throbber
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`___________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`___________
`
`CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY, CAMPBELL SALES COMPANY,
`AND TRINITY MANUFACTURING, LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`GAMON PLUS, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`_________
`
`Case IPR2017-00091 (Patent D621,645 S)
`Case IPR2017-00094 (Patent D612,646 S)
`___________
`
`
`
`
`Before GRACE KARAFFA OBERMANN, BART A. GERSTENBLITH,
`and ROBERT L. KINDER, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00091 (Patent D621,645 S)
`Case IPR2017-00094 (Patent D612,646 S)
`
`
`
`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`
`
`TRACY ZURZOLO QUINN, ESQUIRE
`Reed Smith LLP
`Three Logan Square
`1717 Arch Street, Suite 3100
`Philadelphia, PA 19103
`
`GERARD M. DONOVAN, ESQUIRE
`Reed Smith LLP
`1301 K Street
`Suite 1000-East Tower
`Washington, DC 20005
`
`
`ON BEHALF OF PATENT OWNER:
`
`
`ANDREW L. TIAJOLOFF, ESQUIRE
`Tiajoloff & Kelly LLP
`Chrysler Building, 37th Floor
`405 Lexington Avenue
`New York, NY 10174
`
`and
`
`Darren Mogil, Esquire (Trinity)
`Kelly Grady, Esquire (Campbell)
`
`
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing Tuesday, January 23,
`
`2018, commencing at 10:41 a.m., at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
`600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00091 (Patent D621,645 S)
`Case IPR2017-00094 (Patent D612,646 S)
`
`
`P R O C E E D I N G S
`- - - - -
`JUDGE GERSTENBLITH: Good morning, everyone. We are
`
`
`here for a hearing in IPR2017-00091 and IPR2017-00094, Campbell Soup
`Company, Campbell Sales Company and Trinity Manufacturing v. Gamon
`Plus, Inc.
`I'm Judge Gerstenblith, to my right is Judge Obermann, to my
`
`
`left is Judge Kinder.
`
`
`Starting with Petitioner, will you please come up to the podium
`and enter your appearance for the record.
`
`
`MR. DONOVAN: This is Gerard Donovan and with me today
`is Tracy Quinn for the Campbell Petitioners. Also with us today is Darren
`Mogil for the Trinity Petitioner and a representative from our client,
`Campbell, Kelly Grady.
`
`
`JUDGE GERSTENBLITH: Thank you. And I would just
`confirm that either everyone here is under the protective order or it's not an
`issue for those here.
`
`
`MR. DONOVAN: That's correct, Your Honor. And Mrs.
`Quinn will be presenting arguments.
`
`
`JUDGE GERSTENBLITH: Thank you.
`
`
`MR. TIAJOLOFF: Good morning, Your Honor. My name is
`Drew Tiajoloff, I am here for Gamon Plus, the Patent Owner in this case,
`nobody else is present.
`
`
`JUDGE GERSTENBLITH: Thank you. If either side brought
`a copy, has a copy of its demonstratives, feel free to hand that to the court
`reporter and to us. We also have the electronic version.
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00091 (Patent D621,645 S)
`Case IPR2017-00094 (Patent D612,646 S)
`
`(Pause.)
`
`
`JUDGE GERSTENBLITH: Thank you.
`
`
`Before we begin, let me just confirm that we have three pending
`
`
`motions. We have Petitioner's motion to exclude, Patent Owner's motion to
`exclude, and Petitioner's motion to seal. Am I missing anything from
`Petitioner?
`MS. QUINN: I don't believe so, Your Honor.
`
`
`JUDGE GERSTENBLITH: Thank you.
`
`
`Am I missing anything from Patent Owner?
`
`
`MR. TIAJOLOFF: No, Your Honor.
`
`
`JUDGE GERSTENBLITH: Thank you. We set forth the
`
`
`procedure for today's hearing in our trial order, which is Paper 62 in each
`case. Each party will have 40 minutes of total argument time.
