throbber

`
` Paper 7
`Entered: January 31, 2017
`
`
`
`Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`JOHN CRANE, INC.,
`JOHN CRANE PRODUCTION SOLUTIONS, INC. &
`JOHN CRANE GROUP CORP.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`FINALROD IP, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2016-01786
`Patent 9,045,951 B2
`____________
`
`Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, LYNNE E. PETTIGREW, and
`AMANDA F. WIEKER, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`WIEKER, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`

`

`Case IPR2016-01786
`Patent 9,045,951 B2
`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`John Crane, Inc., John Crane Production Solutions, Inc., and John
`Crane Group Corp. (collectively, “Petitioner”) filed a Petition requesting an
`inter partes review of claims 4, 6–8, 14, 15, 17, 21, 22, 35, 47, 50, 52, 57,
`59, and 65–68 of U.S. Patent No. 9,045,951 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’951
`patent”). Paper 2 (“Pet.”). In response, Patent Owner, Finalrod IP, LLC,
`filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). We have
`jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes
`review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the
`petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner
`would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the
`petition.”
`For the reasons set forth below, we deny institution of an inter partes
`review of the ’951 patent.
`
`A. Related Matter
`According to the parties, the ’951 patent is involved in the following
`lawsuit: Finalrod IP, LLC v. John Crane, Inc., et al., Case No. 7-15-cv-
`00097 (W.D. Tex. 2015). Pet. 1; Paper 5, 2. The ’951 patent is also the
`subject of PTAB proceeding IPR2016-01827. Pet. 1; Paper 5, 3.
`The ’951 patent claims benefit to issued U.S. Patent No. 8,851,162
`B2, which was the subject of PTAB proceeding IPR2016-00521
`(terminated). Pet. 1 (misstating proceeding number); Paper 5, 2–3.
`B. The ’951 Patent
`The ’951 patent relates to end fitting connectors for oil well sucker
`rods. Ex. 1001, 1:15–20. Specifically, the ’951 patent discloses that
`fiberglass sucker rods may be connected together with end fittings to form a
`
`2
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2016-01786
`Patent 9,045,951 B2
`
`string that connects a down hole pump to an above-ground pump drive,
`which is used to extract oil from a well. Id. at 1:15–20, 25:7–35, Fig. 12.
`Figure 1 of the ’951 patent is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 1 depicts a cross-sectional view of a rod and associated end
`fitting. Id. at 6:4–6. End fitting 10 includes open end 16, for receiving
`sucker rod 32, and closed end 18. Id. at 6:66–7:2. The interior surface of
`the end fitting includes wedge system 13, having outer 20, intermediate 22,
`and inner 24 wedges. Id. at 7:5–7. Each wedge includes a leading edge
`
`3
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2016-01786
`Patent 9,045,951 B2
`
`(26A, 26B, 26C), a trailing edge (28A, 28B, 28C), and an angle between
`those edges (30A, 30B, 30C). Id. at 7:13–24.
`A securing material such as resin is provided between rod 32 and
`fitting 10, wherein the resin cures and forms wedge sections 29A, 29B, 29C
`that protrude from the rod and fixedly secure the rod in the fitting. Id. at
`7:7–12, 7:28–35. The ’951 patent explains that contact between the
`protruding wedges of resin and the leading or trailing edges of the fitting
`distributes tensile and axial compressive forces at each of the wedge
`portions. Id. at 7:43–54. Further,
`[t]he amount of each compressive force applied to each
`respective wedge portion can vary depending on the length of
`the leading edge, or trailing edge against which the protruding
`wedge of cured epoxy/resin material is urged by the axial force
`from reciprocation of the sucker rod string. The size of the
`angles influences the angle at which each of the edges extends
`relative to the corresponding protruding wedge of resin material
`and therefore also influences the force applied to each wedge
`portion.
`Id. at 7:54–64 (reference numerals omitted). The ’951 patent further
`explains that the lengths of the leading edges, trailing edges, and/or the size
`of the angles can be arranged to create a desired force distribution profile
`along the length of the end fitting, including to provide a profile in which
`compressive load at the outer wedge portion exceeds that at the inner wedge
`portion. Id. at 3:21–51.
`
`C. Illustrative Claim
`Challenged claims 4, 7, 14, and 21 are independent claims. Ex. 1001,
`27:5–52, 27:57–28:39, 28:62–29:27, 29:44–30:28. Challenged claims 6 and
`65 depend directly from claim 4. Id. at 27:55–56, 34:12–22. Challenged
`claims 8 and 66 depend directly from claim 7. Id. at 28:40–42, 34:23–33.
`
`4
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2016-01786
`Patent 9,045,951 B2
`
`Challenged claims 15, 17, and 67 depend directly or indirectly from claim
`14. Id. at 29:28–32, 29:35–36, 34:34–44. Challenged claims 22, 35, 50, 52,
`57, 59, and 68 depend directly from claim 21. Id. at 30:29–31, 31:7–9,
`31:59–61, 31:65–67, 32:12–14, 32:18–20, 34:45–55.
`Claim 4, reproduced below, is illustrative:
`
`4.
`An end fitting for a sucker rod, the end fitting
`comprising:
`a body having an interior, a closed end, an open end, and
`a wedge system formed in the interior, wherein the wedge
`system comprises:
`an outer wedge portion formed in the interior
`proximate to the open end, wherein the outer wedge
`portion comprises a first leading edge, a first trailing
`edge, and a first angle between the first leading edge and
`the first trailing edge, wherein the first leading edge faces
`the open end and the first trailing edge faces the closed
`end, and wherein the length of the first leading edge, the
`length of the first trailing edge, and the size of the first
`angle define a first distribution of force in the outer
`wedge portion;
`an intermediate wedge portion formed in the
`interior between the outer wedge portion and the closed
`end, wherein the intermediate wedge portion comprises a
`second leading edge, a second trailing edge, and a second
`angle between the second leading edge and the second
`trailing edge, wherein the second leading edge faces the
`open end and the second trailing edge faces the closed
`end, and wherein the length of the second leading edge,
`the length of the second trailing edge, and the size of the
`second angle define a second distribution of force in the
`intermediate wedge portion; and
`an inner wedge portion formed in the interior
`between the intermediate wedge portion and the closed
`end, proximate to the closed end, wherein the inner
`wedge portion comprises a third leading edge, a third
`
`5
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2016-01786
`Patent 9,045,951 B2
`
`
`trailing edge, and a third angle first angle between the
`third leading edge and the second third edge, wherein the
`third leading edge faces the open end and the third
`trailing edge faces the closed end, and wherein the length
`of the third leading edge, the length of the third trailing
`edge, and the size of the third angle define a third
`distribution of force in the inner wedge portion,
`wherein at least two of the first angle, the second
`angle, and the third angle differ in size such that during
`use a compressive load applied to the sucker rod at the
`inner wedge portion is greater than a compressive load
`applied to the sucker rod at the outer wedge portion, such
`that compressive forces applied to the sucker rod at the
`closed end of the body exceed compressive forces at the
`open end of the body, and
`wherein the second angle is equal to one of the
`first angle or the third angle.
`Ex. 1001, 27:5–52; see also Pet. 12–18.
`D. Prior Art Relied Upon
`Petitioner relies upon the following prior art references. Pet. 3.
`
`Rutledge ’431
`U.S. 6,193,431 B1
`Feb. 27, 2001
`(Ex. 1003)
`Iwasaki
`
`U.S. 4,822,201
`
`Apr. 18, 1989
`(Ex. 1007)
`McKay
`
`U.S. 4,401,396
`
`Aug. 30, 1983
`(Ex. 1012)
`Anderson
`
`U.S. 4,653,953
`
`Mar. 31, 1987
`(Ex. 1018)
`
`
`E. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`Petitioner asserts the following grounds of unpatentability. Pet. 3.
`References
`Basis
`Challenged Claims
`Rutledge ’431, Iwasaki, and
`§ 103(a)
`4, 6–8, 14, 15, 17, 21, 22, 35,
`McKay
`47, 52, 65–68
`Rutledge ’431, Iwasaki,
`50, 57, 59
`McKay, and Anderson
`
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`6
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2016-01786
`Patent 9,045,951 B2
`
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`A. Claim Interpretation
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are given
`their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the
`patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Cuozzo Speed Techs.,
`LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016). Under that standard, claim
`terms are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as would be
`understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire
`disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
`2007).
`Petitioner proposes constructions for the phrases “define a
`[first/second/third] distribution of force” and “such that.” Pet. 20–25.
`Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner’s constructions and proposes its own.
`Prelim. Resp. 18–22.
`On the record before us, we need not construe explicitly these phrases
`in reaching our Decision. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc.,
`200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
`B. Asserted Ground of Obviousness
`over Rutledge ’431, Iwasaki, and McKay
`Petitioner contends that claims 4, 6–8, 14, 15, 17, 21, 22, 35, 47, 52,
`65–68 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Rutledge
`’431, Iwasaki, and McKay. Pet. 25. To support this contention, Petitioner
`explains how it believes the references disclose or suggest each claim
`limitation, and why one skilled in the art would have found it obvious to
`combine the references. Id. at 25–50. Petitioner also relies upon the
`Declaration of Gary R. Wooley (Ex. 1010, the “Wooley Declaration”) in
`support. Id. Patent Owner counters that Petitioner fails to satisfy its burden
`7
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2016-01786
`Patent 9,045,951 B2
`
`of presenting a proper case of obviousness in accordance with Graham v.
`John Deere1 and, further, that the cited prior art fails to disclose or suggest
`all claim limitations. Prelim. Resp. 22–52.
`We have reviewed the parties’ contentions and supporting evidence.
`Given the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in
`the Petition fails to establish a reasonable likelihood that challenged claims
`4, 6–8, 14, 15, 17, 21, 22, 35, 47, 52, 65–68 are unpatentable under 35
`U.S.C. § 103(a) over Rutledge ’431, Iwasaki, and McKay. We begin our
`analysis with the principles of law that generally apply to a ground based on
`obviousness, followed by a brief summary of the asserted prior art, and then
`we address the parties’ contentions.
`1.
`Principles of Law
`A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that
`the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
`(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3)
`the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of
`nonobviousness. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. We analyze this ground
`based on obviousness in accordance with the above-stated principles.
`
`8
`
`
`1 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2016-01786
`Patent 9,045,951 B2
`
`2. Overview of Rutledge ’431 (Ex. 1003)
`Rutledge ’431 discloses a connector for connecting together fiberglass
`sucker rods. Ex. 1003, Abstract. Figure 25 is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 25 presents a cross-sectional view of a sucker rod and
`connector. Id. at 7:39–40, 44–46. As shown, connector 10 includes axial
`receptacle 12 for receiving sucker rod 14, wherein the receptacle includes a
`plurality of wedge-shaped annuluses 24, 26. Id. at 7:48–55.
`3. Overview of Iwasaki (Ex. 1007)
`Iwasaki discloses a coupling pin for connecting together sucker rods.
`Ex. 1007, 1:17–21, 2:14. Figure 1 is reproduced below.
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2016-01786
`Patent 9,045,951 B2
`
`
`Figure 1 presents a sectional view of coupling pin 12 with sucker rod
`10 inserted into the pin. Id. at 2:31–33, 2:51–53. As shown, coupling pin 12
`includes hole 14 with an inner wall having annular depressions 26, 28, 30.
`Id. at 2:49–54.
`4.
`Overview of McKay (Ex. 1012)
`McKay discloses a fitting for connecting together fiberglass sucker
`rods. Ex. 1012, Abstract. Figure 2 is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 2 presents a sectional view of a sucker rod and fitting. Id. at
`2:36–42. As shown, fitting 12 includes opening 15 for receiving sucker rod
`10, wherein the opening includes tapered pockets 23A, 23B, 23C, 23D. Id.
`at 2:49–64.
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2016-01786
`Patent 9,045,951 B2
`
`5. Discussion
`The Petition contends that the challenged claims would have been
`obvious over Rutledge ’431, Iwasaki, and McKay, and concludes that “[it]
`would have been obvious to a POSITA to employ the Rutledge ’431 Patent’s
`teachings with the teachings of Iwasaki and McKay given that each
`reference describes a potential means for addressing sucker rod fatigue by
`reducing stress concentrations within the wedge system.” Pet. 25–27.
`We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions and, for the reasons that
`follow, are not satisfied that the Petition provides adequate explanation or is
`appropriately precise and specific in articulating the basis of the proposed
`ground to warrant institution of an inter partes review. See, e.g., Prelim.
`Resp. 22–28.
`The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`factual determinations set forth in Graham v. John Deere. Namely, the
`“scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between
`the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of
`ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the
`obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined.”
`Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18; see supra Section II(B)(1). In this case, the
`Petition fails to identify sufficiently or precisely the differences between the
`prior art and claims, and fails even to identify the specific prior art teachings
`upon which Petitioner relies, preventing proper evaluation of this asserted
`ground of unpatentability.
`
`11
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2016-01786
`Patent 9,045,951 B2
`
`
`For example, in treating the first three limitations of the independent
`claims (termed X.1, X.2, and X.3 in the Petition),2 the Petition contends that
`each of “[t]he Rutledge ’431, Iwasaki, and McKay patents teach end
`fittings” as claimed. Pet. 27–28. From this contention, it is unclear which
`reference Petitioner relies upon to teach these limitations, or whether
`Petitioner relies upon an unarticulated combination of the references.
`Petitioner does not explain why it cites all three references, and does not
`explain if the references’ teachings are equivalent, duplicative, or meant to
`address a feature missing in another reference. See also id. at 28–30
`(similarly treating limitations X.4a–c, X.5a–c, X.6a–c).
`With respect to the limitations of the independent claims drawn to
`wedge characteristics that “define a [first/second/third] distribution of force”
`(termed X.4d, X.5d, X.6d), the Petition again presents imprecise
`contentions. First, the Petition contends, “[t]hese limitations are obvious.”
`Id. at 30 (emphasis added). The Petition then states, however, that each of
`“the Rutledge ’431, Iwasaki, and McKay patents disclose that the shape of a
`wedge . . . necessarily ‘defines’ or impacts a distribution of force by
`contributing to the distribution of forces acting on that wedge. Accordingly,
`a POSITA would find that the Rutledge ’431, Iwasaki, and McKay patents
`disclose these limitations.” Id. at 31–33 (emphases added, citations
`omitted). On this record, it is unclear whether Petitioner contends that these
`limitations would have been obvious (id. at 30) or are disclosed inherently
`by the prior art (id. at 33), and by which references—Rutledge ’431,
`Iwasaki, McKay, or an unarticulated combination of the references.
`
`
`2 See Pet. 13–18 (charting independent claims 4, 7, 14, and 21 and assigning
`designators, e.g., “X.1,” to each claim limitation).
`12
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2016-01786
`Patent 9,045,951 B2
`
`
`Finally, with respect to the limitations of the independent claims
`drawn to compressive loads applied to different wedges of the wedge system
`(termed X.7b, X.8), the Petition again presents imprecise contentions. First,
`the Petition contends, “these limitations are obvious.” Id. at 38 (emphasis
`added). The Petition then states, however, that each of “the Rutledge ’431,
`Iwasaki, and McKay [patents] disclose wedge systems” as claimed because,
`“[d]ue to the interior wedge’s proximity to the closed end . . . [it] naturally
`receives a greater amount of compressive forces,” such that “a POSITA
`would have found the natural result of the Rutledge ’431, Iwasaki, and
`McKay patents’ end fitting designs to satisfy the claims’ requirement.” Id.
`at 38–40 (emphases added, citations omitted). Finally, the Petition states
`that “[a] POSITA would have found it obvious that the wedge systems
`disclosed by the Iwasaki, McKay, and the Rutledge ’431 patents . . . results
`in greater compressive forces being applied to the interior wedges proximate
`the closed end of the end fitting.” Id. at 40. Again, on this record, it is
`unclear whether Petitioner contends that these limitations would have been
`obvious (id. at 38, 40) or are disclosed inherently by the prior art (id. at 38–
`40), and by which references—Rutledge ’431, Iwasaki, McKay, or an
`unarticulated combination of the references.
`On this record, it is impossible to decipher what Petitioner asserts to
`be its alleged combination because Petitioner fails to identify adequately the
`specific teachings of the references upon which Petitioner relies. See Prelim.
`Resp. 23, 27. Merely identifying where limitations may be found in several
`prior art references is not sufficient to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of
`success in showing the obviousness of the claims, without articulating how
`and why specific teachings of the references would have been combined. It
`
`13
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2016-01786
`Patent 9,045,951 B2
`
`is Petitioner’s responsibility “to explain specific evidence that support[s] its
`arguments, not the Board’s responsibility to search the record and piece
`together what may support Petitioner’s arguments.” Dominion Dealer
`Solutions, LLC v. Autoalert, Inc., Case IPR2013-00225, slip op. at 4 (PTAB
`Oct. 10, 2013) (Paper 15). Further, the lack of clarity in Petitioner’s
`presentation deprives Patent Owner of an appropriate opportunity to respond
`to the Petition, and does not lend itself to informed evaluation by the panel.
`See Prelim. Resp. 23.
`Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review on this ground.
`C. Asserted Ground of Obviousness
`over Rutledge ’431, Iwasaki, McKay, and Anderson
`Petitioner contends that dependent claims 50, 57, and 59 are
`unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Rutledge ’431,
`Iwasaki, McKay, and Anderson. Pet. 50–57. Petitioner’s reliance on
`Anderson to render obvious the limitations of dependent claims 50, 57, and
`59 does not cure the deficiencies noted above with respect to independent
`claim 21, from which these claims depend. Pet. 50–57. Therefore, for the
`same reasons discussed above, we determine that the information presented
`in the Petition fails to establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would
`prevail in showing that dependent claims 50, 57, and 59 are unpatentable
`over Rutledge ’431, Iwasaki, McKay, and Anderson.
`III. CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there is not a reasonable
`
`likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing that claims 4, 6–8, 14,
`15, 17, 21, 22, 35, 47, 50, 52, 57, 59, and 65–68 of the ’951 patent are
`unpatentable.
`
`14
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2016-01786
`Patent 9,045,951 B2
`
`
`IV. ORDER
`Upon consideration of the record before us, it is:
`ORDERED that the Petition is denied as to all challenged claims, and
`no trial is instituted.
`
`15
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2016-01786
`Patent 9,045,951 B2
`
`PETITIONER:
`
`Dion M. Bregman
`Jason C. White
`Ryan B. McBeth
`Nicholas A. Restauri
`Nicholaus E. Floyd
`MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
`dion.bregman@morganlewis.com
`jason.white@morganlewis.com
`ryan.mcbeth@morganlewis.com
`nicholas.restauri@morganlewis.com
`nicholaus.floyd@morganlewis.com
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`John D. Holman
`Josh Shamburger
`MATTHEWS, LAWSON, MCCUTCHEON & JOSEPH, PLLC
`jholman@matthewsfirm.com
`jshamburger@matthewsfirm.com
`
`
`16
`
`
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket