two conditions in Claim 1, rather it's just
`an alternate effect that may be generated in the "if" branch.
`
`Slide 16, please. Now, the patent owner argues that the function
`failure can't be a first haptic effect, as we cited in Claim 1, because it's a
`different effect listed in the table.
`But patent owner's argument is wrong
`for three reasons: First, there's nothing in the claim that requires the first
`haptic effect to always be the same. The '710 Patent, for example, describes
`a cellphone embodiment, in which a user couldn't place calls or manage a
`calendar. One could imagine two different icons on your phone for those
`two functions. And there's nothing in the claim that precludes one first
`haptic effect being generated when a user selects the call command and a
`different first haptic effect being generated when the user selects the
`calendar command.
`
`Second, the claim doesn't preclude additional steps being performed
`when the "if" conditions are satisfied. What the claim requires is that if the
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`Case IPR2016-01603
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`user input is recognized and a command is determined, two things happen;
`you perform a generate step and you perform a transmit step. But so long as
`the device performs those two steps, there's nothing in the claim that
`precludes an additional step. And the function failure determination in
`Martin is exactly that. It's just an additional step that's performed to
`determine which of the two possible first haptic effects to generate. Third,
`nothing in the claim requires that there only be one possible first haptic
`effect for any given command. If we can move to Slide 17. In fact, that
`interpretation would be inconsistent with the preferred embodiment in the
`'710 Patent. On Slide 17 I've included Dependent Claim 12, which requires
`that the first haptic effect, the one associated with the "if" branch, is
`configured to provide information associated with the status of the operation.
`
`If we can go to Slide 18. The preferred embodiment in the '710 Patent
`for Claim 12 describes providing haptic status of a download operation.
`And it gives several examples of that, such as a problem with the download
`or a haptic indication when the download has completed.
`
`Now, in order to provide haptic indication of both failure and
`completion, there would have to be multiple possible first haptic effects. If
`the same effect was used, it wouldn't be conveying any status of completion
`or failure.
`
`And Martin's function failure determination is exactly the same as this
`preferred embodiment in the '710 Patent. If the user input is recognized and
`a command is determined, there's two possible first haptic effects to
`communicate; either success or failure.
`
`I'm sorry. Was there a question, Your Honor?
`
`JUDGE CHUNG: Thank you. Yeah. Actually, I have a question.
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`My microphone was off. So patent owner argued that the "if/otherwise"
`conditional clause requires a binary logic structure that can only have two
`outcomes -- you know, outcome under the "if" condition or an outcome
`under the "otherwise" condition. So are you arguing that patent owner's
`interpretation of the "if/otherwise" clause is inconsistent with the dependent
`claims or the disclosure in the specification? Is that what you're arguing?
`
`MR. WILLIAMS: No, Your Honor. The fact that there are two
`different conditions, if the conditions are satisfied a first haptic effect is
`generated, otherwise a second haptic effect is generated, is entirely
`consistent with both the download embodiment in the "710 Patent, and, in
`fact, Martin's disclosure of function failure.
`
`Now, what's important is that if the conditions are satisfied, some first
`effect is generated, otherwise some second effect is generated. Now, which
`specific effect is generated in the "if" branch could be practiced in a variety
`of ways. You could, for example, have the same first haptic effect always be
`generated no matter what the command. Or alternatively, you could have
`different haptic effects be generated in the "if" branch depending on whether
`the function succeeds or fails. That is exactly what's taught in the '710
`download embodiment and also exactly what's taught in the Martin function
`failure embodiment.
`
`JUDGE CHUNG: I understand. So what you're arguing is that you
`could have different effects, you know, depending on what condition is met,
`but that doesn't mean that you have multiple paths?
`
`MR. WILLIAMS: That's exactly right. What's important is that there
`are two paths that occur. One haptic effect is generated if the conditions are
`satisfied and a different haptic effect is generated if the conditions are not
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`Case IPR2016-01603
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`satisfied. That's what's required by the claim.
`
`JUDGE CHUNG: Okay. Thank you.
`
`MR. WILLIAMS: If we could briefly touch on Slide 19. I think we
`touched on this earlier in response to your question, Your Honor. But patent
`owner's other alleged alternative paths rely on embodiments that are
`irrelevant like the search embodiment or the rocker switch embodiment. I've
`included on Slide 19 some passages from Martin's spec that clearly delineate
`the different embodiments, or describes them as different embodiments.
`
`Jumping ahead to Slide 22.
`
`JUDGE ZECHER: Just so you know, your 15 minutes is up so you're
`eating into your rebuttal time, but you're free to proceed.
`
`MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. One last point I'd
`like to touch on, and this is the last ultimate path that patent owner identifies,
`that somehow there's no haptic effect generated when the user input is not
`recognized. And patent owner doesn't point to any teaching in Martin for
`this alleged alternative path. Instead, they rely solely on the testimony of
`petitioner's expert, Dr. Givargis. And it takes that testimony out of context.
`
`What Dr. Givargis was really saying is if there's no user input at all,
`then, of course, there's no haptic effect. Well, Claim 1 doesn't require
`providing haptic effects when there's no user input at all. If it did, the device
`would be generating haptic effects constantly when the user is not touching
`it. That's certainly not what's contemplated by the '710 Patent.
`
`And in the interest of time, I'll reserve the balance of my time for
`rebuttal.
`
`JUDGE ZECHER: Before I let you go, I just want to ask one
`question. Patent owner makes much to do about our reliance on the ex parte
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`Case IPR2016-01603
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`Schulhauser opinion, precedential opinion, here at the Board in our DI.
`Apart from basically summarizing what they said in their patent owner
`response, in your reply you guys don't really take a position on it one way or
`another. Do you think that that case is solely limited to method claims, or do
`you think it applied to an apparatus claim, such as Claim 1 here?
`
`MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, you're absolutely correct. Petitioner
`has not advocated for that position. Petitioner just notes that, you know, to
`the extent that the Board maintains that interpretation, there's no dispute that
`Claim 1 is invalid. To the extent that patent owner is correct, Martin clearly
`discloses the "otherwise" limitation. So either way, the claims are invalid.
`
`JUDGE ZECHER: Okay. Thank you. You have 12 minutes left for
`rebuttal.
`
`MR. BIRNHOLZ: Good afternoon, Your Honors. Richard Birnholz
`with Irell & Manella for the patent owner. Apologies for the screen display
`complication.
`
`What I fear here is the argument that petitioner has made is that the
`'710 Patent, that the construction of the claim of the '710 Patent, should be
`deemed obvious over the prior art reference that teaches more than one
`haptic effect. And when you look at the architecture and the disclosure of the
`Martin reference -- that it discloses a different approach. There's no
`question there are multiple effects. There's no question that there are
`decision points in deciding what effects are provided. But it's not the elegant
`solution of the '710 Patent, which requires a very carefully constructed
`simple and clear binary determination under certain conditions. If an input
`is recognized and the command is determined, you -- if that condition is met,
`then the first haptic effect is provided. Otherwise, the processor is
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`Case IPR2016-01603
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`configured to provide a second haptic effect. And that architecture is not
`disclosed in Martin.
` I wanted to start with -- if I could have Slide 4,
`please. So I just want to cover -- tell you I'm going to cover three basic
`points. One is the claim construction issue on this "if/otherwise" binary
`logic structure point in connection with the Schulhauser case. I think this is
`a very important point that needs to be addressed. The -- discussing the
`argument on Martin. And also focusing on Claim 12. So those are the three
`largest points.
`
`If I could have Slide 7, please. Your Honor mentioned the discussion
`of the Schulhauser case and how the institution decision stated how a prior
`art reference need not satisfy the "otherwise" portion to render Claim 1
`obvious. The patent owner is clearly taking a position on that point, that that
`would not be a correct interpretation of both Schulhauser and the law.
`
`If I could go to Slide 10, please. In the Schulhauser case itself, when
`the decision is examined, there is a series of paragraphs and sections in the
`case that discuss whether rejections of certain method claims were correct.
`And those method claims contained some conditional language. And the
`decision holds that the conditional steps of the methods need not be
`performed, and therefore the rejections of those claims was upheld.
`
`But much later in the decision, there's a different class of claims that
`are at issue in the case, which talks about the system claims. And at Page 13
`of Schulhauser it says, "Independent Claim 11 is directed to a different
`statutory class of invention than the process in Claim 1." And it talks about
`how those claims are system claims and that the analysis is different. And,
`in fact, the case reaches a different result with regard to the system claims.
`
`And as I put on Slide 10, the Schulhauser case itself says that in those
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`Case IPR2016-01603
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
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`instances when you have a system claim, that it still requires structure for
`performing the function should the condition occur. The structure is present
`in the system regardless of whether the condition is met. And the specific
`example of structure that's provided in the Schulhauser case is a processor
`program that performs certain operations to -- it says, "i.e., a process
`program that performs an algorithm." And when you read the entirety of the
`quote of Schulhauser continuing in this passage here at Page 15 of the
`decision, it says, "thus, in order to show anticipation or obviousness of the
`claim reciting structure that performs a function tied to a condition
`precedent, the examiner must cite prior art that discloses or renders obvious
`such structure."
`
`The decision -- to the extent that the Board holds that a prior art need
`not disclose the "otherwise" language of the '710 Patent, that would be both
`contrary to both Schulhauser and other precedent. If I can --
`
`JUDGE ZECHER: Counselor, can I ask you a question real quick?
`
`MR. BIRNHOLZ: Please.
`
`JUDGE ZECHER: I think we all agree that this is an apparatus or
`system claim, correct? And in reading your briefs, I don't understand you
`guys to argue that Martin doesn't teach the structural elements in this claim,
`apart from maybe the special programing recorded with the processor, is that
`correct?
`
`MR. BIRNHOLZ: It is correct that the distinction with Martin is the
`configuration of the processor and the logic that is employed and how the
`haptic effects are generated with regard to implementing the particular
`design of the system. So the focus is on the configuration of the processor.
`The '710 Patent discloses a novel configuration of the processor, which is
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`Case IPR2016-01603
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`not disclosed or taught in Martin.
`
`JUDGE ZECHER: Okay. So I guess the point I'm getting at is, I
`guess you can see that Martin teaches a sensor, it teaches a housing, it
`teaches an actuator. Now, it teaches a processor. But you're saying it
`doesn't teach a processor so configured as Claim 1?
`
`MR. BIRNHOLZ: Correct.
`
`JUDGE ZECHER: Okay.
`
`MR. BIRNHOLZ: That is correct. The arrangement of the elements
`in Martin is different than the '710 Patent. Both systems are systems that
`provide tactile feedback in certain circumstances and they take certain
`approaches with regard to providing that tactile feedback.
`
`And the '710 -- if I could have Slide 12, please. So the '710 Patent
`requires this recognition of the user input determining a command associated
`with the user input and this "if/otherwise" binary logic structure.
`
`And so from a claim construction and a legal point of view, it would
`be erroneous to ignore the "otherwise" limitation from the analysis as to
`whether this binary logic structure is present or taught in Martin.
`
`And, in fact, as a side note, the importance of the "otherwise"
`limitation was such that in the infringement proceedings in the ITC, that
`language was the focus of non-infringement. So it is clear that that is an
`essential part of the claim, and that the parties agree that this binary logic
`structure must be present, and both the "if" prongs and the "otherwise"
`prongs must be set -- must be met.
`
`JUDGE ZECHER: Okay. Well, I guess I'm just trying to get at the
`point here that this is an apparatus claim. And basically you're arguing it's
`distinguished from Martin by the functions performed by the processor. So
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`Case IPR2016-01603
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`although we did cite the Schulhauser here -- and I was reading over your
`Slide 10. It says, "still requires structure for performing the function should
`the condition occur." And Martin does have a processor. And as you said, it
`does perform multiple haptic effects for different functions. Now, you're
`essentially arguing that it's not capable of doing it in the manner that these
`"if/otherwise" conditions proposed in the claim, is what you're saying.
`
`MR. BIRNHOLZ: Martin does not teach the binary logic structure of
`the processor configuration that's required by Claim 1 and the dependent
`claims in the '710 --
`
`JUDGE ZECHER: So in essence you're saying that Martin
`distinguished -- or your claim is distinguishable from Martin by the
`functions it performs?
`
`MR. BIRNHOLZ: It's not so much the functions it performs as to the
`underlying programming architecture of the machine, this tactile feedback
`machine, that is disclosed in Martin, and as required by the '710 Patent.
`
`JUDGE ZECHER: Well, but the programming is not claimed here,
`it's the function. This is not a means-plus-function claim where we're
`looking for some sort of algorithm in the spec. We're just looking to see if
`Martin is capable of performing these functions in the "if/otherwise" clause,
`correct?
`
`MR. BIRNHOLZ: I think the analysis is whether Martin discloses or
`teaches the system containing a processor configured to perform the items
`that are set forth in the elements of Claim 1 and the dependent claims.
`
`So you need a processor with a certain logic structure. And the logic
`structure is that if the user input is recognized and the command is
`determined, a first haptic effect will be generated, otherwise the system will
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`Case IPR2016-01603
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`generate the second haptic effect.
`
`It is this binary logic structure. And it is an elegant solution to
`provide haptic confirmation. It's not, does the system make various
`decisions and provide haptic effects. That's not what the claim is discussing.
`It's discussing a haptic confirmation of commands by providing a first haptic
`effect if the user input is recognized and the command is determined,
`otherwise providing a second haptic effect that is different, that is
`distinguished from that first haptic effect, in order to provide that
`information to the user to enhance the functionality of the device.
`
`JUDGE ZECHER: Well, let me get at it a different way then. I think
`we're kind of talking past each other a bit.
`
`But if the "if" condition there is met, you never get to the "otherwise"
`condition, do you? I mean, you wouldn't have them performed
`simultaneously?
`
`MR. BIRNHOLZ: If a user input is recognized and the command is
`determined, the first haptic effect will be generated, that is correct.
`
`JUDGE ZECHER: And so you never get to "otherwise", correct?
`
`MR. BIRNHOLZ: You would have -- you would need to have the
`logic in order to provide an alternative second haptic effect if the user input
`is not recognized and the command is not determined.
`
`JUDGE ZECHER: Okay.
`
`MR. BIRNHOLZ: So it's not a matter of never getting there. It's a
`matter of what is the answer for the question that is being asked. And in the
`element immediately before the "if" and "otherwise", the processer is
`configured to receive the input and determine a command associated with
`the user input. That's the question that's being asked in this claim. And if
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`Case IPR2016-01603
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
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`the answer is one thing, the system is going to provide the first haptic effect.
`If the answer is different, it's going to provide the second haptic effect. And
`it's not going to ask multiple other questions that are going to undermine this
`binary logic structure.
`
`Both of the parties agree -- if I could have Slide 16 -- that both of the
`experts -- so this is Dr. Visell. He says that the claim must be construed that
`you have this -- "the broadest reasonable of the "if/otherwise" conditional
`portion of Claim 1 requires this ability to provide the first haptic effect if the
`user input is recognized and a command is determined, and a second haptic
`effect if the user input is not recognized or a command is not determined."
`
`Slide 17, please. This is not a matter tha

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