`571-272-7822
` Entered: February 25, 2019
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`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`AXON ENTERPRISE, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`DIGITAL ALLY, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2017-00515
`Patent 9,253,452 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before PHILLIP J. KAUFFMAN, MINN CHUNG, and
`ROBERT L. KINDER, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`
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`I. INTRODUCTION
`Axon Enterprise, Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Request for Rehearing
`(Paper 15, “Request” or “Req. Reh’g”) of the Decision (Paper 10, “Dec.”),
`in which, based on the information presented in the Petition (Paper 1,
`“Pet.”), we denied institution of an inter partes review of claims 10–17 and
`20 (the “challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 9,253,452 B2 (Ex. 1001,
`“the ’452 patent”). The Petition presented two separate grounds of
`unpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a): one based on the combination of
`Pierce (Ex. 1014) and Brundala (Ex. 1015) (“Ground 1”); and the other
`based on the combination of Vasavada (Ex. 1010) and Tabak (Ex. 1009)
`(“Ground 2”). Pet. 4. In our Decision, we determined the Petition did not
`demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing
`the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims on any of these asserted
`grounds. Dec. 2, 38. Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing does not discuss
`our denial of institution on the ground based on Pierce and Brundala; rather,
`Petitioner’s Request is directed only to the Decision’s denial of the ground
`based on Vasavada and Tabak (i.e., Ground 2). Req. Reh’g 1. Petitioner
`contends that, in denying institution of Ground 2, the Decision overlooked
`Petitioner’s evidence on a key claim limitation and misapplied the law on
`obviousness. Id. at 1–3. For the reasons stated below, Petitioner’s Request
`for Rehearing is denied.
`
`II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
`“The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the
`party challenging the decision,” and the challenging party “must specifically
`identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or
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`overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in a
`paper of record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Because Petitioner seeks rehearing
`of our Decision denying institution of trial based on the Petition, it must
`show an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (“When rehearing a
`decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of
`discretion.”). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on
`an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a
`clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties
`Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
`
`III. ANALYSIS
`In the Decision, we determined that Petitioner did not demonstrate
`sufficiently that the combination of Vasavada and Tabak teaches or renders
`obvious all limitations of independent claim 10. Dec. 30–37. Our analysis
`focused on the limitations of claim 10 identified by Petitioner as limitations
`10[D] and 10[G] (Pet. 58, 64), which recite “a recording device manager
`operable” (limitation 10[D]) to “broadcast, in response to receiving the
`trigger signal, at least one communication signal including correlation data
`to the first recording device and the second recording device instructing the
`first recording device to begin recording said first set of record data and
`instructing the second recording device to begin recording said second set of
`record data” (limitation 10[G]). Dec. 30–37. Claim 10 refers to the signal
`broadcast to the first and second recording devices as “the broadcast
`communication signal.” Ex. 1001, 16:52–53.
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`In the Petition, Petitioner asserted that Vasavada alone discloses
`limitation 10[G], or, in the alternative, the combination of Vasavada and
`Tabak teaches or renders obvious limitation 10[G]. Pet. 64–66.
`
`A. Petitioner’s Contention That Vasavada Discloses Limitation 10[G]
`In the Decision, addressing Petitioner’s contention that “Vasavada
`discloses limitation 10[G]” (Pet. 64), we found that “Petitioner does not
`identify, nor do we discern, any express disclosure in Vasavada that signals
`204 and 206 (the alleged ‘broadcast communication signal’) instruct the first
`and second recording devices (radio units 104 and 106) to begin recording.”
`Dec. 32 (emphasis added). In its Request for Rehearing, Petitioner contends
`our Decision “applied an overly-restrictive test for obviousness (requiring
`‘express disclosure’) when analyzing Vasavada” (Req. Reh’g 2) and
`“overlooked that Vasavada at least suggests” limitation 10[G], including the
`“‘instructing’ requirement.” (id. at 9).
`Petitioner mischaracterizes our Decision. We did not “require”
`Petitioner to show Vasavada expressly discloses limitation 10[G]. Rather, it
`was Petitioner’s contention that “Vasavada discloses limitation 10[G].”
`Pet. 64 (emphasis added).
`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing cites pages 64, 51–52, and 54 of
`the Petition as demonstrating Vasavada at least suggests the claimed
`“instructing” feature. Req. Reh’g 6 (citing Pet. 64), 7 (citing Pet. 54), 8
`(citing Pet. 64), 10 (citing Pet. 51–52), 11 (citing Pet. 51–52). As discussed
`below, the only argument presented in these pages was that Vasavada
`expressly discloses limitation 10[G]. Contrary to Petitioner’s contention in
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`the Request for Rehearing, none of these pages (nor any other portions) of
`the Petition discussed or explained that Vasavada suggests limitation 10[G].
`Page 64 of the Petition addressing the “instructing” feature of
`limitation 10[G] is reproduced below in its entirety.
`Vasavada discloses limitation 10[G]. With regard to Fig.2
`(above), Vasavada discloses that central control station 210 (i.e.,
`recording device manager) retransmits signal 202 (i.e.,
`communication signal, with the retransmission represented as
`signals 204, 206 in Fig.2) to radio units 104, 106 (i.e., first and
`second recording devices) over a communications network, such
`as cellular or WiFi, instructing the radio units to begin recording
`data related to the event. (Ex.1010, 2:31-46, 4:1-6, Fig.2;
`Ex.1003, ¶285). Vasavada discloses that this retransmission is
`in response to central control station 210 receiving signal 202
`(“trigger signal”) from radio unit 102. (Ex.1010, 4:4-6, Fig.4).
`In response to receiving the same retransmitted signal, radio units
`104, 106 begin recording. (Ex.1010, 5:58-64, Fig.4 box 428;
`Ex.1003, ¶285). As such, central control station 210 sends a
`transmission simultaneously to multiple synced radio units
`instructing the devices to record. (Ex.1003, ¶285).
`Pet. 64 (emphases added). Thus, page 64 of the Petition argued only that
`Vasavada discloses limitation 10[G]; Petitioner did not argue, much less
`explain, Vasavada at least suggests the “instructing” feature of limitation
`10[G]. Pages 51–52 of the Petition present summaries of the Vasavada and
`Tabak references, while page 54 discusses the preamble of claim 10. See id.
`at 51–52, 54. Petitioner does not identify where in these pages the Petition
`presented arguments that Vasavada suggests limitation 10[G]. Thus, the
`record shows that, contrary to Petitioner’s contention in the Request, the
`Petition did not present any argument that Vasavada at least suggests
`limitation 10[G]. Nor does Petitioner contend that it argued inherent
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`disclosure. Therefore, the only argument presented in the Petition based on
`Vasavada alone was that Vasavada expressly discloses limitation 10[G],
`including the claimed “instructing” feature (see id. at 64), which we found
`unpersuasive as lacking support in the evidence of record cited in the
`Petition (Dec. 32–34).
`In its Request for Rehearing, Petitioner mischaracterizes this record
`and misattributes Petitioner’s “express disclosure” argument as our
`requirement for obviousness. Req. Reh’g 2, 9–10. As explained above, the
`record shows that, rather than applying an overly-restrictive test for
`obviousness requiring “express disclosure,” our Decision simply considered
`the argument and evidence Petitioner presented in the four corners of the
`Petition, arguing “Vasavada discloses limitation 10[G]” (Pet. 64), and found
`them unpersuasive.
`In addition to Petitioner’s unpersuasive argument discussed above,
`Petitioner also contends that the Decision made erroneous findings of facts
`regarding Figure 4 of Vasavada, and misapprehended and overlooked the
`fact that Figure 4, including Step 428, teaches or suggests the “instructing”
`feature of limitation 10[G]. Req. Reh’g 6–9.
`Again, Petitioner mischaracterizes the record and our Decision. As
`discussed above, the Decision found unpersuasive Petitioner’s argument that
`Vasavada discloses limitation 10[G]. Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
`does not identify where in the Petition Petitioner discussed or explained the
`significance of Figure 4 or Step 428 as teaching or suggesting the
`“instructing” feature of limitation 10[G]. Similar to our discussion above,
`the portions of the Petition cited in the Request for Rehearing—pages 64,
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`51–52, and 54 of the Petition (Req. Reh’g 6 (citing Pet. 64), 7 (citing Pet.
`54), 8 (citing Pet. 64), 10 (citing Pet. 51–52), 11 (citing Pet. 51–52))—do
`not contain any discussion or explanation of why Vasavada’s Figure 4 or
`Step 428 teaches or suggests the “instructing” feature of limitation 10[G].
`At best, Petitioner’s arguments in its Request for Rehearing attempt to
`address the deficiencies in the Petition we identified in the Decision.
`A request for rehearing is not a supplemental petition. Nor is it an
`opportunity to present new arguments or evidence that could have been
`presented and developed in the first instance in the Petition. Simply put, we
`could not have misapprehended or overlooked arguments that were not
`presented or developed in the Petition.
`
`B. Combination of Vasavada and Tabak
`In the Request, Petitioner contends that our Decision improperly
`required an “actual, physical substitution” of Tabak’s content recording
`device for Vasavada’s radios. Req. Reh’g 11, 13. The Decision did not
`require Petitioner to prove an actual physical substitution or bodily
`incorporation of Tabak’s content recording device into Vasavada’s system.
`Instead, the Decision properly determined that the Petition failed to explain
`adequately how Petitioner’s proposed combination of Vasavada and Taka
`produces the claimed invention. See Dec. 34–38; see also TriVascular, Inc.
`v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (an explanation of how the
`references would be combined to produce the claimed invention is necessary
`to show obviousness).
`As explained in the Decision, the Petition relied on Tabak’s content
`recording devices 110 to teach both a “recording device” and a “recording
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`device manager” that broadcasts a communication signal “instructing” the
`first and second recording devices to “begin recording,” as recited in
`claim 10. Dec. 36 (citing Pet. 51–52, 65); Pet. 51 (“Tabak teaches a
`manager . . . that transmits an instruction to a number of other recording
`devices to record and also sends metadata.” (emphases added)), 52
`(“According to Tabak, a first ‘content recording device 110 can
`communicate metadata to the other content recording devices 110.’”
`(emphases added)); 65 (“Tabak teaches a manager that instructs other
`recording devices to record and also sends correlation data in the form of
`metadata.” (emphases added)). The Petition asserted that Tabak’s content
`recording device 110 teaches both a “recording device” and a “recording
`device manager” because Tabak teaches a “manager” that is inside a
`“recording device.” Pet. 51 (“Tabak teaches a manager (in Tabak the
`manager is within a recording device) that transmits an instruction to a
`number of other recording devices to record and also sends metadata.”
`(emphases added)); Dec. 35 (citing Pet. 51).
`The Petition did not propose modifying these teachings of Tabak
`when combining with the teachings of Vasavada. Rather, as Petitioner
`acknowledges in the Request, the Petition proposed “modifying Vasavada to
`employ Tabak’s communication.” Req. Reh’g 12–13 (citing Pet. 52–54, 65–
`66). Thus, as explained in the Decision, in Petitioner’s proposed
`combination of Vasavada and Tabak, the claimed “recording device
`manager” is included within each of the claimed “first recording device” and
`“second recording device,” and the “manager” within each of the recording
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`devices broadcasts a signal “instructing” the other recording devices to
`“begin recording.” Dec. 36 (citing Pet. 51–52, 65).
`As discussed in the Decision, the Petition did not explain adequately
`how this proposed combination produces the claimed invention. Id. Among
`other reasons, the Petition did not explain adequately how the proposed
`combination can be squared with Petitioner’s contentions on other
`limitations of claim 10, e.g., limitation 10[F]. For example, the Decision
`explained that “Petitioner does not explain how ‘a recording device
`manager’ would ‘receive a trigger signal,’ as recited in claim 10, when every
`single radio unit in Vasavada’s system is a ‘recording device manager.’” Id.
`(citing Pet. 61 (discussing limitation 10[F])).
`In addition, we determined that “Petitioner’s analysis is insufficient
`because Petitioner does not explain in sufficient detail how the proposed
`combination is supposed to work.” Id. at 37 (citing Personal Web Techs.,
`LLC v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[A] clear, evidence-
`supported account of the contemplated workings of the combination is a
`prerequisite to adequately explaining and supporting a conclusion that a
`relevant skilled artisan would have been motivated to make the combination
`and reasonably expect success in doing so.”) (emphases added)).
`Ultimately, the Petition did not explain adequately how the proposed
`combination of Vasavada and Tabak renders obvious the subject matter of
`claim 10, as a whole, to a person having ordinary skill in the art. See KSR
`Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007).
`The Request for Rehearing does not identify where in the Petition
`Petitioner explained how Vasavada and Tabak, combined in the manner
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`proposed in the Petition, produce the claimed invention, or how the proposed
`combination is supposed to work. Therefore, the Request does not
`sufficiently demonstrate that a modification of the Decision denying
`institution is warranted.
`
`C. Knowledge of a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`The Request for Rehearing contends that the Decision overlooked the
`fact that “instructing two recording devices to begin recording was well
`known to a [person of ordinary skill in the art]” placing “the disputed
`‘instructing’ of limitation 10[G] within the baseline knowledge of a [person
`of ordinary skill in the art].” Req. Reh’g 4 (citing Pet. 6–11; Ex. 1003
`¶¶ 92–113). The Request asserts that “Petitioner’s proffered prior art” cited
`in the Petition “confirms” that the “instructing” feature of limitation 10[G]
`was known to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention
`of the ’452 patent (Req. Reh’g 4–5 (citing Pet. 7–11)), citing “prior-art
`evidence,” including the following: the ’452 patent’s background section
`(id. at 4 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:20–24)); Raytheon’s 20/20 system (id. (citing
`Ex. 1006, 8–9)); and Petitioner TASER’s communications system
`(“TACOM”) (id. at 5 (citing Pet. 10)).
`The Request does not identify, however, where in the Petition a
`ground of unpatentability based on these “proffered prior art” references was
`presented. The portions of the Petition and the Declaration of Dr. Houh
`(Ex. 1003) the Request cites (as discussing these “prior-art evidence”) are
`titled “State of the Art as of the ’452 Priority Date” (Pet. 7) or “State of the
`Art” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 92).
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`Under § 42.104(b), the Petition was required to set forth:
`(b) Identification of challenge. Provide a statement of the
`precise relief requested for each claim challenged. The statement
`must identify the following:
`(1) The claim;
`(2) The specific statutory grounds under 35 U.S.C.
`102 or 103 on which the challenge to the claim is based
`and the patents or printed publications relied upon for each
`ground;
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (underlined emphases added). As discussed above in
`Section I, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b), the Petition identified only two
`grounds of unpatentability: Ground 1 based on the combination of Pierce
`and Brundala; and Ground 2 based on the combination of Vasavada and
`Tabak. Pet. 4–6. Thus, the Petition’s § 42.104(b) statement did not
`specifically identify a ground of challenge based on Raytheon’s 20/20
`system, the “TACOM” system, the background section of the ’452 patent, or
`any other “prior-art evidence” discussed in the “State of the Art” section.
`The Request does not point to, nor do we discern, any discussion in
`the Petition’s analysis of the ground based on Vasavada and Tabak1 of using
`the purported “proffered prior art” described in the “State of the Art” section
`or any other knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art to teach the
`“instructing” feature of limitation 10[G]. See id. at 64–66. Nor does the
`Petition provide an analysis of how any such “proffered prior art” would be
`combined with Vasavada and Tabak to teach any claim.
`
`
`1 As discussed above, the Request is directed only to our denial of the
`ground based on Vasavada and Tabak. Req. Reh’g 1.
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`Plainly, we could not have misapprehended or overlooked arguments
`or grounds of unpatentability that were not presented or developed in the
`Petition.
`At best, the Request’s argument that the Decision overlooked “what a
`[person of ordinary skill in the art] would have known” (see Req. Reh’g 3)
`appears to be an attempt to introduce a new ground of unpatentability based
`on Raytheon’s 20/20 system, the “TACOM” system, or other prior art
`described in the “State of the Art” section (see id. at 4–5) that was not
`presented initially in the Petition. As discussed above, a request of rehearing
`is not a supplemental petition. Nor is it an opportunity to present a new
`theory of unpatentability that could have been presented and developed in
`the first instance in the Petition. We decline to consider this new ground of
`unpatentability asserted for the first time in Petitioner’s Request for
`Rehearing because Petitioner’s belated assertion disregards the requirements
`under § 42.104(b), as well as “the requirement that the initial petition
`identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the
`challenge to each claim.’” Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina
`Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis added)
`(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)). Cf. Sirona Dental Sys. GmbH v. Institut
`Straumann AG, 892 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It would . . . not be
`proper for the Board to deviate from the grounds in the petition and raise its
`own obviousness theory.” (emphasis added)) (citing SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu,
`138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356–57 (2018)).
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`D. Dr. Houh’s Testimony
`The Petition cited Dr. Houh’s testimony in support of Petitioner’s
`contention that Vasavada discloses limitation 10[G]. Pet. 64 (citing
`Ex. 1003 ¶ 285). In the paragraphs of his Declaration addressing limitation
`10[G], Dr. Houh relied on essentially the same disclosures of Vasavada
`discussed in the Petition. Compare Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 284–286 (citing Ex. 1010,
`4:1–13, 5:51–61, Figs. 2, 3, 4), with Pet. 64 (citing Ex. 1010, 4:1–6, 5:58–
`64, 2:31–46, Figs. 2, 4). Thus, for essentially the reasons discussed above,
`our Decision found that Dr. Houh’s testimony that Vasavada discloses
`limitation 10[G] was not supported by the cited disclosures of Vasavada.
`Dec. 32–33. In particular, we determined that
`None of the portions of Vasavada cited by Dr. Houh
`contain an explicit disclosure that signals 204 and 206 instruct
`the first and second recording devices (units 104 and 106) to
`begin recording a first set of record data and a second set of
`record data, respectively.
`Id. at 33.
`The Request asserts that the Decision overlooked “the record evidence
`that corroborates” Dr. Houh’s testimony. Req. Reh’g 13. The Request,
`however, does not identify specifically what “record evidence” the Decision
`overlooked or explain how Dr. Houh’s testimony was corroborated by the
`cited disclosures of Vasavada or any other evidence of record. Id. at 13–15.
`The Request appears to simply disagree with our determination that
`Dr. Houh’s testimony was not supported or corroborated by the disclosures
`of Vasavada. Mere disagreement with a decision is not a proper basis for
`rehearing when a party’s arguments were considered and addressed in the
`decision.
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`The Request also contends that we “overlooked Dr. Houh’s expertise
`in the field” (Req. Reh’g 13) and “[b]ased on his qualifications, Dr. Houh
`indisputably possesses sufficient technical expertise to be of assistance to the
`trier of fact” (id. at 15). We were not, however, required to accept
`Dr. Houh’s testimony merely because Petitioner offered it. See Skky, Inc. v.
`MindGeek, s.a.r.l., 859 F.3d 1014, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (the Board was not
`required to credit expert evidence simply because [a party] offered it) (citing
`In re Ethicon, Inc., 844 F.3d 1344, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017); 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.65(a)). Dr. Houh’s qualifications, impressive as they may be, do not by
`themselves render Dr. Houh’s testimony credible without being supported
`by underlying facts or evidence of record. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert
`testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the
`opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). As discussed above,
`upon review of the disclosures of Vasavada cited by Dr. Houh, we
`determined on our own that Dr. Houh’s testimony was not supported by
`Vasavada, and found Dr. Houh’s testimony not credible. Dec. 32–33.
`Finally, the Request asserts that Dr. Houh’s testimony was unrebutted
`because Patent Owner did not submit a declaration disputing Dr. Houh’s
`testimony. Req. Reh’g 13–15. Petitioner appears to turn the burdens
`requirement of an inter partes review proceeding on its head. Patent Owner
`had no obligation to “rebut” Petitioner’s contentions or submit a declaration
`“rebutting” Petitioner’s contention that Vasavada discloses limitation 10[G].
`See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.107(a) (“The patent owner may file a preliminary
`response to the petition.” (emphasis added)), 42.108(c) (“The Board’s
`decision will take into account a patent owner preliminary response where
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`such a response is filed, including any testimonial evidence, . . . .” (emphasis
`added)). Rather, it was Petitioner’s burden to demonstrate sufficiently in the
`Petition that the cited prior art renders the challenged claims unpatentable,
`including showing that the Petition’s contentions (e.g., Vasavada discloses
`limitation 10[G]) are supported by evidence. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a);
`Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“In
`an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with
`particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” (emphases
`added)) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)); Intelligent Bio-Sys., 821 F.3d at 1369
`(requiring “the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that
`supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’” (emphases added)).
`As discussed above, the Decision properly determined that the Petition did
`not meet this burden required on Petitioner.
`
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not demonstrated that we
`abused our discretion or that we misapprehended or overlooked any matter
`in our Decision denying institution of inter partes review of the challenged
`claims of the ’452 patent. Petitioner, therefore, has not carried its burden of
`demonstrating that the Decision denying institution should be modified. See
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).
`
`V. ORDER
`Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
`is DENIED.
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`For PETITIONER:
`
`Michael Specht
`Richard Bemben
`Michelle Holoubek
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX PLLC
`mspecht-ptab@sternekessler.com
`rbemben-ptab@sternekessler.com
`holoubek-ptab@sternekessler.com
`
`For PATENT OWNER:
`Jennifer Bailey
`Marshall Honeyman
`ERISE IP
`jennifer.bailey@eriseip.com
`marshall.honeyman@eriseip.com
`
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