Paper No. __
`Filed: October 10, 2017
`
`Filed on behalf of: Google Inc.
`By: Naveen Modi (Google-IXI-IPR@paulhastings.com)
`Joseph E. Palys (Google-IXI-IPR@paulhastings.com)
`Daniel Zeilberger (Google-IXI-IPR@paulhastings.com)
`Arvind Jairam (Google-IXI-IPR@paulhastings.com)
`Paul Hastings LLP
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________________
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________________
`GOOGLE INC.1
`Petitioner
`v.
`IXI IP, LLC
`Patent Owner
`____________________
`Case IPR2016-01669
`Patent No. 7,552,124
`____________________
`PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF
`
`
`1 As per Paper No. 18, Google Inc. is now Google LLC.
`
`
`Filed: October 10, 2017
`
`Filed on behalf of: Google Inc.
`By: Naveen Modi (Google-IXI-IPR@paulhastings.com)
`Joseph E. Palys (Google-IXI-IPR@paulhastings.com)
`Daniel Zeilberger (Google-IXI-IPR@paulhastings.com)
`Arvind Jairam (Google-IXI-IPR@paulhastings.com)
`Paul Hastings LLP
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________________
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________________
`GOOGLE INC.1
`Petitioner
`v.
`IXI IP, LLC
`Patent Owner
`____________________
`Case IPR2016-01669
`Patent No. 7,552,124
`____________________
`PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF
`
`
`1 As per Paper No. 18, Google Inc. is now Google LLC.
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`
`B.
`
`2.
`3.
`
`I.
`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1
`CLAIMS 1-5 ARE UNPATENTABLE IN VIEW OF THE PRIOR
`ART. ............................................................................................................... 2
`A.
`Claims 1-5 Are Obvious in View of Maes and Preston. ..................... 2
`1. Maes Discloses “Parsing the High-Level Code for the
`Keywords” ................................................................................. 3
`2. Maes Discloses the Claimed “Implementation” Feature ........... 9
`Claims 1-5 Are Obvious in View of Pazandak, White, and
`Manson ............................................................................................... 12
`1.
`Pazandak Discloses the Claimed “Without Having to
`Select from Menu Items” Features .......................................... 12
`Pazandak Discloses the Claimed “Parsing” Features .............. 14
`Pazandak Discloses “Determining Whether High-Level
`Code Comprises Keywords Defining One or More
`Relationships and Conditions Corresponding to the
`Operative Language” ............................................................... 16
`4. White Discloses the “Implementation” Recitation .................. 17
`5.
`Patent Owner’s Arguments Regarding Lack of
`Motivation to Combine References Should Be Rejected ........ 19
`PATENT OWNER’S CONTENTION THAT EX.1002 IS
`ENTITLED TO LITTLE WEIGHT IS WITHOUT MERIT ....................... 20
`IV. PATENT OWNER’S CONSTITUTIONALITY ARGUMENT
`SHOULD BE REJECTED ........................................................................... 21
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 22
`
`III.
`
`V.
`
`i
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Apple Inc. v. Chestnut Hill Sound Inc.,
`IPR2016-00794, Paper No. 32 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2017) .................................. 21
`Bungie, Inc. v. Worlds Inc.,
`IPR2015-01321, Paper No. 42 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 28, 2016) .................................. 21
`Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
`355 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................................................ 8
`GSI Tech., Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp.,
`IPR2014-00202, Paper No. 44 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 9, 2015); ................................... 20
`LG Elecs. Inc. v. ATI Techs. ULC,
`IPR2015-00325, Paper No. 62 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 14, 2016) .................................. 20
`MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
`812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .......................................................................... 21
`MexiChem Amanco v. Honeywell Int’l,
`IPR2013-00576, Paper No. 36 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 5, 2014) ...................................... 2
`Nichia Corp. v. Emcore Corp.,
`IPR2012-00005, Paper No. 68 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2014) ..................................... 2
`SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC,
`825 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 4
`Square, Inc. v. Unwired Planet LLC,
`IPR2014-01165, Paper No. 32 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 30, 2015) ................................... 21
`Universal Remote Control, Inc. v. Universal Elecs., Inc.,
`IPR2014-01146, Paper No. 36 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 10, 2015) ................................ 7, 8
`Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc.,
`782 F.3d 671 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .............................................................................. 7
`
`ii
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`
`Federal Regulations
`37 C.F.R. § 42.24 ..................................................................................................... 23
`37 C.F.R. § 42.24(d) ................................................................................................ 23
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`
`LIST OF EXHIBITS
`
`Description
`
`Previously
`Submitted
`X
`X
`X
`X
`
`X
`X
`
`X
`X
`
`X
`X
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`X
`
`X
`
`
`
`Exhibit
`No.
`1001 U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`1002 Declaration of Dr. Jason Flinn, Ph.D.
`1003
`Prosecution History of U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`1004 Office Action dated July 27, 2010 in European
`Application No. 05 752 631.1 - 1243
`1005 U.S. Patent No. 7,003,463 (“Maes”)
`1006 U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2003/0046061
`(“Preston”)
`1007 U.S. Patent No. 7,027,975 (“Pazandak”)
`1008 U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2002/0072918
`(“White”)
`1009 U.S. Patent No. 7,085,708 (“Manson”)
`1010
`IXI’s Supplemental Claim Chart
`1011
`PCT Application Publication No. WO 02/12982 to
`Applicant Object Services and Consulting, Inc. (“Object”)
`1012 U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2003/0182132
`(“Niemoeller”)
`1013 U.S. Patent No. 7,693,720 to Kennewick (“Kennewick”)
`1014 Withdrawal dated January 12, 2011 in European
`Application No. 05 752 631.1 – 1243
`Request for Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. Patent No.
`7,552,124, Control No. 90/013,988, and Appendix M,
`Amended Claims Presented With Request
`1016 Garner, B., Garner’s Modern American Usage, Oxford
`University Press (2003)
`
`1015
`
`
`
`iv
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Petitioner Google Inc. (“Petitioner”) replies to the Patent Owner’s Response
`
`(Paper No. 12, “Response”) filed by Patent Owner IXI IP, LLC (“Patent Owner”)
`
`and the Board’s decision to institute inter partes review (Paper No. 9, “Institution
`
`Decision”) of U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124 (“the ’124 patent”).
`
`The ’124 patent is directed to “programming [of] a mobile communication
`
`device using a high-level natural language.” Ex.1001, 1:10-11; see also id., 8:59-
`
`61; Ex.1002, ¶15; see also Ex. 1002, ¶28. The ’124 patent describes converting
`
`high-level code into executable instructions using application software running in a
`
`distributed computing environment (Ex.1001, FIGS. 1-2, 3B; Ex.1002, ¶23), but
`
`the thin specification does not provide many details regarding several of the
`
`claimed features, as noted previously by the Board (see, e.g., Institution Decision,
`
`8, 19, 36). The prior art references upon which Petitioner relies, including Maes
`
`(Ex.1005), Preston (Ex.1006), Pazandak (Ex.1007), White (Ex.1008), and Manson
`
`(Ex.1009), in fact provide as much, if not more, disclosure regarding the claimed
`
`features. Petitioner’s reliance on this prior art was further supported by the
`
`unrebutted testimony of Dr. Jason Flinn (see generally Ex.1002), whom Patent
`
`Owner chose not to cross-examine.
`
`As submitted in the Petition, claims 1-5 of the ’124 patent should be found
`
`unpatentable.
`
`1
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`II. CLAIMS 1-5 ARE UNPATENTABLE IN VIEW OF THE PRIOR
`ART.
`This proceeding has been instituted on two grounds for claims 1-5: (1) Maes
`
`in view of Preston, and (2) Pazandak in view of White and Manson. Institution
`
`Decision, 40. Patent Owner raises attorney arguments, unsupported by any
`
`expert,2 that seek to challenge the prior art based on features not recited in the
`
`claims (or even in the specification) of the ’124 patent. As discussed below, Patent
`
`Owner is incorrect regarding each of its arguments.
`
`A. Claims 1-5 Are Obvious in View of Maes and Preston.
`Patent Owner does not focus on Preston in its Response, and instead
`
`presents two principal arguments regarding Maes—namely, that Petitioner
`
`allegedly fails to establish that Maes discloses the “parsing the high-level code for
`
`2 Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response (Paper No. 7, “Preliminary Response”)
`
`was accompanied by a declaration by Dr. Lin Chase (Ex. 2001) (“the Chase
`
`declaration”). Patent Owner does not cite to the Chase declaration in its Response
`
`and refused to produce Dr. Chase for cross-examination, as confirmed by Patent
`
`Owner during a conference call with the Board on August 21, 2017. Therefore, the
`
`Chase declaration is entitled to no weight. See Nichia Corp. v. Emcore Corp.,
`
`IPR2012-00005, Paper No. 68 at 63 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2014); MexiChem Amanco
`
`v. Honeywell Int’l, IPR2013-00576, Paper No. 36 at 3 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 5, 2014).
`
`2
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`the keywords” and “determining level of complexity and implementation of the
`
`high-level code” features of claim 1. Response, 10-22.3 As explained below,
`
`Patent Owner’s arguments are misplaced, as they are based on an incorrect reading
`
`of the claim language as applied to Maes.
`
`1. Maes Discloses “Parsing the High-Level Code for the
`Keywords”
`Maes discloses “parsing the high-level code for the keywords” as recited in
`
`claim 1. As Petitioner previously explained, Maes describes using a parser to
`
`recognize keywords in a user’s command. Ex.1005, 15:46-55; Ex.1002, ¶64; see
`
`also Pet., 17-21. For example, Maes discloses that a conversational engine at a
`
`local client device or at a server includes a natural language understanding (NLU)
`
`engine that parses high-level code. Ex.1005, 2:6-10, 4:24-29 (describing local
`
`conversational engine), 4:57-62 (describing server conversational engine), 8:34-35,
`
`11:23-33, 15:49-61 (disclosing “recogni[tion]/underst[anding]” of words in a
`
`user’s command), FIG. 2; Ex.1002, ¶64. Through the combination of local and
`
`server conversational engines, Maes’s system parses high-level code to recognize
`
`operative language in the user’s command associated with controlling operations
`
`3 Patent Owner also argues in the Maes-Preston section of its Response that
`
`Exhibit 1002 is entitled to little, if any weight (Response, 22-23), which is
`
`addressed below in Section III.
`
`3
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`of the client device (e.g., dialing a phone number). Ex.1005, 4:24-29, 4:57-62,
`
`15:49-61; Ex.1002, ¶64; see also Pet., 14-15, 18-21; Institution Decision, 13, 19-
`
`21.
`
`Patent Owner makes two main arguments regarding this limitation.
`
`Response, 10-16. First, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner allegedly reads out the
`
`phrase “for the keywords” from claim 1. Response, 14, 15. Second, Patent Owner
`
`argues that the claim language refers to a “known, distinct, and specific parsing
`
`technique” that Maes does not disclose. Id., 15, 16; see also id., 10-14. Patent
`
`Owner is mistaken both factually and legally.
`
`a.
`
`The Specification Supports the Board’s and
`Petitioner’s Analysis
`Patent Owner asserts that “Petitioner’s and the Board’s analysis improperly
`
`reads out a clear requirement of claim 1 (i.e., parsing ‘for the keywords’) and
`
`instead simply interprets the claim to require ‘parsing the high-level code . . . to
`
`recognize the operative language.’” Response, 14. Patent Owner is incorrect. In
`
`fact, the specification’s description of the claimed “parsing” feature is consistent
`
`with the Petitioner’s and Board’s analysis with respect to Maes.
`
`The Federal Circuit has emphasized the importance of the specification in
`
`understanding claim language. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825
`
`F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, the specification of the ’124 patent
`
`discloses that “each sentence comprises at least one operative language (i.e.
`
`4
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`keyword)” and that if the user inputs the sentence “Transfer call to voice mail if
`
`call is from Bob,” “[t]he operative language (i.e., keyword or instruction) in the
`
`sentence is ‘transfer’.” Ex.1001, 4:18-27. Thus, the specification equates
`
`“operative language” and “keyword” by linking those terms with “i.e.” in the
`
`specification. See Ex.1016, 421 (explaining that “i.e.” is an abbreviation for a
`
`Latin phrase meaning “that is”). As noted above, Maes discloses parsing for “dial”
`
`(the operative language, a keyword, in a user’s command) similar to the above
`
`disclosure in the ’124 patent regarding the keyword “transfer.” Ex.1005, 15:46-55;
`
`Ex.1001, 4:18-27; Ex.1002, ¶64; see also Pet., 17-21.
`
`Therefore, Patent Owner’s assertion that “[n]owhere does Petitioner allege,
`
`or the Institution Decision find, that ‘dial’ is identified by Maes’ conversational
`
`engine as a ‘keyword’” is incorrect. Response, 14; Pet., 17; Institution Decision,
`
`20. Maes not only discloses “parsing the high-level code for the keywords,” as
`
`claimed—it does so in the same way as described in the ’124 patent specification.
`
`b.
`
`Patent Owner’s Analysis Improperly Reads in
`Unsupported Features
`Not only is Patent Owner wrong that the Board’s analysis improperly reads
`
`out a claimed feature, it is Patent Owner’s analysis that improperly reads in
`
`features that are not supported by the intrinsic evidence for the ’124 patent. Patent
`
`Owner cites to White (Ex.1008), a Wikipedia article dated June 29, 2017
`
`(Ex.2002), and a patent filed in 2007 (Ex.2003), in an attempt to argue that
`
`5
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`“keyword spotting” is a specific type of parsing technique required by claim 1 that
`
`Maes does not disclose. Response, 11-13. But the claims, read in view of the
`
`specification, say nothing of a specific parsing technique, nor does Patent Owner
`
`adequately explain how these extrinsic references would limit the claims.
`
`Claim 1 broadly recites “parsing the high level code for the keywords.”
`
`Ex.1001, 9:1-4. It does not refer to any “keyword spotting” technique or include
`
`any negative limitations regarding how to account for non-keywords. Id., 8:59-
`
`9:38. The specification of the ’124 patent discloses that “application software
`
`1122 [parses] high-level code 150 for keywords in an attempt to recognize any
`
`operative language” and includes the example of “determin[ing] that ‘transfer’ . . .
`
`is the operative language.” Ex.1001, 5:36-43; see also id., 5:44-46 (“Application
`
`software 1122 is also [] implemented to parse high-level code for keywords in an
`
`attempt to recognize any data sources”), 5:53-56 (“Once application software 1122
`
`parses high-level code 150 for the particular keywords, then application software
`
`1122 determines the requested operation that is to be performed in accordance with
`
`the recognized keywords (S240).”). The specification does not disclose any details
`
`of any specific parsing technique that is performed to recognize operative
`
`language/keywords.
`
`Patent Owner argues, without expert support, that “a person of ordinary skill
`
`in the art would . . . understand that the claim language refers to a known, distinct,
`
`6
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`and specific parsing technique.” Response, 15-16 (emphasis added). However,
`
`Patent Owner does not clearly specify what this “distinct” and “specific” “keyword
`
`spotting” technique actually is. Id. The closest that Patent Owner comes to
`
`specifying this “specific keyword parsing technique” (id., 13) is to say that “[i]n
`
`such a technique, a parser attempts to identify one or more particular ‘keywords’
`
`within an input sequence” and “the claims require parsing for keywords. . . .” Id.,
`
`11, 16 (emphasis in original). But those statements merely echo the breadth of the
`
`claim language itself without providing any meaningful distinction.
`
`Nor do the extrinsic evidence references cited by Patent Owner justify
`
`introducing additional limitations to claim 1. As an initial matter, Exhibits 2002
`
`and 2003 are not contemporaneous with the ’124 patent, and so it is unclear how
`
`these references have any relevance. See Vasudevan Software, Inc. v.
`
`MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Moreover, while Patent
`
`Owner essentially acknowledges that the claimed “parsing” features are not
`
`innovative because they are disclosed by the White prior art reference identified by
`
`Petitioner (Ex. 1008) (Response at 11, 12), White and Exhibits 2002 and 2003 are
`
`extrinsic evidence, and thus less relevant than the specification of the ’124 patent
`
`on the meaning of the claimed “parsing . . . for the keywords” limitation. See
`
`Universal Remote Control, Inc. v. Universal Elecs., Inc., IPR2014-01146, Paper
`
`No. 36 at 11 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 10, 2015) (“The Federal Circuit cautions us that
`
`7
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`extrinsic evidence in general is less reliable than the patent and its prosecution
`
`history in determining how to read claim terms.”) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`
`415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)).
`
`As discussed above, Maes discloses using a parser to recognize keywords
`
`such as “dial” in a user’s natural language command in the same manner disclosed
`
`in the specification of the ’124 patent and the specification of the ’124 patent does
`
`not disclose any particular type of parsing for keywords. Supra Section II.A.1.a. It
`
`is improper to import a limitation from the specification into the claims (see, e.g.,
`
`Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2004)), and
`
`Patent Owner’s attempt to import limitations into claim 1 based on less reliable
`
`extrinsic evidence that is inconsistent with the specification is thus at least as
`
`improper (Universal Remote Control, IPR2014-01146, Paper No. 36 at 11).
`
`Moreover, Patent Owner’s arguments should be rejected given Patent Owner
`
`does not sufficiently explain how Maes would be differentiated by the “keyword
`
`spotting” concept that it attempts to inject into the claims. Response, 10-16. Even
`
`under Patent Owner’s vague characterization of this feature, Maes discloses
`
`“keyword spotting” given it describes using a parser to identify one or more
`
`particular “keywords” such as “dial” within an input sequence. Supra Section
`
`II.A.1.a.
`
`8
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`2. Maes Discloses the Claimed “Implementation” Feature
`Patent Owner argues that Petitioner allegedly does not address the
`
`“implementation” limitation and, relatedly, allegedly did not discuss in the Petition
`
`any distinction between “complexity” and “implementation” in the phrase
`
`“determining level of complexity and implementation of the high-level code” in
`
`claim 1. Response, 17, 18, 21.4 Patent Owner is incorrect.
`
`Petitioner addressed the “implementation” recitation in the Petition in the
`
`context of the larger phrase “determining level of complexity and implementation
`
`of the high-level code” and explained that Maes discloses using a combination of
`
`client device processing and server-side processing, and determining whether a
`
`command is for a simple local device operation. Ex.1010, 10; Ex.1002, ¶64; see
`
`also Pet., 31, 32. For example, Maes discloses that “a NLU/FSG system can be
`
`designed in accordance with the present invention . . . [such that a] request can be
`
`processed locally . . . [or by] forwarding to a remote server for recognition.”
`
`
`4 Patent Owner also suggests that because Petitioner did not move to submit
`
`supplemental information, “any new argument or reply evidence now advanced by
`
`Petitioner outside the scope of its original Petition would constitute an improper
`
`reply.” Response, 21. However, the arguments presented herein, which rebut
`
`Patent Owner’s arguments, are within the proper scope of a reply.
`
`9
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`Ex.1005, 16:42-47; Ex.1002, ¶64; see also Ex.1005, 4:36-44, 11:8-10. As
`
`Petitioner explained in the Petition, the phrase “determining level of complexity
`
`and implementation of the high-level code” was interpreted in a manner consistent
`
`with Patent Owner’s assertions in district court litigation that “this limitation deals
`
`with ‘us[ing] a combination of local device processing and internet-based . . .
`
`servers,’ and ‘determin[ing whether a] command is for a simple local device
`
`operation.’” Pet., 31 n.10 (citing Ex.1010, 10).
`
`In its Institution Decision, the Board explained that “‘implementation’ is
`
`considering whether application software is implemented on a mobile device, a
`
`network server, or both.” Institution Decision, 23 (citing Ex.1001, 4:67-5:4, 7:42-
`
`45). The Board also invited the parties to address the interpretation of
`
`“implementation.” Institution Decision, 24. Petitioner submits that the Board’s
`
`interpretation is consistent with Patent Owner’s own characterization of this
`
`feature during litigation. Ex.1010, 10; see also Pet., 31 n.10. In addition, as the
`
`Board observed, the analysis in the Petition regarding Maes is consistent with this
`
`understanding of “implementation.” Institution Decision, 23.
`
`Despite the Board’s invitation, Patent Owner declined to offer any
`
`explanation as to its interpretation of “implementation” in response to the
`
`Decision. Response, 16-22. Nor does Patent Owner offer any rebuttal to the
`
`Board’s rejection of Patent Owner’s interpretation in its Preliminary Response
`
`10
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`(Paper No. 12, “Preliminary Response”), where Patent Owner suggested that
`
`“implementation” be construed to mean “the impact of the location, functionality,
`
`and execution procedures of the application software that would be processing and
`
`compiling the high-level code into an executable code.” Preliminary Response, 21;
`
`Institution Decision, 22.
`
`Patent Owner states that “Petitioner’s citations to Maes and its associated
`
`arguments do not distinguish between the terms ‘complexity’ and
`
`‘implementation.’” Response, 17; see also id., 21. As discussed above, however,
`
`Petitioner demonstrated that Maes does satisfy the “implementation” recitation,
`
`and Patent Owner in fact does not dispute that Maes satisfies the “complexity”
`
`recitation. See, e.g., Preliminary Response, 22; see also Ex.1005, 3:1-5 (disclosing
`
`a processing technique that “allows a low resource client device to transparently
`
`perform simple tasks locally, as well as complex tasks in … connection with a
`
`server (or other device) having more complex conversational capabilities”), 16:42-
`
`47 (disclosing determining whether a user’s “request is more complex and natural,
`
`thereby requiring forwarding to a remote server for recognition”); Ex.1002, ¶64;
`
`Pet., 31-32. Thus, contrary to Patent Owner’s assertions, the Petition established
`
`that Maes discloses “determining level of complexity and implementation of the
`
`high-level code.”
`
`11
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`B. Claims 1-5 Are Obvious in View of Pazandak, White, and Manson
`Patent Owner presents five arguments relating to the Petition’s showings as
`
`to Pazandak, White, and Manson: (1) Petitioner allegedly did not establish that
`
`Pazandak discloses “parsing the high-level code for the keywords” (Response, 32-
`
`35), (2) Petitioner allegedly did not establish that Pazandak discloses “receiving a
`
`high-level code comprising one or more keywords, wherein the high-level code is
`
`provided by a user . . . without having to select from menu items” (id., 28-32), (3)
`
`Petitioner allegedly did not establish that Pazandak discloses “determining whether
`
`high-level code comprises keywords defining one or more relationships and
`
`conditions corresponding to the operative language” (id., 35, 36), (4) Petitioner
`
`allegedly did not establish that White discloses “determining level of complexity
`
`and implementation of the high-level code” (id., 36, 37), and (5) Petitioner
`
`allegedly did not establish that a person of ordinary skill would have been
`
`motivated to combine Pazandak, White, and Manson in the manner set forth in the
`
`Petition (id., 37-39). As explained below, Patent Owner’s arguments are incorrect
`
`and should be rejected.
`
`1.
`
`Pazandak Discloses the Claimed “Without Having to Select
`from Menu Items” Features
`Contrary to Patent Owner’s assertions (Response, 28), the Petition explained
`
`how Pazandak discloses the claimed “without having to select from menu items”
`
`features of claim 1. (Ex. 1001, 8:62-67; Pet., 48, 49.) Specifically, as set forth in
`
`12
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`the Petition, Pazandak discloses that “choice items which are valid at a given point
`
`during sentence construction can be . . . hidden (not displayed) if the user is
`
`experienced and recalls the valid choice items.” Ex.1007, 15:26-31; Ex.1002, ¶69;
`
`see also Pet., 49. Thus, when the choice items are not displayed, the user does not
`
`select from menu items—indeed, the user cannot do so, because they are hidden
`
`from the user. Ex.1002, ¶69; see also Pet., 49.
`
`Patent Owner argues that “where [Pazandak’s] choice items are not
`
`displayed, the user’s ability to provide input is nonetheless limited by the menu
`
`because the user can make a selection only if the user ‘recalls the valid choice
`
`items.’” Response, 31. But that argument is off base, because claim 1 does not
`
`include any limitations regarding a “menu” other than “without having to select
`
`from menu items . . . ,” which Pazandak discloses. Ex.1001, 8:65-67; Response,
`
`31; Ex.1007, 15:26-31; Ex.1002, ¶69; see also Pet., 49. Indeed, claim 1 does not
`
`require that after the user has provided the input, any particular processing related
`
`to what the user said must or must not occur based on a menu. Ex.1001, 8:59-9:38
`
`(claim 1).5
`
`
`5 The Response states that “the Institution Decision again attempts to cure the
`
`Petition’s deficiencies [by citing to column 15, lines 48-52 of Pazandak]”
`
`(Response, 30), but that portion of Pazandak’s disclosure is merely confirmatory
`
`
`
`13
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`2.
`Pazandak Discloses the Claimed “Parsing” Features
`Pazandak discloses using a parser to recognize keywords (e.g., “record” in
`
`the context of a VCR example) in a user’s command. Ex.1007, 34:59-66; Ex.1002,
`
`¶69; see also Pet., 51, 52. Based on recognition of the word “record,” which is
`
`achieved through the use of a parser, Pazandak’s system causes a program to be
`
`recorded. Ex.1007, 6:54-56 (“the parser . . . performs a parse of the query or
`
`command input”), 10:59-60 (“parser 310 . . . performs a parse of the query or
`
`command in a step 416”), 11:3-4 (“the entire query or command is parsed on
`
`receipt of a request therefore [sic] by the parser 310”), 17:53-56, 34:59-66,
`
`Abstract; Ex.1002, ¶¶50-54, 69.
`
`For the phrase “parsing the high-level code for the keywords” as applied to
`
`the Pazandak-White-Manson combination, Patent Owner refers to its “keyword
`
`spotting” argument presented at an earlier portion of the Response regarding the
`
`Maes-Preston combination. Response, 32. That argument as applied to the
`
`Pazandak-White-Manson combination is erroneous for similar reasons as
`
`Petitioner presented above regarding the Maes-Preston combination. See supra
`
`Section II.A.1. For example, Patent Owner again argues that Petitioner “reads out
`
`
`of Petitioner’s positions expressed in the Petition. In any event, Patent Owner has
`
`had a fair opportunity to respond to it.
`
`14
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`a clear requirement of claim 1.” Response, 34. But as explained above at Section
`
`II.A.1.a, the specification of the ’124 patent equates “keywords” to “operative
`
`language.” See supra Section II.A.1.a. Pazandak discloses parsing for “record”
`
`(the operative language, a keyword, in a user’s command), similar to the disclosure
`
`in the ’124 patent regarding the keyword “transfer,” and thus discloses the
`
`limitation “parsing . . . for the keywords.” Ex.1007, 34:59-66, 6:54-56, 10:59-60,
`
`17:53-56, 34:59-66, Abstract; Ex.1002, ¶¶50-54, 69; Ex.1001, 4:18-27.
`
`Additionally, similar to its argument regarding the Maes-Preston
`
`combination, Patent Owner does not clearly specify with regard to the Pazandak-
`
`White-Manson combination what the allegedly differentiating “keyword spotting”
`
`limitation is. Response, 32-33. The closest that Patent Owner comes to this is to
`
`say that it is a parsing technique “in which a parser selectively and individually
`
`identifies particular items in the input sequence (i.e., the keywords)” (Response,
`
`32) and that it is a “technique that seeks to identify individual keywords” (id., 33
`
`(emphasis in original)). As with its argument for the Maes-Preston combination,
`
`Patent Owner here appears to suggest that the claims require a negative limitation
`
`to a parser that avoids accounting for non-keywords by only identifying keywords.
`
`But again, claim 1 is broadly drafted and does not include any such negative
`
`limitations. See supra Section II.A.1.b.
`
`15
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`Patent Owner again argues that a person of ordinary skill “would understand
`
`that the claim language refers to a known, distinct, and specific parsing technique”
`
`(Response, 34), without clearly explaining what that technique is or how it
`
`differentiates Pazandak. Indeed, Pazandak’s disclosure of parsing to identify a
`
`keyword such as “record” in the VCR example meets Patent Owner’s own
`
`nebulous characterization of a “‘keyword spotting’ technique that seeks to identify
`
`individual keywords” (id., 33 (emphasis in original)), because “record” is an
`
`individual keyword that is identified. Ex.1007, 8:56-64, 34:59-66 (“Record
`
`program”), Abstract; Ex.1002, ¶69.
`
`3.
`
`Pazandak Discloses “Determining Whether High-Level
`Code Comprises Keywords Defining One or More
`Relationships and Conditions Corresponding to the
`Operative Language”
`Pazandak discloses various examples of determining whether high-level
`
`code comprises keywords defining one or more relationships or conditions. See,
`
`e.g., Ex.1007, 35:7-14, 38:26-30, 38:35-38; Ex.1002, ¶69. Various ones of those
`
`relationships/conditions correspond to operative language in the user’s command,
`
`because they pertain to situations in which the operative language should or should
`
`not be effectuated. See, e.g., Ex.1007, 35:7-14 (“if”), 38:26-30 (“unless”);
`
`Ex.1002, ¶69; see also Pet., 53.
`
`Patent Owner argues that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Pazandak
`
`discloses or suggests the above limitation because “a person of ordinary skill in the
`
`16
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124
`art would understand that Pazandak’s grammar-based parser does not determine
`
`whether the input comprises any keyword, let alone one that defines relationships
`
`and conditions corresponding to operative language.” Response, 35, 36 (emphasis
`
`in original). But that argument does not add anything substantive beyond what
`
`Patent Owner already presented regarding the “parsing the high-level code for the
`
`keywords” recitation of claim 1, which Petitioner addressed above in Section
`
`II.B.2.
`
`4. White Discloses the “Implementation” Recitation
`Although the Response refers to the larger phrase “determining level of
`
`complexity and implementation of the high-level code” in claim 1, Patent Owner
`
`again focuses on only the “implementation” feature without challenging
`
`Petitioner’s arguments regarding the “complexity” feature, similar to Patent
`
`Owner’s arguments regarding the Maes-Preston ground. Response, 36, 37.
`
`White discloses determining the implementation of the high level code under
`
`the interpretation of the “implementation” term set forth in the Petition, which is
`
`consistent with the Board’s interpretation of this limitation and with Patent
`
`Owner’s assertions in district court litigation. Ex.1010, 10; Pet., 31 n.10. For
`
`example, White discloses using a combination of local device processing and
`
`remote servers to implement conditional execution of speech r
Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.
After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.
Accept $ Charge
Still Working On It
This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.
Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.
A few More Minutes ... Still Working
It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.
Thank you for your continued patience.
This document could not be displayed.
We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
Set your membership
status to view this document.
With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll
get a whole lot more, including:
- Up-to-date information for this case.
- Email alerts whenever there is an update.
- Full text search for other cases.
- Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.
One Moment Please
The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.
Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.
Your document is on its way!
If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.
Sealed Document
We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.
If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.
Access Government Site