`
`
`We will begin with Petitioner, who will start with its case in
`chief and may also address either of its motions. Petitioner may reserve time
`for rebuttal. And after Petitioner presents its opening arguments, it will be
`Patent Owner's turn to respond to those arguments and raise any argument
`that it wishes on its motion to exclude. At that time, Petitioner may use its
`rebuttal time to respond to arguments raised by Patent Owner directed to
`Petitioner's case in chief, and also respond to any arguments that Patent
`Owner raises on its motion to exclude.
`
`
`Now, Patent Owner has an opportunity to reserve time as well.
`If Patent Owner chooses to reserve time, that time may only be used to
`respond to arguments raised by Petitioner during its rebuttal time directed to
`Patent Owner's motion to exclude. This is a little bit, I don't want to say
`tricky, but essentially if Petitioner -- if Patent Owner discusses its motion to
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00091 (Patent D621,645 S)
`Case IPR2017-00094 (Patent D612,646 S)
`
`exclude when it's first at the podium and Petitioner responds to that motion,
`then Patent Owner will have an opportunity to respond. So -- however, if
`the Petitioner does not respond to Patent Owner's motion to exclude, then
`Patent Owner only has the one opportunity to present argument.
`
`
`Does anybody have any questions about that process, from
`Petitioner?
`MS. QUINN: No, Your Honor.
`
`
`JUDGE GERSTENBLITH: From Patent Owner?
`
`
`MR. TIAJOLOFF: No, Your Honor.
`
`
`JUDGE GERSTENBLITH: Okay. I have a timer here, I can
`
`
`set it for any time you wish to give you a reminder. When you come up to
`the podium, just let me know. And, Ms. Quinn, whenever you're ready, you
`may proceed.
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Thank you, Your Honor.
`
`
`I may be going without the demonstratives, as --
`
`
`(Pause.)
`
`
`JUDGE GERSTENBLITH: We have them here also --
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Yes.
`
`
`JUDGE GERSTENBLITH: -- if you have -- do you still have a
`paper copy?
`MS. QUINN: I do, Your Honor. So it probably makes sense
`
`
`(indiscernible) thank you, Your Honor. I'd like to reserve ten minutes for
`rebuttal.
`JUDGE GERSTENBLITH: Okay.
`
`
`MS. QUINN: We are happy to rest on our papers on the
`
`
`motion to exclude. I don't know if the panel wants to hear our issues related
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00091 (Patent D621,645 S)
`Case IPR2017-00094 (Patent D612,646 S)
`
`to the motion to seal at this time.
`
`
`JUDGE GERSTENBLITH: Whatever you prefer, but we
`understand Petitioner’s position.
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. In that case, I'll
`move ahead.
`
`
`So we are dealing here with two design patents, U.S. Patent
`Nos. D621,645 and 612,646. The sole figure from each of those patents is
`shown on page 2 of our demonstrative exhibit, Exhibit 1023. And as the
`panel will see, the 645 patent is titled, "A Gravity Feed Dispenser Display,"
`claim -- its sole claim recites, "The ornamental design for a gravity feed
`dispenser display as shown and described." And the 646 patent similarly is
`titled, "A Gravity Feed Dispenser Display," and recites, "The ornamental
`design for a gravity feed dispenser display as shown and described."
`
`
`There's a sole figure in each patent and, as the panel can see on
`page 2 of Exhibit 1023, each figure is drawn in a combination of broken and
`solid lines, the bulk of the drawings being in broken lines.
`
`
`Each patent has a clear disclaimer on it. On page 3 of Exhibit
`1023 is the disclaimer in the 645 patent, which states that "the broken line
`showing is for the purpose of illustrating portions of the gravity feed
`dispenser display and forms no part of the claimed design." And on page 4
`of Exhibit 1023 is the disclaimer from the 646 patent that "the broken line
`disclosure in the views is understood to represent the article in which the
`claimed design is embodied."
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: Let me ask a question real quick.
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Of course, sure.
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: Why do you call it a disclaimer? Is that
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00091 (Patent D621,645 S)
`Case IPR2017-00094 (Patent D612,646 S)
`
`language used? And that's kind of getting to a lot of the Patent Owner's
`objections, which you seem to have shifted from saying here's what the
`claim's scope is to saying, well, certain things are disclaimed.
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Okay. I think that it's --
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: Do we need that language? Why do we
`need to say it's disclaimed?
`
`
`MS. QUINN: I don't think we need -- I'm happy to use
`different language, Your Honor. That language to me was sort of a
`descriptor of what the broken line disclosure is, but I think we can just as
`easily say that the -- each patent makes clear that the only thing that is
`claimed is that which is shown in solid lines. So if that helps resolve that
`concern, I'm happy to speak to it that way instead.
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: It seems like, you know, Patent Owner did
`raise a point that you're making kind of a disclaimer argument, which in kind
`of a prosecution history context disclaimer has a certain --
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Sure.
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: -- meaning in the art. I don't see it that way.
`I think the description lays out specifically what is and what is not claimed.
`There's a little bit of difference in the descriptions, as you're probably aware.
`In the 94 case, the description actually goes into a little bit more detail about
`the boundaries and I think that's the issue -- one of the issues the Patent
`Owner has is that you're kind of changing your tune, so to speak, on how the
`boundaries are claimed.
`
`
`MS. QUINN: And to be honest, Your Honor, I really hadn't
`intended to do that. What we really are focusing on is claim scope. So I'm
`happy to talk about what's claimed, because the only thing that's claimed is
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00091 (Patent D621,645 S)
`Case IPR2017-00094 (Patent D612,646 S)
`
`what's shown in solid lines. And so if that resolves that issue, I'm more than
`happy to use that language going forward and to make clear we weren't
`arguing substantively anything different than that.
`
`
`Focusing on what actually is claimed, if you look at slides 5 and
`6. So in slide 5, you see -- these are drawings, images taken from the
`institution decision where the claimed elements are highlighted in blue for
`the 645 and 646 patents. And then if you look at page 6, these are images
`from our reply, which, again, just to really focus the panel's attention on
`what is claimed, those images show the figures from 645 and 646 patents
`with the broken line portions of the drawings removed.
`
`
`So the issue here really I think for the Board when you're
`looking at these is, is the claim scope really -- is the claim scope going to be
`construed to mean what the patentee said in the patent, that they're claiming
`what's shown in solid lines, which is what appears on page 6, because if the
`answer to that is yes, I think that the walking through of the prior art is a
`pretty straightforward exercise, because what's claimed really is not
`particularly unique, novel or ornamental. But if the answer is going to be
`no, that the claim scope somehow exceeds what's shown on page 6, then
`we're going to have to talk about where you're going to -- where to draw that
`line, so to speak. Not to play with words too much, but if the claimed -- if
`the claim scope is going to be more than what's shown in solid lines, where
`are you going to draw those boundaries and where is the public being put on
`notice of where those boundaries should be drawn if it's not what the Patent
`Owner specifically said in its patents.
`
`
`As we'll note, there obviously is a difference between what
`Petitioners say should be deemed to be the claim scope and what Patent
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00091 (Patent D621,645 S)
`Case IPR2017-00094 (Patent D612,646 S)
`
`Owner argues about, but as you'll see as we go through this, to a large extent
`it's almost a moot point, because even accepting for the sake of the argument
`Patent Owner's description of its claim scope, the prior art still reads -- is
`almost perfectly aligned with it.
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: Let me ask one question --
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Sure.
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: -- about what you just said. The scope of
`the claim clearly is what is not in broken lines, but broken lines are used in
`the design patent context to place the claim scope into context.
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Uh-huh.
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: Here you're kind of cherry-picking, if you
`will, just the non-broken lines out and I don't know if that's necessarily
`proper, because you lose the context of the overall invention, which is a
`gravity feed dispenser display, and -- if you can go into that a little bit, and
`then also the spatial relationship is still there. You still have portions
`claimed in relation to one another in a spatial relationship and the broken
`lines -- you know, I've had several cases, design patent, and they're there to
`put things into context, when you pull this out, to me it takes it out of that
`context.
`MS. QUINN: Okay. So going back to page 5, which shows the
`
`
`claimed portion in context -- I mean, I agree, the broken lines provide
`environmental context, they show the person of ordinary skill that this -- that
`the context in which this design appears is the context of a gravity feed
`dispenser. The point of page 6 is really, as we're talking about whether or
`not the actual claim scope is taught by the prior art, we really should be
`focusing on the claimed elements as opposed to the environmental context.
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00091 (Patent D621,645 S)
`Case IPR2017-00094 (Patent D612,646 S)
`
`So we can alternate or look at whichever you're more comfortable with, page
`5 or page 6, but page 6 is really highlighting and calling into focus the
`specific claim elements.
`
`
`In terms of the relationship between what's claimed, I agree, so
`-- but what's shown there is a label area above a can or, in the case of the
`646 patent, a can behind stops. So there is that proportionality, the label area
`does appear above the can, but beyond that there's no specific claim as to
`how high it is, how far it is above the can, how close it is to the can, how
`narrow, how wide. Those are the elements of proportionality that we say are
`not captured in the claim scope.
`
`
`Does that answer your question, Your Honor?
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: Yes, thank you.
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Okay. So the two pieces of prior art that we're
`talking about are shown on pages 7 and 8, U.S. Patent D405,622, the Linz
`patent, and Great Britain Patent Application 2,303,624, the Samways patent.
`
`
`So Linz, which is shown on page 7, which was art of record,
`but not applied by the examiner in prosecution, is titled, "A display rack,"
`claims an ornamental design for a display rack. And as shown in figure 1 of
`Linz, it shows a top portion, a label area, and a bottom portion, a display
`area, for a cylindrical object that would be lying on its side with stops
`positioned --
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: When you stay a cylindrical object --
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Yes.
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: -- that would be lying on its side, is there
`anything in Linz to suggest it has to be a perfect cylinder lying on its side?
`
`
`MS. QUINN: A perfect cylinder lying on its side, probably not
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00091 (Patent D621,645 S)
`Case IPR2017-00094 (Patent D612,646 S)
`
`in those specific words, but what you have in Linz is the teaching that, first,
`it's a display rack. If you look at the dispensing area of the rack, it's a
`dispensing area that is shaped to hold what appears to be a cylindrical object
`on its side.
`JUDGE KINDER: Patent Owner raises, which I think in
`
`
`hindsight is kind of an interesting theory, in that it could be a number of
`differently sized and shaped objects that are meant to be displayed. It could
`be, for example, like a spool of thread that has cylinders on the side that it's
`smaller diameter in the middle. I mean, why -- my point is, what do you
`have to do to get to the point where you know that it's a cylinder there?
`There's nothing in Linz that tells you the design and shape of the object to be
`displayed.
`MS. QUINN: I think it would be clear to a person of ordinary
`
`
`skill, to a designer of ordinary skill in the art that the object to be displayed
`there is a cylinder lying on its side, including, as Your Honor pointed out,
`from the environmental context showing how the gravity feed dispenser
`works that objects are loaded into the top and slide down around the back,
`down that chute, and then come out through the dispensing area, that a
`designer of ordinary skill would understand the general shape of what that
`object should be and I believe --
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: Could it be a differently sized and shaped
`object?
`MS. QUINN: So, in other words, just a smaller one, as
`
`
`opposed to a soup can, for example?
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: A different shape. Could it be a different
`shaped object besides a cylinder?
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00091 (Patent D621,645 S)
`Case IPR2017-00094 (Patent D612,646 S)
`
`JUDGE GERSTENBLITH: For example, circular?
`
`
`MS. QUINN: I think that between the display area that's shown
`
`
`and the context suggested by the broken lines, I'm not sure that a designer of
`ordinary skill would see a sphere or a circle being used that, and certainly
`our expert has opined to the contrary and I don't believe there's been any
`evidence from Patent Owner suggesting that, that that's how a designer of
`ordinary skill would understand Linz.
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: Don't you need a reference that is
`essentially the same as the drawing in the patent?
`
`
`MS. QUINN: So you need -- to be a primary reference, to be --
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: To be a Rosen reference.
`
`
`MS. QUINN: -- to be a Rosen reference. So the design
`characteristics have to be basically the same, but as the Federal Circuit held
`in MRC Innovations, it doesn't have to be identical. If it were identical, then
`you wouldn't be doing an obviousness analysis in the first case.
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: Do you have a case where an element
`like this was missing in the Rosen reference?
`
`
`MS. QUINN: So I will check the record for something
`specifically on that. What we have in MRC Hunter, it's not that it was
`missing; it was that it was affirmatively different. And the court there still
`found the reference to be a proper Rosen reference. So they were sweaters
`for dogs and one had, you know, a rounded collar, the other had a V-neck
`collar. They were made of different materials, there were different design
`elements in the stitching, so it's not even that something --
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: It depicted the element a collar.
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Of a collar, but with different -- but a different
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`
`
`
`12
`
`

`

`JUDGE KINDER: -- you're probably not going to win the day,
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: Right.
`JUDGE KINDER: -- we can easily change our minds, so --
`MS. QUINN: Oh, I understand. I'm not suggesting the panel is
`
`Case IPR2017-00091 (Patent D621,645 S)
`Case IPR2017-00094 (Patent D612,646 S)
`
`type of collar, different types of materials.
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: So why does that take you there?
`Because here you do not have an object in that space.
`
`
`MS. QUINN: You do not have an object in that space, but as
`the Board found in its institution decision --
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: If you're citing our institution decision --
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: We didn't find -- yeah, that's not good
`enough --
`
`
`because --
`
`
`
`
`
`
`--
`JUDGE KINDER: And we know --
`
`
`MS. QUINN: -- bound by it.
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: -- what we said, so --
`
`
`MS. QUINN: I'm sorry?
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: We know what we said --
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Right.
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: -- in our institution, so --
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Okay.
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: That's okay. I wouldn't mind hearing
`
`
`which part you're --
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: Go ahead, Ms. Quinn.
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: Sorry.
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00091 (Patent D621,645 S)
`Case IPR2017-00094 (Patent D612,646 S)
`
`MS. QUINN: Sure. So --
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: But if it's just us saying that, I mean,
`
`
`you don't have to use your time on it, but --
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Sure. No, no, I understand, and I certainly
`understand the panel is not bound by the institution decision, but just to
`borrow the language from it to point Your Honor to it. So, it was page 18,
`that Linz depicts an ornamental design for a gravity feed dispenser display
`with various elements. Linz does not display a cylindrical object, but it
`defines a space for displaying such an object.
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: That doesn't mean it's good enough
`under In re Rosen, you know, and I am concerned about that, because it
`seems to me here you're missing a third of the entire design that's claimed.
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Well, and that's why we understand the panel
`decided not to institute on anticipation or obviousness in view of Linz alone,
`because you do need to combine Linz with something else to arrive at that.
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: So let me stop you right there. And I think
`that's a crutch for your position in that you have to combine Linz with
`something else. When you're looking at a Rosen reference -- and I'm
`referring to the Durling case by the Federal Circuit -- "before one can begin
`to combine prior art designs, one must find a single reference, a something
`in existence the design characteristics of which are basically the same." It
`seems to me that you have to modify this to get it to the point where it could
`be a Rosen reference by adding the cylinder.
`
`
`MS. QUINN: And let me clarify what I meant when I talked
`about having to combine. I was referring only to the next part of the
`analysis, which is once you have your primary reference, we understand --
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`
`
`
`14
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00091 (Patent D621,645 S)
`Case IPR2017-00094 (Patent D612,646 S)
`
`we understood that the panel did not institute on Linz for anticipation or for
`obviousness alone in view of Linz because the obviousness analysis would
`require some combination to bring in the can.
`
`
`But for Linz as a primary reference, I understand Your Honor's
`point that the can is not there and you're questioning whether Linz can still
`be --
`JUDGE OBERMANN: To me, that's the big issue. I mean, I'm
`
`
`following what happens if you can rely on Linz as a Rosen reference, but I'm
`wondering whether we overlooked that in the decision to institute in
`whether, you know, you really made that out.
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Okay. I mean, I can point the panel -- obviously,
`our expert opined on -- our expert opined on --
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: You know me and intrinsic evidence.
`
`
`(Laughter.)
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: I just wondered if you had an
`opportunity to find some case that might be comparable where a Rosen
`reference was a Rosen reference notwithstanding the fact that you had to
`import, you know, an entire element into the drawing.
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Standing here at the podium, Your Honor, I'm
`not recalling a case specifically on that point. I would say, though, that from
`what the Federal Circuit did in the case that we talked about --
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: That's in your reply?
`
`
`MS. QUINN: It is, Your Honor.
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: See, just based on what you say, it
`sounds like that's distinguishable because the Rosen reference in that case
`had the element, it was a collar, and the change came about by changing the
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`
`
`
`15
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00091 (Patent D621,645 S)
`Case IPR2017-00094 (Patent D612,646 S)
`
`design of that collar that was in the Rosen reference.
`
`
`MS. QUINN: There also in that case, Your Honor, were
`different ornamental features that varied from reference to reference. So I
`don't know that the Federal Circuit focused so much on -- it was looking at
`overall visual impression.
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: Right. And I do think that we need to
`be careful not to import the principles that apply to a utility patent, but I am
`concerned that there's a complete absence in Linz of the can that's required
`in the design.
`
`
`MS. QUINN: I understand, Your Honor. Again, I can just
`point you to Linz itself, which suggests to a designer of ordinary skill, it
`suggests the place for the can that a designer of ordinary skill effectively
`would look at that figure 1 of Linz --
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: See, that's what is --
`
`
`MS. QUINN: -- and see the can.
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: -- interesting to me. Is there anything
`that supports your view that the suggestion is enough to the ordinary artisan
`in this context of the Rosen reference?
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Right. And again, Your Honor, I don't have the
`specific case on point standing here that I know -- I understand what you're
`asking. I would just refer back to the guidance from the Federal Circuit that
`the primary reference does not have to be identical. They don't really say
`more than that about what it does or doesn't have to have, just it doesn't have
`to be identical, because that's why you're doing obviousness at all.
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: I don't think the test is whether it's
`identical. I think my colleague cited -- was it Darling?
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`
`
`
`16
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00091 (Patent D621,645 S)
`Case IPR2017-00094 (Patent D612,646 S)
`
`JUDGE KINDER: Durling.
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: -- Durling, that doesn't seem to really
`
`
`support the idea that if it would have been obvious to an ordinary artisan it's
`okay to import in.
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Right. Your Honor, I do understand the point.
`Again, I think we have made the case that Linz suggests the appearance of
`the can, but I do -- I understand the question Your Honor is raising.
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: All right.
`
`
`MS. QUINN: I think perhaps we can address that, since we
`have a time limit here, even just by looking at Samways, which takes that
`issue off the table. So Samways does teach the cylindrical object directly, it
`shows it, and Samways also is a primary -- is an appropriate Rosen
`reference.
`So Samways, which is shown on page 8 of Exhibit 1023, again,
`
`
`is a gravity feed dispenser specifically for cylindrical objects that creates
`basically the same visual impression. You have the label area over a
`dispensing area. Now, this -- and this, unlike Linz, does actually show the
`cylindrical objects.
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: So Samways does show a cylindrical
`object, but Samways seems to be very distinct in the embodiments that are
`depicted, they're all the two-channel or two-can embodiments that are
`depicted in the figures, such as figure 3 of Samways. In our decision to
`institute, I think we took a step to say, well, the specification describes a
`single-track embodiment and we kind of combined those. Is that proper to
`get to a Rosen reference to combine in a single art reference?
`
`
`MS. QUINN: From a single reference, I think, Your Honor,
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`
`
`
`17
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00091 (Patent D621,645 S)
`Case IPR2017-00094 (Patent D612,646 S)
`
`you can look at the teachings of the reference as a whole, looking at the
`reference in its entirety.
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: But I think that's utility. Going back and
`looking at Durling, which I've already read, you know, Durling is pretty
`explicit. Before one can begin to combine prior art designs, you have to
`have something in existence. And what we did in the decision to institute,
`we didn't take something in existence, we -- I think we kind of speculated as
`to how it would come into existence and we combined distinct
`embodiments, and I'm not for sure if that's correct even for a single reference
`to get to a Rosen reference.
`
`
`Do you have any kind of theory or, you know, something we
`can look at where that's been done, you can pick and choose embodiments in
`a single reference?
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Well, the something in existence is described in
`claim 9 of Samways, that's the single-path design. I can provide column
`numbers, but I believe it's claim 9.
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: Yeah, I'm familiar with the claim and --
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Right.
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: -- you know, Patent Owner had a couple
`points there that it doesn't necessarily have to be a single track, it could be
`one or more, which was, you know, kind of basic claim construction, but
`even there you're not depicting that design. It leaves a lot to the imagination.
`I think in the decision to institute we certainly kind of envisioned that, but
`I'm still not convinced that's the correct approach, and can you touch on that
`a little more?
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Sure. Well, so the embodiment that we propose,
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`
`
`
`18
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00091 (Patent D621,645 S)
`Case IPR2017-00094 (Patent D612,646 S)
`
`the one delivery path, which is on page 9 -- and maybe if you look at page 9
`in conjunction with page 8. So, page 8 shows figure 3 of Samways. Figure
`3 of Samways shows a dispenser, it has a single-label area over a dispensing
`area, and the dispensing area is divided for two cans to be dispensed.
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: But what you've done here is you've made
`significant modifications to figure 3. And look at your slide itself, it says
`figures 3 and 5 modified to have only one delivery path. You know, Durling
`says you can't begin to combine or modify references to achieve a Rosen
`reference. So that's where we're held up at. Everything you're showing me
`here has already been modified. And, yeah, I mean, from a utility
`standpoint, I think this is the way you would do it, but from a design
`standpoint and what we're bound by, it's a close call here.
`
`
`MS. QUINN: So I think we have to read Durling in
`conjunction with MRC Innovations, which again the Federal Circuit was
`saying in MRC Innovations that the primary reference can have differences
`from -- you know, from the design that you're looking at. So, again, they
`were looking at dog sweaters that had, you know, V-neck versus a collar,
`they were made from different materials, one had mesh in certain places
`where the other did not --
`
`
`JUDGE OBERMANN: Was the mesh claimed?
`
`
`MS. QUINN: I will have to -- if Your Honor doesn't mind, I
`can go back and look specifically at how the claim language was worded. I
`know that was an element that the court was looking at in terms of assessing
`the overall visual impression. I believe that it was, but I can double check
`that.
`
`
`So the Federal Circuit is saying, you know, you can look at a
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`
`
`
`19
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00091 (Patent D621,645 S)
`Case IPR2017-00094 (Patent D612,646 S)
`
`reference as a primary reference even though it differs in some respects from
`what you're comparing it to, so long as the overall visual impression has the
`same basic design characteristics. And so --
`
`
`JUDGE KINDER: Does a single -- in the claims we have kind
`of a single label area with a single cylindrical object below, is that
`substantially the same, though, as a dual-track system with a much wider
`label area that covers both tracks?
`
`
`MS. QUINN: Well, so, Your Honor, maybe to answer this, if
`you compare figure 3, unadorned figure 3 in -- on page 8 of our Exhibit
`1023, with page 9, which shows the modification, if you're looking at the
`overall visual impression of that design, you've got that label area. So the
`label area itself is not divided in terms of the visual impression it creates,
`right? It's got that covered door. The single-label area, the dispensing area
`is the same. Really the only thing that changes for purposes of the visual
`impression is that divider in the dispensing

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket