Before the
`FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
`Washington, DC 20554
`
`In the Matter of
`
`Amendment of Part 73,
`Subpart G, of the Commission's
`Rules Regarding the
`Emergency Broadcast System
`
`FO Docket 91-301
`FO Docket 91-171
`
`FCC 94-288
`
`REP9RT AND 0RDER AND
`FURTER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE MAKING
`
`Adopted: November 10, 1994
`
`Released: December 9, 1994
`
`Comments Due: February 22, 1995
`
`Reply Comments Due: March 24, 199!
`
`By the Commission:
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Tonic
`
`Paraaraph No.
`
`I.
`
`SUMMARY .....
`
`..............
`
`. . . . . . . . .
`
`1-2
`
`II.
`
`BACKGROUND ...........
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`3-25
`
`A. The current EBS ......
`B. Origin of this proceeding
`C. Field tests
`........
`
`. . . . . . . . . 7-12
`. . . . . . . .
`13-15
`. . . . . . . .
`16-25
`
`III.
`
`MODERNIZING EBS ...........
`
`. . . . . . . . . 26-76
`
`A. Broadcast participants . . .
`B. Cable participants .....
`C. Voluntary participants in the
`
`. . . . . . . .
`40-49
`. . . . . . . . . 50-65
`66-76
`new system .
`.
`
`1/116
`
`DOJ EX. 1016
`
`

`
`I.
`
`TECHNICAL STRUCTURE OF THE NEW SYSTEM ........
`
`............
`A. Mandatory protocol
`B. Prohibition of false and deceptive codes
`..........
`C. Equipment requirements
`D. Two-tone alert signal ....
`E. Monitoring requirements ...
`................
`F. Automation
`.............
`G. Test requirements .....
`H. Cost of an enhanced emergency system
`
`............
`...........
`
`V.
`
`OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW SYSTEM ........
`
`............
`A. National procedures .....
`B. State and local area procedures .........
`C. Advisory committee
`D. FEMA/NWS/FCC/industry coordination ....
`E. Instructional services ..........
`
`VI.
`
`FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE MAKING
`
`....
`
`A. Further issues regarding cable systems .
`B. Services under further consideration . .
`
`IMPLEMENTATION TIMETABLE ...........
`
`CONCLUSION ..................
`
`PROCEDURAL MATTERS ..............
`
`ORDERING CLAUSES ...............
`
`III.
`Vl
`EII.
`
`IX.
`
`X.
`
`77-127
`
`78-81
`82-84
`85-94
`95-96
`97-99
`100-106
`107-114
`115-127
`
`128-146
`
`130
`.
`131-135
`136-138
`139-140
`141-146
`
`147-163
`
`147-153
`154-163
`
`164-170
`
`171-173
`
`174-183
`
`184-189
`
`LIST OF COMMENTERS FOR FO Dkt. 91-171/91-301
`W
`a
`LIST OF REPLY COMMENTERS
`LIST OF COMMENTERS FOR PN FO "
`LIST OF FIELD TEST GROUPS
`RULES (Parts 0, 11, 73 and 76)
`GLOSSARY OF TERMS
`EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS AND TIMETABLE
`
`APPENDIX A
`APPENDIX B
`APPENDIX C
`APPENDIX D
`APPENDIX E
`APPENDIX F
`APPENDIX G
`
`2/116
`
`DOJ EX. 1016
`
`

`
`I.
`
`SUMMARY
`
`1. By this action, we establish the Emergency Alert System
`(EAS), which will replace the existing Emergency Broadcast System
`(EBS). We require broadcast stations and cable systems to
`install and operate new equipment for national alerts while
`relaxing some requirements for noncommercial educational Class D
`FM stations and low power television stations. Satellite, Direct
`Broadcast Satellite (DBS), telephone and cellular carriers, and
`other service providers are encouraged to voluntarily
`participate. A standard protocol and new digital codes are
`adopted that will facilitate different technologies using the new
`system. Finally, procedures are streamlined so that more
`participants can work together effectively during emergencies.
`
`2. In a Further Notice of Proposed Rule MakinQ ("FNPRM")
`we seek comment on how services such as the Multipoint
`Distribution Service (MDS)I, Satellite Master Antenna Television
`(SMATV), and Video Dial Tone should participate in the new EAS.
`We also seek further comment on whether we should waive our EAS
`requirements for a defined class of "small" cable systems.
`
`II.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`3. In 1951 President Harry S Truman established CONELRAD
`(Control of Electromagnetic Radiation) as the first national
`alerting system. Under CONELRAD, AM radio stations were required
`to broadcast only on 640 or 1240 kHz during an emergency alert to
`the public so that enemy missiles could not use transmissions
`from broadcast stations as a guide for their targets.2 By the
`early 1960's the development of missile guidance systems made the
`two channel limitation obsolete.
`
`4. In 1963 President John F. Kennedy established the
`Emergency Broadcast System and allowed stations to transmit on
`their normal frequencies during an emergency. Technical
`requirements for EBS equipment were developed in the 1960's and
`included an audio/analog two-tone alerting signal. It was not
`until the mid-1970;s, however, that the Commission amended its
`rules to replace the CONELRAD signalling technique with the
`existing EBS audio signal. In 1976, a Memorandum of
`Understanding (MOU) between the Federal Communications Commission
`(FCC or Commission), the Federal Emergency Management Agency
`
`I These frequencies when used to deliver video programming
`are referred to as "wireless cable" services. See 47 C.F.R. Part
`21, Subpart K.
`2 See Executive Order 10312, Dec. 10, 1951. Se a
`Docket 91-171, 6 FCC Rcd 4264 (1991).
`
`FO
`
`3/116
`
`DOJ EX. 1016
`
`

`
`(FEMA), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's
`(NOAA) National Weather Service (NWS) endorsed the two-tone EBS
`audio signal for use in state and local emergencies. This MOU
`3
`was updated in 1982 to reflect the reorganization of FEMA.
`
`5. Our authority to regulate emergency broadcasting
`emanates primarily from Sections 303(r) and 706(c) of the
`Conmnmications Act, 47 U.S.C. §5 303(r) and 706(c). Section
`303(r) is a general grant of rulemaking authority to the
`Commission. Section 706 grants specific, communications-related
`powers to the President in time of war or national emergency. In
`such event, the President may, for example, take control of, or
`suspend or amend the rules and regulations applicable to, any or
`all stations within the Commission's jurisdiction. Our EBS rules
`are designed to enable the President to exercise these powers
`quickly and efficiently.
`
`6. Our authority to regulate participation by cable systems
`in the emergency alerting process, on the other hand, stems
`primarily from Section 624(g) of the Conmnunications Act, 47
`U.S.C. § 544(g), s paras. 50-65, infra. That provision
`requires the Commission to ensure that cable viewers are afforded
`the same access to emergency communications as broadcast viewers
`and listeners. We also note that the Americans with Disabilities
`Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et se2., aims to "make all facets of our
`society fully accessible to individuals with disabilities." 4 Our
`rules adopted herein comport with that goal as well.
`
`A. The current EBS
`
`7. The current EBS is composed of technical equipment and
`an operational structure which provides guidance to those
`broadcast stations and others who participate in EBS. It is a
`joint government-industry effort which responds to a Presidential
`requirement to address the entire nation on very short notice
`because of a grave national threat. It uses the facilities of
`the communications industry, including 13 radio and 5 television
`networks, 12 cable networks, the Associated Press, Reuters and
`United Press International wire services, and over 13,000
`broadcast stations.5
`
`3 See MOU dated June 28, 1976; revised April 21, 1982.
`
`4 Comments 6f the National Center for Law and Deafness,
`November 24, 1993, at 5.
`
`5 The Broadcast Station Protection Program (BSPP) is a
`(FEMA)
`program funded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
`that enhances the operating capability of key EBS stations. The
`program provides these stations with emergency generators, remote
`
`4/116
`
`DOJ EX. 1016
`
`

`
`8. Technically, EBS is an analog transmission system in
`which broadcasters are required to have specified equipment and
`relies upon operator control. During an alert, EBS equipment
`transmits audio EBS messages after receipt of a two-tone
`attention signal, which activates the decoder/receiver at a
`broadcast radio or TV station. The EBS station operator must
`listen to the audio message coming out of the speaker (of the
`decoder/receiver) to determine the reason the EBS signal has been
`transmitted. 6
`If the audio message was a test of the system, the
`test date and time are logged. If the message is for a national
`emergency, they must alert the public. If the message is for a
`state or local emergency, responding personnel have a number of
`options, including ignoring or rebroadcasting the message.
`
`9. The Commission requires the use of EBS only in the
`event of a national emergency. State and local authorities,
`however, may request use of the EBS to provide early warning to
`communities about regional, state, county, and local emergencies.
`More than 20,000 activations of the EBS have been reported since
`19757, and every state and territory has used it.
`State and
`(SECC and LECC)6 are
`Local Emergency Communications Committees
`responsible for the development of plans which detail procedures
`for stations and officials to follow for activation of the EBS.
`Broadcast stations have voluntarily made increasing use of EBS
`since the system was allowed to be used for local emergencies.
`
`10. The current EBS has several significant drawbacks.
`First, the equipment relies on the broadcaster who receives the
`initial alert to alert other broadcasters in a "daisy chain."'
`
`pickup units, electromagnetic pulse protection, and other
`facility add-ons.in order to enhance the stations' ability to
`continue to operate in an emergency. There are over 600
`broadcast stations in the BSPP.
`6 The two-tone Attention Signal generated by the encoder
`does not carry any intelligent information. It merely turns on
`or activates the decoder/receiver.
`7 The Commission does not require stations to report EBS
`activations. Our figures represent only those activations which
`have been voluntarily reported. We believe, based on informal
`conversations with licensees, that thousands of additional alerts
`have been issued.
`S & Section V.B. in this Order.
`
`" "Daisy chain" monitoring refers to the present day system
`where key stations relay EBS messages with the two-tone signal
`from one station to another.
`
`1790
`
`5/116
`
`DOJ EX. 1016
`
`

`
`The daisy chain is often unreliable, as stations are completely
`dependent on the station they monitor to activate the EBS system.
`If the key "upstream" station fails to activate, stations further
`down the chain are not alerted to the emergency and, therefore,
`cannot inform their audiences. There has been no monitoring of
`multiple sources for emergency alerts. In addition, operators
`must be trained in EBS activation procedures in order to send and
`receive emergency notifications.
`
`i1. Second, much EBS equipment dates back several decades.
`Very few manufacturers produce repair parts for EBS equipment.
`If a broadcaster had to purchase replacement EBS equipment, the
`replacement costs would be comparable to the cost for new digital
`equipment. Moreover, even if the current equipment could be
`economically maintained, cable participation in EBS would be
`severely handicapped because the present signalling scheme does
`not lend itself to unattended operation.10
`
`12. Third, when an emergency strikes, the EBS can still
`fail even if the alert is forwarded to the next station in the
`chain, the equipment is working properly, and the operating
`personnel are knowledgeable because the current EBS relies on
`station personnel to acknowledge and relay the alert, which can
`cause critical delays. Seconds may mean the difference between
`life and death during sudden emergencies such as tornadoes, flash
`floods, hazardous chemical spills, and nuclear accidents. In
`addition, current EBS equipment does not allow participants to
`alert the public selectively in the event of an emergency. For
`example, an EBS alert warning of a flood may be of little value
`to listeners located in more distant locations. These
`disadvantages of the EBS have become more apparent as
`communications technology has advanced, and have contributed in
`part to our determination to examine more closely the
`modernization of the system. After every major disaster, the
`National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) conducts a
`survey to determine the effectiveness of warning systems.
`Approximately 80 percent of these surveys have indicated the need
`for improvements in the EBS because of deficiencies inherent in
`the old system."
`
`B. Oriain of this proceedina
`
`10 Cable system facilities are predominantly unattended, and
`headends are frequently located in remote areas. As noted above,
`the current EBS system depends on manual intervention by trained
`personnel to pass an alert to additional broadcast stations and
`to inform the public of an emergency.
`
`1 See letter from NOAA, NWS to FCC, May 20, 1994.
`
`6/116
`
`DOJ EX. 1016
`
`

`
`13. In 1989 the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB)
`petitioned the FCC for a rule making to shorten the two-tone
`audio alerting signal and to revise other operational aspects of
`the EBS.12 In 1991, the Society of Cable Television Engineers
`(SCTE) established an EBS working group to explore the most
`efficient and cost effective manner to reach their cable
`subscribers during an EBS alert.
`
`14. Since 1991 there have been four Commission actions
`examining the modernization of EBS. On June 13, 1991, we adopted
`a Notice of Inauirv (NOI)to solicit comments on new technology
`and equipment that would improve EBS.1 On October 9, 1991, we
`adopted a NOI/Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPM) to solicit
`comments on the NAB petition to shorten the two-tone signal and
`to propose a rule to prohibit false use of the EBS signal.14
`15. On September 17, 1992, we adopted a NPRM/Further Notice
`of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM/FNPRM), FO Dockets 91-301/91-171,
`consolidating the earlier proceedings and seeking further
`comments on proposals to update the technical and operational
`features of the EBS." On November 12, 1992, we issued a Public
`Notice addressing a requirement in the Cable Act of 1992 to
`include cable in EBS and invited commenters to discuss this
`requirement when filing comments to the NPRL/FNP .0 We received
`63 comments and 17 reply comments in response to the consolidated
`7
`NPRM/FNPRM.
`
`C. Field tes
`
`16. In December, 1992, we invited equipment manufacturers
`to demonstrate their alerting equipment and prototypes at the
`
`12 See Petition for Rule Making (RM-7188), filed by the
`National Association of Broadcasters.
`Notice of Inquiry, FO Docket 91-171, 6 FCC Rcd 4264
`
`(1991).
`1 Notice of Inquiry/Notice of Proposed Rule Making, FO
`Docket 91-301, 6 FCC Rcd 6739 (1991).
`15 NPRM/RM, FO Dockets 91-301/91-171, 7 FCC Rcd 6903
`(1992).
`
`" Public Notice, DA 92-1497, November 12, 1992.
`Commenters and reply commenters to the NPRMIMNPZ are
`listed in Appendices A and B.
`
`7/116
`
`DOJ EX. 1016
`
`

`
`Commission."s Eleven manufacturers participated. This
`demonstration showed that newer technologies were available and
`
`effective to create more advanced emergency communications
`equipment.
`
`17. We determined that further testing would reveal the
`best methods to integrate various technologies, the compatibility
`of different prototype equipment, and verify the robustness of
`the proposed digital protocols. We invited interested parties to
`participate in field testing of the proposed EBS system.9 An
`Eastern and a Western field test were scheduled. Plenary
`meetings for the tests began in March 1993. These meetings
`involved manufacturers, industry members, and government
`officials. Each test was headed by a state EBS coordinator who
`worked with the group to design the tests. The testing was based
`on the proposals presented in the NPRM/FNP and drew on the
`expertise and experience of each participant.m The field tests
`documented the capabilities of existing or prototype equipment to
`deliver emergency communications.21
`
`18. The Western Field Test was conducted June 27 through
`June 30, 1993, in Denver.2 More than 75 representatives from
`broadcast stations, cable systems, satellite companies, emergency
`management offices, consulting engineering firms, amateur radio
`organizations, and manufacturers of alerting equipment and
`consumer end products, voluntarily provided their own personnel
`and resources for the tests.
`
`Is See Public Notice No. 30336, October 29, 1992, "FCC To
`Hold Exhibit of Various Emergency Alerting Systems."
`19 Public Notice No. 31623, February 3, 1993. More than 150
`representatives and observers from broadcasting, cable,
`satellite, other communications transmission means, emergency
`management, equipment manufacturers, and government agencies
`participated in these tests.
`
`20 The various tests were meant to be exemplary and not
`inclusive of every proposal in the NPRM/FNPRM. See Appendix D
`for list of participants in the Western and Eastern field tests.
`21 More than 35 devices were demonstrated during the tests.
`While the tests were not representative of all aspects of our
`proposed system, they did indicate that the equipment tested had
`the capability of delivering alerting messages in many kinds of
`environments.
`
`I See Public Notice, DA 93-1211, October 6, 1993, and the
`Western Field Test results referenced therein.
`
`8/116
`
`DOJ EX. 1016
`
`

`
`19. In-band, subcarrier, satellite, HF radio, VHF, UHF,
`microwave, and telephone were the primary transmission modes
`tested. Three focus groups and one composite focus group offered
`
`some insight into audience perception of the systems and
`equipment.2
`
`20. The Eastern Field Test was conducted September 12,
`1993, through September 15, 1993, in Baltimore.Y The tests
`involved more than 60 representatives from government, industry,
`and manufacturing. Technical/emergency management personnel and
`others served as official observers to record the test results.
`Testing sites included the State Emergency 0peration Center,
`experimentally licensed AM and FM stations, FCC field
`facilities, the National Weather Service office, a cable head-
`end, existing AM and FM stations, and Spanish language television
`and radio stations.
`
`21. The goals of both tests were to examine the ability of
`broadcast, cable, satellite, and other means to transmit digital
`information, to test speed, redundancy and reliability factors,
`to determine operator needs for equipment responsiveness, to test
`as many of the parameters in the NPR MLNPRM in different
`situations as feasible, and to experiment with an architecture
`broad enough to encompass other technologies as they become
`available. In response to the field testing, we received 42
`conm ents and 9 reply comments.
`
`22. The test data demonstrated that (1) monitoring of
`
`3 See Dr. Dennis Mileti's report in the Western Field
`Tests, pp. 484-511. The general group consensus was that there
`was no objection to devices that turned receivers on and off in
`the event of a real emergency; that testing should not be
`overused; and that there was a place for devices that flashed or
`radiated light to draw attention to the source of information.
`
`2 See JA,, discussion on the Eastern Field Test results.
`
`" These stations were specially licensed by the FCC to Mr.
`Morris Blum, Chair of the Maryland Emergency Communications
`Committee, so that tests could be conducted continuously on-the-
`air and not disrupt an existing station's operations or
`programming.
`
`See Public Notice DA 93-1211, October 6, 1993, which
`invited interested parties to review and comment on the results
`of the field tests. Commenters and reply comments are listed in
`Appendix C.
`
`9/116
`
`DOJ EX. 1016
`
`

`
`multiple sources of emergency information was successful in
`providing reliability and redundancy; (2) a small geographic area
`could be alerted without affecting other areas; (3) transmissions
`could be easily relayed from point-to-point via different
`transmission means; (4) equipment could automatically receive,
`store, and forward alerts and messages; (5) in-band and
`subcarrier transmissions could coexist;" (6) satellite and cable
`technology could interface with the EAS digital transmission
`scheme; (7) mobile reception of in-band and subcarrier were
`equally susceptible to multipath, distortion, shadowing, and
`other propagation anomalies; and (8) consumer radio receiver
`equipment could turn itself on from an "off" position in response
`to broadcasters' digital signals, such as Radio Broadcast Data
`System (RBDS) signals.
`
`23. The field tests clearly showed that the current EBS was
`of limited utility compared to capabilities offered by the new
`generation of digital equipment. The tests also conclusively
`demonstrated that digital messaging for emergency alerting was
`feasible regardless of the transmission link or operating
`environment tested. The digital coding schemes used during the
`tests were more technically demanding than the EAS codes which we
`adopt by this Order.Y We found that transmission media
`traditionally associated with analog modulation, like AM
`broadcasting, were suitable for carrying digital information.
`Furthermore, we realized the significant possibilities of
`alerting using digital communications technologies, such as those
`used by some subcarriers, pagers, computers and satellite
`systems.
`
`24. The tests confirmed that many types of transmission
`systems could be links in the HAS network, because they all were
`capable of digital signalling and interfacing. The tests showed
`that there was a place in emergency alerting for each
`transmission system because the systems complemented each other
`in delivering alert messages. Thus, we found that every
`technology and service had advantages, and each could fill
`particular needs.
`
`25. There has been significant growth and improvement in
`emergency communications prototype equipment since the December
`1992 demonstration and the field testing. Emergency managers,
`deaf and hard-of-hearing persons, Spanish language participants,
`and blind persons have given important feedback to the
`
`2 Subcarrier transmissions do not interfere with the main
`channel programming, and therefore information can be transmitted
`without interfering with regular programming.
`22 See Appendix R, S 11.31.
`
`10/116
`
`DOJ EX. 1016
`
`

`
`manufacturers." Cable equipment suppliers have worked to
`optimize the video display for television. During the course of
`the two tests, over 35 equipment prototypes were used, which
`indicates that manufacturers will be able to offer a wide range
`of equipment to broadcast stations and cable systems. Our tests
`also showed that satellite equipment manufacturers could offer
`emergency communications for mobile uses and other
`configurations.
`
`111. KODWNIZING EBS
`
`26. During this proceeding the Commission has held regional
`workshops and numerous meetings with the telecommunications
`industry, manufacturers, state and local emergency officials and
`others to discuss the technical and operational aspects of
`modernizing EBS. More than 225 entities have filed comments
`since this proceeding began in 1991.
`
`27. We examined more than 20 issues in the NPRM/FNPRM. The
`key issues include: (1) requiring cable to be a participant, (2)
`designing equipment that can interact with all technologies, (3)
`permitting automation, (4) reducing dependency on single station
`monitoring, (5) reducing on-air EBS testing, and (6) shortening
`the two-tone alerting signal. The decisions on these and other
`items are discussed below.
`
`28. is There A Need for An Emergency Broadcast System? A
`threshold question is whether the Commission should continue to
`require an EBS or similar alerting system. Since the early
`1950's, the installation of alerting equipment has been mandatory
`in order to provide the President with the capability to transmit
`This
`national emergency information to the general public.
`requirement has been reaffirmed by every Administration since
`President Truman. We are fortunate in not having had an
`emergency requiring use of that capability. The fact that we
`have not had to use EBS for a national alert, however, does not
`necessarily support a determination to abandon the concept of an
`emergency warning system. As discussed further below, we
`continue to believe that maintaining such capability is in the
`public interest. Indeed, based on the history of this proceeding
`and of the EBS generally, we believe that effective emergency
`warning systems can reduce life and property loss and that
`
`See generally comments of Self Help for Hard of Hearing
`People, October 22, 1993 and of the American Council of the Blind
`of Maryland, November 11, 1993.
`
`0 Alerting equipment is most frequently used to provide
`federal, state and local government officials a means of
`communicating critical information to the public.
`
`11/116
`
`DOJ EX. 1016
`
`

`
`effectiveness and timeliness are clearly linkedSl
`
`29. One commenter has questioned the need to modernize or
`replace the EBS and has suggested instead that EBS may not be
`necessary if there is greater use and expansion of the National
`Weather Service (NWS) NOAA Weather Radio (NWR) network as a
`replacement." The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
`also maintains warning systems. The FEMA and NWS systems,
`including NWR, and EBS, complement each other to form a cohesive
`warning structure. Each system working alone cannot do the job.
`NOAA Weather Radio alone does not have the coverage capabilities
`to reach all of the nation's populace. FEMA's systems interface
`mainly with other government agencies, including state and local
`emergency organizations. The HAS needs to have the emergency
`information from the above agencies. Working together, the three
`agencies provide federal, state and local agencies with a means
`to alert the public to all orders of emergencies. Radio and
`television broadcast stations currently reach nearly every part
`of the country, often with several stations. There are radios
`and televisions in virtually every home and business. In order
`to receive NWR broadcasts, the consumer must buy a special radio.
`Penetration of NWR receivers into homes is not comparable to that
`of standard radios and televisions." We therefore do not believe
`that the NWR is a realistic alternative.
`
`30. Can the EBS be Improved or Must it be Replaced? The
`NRML/FNPRM proposed to modernize the EBS by requiring replacement
`of the old equipment with equipment capable of interacting with
`multiple mass communications technologies. Our review of the
`existing EBS indicated that there are enough serious shortcomings
`to warrant its replacement by a new Emergency Alert System (EAS).
`Of those commenters addressing this issue, virtually all
`supported the need for changing EBS. The shortcomings of EBS
`
`31
`In the NUML/FNP , we pointed out that the new equipment
`would contribute to reducing the time it takes to disseminate an
`emergency message, and therefore, new equipment could reasonably
`be expected to yield a disproportionately large gain to the
`public interest.
`x parts letter of the National Association of
`32
`Broadcasters to Chairman, FCC, April 29, 1994, and the Press
`Release of the Department of Commerce, "New Hazardous Weather
`Warning System," March 31, 1994.
`
`As one of the three agencies responsible for EBS, NOAA
`3
`NWS has participated in this proceeding and has supplied
`extensive information to the Commission. See, e..,, letter from
`Assistant Administrator for Weather Services, NOAA, to Chief,
`Field Operations Bureau, September 13, 1994.
`
`12/116
`
`DOJ EX. 1016
`
`

`
`most commonly identified in the comments were the age and
`inflexibility of current equipment and the fact that it does not
`work with new mass communication technologies such as cable. As
`commenters overwhelmingly agreed, the existing EBS mechanism is
`vulnerable to operator error and at times has failed to deliver
`timely information to the public.' It also appears that the cost
`of replacing existing EBS equipment would equal that of new EAS
`equipment with superior capabilities and lower operating costs.
`
`31. The majority of commenters agreed that it was no longer
`cost effective to invest in the current equipment. This
`perspective was best expressed by a joint filing of several state
`broadcast associations which stated: "We recognize that the new
`EBS improvements will cost us some money, but our consensus is
`that EBS is broken and needs to be modernized."" Another system
`participant commented: "While we realize that the modernization
`might create some additional cost, we believe such cost could be
`minimized by utilizing equipment with modular or highly
`integrated construction.0"i
`
`32' One state broadcasters' association stated, "The system
`selected must work in seconds, must work every time and should
`require little or no broadcast operator intervention.03 Other
`commenters were particularly hopeful that new equipment might
`alleviate common problems. "[W]e routinely incur problems with
`poorly trained operators after hours or operators not at their
`usual positions 'to take the call'. "i We agree with these
`commenters that it is impractical to rely on the current EBS
`equipment and operating procedures or to attempt to upgrade them
`using the existing analog BBS technology. We further believe
`that replacement of existing EBS equipment with a new generation
`of digital RAS equipment better complies with our statutory
`mandate to provide adequate communications facilities that
`
`e. e.gd, comments of Delaware Department of Public
`4
`Safety, November 17, 1992, at 1.
`
`See ea rte letter from the New Jersey Broadcasters
`Association, the Connecticut Broadcasters and the South Carolina
`Broadcasters Association to Chairman, FCC, December 3, 1993, at
`1.
`
`3 Comments of Cap Cities/ABC Inc., January 15, 1993, at 8.
`
`3 Comments of South Carolina Broadcasters Association,
`January 8, 1993, at 1.
`
`8 Comments of State of Delaware, Department of Public
`Safety, November 17, 1992, at 1 .
`
`13/116
`
`DOJ EX. 1016
`
`

`
`enhance national defense.39 Replacement of EBS will ultimately
`result in an alerting system that will function seamlessly with
`many sources of emergency communications. In view of the reasons
`discussed above, we will replace, rather than attempt to improve,
`the EBS.
`
`33. We are confident that the new equipment will be a
`better overall value than the current equipment because it
`permits automated operation, is reliable, and should be usable
`for a longer period of time due to its digital nature.4 We
`weighed the advantages of a new system versus the costs of
`repairing and upgrading the EBS system, and find that requiring
`new equipment is clearly preferable.
`
`34. The new system will not be limited to a particular
`transmission system such as analog broadcasting. No one
`transmission system could, in isolation, sufficiently achieve our
`goals for EAS. We agree with the concerns of most commenters
`that to select one system to the exclusion of others would create
`problems of incompatibility. Although some commenters and
`participants in the field tests preferred a particular
`transmission system, such as RBDS, there was no clear consensus
`by commenters on a preferred transmission system. We believe that
`by not choosing or favoring one transmission mode over others,
`the resulting alerting system will offer the most flexibility to
`system participants and also be in the best interest of the
`public and system participants.
`
`The extraordinary diversity of technologies available
`35.
`to be used in an alerting system suggests a need for an
`architecture that can accommodate all the proposed media
`distribution schemes. Therefore, as the foundation for the new
`EAS, and as discussed more fully below, we will adopt a mandatory
`standard digital protocol with a flexible architecture usable by
`
`See 47 U.S.C. § 151 and 606. EBS is also authorized by
`39
`a Presidential Statement of Requirements dated October 17, 1990
`and is cited in the 1992 Cable Act as supporting the national
`defense and saving life and property. See Cable Television
`Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
`385, § 16(b).
`If the present two-tone system were updated and not
`4
`replaced, it would still have to rely on a daisy chain of
`stations monitoring for alerts, and weekly on-air audible tests
`would still have.to be conducted. A major criticism made by the
`commenters was that the weekly tests caused the public to "tune
`out" the EBS alert, which placed them in jeopardy in case of a
`real emergency. As previously discussed, the daisy chain was
`also viewed as unreliable.
`
`14/116
`
`DOJ EX. 1016
`
`

`
`many kinds of transmission media.
`
`36. With such a standard, in-band broadcasting of alerts
`could be received today over any radio or television.
`Subcarriers could transmit unobtrusive text data and activate
`turned-off receivers.41 Cable could give all subscribers alerts
`and special cable equipment could provide the deaf, hard-of-
`hearing, blind, and non-English speaking audiences distinctive
`visual and audio alerts. Satellite terminals could be used for
`remote field activations and could be used on disaster sites.
`Pagers could be used to alert persons in offices or who are
`travelling. In addition, such a standardized digital protocol is
`flexible enough for expansi