Paper No. 6
`Filed: May 24, 2017
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`CULTEC, INC.,
`Petitioner
`v.
`
`STORMTECH LLC,
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-00777
`Patent 9,255,394
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`to Petition for Inter Partes Review
`of U.S. Patent No. 9,255,394
`
`
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`
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2017-00777
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`Preliminary Statement .................................................................................... 1
`
`The Patent Office Already Considered the Art and Arguments of
`Grounds 1-4 .................................................................................................... 2
`
`III. The Board Should Deny Institution of Grounds 1-4 Because They Do
`Not Disclose or Suggest Crest Sub-Corrugations Terminating Below
`the Chamber Top as Recited in Claims 1-17 .................................................. 4
`
`A. Ground 1 Provides Nothing More Than an Incomplete Basis for
`Modifying Cobb ................................................................................... 6
`
`B.
`
`The Board Should Deny Institution on Ground 2 Because Fouss
`Does Not Disclose or Suggest Sub-Corrugations Terminating
`Below the Chamber Top ...................................................................... 9
`
`C. Ground 3 Fails to Provide a Basis for Institution Because Ellis
`Does Not Disclose or Suggest Sub-Corrugations Terminating
`Below the Chamber Top .................................................................... 12
`
`D.
`
`The Board Should Deny Institution on Ground 4 Because
`Petitioner Provides No Explanation for Combining Cobb,
`Fouss, and Ellis .................................................................................. 15
`
`IV. The Board Should Deny Institution of Grounds 1-4 Because They Do
`Not Disclose or Suggest Valley Sub-Corrugations Terminating Above
`the Base as Recited in Claims 11 and 17-20 ................................................ 18
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Petitioner’s Referential Argument Does Not Account for the
`Language of Claim 18 ........................................................................ 19
`
`The Petition’s References Do Not Disclose or Suggest
`Terminating Valley Sub-Corrugations at an Elevation Above
`the Base .............................................................................................. 20
`
`V.
`
`The Board Should Not Institute Review on the Basis of Grounds 3 and
`4 Because Ellis Is Nonanalogous Art ........................................................... 23
`
`VI. The Board Should Deny Institution of All Grounds Because Cobb Is
`Not Prior Art ................................................................................................. 27
`
`i
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`
`

`

`A.
`
`The Inventors Conceived the Claimed Invention Prior to
`Cobb’s Priority Date ........................................................................... 28
`
`Case No. IPR2017-00777
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`6.
`
`7.
`
`8.
`
`9.
`
`Claim 1 ..................................................................................... 29
`
`Claim 2 ..................................................................................... 37
`
`Claim 3 ..................................................................................... 38
`
`Claim 4 ..................................................................................... 39
`
`Claim 5 ..................................................................................... 40
`
`Claim 6 ..................................................................................... 41
`
`Claim 7 ..................................................................................... 42
`
`Claim 9 ..................................................................................... 43
`
`Claim 11 ................................................................................... 44
`
`10. Claim 12 ................................................................................... 45
`
`11. Claim 13 ................................................................................... 46
`
`12. Claim 14 ................................................................................... 47
`
`13. Claim 15 ................................................................................... 55
`
`14. Claim 16 ................................................................................... 56
`
`15. Claim 17 ................................................................................... 57
`
`16. Claim 18 ................................................................................... 58
`
`17. Claim 20 ................................................................................... 66
`
`B.
`
`The Inventors Reduced to Practice Claims 1-7, 9, 11-18, and 20
`Before Cobb ....................................................................................... 67
`
`VII. The Board Should Exercise Its Discretion to Deny Redundant
`Grounds That Are Not Distinguished ........................................................... 68
`
`VIII. Conclusion .................................................................................................... 70
`
`ii
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`Case No. IPR2017-00777
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`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Federal Cases
`Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc.,
`832 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Google Inc. v.
`Arendi S.A.R.L., No. 16-626, 2017 WL 1040877 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2017) .............. 8
`
`Page(s)
`
`Coleman v. Dines,
`754 F.2d 353 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ............................................................................28
`
`Fox Grp., Inc. v. Cree, Inc.,
`700 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ..........................................................................67
`
`Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) ......................................................................................... 16, 22
`
`In re Bigio,
`381 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ..........................................................................23
`
`In re Clay,
`966 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ..................................................................... 23, 25
`
`In re Ellis,
`476 F.2d 1370 (C.C.P.A. 1973) ..........................................................................24
`
`In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,
`496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ..........................................................................25
`
`In re Kahn,
`441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .............................................................................. 9
`
`In re Klein,
`647 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ..........................................................................23
`
`In re Van Os,
`844 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ..........................................................................16
`
`In re Wood,
`599 F.2d 1032 (C.C.P.A. 1979) ..........................................................................23
`
`iii
`
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2017-00777
`
`Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc.,
`637 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ..........................................................................23
`
`Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
`688 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ..........................................................................26
`
`Kridl v. McCormick,
`105 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ..........................................................................28
`
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) .................................................................................... passim
`
`Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc.,
`525 U.S. 55 (1998) ..............................................................................................27
`
`Plas-Pak Indus., Inc. v. Sulzer Mixpac AG,
`600 F. App’x 755 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ....................................................................... 6
`
`Singh v. Brake,
`222 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ..........................................................................28
`
`Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal-Lite, Inc.,
`304 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ..........................................................................28
`
`Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP,
`661 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ..........................................................................67
`
`Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels,
`812 F.3d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ..........................................................................26
`
`Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc.,
`655 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ..........................................................................16
`
`Board Authority
`2Wire, Inc. v. TQ Delta LLC,
`IPR2015-00240, Paper 18 (P.T.A.B. May 29, 2015) .........................................15
`
`Berk-Tek LLC v. Belden Techs. Inc.,
`IPR2013-00057, Paper 21 (P.T.A.B. May 14, 2013) .........................................69
`
`Conopco, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
`IPR2013-00505, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 12, 2014) ............................................69
`
`iv
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`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2017-00777
`
`Dexcowin Glob., Inc. v. Aribex, Inc.,
`IPR2016-00440, Paper 13 (P.T.A.B. July 7, 2016) ............................................25
`
`Dominion Dealer Sols., LLC v. Autoalert, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00225, Paper 15 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 10, 2013). .........................................17
`
`GN Resound A/S v. Oticon A/S,
`IPR2015-00103, Paper 10 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 29, 2015), request for reh’g
`denied, Paper 13 (P.T.A.B. June 18, 2015) ................................................. 18, 23
`
`Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. Uniloc USA, Inc.,
`IPR2015-00178, Paper 10 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 21, 2015). .......................................... 7
`
`Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
`CBM2012-00003, Paper 7 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2012) .................................. 69, 70
`
`Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
`CBM2012-00003, Paper 8 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2012) .........................................17
`
`Neil Ziegman, N.P.Z., Inc. v. Stephens,
`IPR2015-01860, Paper 11 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 24, 2016) ............................................ 4
`
`Riverbed Tech., Inc. v. Parallel Networks, LLC,
`IPR2014-01398, Paper 11 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 27, 2015) ..........................................69
`
`Federal Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (1999) ........................................................................................27
`
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) ........................................................................................ 17, 22
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ............................................................................................ 17, 22
`
`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) .................................................................................................2, 3
`
`Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(n), 125 Stat.
`284, 293 (2011) ...................................................................................................27
`
`
`
`v
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`

`

`Case No. IPR2017-00777
`
`I.
`
`Preliminary Statement
`
`Petitioner Cultec, Inc.’s petition merely reargues points that its counsel
`
`already raised—and that the Patent Office soundly rejected—during prosecution of
`
`U.S. Patent No. 9,255,394 (“the ’394 patent”) (Ex. 1001). In 2015, the Examiner
`
`applied U.S. Patent No. 4,360,042 to Fouss et al. (“Fouss”) (Ex. 1003) during
`
`prosecution, considered detailed claim charts from Cultec’s counsel that allegedly
`
`compared U.S. Patent No. 8,491,224 to Cobb et al. (“Cobb”) (Ex. 1002) to Patent
`
`Owner StormTech LLC’s application, and then ultimately allowed the claims.
`
`Notably, the comparison by Cultec’s counsel provided the Patent Office with
`
`the same citations of Cobb that are in the instant petition. The features allegedly
`
`disclosed by U.S. Patent No. 6,497,333 to Ellis et al. (“Ellis”) (Ex. 1004),
`
`according to the petition, were already considered by the Examiner. If the Board
`
`reaches the merits of these grounds, however, it will still find them deficient.
`
`Cultec’s muddled and redundant petition fails to formulate a reasonable, and
`
`much less a complete, explanation as to how and why the cited references disclose
`
`crest sub-corrugations terminating below the chamber top and valley sub-
`
`corrugations terminating above the base. First, two of the three references on
`
`which the petition relies cannot be used to render the claims of the ’394 patent
`
`obvious. That is, Ellis is not analogous art, and Cobb includes a priority date that
`
`falls after the inventors’ actual reduction to practice of the invention recited in
`
`1
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`

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`Case No. IPR2017-00777
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`claims 1-7, 9, 11-18, and 20 of the ’394 patent. For at least these reasons, the
`
`Board should deny institution of Grounds 1-4. Second, Petitioner’s proposed
`
`grounds are redundant and Petitioner does not explain why its case warrants such
`
`redundancy. Accordingly, the petition should be treated as a single ground.
`
`II. The Patent Office Already Considered the Art and Arguments of
`Grounds 1-4
`
`The Board should deny institution of Grounds 1-4 because the Patent Office
`
`already considered their art and arguments. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). The Examiner
`
`applied Fouss during prosecution and allowed the claims after also considering
`
`Cobb, including the same passages of Cobb identified and relied on by the petition.
`
`Further, the features the petition alleges are disclosed by Ellis were already
`
`considered by the Examiner during prosecution. As a result, the petition only
`
`duplicates considerations already evaluated by the Patent Office.
`
`Throughout prosecution of the application that became the ’394 patent, the
`
`Examiner applied Fouss. See, e.g., Ex. 1010 at 131-132, 180-182. Indeed, it served
`
`as the primary basis for rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in both office actions. Id.
`
`The Examiner also considered Cobb. Id. at 22-23. Not only did the Patent Office
`
`allow the application with knowledge of Cobb’s existence, the Examiner
`
`considered the same Cobb citations used in the petition. Compare id. at 121-124,
`
`with Pet. 30-33.
`
`2
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`

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`Case No. IPR2017-00777
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`Specifically, Petitioner’s counsel submitted a claim chart allegedly mapping
`
`portions of Cobb to each limitation of the ’394 patent claims. Ex. 1010 at 121-124.
`
`Fewer than two months later and after considering this chart, the Examiner allowed
`
`the claims over Fouss, Cobb, and many other pertinent references. Accordingly,
`
`the Board should deny institution of Grounds 1 and 2 under § 325(d) because the
`
`Patent Office previously considered Cobb and Fouss, the sole bases for those
`
`grounds.
`
`Further, the petition uses Ellis to demonstrate nothing more than features
`
`already presented by Fouss during prosecution. Namely, Petitioner alleges that
`
`both Fouss and Ellis show that terminating corrugations would “improve the
`
`strength and resistance to buckling.” Pet. 29; see also Pet. 28. Indeed, the petition
`
`applies both Fouss and Ellis in an attempt to remedy the same admitted deficiency
`
`of Cobb, i.e., crest sub-corrugations terminating below the chamber top.
`
`Pet. 28-30. And the Examiner considered Fouss as allegedly teaching sub-
`
`corrugations that terminate below the chamber top. Ex. 1010 at 131. The addition
`
`of Ellis merely adds an inferior, nonanalogous reference to attempt to cure the
`
`same deficiency. Because Ellis is used to allege that terminating crest sub-
`
`corrugations below the chamber top would be obvious—a position considered by
`
`the Examiner during prosecution—the Board should deny institution of Ellis-based
`
`Grounds 3 and 4. See, e.g., Neil Ziegman, N.P.Z., Inc. v. Stephens, IPR2015-01860,
`
`3
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`Case No. IPR2017-00777
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`Paper 11 at 9-11 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 24, 2016) (denying institution of grounds based on
`
`references not cited during prosecution because the new references were relied on
`
`to show features considered by the Examiner).
`
`Because Grounds 1-4 only use references and arguments already considered
`
`by the Patent Office, including the same portions of Cobb relied on by the petition,
`
`the Board should deny institution.
`
`III. The Board Should Deny Institution of Grounds 1-4 Because They Do
`Not Disclose or Suggest Crest Sub-Corrugations Terminating Below the
`Chamber Top as Recited in Claims 1-17
`
`Review should not be instituted for the simple reason that none of the
`
`references or combination of references identified in the petition disclose or
`
`suggest “each crest sub-corrugation terminat[ing] at an elevation lower than the
`
`chamber top,” a required feature of independent claims 1 and 14. Ex. 1001 at
`
`13:25-27, 14:19-21. An example of this feature is shown in Figures 1 and 2
`
`(reproduced below with annotations) of the ’394 patent. See, e.g., id. at 3:38-47,
`
`Figs. 1, 2.
`
`4
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`Case No. IPR2017-00777
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`
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`Petitioner admits in Ground 1 that Cobb fails to consider sub-corrugations
`
`terminating below the chamber top, and Petitioner includes only an incomplete
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`substitution rationale. Pet. 21, 24-25, 27-28. Petitioner then tries to remedy this
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`deficiency in Grounds 2 and 3, which identify Fouss and Ellis. Pet. 28-30. But
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`neither Fouss nor Ellis discloses sub-corrugations that terminate below the
`
`chamber top. Indeed, Ellis does not even contemplate sub-corrugations, and
`
`Petitioner provides no reasoning why one would combine all three of Ellis, Cobb,
`
`and Fouss to somehow arrive at the claimed invention. Ground 4 similarly cobbles
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`together—without any reasoned explanation—disparate citations from the three
`
`different references. Pet. 30-33. For the reasons explained below, the Board should
`5
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`Case No. IPR2017-00777
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`deny institution on Grounds 1-4 for independent claims 1 and 14, as well as claims
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`2-13 and 15-17 that depend from them.
`
`A. Ground 1 Provides Nothing More Than an Incomplete Basis for
`Modifying Cobb
`In Ground 1, the petition acknowledges that Cobb does not disclose crest
`
`sub-corrugations terminating at an elevation lower than the top of the chamber.
`
`Pet. 24. Petitioner then provides an incomplete basis for modifying Cobb.
`
`Pet. 24-28. Petitioner’s rationale, however, does not provide any basis for
`
`instituting review.
`
`Petitioner does not establish that terminating sub-corrugations were a known
`
`alternative to continuous sub-corrugations in stormwater chambers before the ’394
`
`patent. Because the petition includes no basis for terminating sub-corrugations, it
`
`cannot suggest modifying Cobb’s continuous sub-corrugations to terminate below
`
`the chamber top as claimed. Petitioner fails to articulate a complete rationale, and
`
`thus, the Board should deny institution of Ground 1.
`
`Petitioner’s suggestion that the ’394 patent’s novel combinations of features
`
`might yield predictable results or might be known in the prior art is insufficient.
`
`See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007); see also Plas-Pak
`
`Indus., Inc. v. Sulzer Mixpac AG, 600 F. App’x 755, 757-58 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
`
`Rather, Petitioner must establish that the prior art collectively disclosed or
`
`suggested each and every claimed feature and provide a reasoned explanation for
`
`6
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`Case No. IPR2017-00777
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`why the skilled artisan would have made the claimed combinations. KSR, 550 U.S.
`
`at 418. Here, Petitioner fails to do either. Rather, Ground 1 mirrors similarly
`
`flawed petitions that provided “neither a sufficiently articulated reasoning nor a
`
`rational evidentiary underpinning explaining why an ordinary artisan would have
`
`had considered it obvious.” Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. Uniloc USA, Inc., IPR2015-
`
`00178, Paper 10 at 11 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 21, 2015).
`
`While Petitioner admits that Cobb does not disclose terminating crest sub-
`
`corrugations, it points to no other prior art evidencing that terminating crest sub-
`
`corrugations were known in the field prior to the ’394 patent. Instead, it provides a
`
`supposed substitution rationale without ever establishing that a skilled artisan even
`
`knew of using terminating sub-corrugations in stormwater chambers at the time of
`
`the invention. See Pet. 24-28. For example, the petition actively misrepresents the
`
`disclosures of Cobb, stating that it “discloses valley sub-corrugations that . . . will
`
`‘gradually fade out’ to nothing.” Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1002 at 8:57-66). To the
`
`contrary, Cobb states that “the sub-corrugation feature 108 begins to gradually fade
`
`out . . . when moving further downward along the chamber sidewall.” Ex. 1002 at
`
`8:56-66. Thus, Cobb never discloses sub-corrugations terminating below the
`
`chamber top, and fading “to nothing” has no support in its disclosure. Because the
`
`petition never explains how or why a skilled artisan knew of using terminating sub-
`
`corrugations in stormwater chambers at the time of the invention, the petition fails
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`7
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`Case No. IPR2017-00777
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`to provide a complete obviousness analysis. That is, Petitioner relies on a
`
`substitution rationale that presupposes the claimed elements were known, when in
`
`fact the claimed terminating sub-corrugations were not known outside of the ’394
`
`patent.
`
`To the extent Petitioner intends to rely on a “common sense” rationale to
`
`supply the missing limitations, the petition similarly suffers from a fatal flaw. The
`
`petition does not provide “evidence and a reasoned explanation” regarding the
`
`presence of the missing limitation in the prior art. Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc.,
`
`832 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Google Inc. v. Arendi
`
`S.A.R.L., No. 16-626, 2017 WL 1040877 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2017). Such evidence and
`
`explanation is particularly necessary where “the missing limitation goes to the
`
`heart of an invention.” Id.
`
`Petitioner admits that terminating crest sub-corrugations distinguish the
`
`claims from Cobb. Pet. 21, 24. This limitation, distinguishing the claims from the
`
`cited references, evidences that the terminating crest sub-corrugations are an
`
`important feature of the claimed invention, like that in Arendi. Petitioner, however,
`
`provides no explanation as to how one skilled in the art would, based on the prior
`
`art, know to modify Cobb to use the claimed terminating sub-corrugations.
`
`Petitioner’s assertions on Ground 1 amount to a collection of conclusory
`
`statements. But that is not enough here. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir.
`
`8
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`

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`Case No. IPR2017-00777
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`2006); see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Accordingly, the Board should find that
`
`Petitioner has not established that terminating sub-corrugations were known prior
`
`to the ’394 patent.
`
`B.
`
`The Board Should Deny Institution on Ground 2 Because Fouss
`Does Not Disclose or Suggest Sub-Corrugations Terminating
`Below the Chamber Top
`Ground 2 identifies Fouss as allegedly curing the defects of Ground 1.
`
`Pet. 28. But Fouss, like Cobb, does not teach or suggest crest sub-corrugations
`
`terminating below the chamber top.
`
`As an initial matter, Petitioner fails to appreciate that Fouss’s chamber
`
`design includes a corrugation having a “rounded recess,” which is a different
`
`design than Cobb’s “sub-corrugation feature.” Compare Ex. 1003 at 5:26-28, Fig.
`
`5, with Ex. 1002 at 8:5-7, Fig. 19 (reproduced below with annotations). Fouss
`
`relies on ribs on either side of its rounded recess to provide structural integrity. Ex.
`
`1003 at 5:14-35. Conversely, Cobb inserts a rib into the middle of its “sub-
`
`corrugation feature” to support its load. Ex. 1002 at Fig. 19. Petitioner fails to
`
`reconcile this fundamental difference in the cross-sections of Fouss and Cobb,
`
`which are illustrated below.
`
`9
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`Case No. IPR2017-00777
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`
`
`Petitioner fails to even acknowledge these differences. Petitioner also does
`
`not explain how a skilled artisan would accomplish combining these different
`
`features or why a skilled artisan would seek to further increase the overall weight
`
`and material costs of a chamber by combining the thicker ribs in Cobb with the
`
`additional rounded recesses of Fouss. Moreover, Petitioner’s arguments do not
`
`provide any reasoning why a skilled artisan would understand the “rounded recess”
`
`in Fouss to apply to the “sub-corrugation feature” of Cobb. Further, the petition
`
`does not explain how Fouss discloses any termination points, much less how they
`
`10
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`Case No. IPR2017-00777
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`would still apply to the raised and thickened sub-corrugation feature of Cobb.
`
`See Pet. 28.
`
`Additionally, the recesses in Fouss do not terminate below the chamber top.
`
`To the contrary, as shown in the annotated figure below, Fouss merely includes a
`
`hinge at the apex of the chamber. Ex. 1003 at 2:34-38, Fig. 3.
`
`
`
`According to Fouss, “[t]he peak portions 26 are spaced a small distance
`
`apart at the apex area,” which is “sufficient to form [a] hinge.” Id. at 6:12-17
`
`(emphasis added). Because Fouss places the peak portions and rounded recess “at
`
`the apex area,” and since these features do not terminate below a chamber top,
`
`Fouss does not disclose or suggest terminating the rounded recesses below the top
`
`of the chamber. Accordingly, Ground 2 fails to provide an adequate basis for
`
`instituting review of claims 1 and 14. Moreover, claims 2-13 and 15-17 depend
`
`from one of claims 1 and 14, and thus also include crest sub-corrugations
`
`11
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`

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`Case No. IPR2017-00777
`
`terminating below the chamber top. Therefore, the Board should deny institution of
`
`Ground 2 for claims 1-17.
`
`C. Ground 3 Fails to Provide a Basis for Institution Because Ellis
`Does Not Disclose or Suggest Sub-Corrugations Terminating
`Below the Chamber Top
`
`Petitioner continues its theme of incomplete invalidity theories in Ground 3,
`
`where it argues that Ellis—which relates to cylindrical, handheld plastic bottles—
`
`somehow would inform a skilled artisan on how to design drastically larger and
`
`heavier open-bottom stormwater chambers for use under several feet of soil. See
`
`Pet. 29-30. Like Petitioner’s other identified references, Ellis fails to disclose
`
`terminating sub-corrugations. In fact, Ellis fails to disclose any sub-corrugations.
`
`Ellis relates to an entirely different field, i.e., cylindrical and handheld
`
`plastic bottles that have grooves. Ex. 1004 at 4:20-28, 5:8-17, Figs. 1, 4, 5, 5A.
`
`As shown below in the correct orientation1 and compared to the claimed invention,
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`the water bottles disclosed in Ellis have nothing to do with the field of the ’394
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`patent.
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`1 The petition effectively mischaracterizes Ellis by rotating Figure 1 without
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`providing any explanation as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would interpret
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`Ellis’s figures in this fashion. Pet. 45, 58.
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`Ellis, for example, discloses handheld bottles for storing consumables, such
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`as “foodstuffs,” medicines, and liquids (Ex. 1004 at 1:18-20), and is classified in
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`United States Patent Classification (USPC) 215, titled “Bottles and Jars,” and
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`USPC 220, titled “Receptacles” (id. at 1). By contrast, the ’394 patent, classified in
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`Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC) class E03F for “Sewers; Cesspools,”2
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`describes underground stormwater chambers that can be 90 inches long, 77 inches
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`wide, 45 inches high, and weigh 120 to 130 pounds. See, e.g., Ex. 1001 at 1, 9:55-
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`10:15. Cobb and Fouss also involve entirely different technical subject matter than
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`Ellis. Ex. 1002 at 1, 1:13-23 (describing its application in “plastic detention
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`2 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office recently switched from classifying issued
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`patents using the USPC scheme to the new CPC scheme. While the USPC classes
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`do not map directly to the CPC classes, the difference in the subject matter of the
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`respective classes of the ’394 patent and Ellis illustrates the chasm between their
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`disclosures.
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`chambers for burial in the earth for use in temporary stormwater detention”);
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`Ex. 1003 at 1, 1:13-18 (describing its disclosure as “applicable to culverts, tunnels,
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`[and] subterranean conduits”).
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`The grooves in Ellis do not terminate below a chamber top. The top portion
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`of the cylindrical bottle described in Ellis is determined with reference to the axial
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`direction, and it is the portion that includes a screw-top opening and a neck. See
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`Ex. 1004 at Fig. 1, Abstract (“A container is provided which includes a top portion
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`having an opening . . . .”). Thus, it is impossible for Ellis, which merely includes
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`indentations running perpendicular to the axial direction, to disclose or suggest
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`sub-corrugations that terminate below a stormwater chamber’s top.
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`Accordingly, Ellis falls short of rendering claim 1 obvious. The claims
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`require termination points at specific locations, namely, below the top of the
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`chamber. The features in Ellis are on a cylindrical vessel and lie on an axially
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`symmetric surface with no unique points, much less a top.
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`By rotating the image of Figure 1 of Ellis, Petitioner mischaracterizes Ellis
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`to suggest the presence of a “top” where none exists. See Pet. 45, 58. When viewed
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`in the proper context, the endpoints of the grooves in Ellis have no relation to the
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`described “top.” Ellis, therefore, would not provide any motivation or reason to
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`terminate the features in Cobb or Ellis at any particular point, much less below the
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`top of the chamber as required by the claims of the ’394 patent.
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`Petitioner does not even attempt to provide a reason why a person of
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`ordinary skill in the art would use the disclosures in Ellis to somehow arrive at the
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`conclusion that the features in Cobb should terminate below a chamber top.
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`See Pet. 29-30. Instead, Petitioner argues that Cobb discloses sub-corrugations for
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`use “in the widest, flattest areas of the chamber.” Id. But despite this disclosure, it
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`is clear that Cobb never discloses terminating sub-corrugations. Id. As explained
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`above, Ellis also does not disclose this feature. And Petitioner never reconciles this
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`shortcoming in both Cobb and Ellis. Accordingly, the Board should find
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`Petitioner’s incomplete arguments unpersuasive. See, e.g., 2Wire, Inc. v. TQ Delta
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`LLC, IPR2015-00240, Paper 18 at 8-10 (P.T.A.B. May 29, 2015) (denying
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`obviousness grounds that lack sufficient explanation).
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`Ground 3 fails to present that Petitioner has a reasonable likelihood of
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`success on proving that claims 1 and 14 are unpatentable. Moreover, claims 2-13
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`and 15-17 depend from one of claims 1 and 14, and thus also include crest sub-
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`corrugations terminating below the chamber top. Therefore, the Board should deny
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`institution of Ground 3 for claims 1-17.
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`D. The Board Should Deny Institution on Ground 4 Because
`Petitioner Provides No Explanation for Combining Cobb, Fouss,
`and Ellis
`Ground 4 must fail for all claims because it does not provide any rationale
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`for combining Cobb, Fouss, and Ellis. In fact, in Ground 4, Petitioner does not
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`even acknowledge the basic legal requirements for obviousness. See Pet. 30-33; cf.
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`Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966); KSR, 550 U.S. 398.
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`And yet again, Petitioner’s Ground 4 merely recites unexplained citations, and
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`Petitioner does not even purport that any of those citations provide a reason to
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`combine the three references. Pet. 30-33.
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`A finding of obviousness requires explicit reasoning for combining
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`teachings from separate references. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; see also Unigene Labs.,
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`Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[O]bviousness requires
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`the additional showing that a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention
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`would have selected and combined those prior art elements in the normal course of
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`research and development to yield the claimed invention.”). Because Ground 4
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`includes no reason to combine the references, it fails to provide an obviousness
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`challenge with any chance of success.
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`To the extent that the Board considers importing Petitioner’s incomplete
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`rationales from other grounds, doing so would be improper because Petitioner
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`never explains why one of ordinary skill would combine teachings from all three
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`references. In re Van Os, 844 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“KSR specifically
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`instructs that when determining whether there would have been a motivation to
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`combine, the ‘analysis should be made explicit.’” (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 418)).
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`That is, Petitioner never provides any explanation of how all three references—
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`Fouss, Ellis, and Cobb—could or would be combined wi