UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_________________
`
`SONY CORPORATION,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`
`FUJIFILM CORPORATION,
`Patent Owner.
`_________________
`
`Case IPR2017-00809
`Patent 6,703,106 B2
`_________________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held: May 17, 2018
`_________________
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`
`
`
`Before JO-ANNE M. KOKOSKI, JEFFREY W. ABRAHAM, and
`MICHELLE N. ANKENBRAND, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
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`_________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_________________
`
`SONY CORPORATION,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`
`FUJIFILM CORPORATION,
`Patent Owner.
`_________________
`
`Case IPR2017-00809
`Patent 6,703,106 B2
`_________________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held: May 17, 2018
`_________________
`
`
`
`
`Before JO-ANNE M. KOKOSKI, JEFFREY W. ABRAHAM, and
`MICHELLE N. ANKENBRAND, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`Case IPR2017-00809
`Patent 6,703,106 B2
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`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`
` RICHARD F. GIUNTA, ESQUIRE
` ELISABETH H. HUNT, Ph.D.
` WOLF, GREENFIELD & SACKS, P.C.
` 600 Atlantic Avenue
` Boston, Massachusetts 02210-2206
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
`
` MICHAEL E. KNIERIM, ESQUIRE
` BAKER BOTTS, LLP
` 30 Rockefeller Plaza
` New York, New York 10112
`
` ELIOT D. WILLIAMS, ESQUIRE
` BAKER BOTTS, LLP
` 1001 Page Mill Road
` Building One, Suite 200
` Palo Alto, California 94304-1007
`
`
`
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on May 17, 2018,
`commencing at 1:00 p.m., at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
`Madison Building, 600 Dulaney Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22314.
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`P R O C E E D I N G S
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: Okay. Welcome. This is the hearing in
`IPR2017-00809 regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,703,106. I'm Judge
`Abraham, and with me today are Judges Ankenbrand and Kokoski.
` Let's begin by having appearances, starting with the
`Petitioner.
` MR. GIUNTA: Good afternoon, Your Honors. Richard
`Giunta and Elisabeth Hunt from Wolf Greenfield for Petitioner,
`Sony Corporation.
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: Okay. Welcome.
` And Patent Owner?
` MR. KNIERIM: Thank you, and good afternoon, Your
`Honors. This is Michael Knierim from Baker Botts on behalf of the
`Patent Owner. With me is Eliot Williams, also from Baker Botts.
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: Okay. Welcome.
` All right. We sent out a hearing order on May 4th,
`2018. According to that order, each party will have 60 minutes of
`total time for their arguments, and we're going to follow the
`procedure that we outlined in terms of who will go first and who
`will follow after that. Because we have a noncontingent motion to
`amend here, we're going to allow Petitioner -- I'm sorry -- Patent
`Owner to start and address the statutory considerations for filing
`a motion to amend.
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` Are there any questions about the procedure, the amount
`of time, or anything like that from any of the parties?
`Petitioner?
` MR. GIUNTA: The only question we have, Your Honor, is
`Dr. Hunt and I plan to split the time, and I'm wondering if, when
`I begin, if we can set the time for 30 minutes so that I am sure I
`don't bleed into her time.
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: Absolutely.
` MR. GIUNTA: Thank you.
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: Any questions on your end?
` MR. KNIERIM: I have no questions, Your Honor.
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: Okay. Just a few things: When you're
`going through your presentations, we do have the demonstratives
`that you provided. I notice they're also up on the screen, but
`please refer to them by slide number. It helps keep an accurate
`record so when we go back and review it, we'll know exactly which
`slide you're referring to.
` And please, when you're speaking, speak into the
`microphone so that we can hear you.
` Other than that, I'll invite Patent Owner to the podium
`to begin and ask if you'd like to reserve time now or I can just
`start at 60 minutes and count down, whichever you'd prefer.
` MR. KNIERIM: Thank you, Your Honor. I would like to
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`reserve 40 minutes. And Your Honors, I do have photocopies,
`additional hard copies of the demonstratives if you would like a
`copy.
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: I don't need them.
` Judge Ankenbrand, would you like it?
` JUDGE ANKENBRAND: I'm okay.
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: The court reporter might -- like I said,
`if you haven't already provided hard copies --
` MR. KNIERIM: I believe a copy has been provided.
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: Okay. So we're all set. Begin whenever
`you're ready.
` MR. KNIERIM: Thank you, Your Honors.
` So I'd like to start with a brief overview of what is
`disputed and perhaps just as importantly, what's not disputed by
`Petitioner. And if we could turn to slide 5.
` Petitioner does not dispute that the motion was properly
`filed. It includes a reasonable number of claims for the
`substitute claim supported by the original disclosure of the
`patent. So unless the Board has any questions about these
`requirements, I will proceed to discuss the other parts that are
`in dispute.
` So if you turn to slide 6, Petitioner does dispute that
`the amendment properly responds to a ground of institution; that
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`it does not enlarge the claimed scope and that substitute claim 7
`(indiscernible) patentable. And per the Board's order in
`(indiscernible), I wanted to address that last point on rebuttal.
`And before turning to the merits of the first two disputes, I
`think it makes sense to take a quick look at the amendments
`themselves and the claim construction issues related to them, just
`to refresh everybody's memory and frame the issues.
` And if we could turn to slide 8. There are three
`amendments in particular that I want to emphasize for this
`discussion, and the first of those is the change from track width
`(A) -- A in parenthesis -- that was in the original claims to the
`read head width (A).
` And the second change I want to emphasize is for that
`average longer size term, which also appeared in the original
`claims. Now that the substitute claims recite that the average
`longer size is the average value -- average of the largest value
`of the width, that the abrasion particles and said one or more
`clusters.
` And the third change I want to emphasize for the purpose
`of this discussion is that the claims recite that each of
`said one or more clusters as a whole is taken as one.
` Now, the first amendment I mentioned here, the change
` from track width (A) to read head width (A) is significant because, in
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`the institution decision -- it's paper 13, I believe -- the Board
`found that the broadest reasonable interpretation in this claim
`covered three possible values. And there's actually an excerpt
`from the institution decision on this, slide 13 if it's -- slide
`14 is helpful.
` And specifically -- and this is in response to what the
`Petitioner argued in its Petition, the Board found that the
`broadest reasonable interpretation of the original term "track
`width (A)" covered first the reciprocal track density, the width
`of recorded data, or the width of a read head. So there's three
`possible meanings, all covered by the original term.
` And for the variable (B), the average longer size -- if
`you could turn to slide 16. You can see in the Petition -- and
`this is actually -- there's an excerpt here from the institution
`decision, paper 13. Petitioner argued that the average
`longer size in the original claims would be measured from
`individual particles alone. Individual particles. And the Board
`agreed with that, and you can see in the excerpt here.
` And if we could turn to slide 17, the amendments in
`claims 7 and 8 clarify that what he should measure is the size of the
`clusters, if they're present. So you can no longer measure the
`size of the individual particles alone.
` And I'd like to jump right into Petitioner's argument
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`first regarding the scope of the claims. And this is slide 27.
` So their first argument here is that the amendment from
`track width to read head width broadens the claims because the
`original claims -- the original term "track width (A)" was
`indefinite. And so when we argued -- and you can see the excerpt here
`in their opposition at 5 -- that the Board did not find that the
`original term had ascertained the scope. But that's not what the
`institution decision says, and in particular, you can see the
`excerpt from paper 13 here that says that we are able to ascertain
`the proper claimed scope.
` If we can switch to slide --
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: Before you move on, Counselor. If you
`finish that sentence, it says, "We are able to ascertain the
`proper claim scope to allow us to apply the asserted prior art to
`the challenged claim." And so that preliminary construction was
`based on Petitioner's argument that it may not be clear exactly
`what track width means, but it could mean one of those three
`options. And under any of those three options, the prior art
`still satisfies the less-than-5 microns of track width.
` So it seems to me that the way you're approaching it is
`that you could just pick one of the three methods and that's --
`that's the scope of original claim 1.
` MR. KNIERIM: So I think the argument is slightly
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`different. I think what we're saying here is that the original
`claim 1, track width (A), if you accept what Petitioner argued in
`the Petition and what the Board reflected in the institution
`decision, that original term "track width (A)" alone could be
`broad enough to cover all three of those. And the ambiguity there
`is you don't know which one in particular it's referring to. But
`for the broadest reasonable interpretation, it could be any.
` Now, to be clear, Patent Owner has, in connection with
`related litigation, always maintained the position that the
`correct interpretation of that claim is read head width. But the
`amendment makes that clear. The amendment here says it's not the
`other possible values. It's just one of them. It's the read head
`width. And if you --
` JUDGE KOKOSKI: But isn't that the broadest possible
`value, at least that's what Petitioner argues, that of the three
`that are listed, the read head width is -- gives the claim term
`its broadest meaning?
` MR. KNIERIM: So -- thank you for that question. That's
`an excellent question. I would like to address that.
` So it is true that the read head width -- it's
`undisputed that that will be less than the two other options. So
`in some sense, it could be seen as the broadest of the three
`options, but the original claim -- the original term, "track width
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`(A)," encompassed all. So the correct inquiry is not necessarily
`which of these three is broadest. The correct inquiry is, is the
`substitute claim broader or narrower than the original claim?
` And if the original claim included either of the
`three -- let's just call them A, B, or C -- then the substitute
`claim cannot be broader if it only includes one, regardless of the
`comparison of each one inside of it.
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: Well, if the original one requires --
`original claim 1 requires A, B, or C, what's your position in
`terms of the scope of original claim 1? Does A, B, or C all have
`to give you a measurement below five, or does just one of A, B, or
`C need to give you a measurement below 5 microns?
` MR. KNIERIM: So I think under the broadest reasonable
`interpretation as put forth in the ID, it would be the latter
`of A, B, or C.
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: And what's the basis for saying that
`that's the right interpretation of the claim?
` MR. KNIERIM: Well, I have to say, Your Honor, the
`Patent Owner has never agreed that the correct interpretation of
`the original term should include all of those. Our position has
`been that it's read head width, but if we take a look, actually --
` JUDGE ANKENBRAND: Is that a position you raised in this
`proceeding?
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` MR. KNIERIM: It is not. We did not address that the
`claim construction (indiscernible).
` But if we could take a look at slide (indiscernible).
`So here's the excerpt from the institution decision. And the
`broadest reasonable interpretation that was put forth by
`Petitioner and not by the Board is that it could be -- and I'll
`just read this -- it should be interpreted to include track width
`values based on the reciprocal track density, the width of the
`recorded data, or the width of the read head. So it could be any
`one of those.
` JUDGE KOKOSKI: Could it be anything other than those
`three things?
` MR. KNIERIM: Not that I'm aware of, and I don't think
`there's anything in the record that suggests it's anything other
`than one of those.
` JUDGE KOKOSKI: Because -- well, because the proposed
`construction should include those, so I was just wondering whether
`that meant are there other ways out there that you could measure
`it.
` MR. KNIERIM: I don't think so, Your Honor.
` JUDGE KOKOSKI: Okay. Thank you.
` MR. KNIERIM: So if we could turn to slide 29 here. And
`actually, if we could see one more. That is Patent Owner's reply
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`on this issue, and I think this really clarifies it. Right? It's
`selecting one of three options narrows the broadest reasonable
`interpretation as applied by the Board.
` And if we could go to the next slide -- go to 31, the
`little graphic here. And there's a cite to a case law. And
`there's a great analogy here between Markush group that contains
`three options, and selecting one of those options, and that's a
`narrow (indiscernible).
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: In a Markush group situation, all of the
`members of that group would need to fall within the scope of the
`claim; isn't that right? If you have a Markush group that
`includes one or more of A, B, and C, then A, B, or C are all going
`to fall within the scope of that claim.
` MR. KNIERIM: Right. The claim would be broad enough to
`cover all of them. I think that's true.
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: So, here, we have got -- if it is, like
`you say, a Markush group, then doesn't that mean that when you
`measure the width using A, B, or C, they all have to be under 5
`microns?
` MR. KNIERIM: That's not my understanding, Your Honor.
`I think -- the way I understood it -- and, you know, in the
`institution decision, I think the word "or" clarifies this. If
`there's an embodiment or a piece of prior art or product that has
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`one of the three, it would fall within the literal scope of the
`broadest reasonable interpretation of the original
`(indiscernible).
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: So if there's -- if there's a prior art
`reference out there that talked about a track width measured by
`the inverse of track density that was 5.5 -- okay?
` MR. KNIERIM: Mm-hmm.
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: -- does that fall within the scope of
`the claim?
` MR. KNIERIM: Just by that statement alone, no.
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: But you know, based on the testimony,
`that the read head width is going to be less than that. So why
`doesn't it, if the read head width -- if it's, say, 70 percent,
`takes you below the 5.5 -- I'm sorry, the 5 microns in the claim,
`if it's an "or" like you say, then wouldn't that reference fall
`within the scope of the claim?
` MR. KNIERIM: That's an excellent question, and in
`response, I'll note that there's a disagreement about how
`accurately you can measure read head width from the inverse of
`track density. So, in that example, if the inverse of track
`density is 5.5, it's possible that the read head width would be
`5.4 or it's possible that it could be less than 5 microns. You
`just don't know.
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` There's a wide range. Even under some of these experts'
`original opinions, there's a wide range of percentages that have to
`fall under that, and we dispute that even that range is
`appropriate. It could be even wider. But you just don't know,
`based on that one data point, whether that's inside or outside.
`You know that the inverse of track density is outside. You
`wouldn't be able to speak (indiscernible).
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: So if the reference told you that the
`track or that the read head width was 4.4 and the inverse of track
`density was 5.5, would the -- would that reference fall within the
`scope of the claims?
` MR. KNIERIM: In the scope of the original claims? Yes,
`Your Honor. In fact, if we could bring up --
` JUDGE ANKENBRAND: So how is that similar to a Markush
`Group? I'm sorry.
` MR. KNIERIM: So the thought is -- the analogy is that
`the broadest reasonable construction of the original term has a
`list of things separated by an "or". So it could be A, B, or C.
`And that's similar to the Markush group. It could be any one of
`A, B, and/or C.
` And so by choosing one of them, they're narrow.
` JUDGE ANKENBRAND: The A, B, or C are typically all
`equivalent types of thing; right? And here, we're saying that not
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`all these three things are equivalent because you could have a
`read head width that meets or falls within the bounds of the
`claims and, at the same time, have an inverse of track density
`that's outside the bounds of the claims.
` MR. KNIERIM: That is true that you could have a read
`head width that would be less than 5 microns and an inverse of
`track density that's higher than 5 microns, but that would still
`be within the scope of the claims under that broadest reasonable
`interpretation.
` So if you think about -- and, actually, Sony provides an
`example with numbers, and I think the values they propose in their
`example are 4.4 microns for the read head width and 5.5 microns
`for the inverse of track density.
` So if you just think about this example, the question
`that you want to ask isn't whether either of those options is
`broader than the other. The question you want to ask is, you
`know, does that example infringe or is it covered by the original
`claims and then is it -- if not, is it covered by the substitute
`claims?
` So is there some subject matter that substitute claims
`covered that's not covered by the original claims? And I think if
`you think through every possible example you can think of, the
`answer is no, there's no situation in which the substitute claims
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`would cover something that's not already inside the scope of the
`initial claims.
` And I'd like to briefly address Petitioner's third
`argument here on broadening. And let's turn to slide 33. So this
`is for claim 8 only. This does not apply to claim 7. But
`Petitioner argues that claim 8 impermissibly broadens because --
`well, they have three rationales. I'll put them up on the screen
`here.
` And the first argument -- and if you can turn to slide
`34 here. The first argument is that the amendment converts claim
`2 from a dependent claim into an independent claim requiring none
`of the limitations of the claims.
` And that's not the case. Claim 2 is not a dependent
`claim. It was an independent claim.
` And if we could just read -- I'll read the preamble from
`claim 2. It says, "A magnetic recording media which is used in
`the magnetic recording and reproducing method as claimed in claim
`1." That language there in claim 2 that I just read, that's
`functional language regarding independent use. It doesn't convert
`that into a dependent claim.
` And if we could turn to slide 35, Petitioner's
`contention that claim 8 requires none of claim 1's limitations,
`that is inaccurate. Claim 8 incorporates all of claim 1's
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`limitations. So whereas claim 2 included this functional language
`regarding intended use, the use would be in a recording -- a
`method comprising -- recording and reproducing. So what we have
`here in claim 8 is a positive recitation of a magnetic head under
`the read head width (A) of less than 5 microns and (indiscernible)
`to record and reproduce the signal.
` And also claim 8 positively recites a magnetic recording
`medium. And that's --
` JUDGE ANKENBRAND: I had a question about that. The
`claim says "configured to record and reproduce a signal on a
`magnetic recording medium." How does it -- doesn't the claim just
`require something that's capable of doing that but not that it
`actually has to do that?
` MR. KNIERIM: So it's a system claim that recites this
`head that is configured to do that. So that would be --
` JUDGE ANKENBRAND: Right. But is that -- is the head
`required to do that? It's configured to do that but is it
`required to do that?
` MR. KNIERIM: I mean, I think that you'll need -- you
`use read heads for recording and reproducing. And so by saying
`"configured to," it means that it would be used for that.
` JUDGE ANKENBRAND: Rather than just capable of doing
`that?
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` MR. KNIERIM: Yes. That's the whole purpose of these
`things. There's no other use for them.
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: Where does claim 8 require a magnetic
`recording medium? When I read it, it says it requires a
`magnetic head that's configured to do certain things on a medium,
`but it doesn't say that the medium -- magnetic recording medium is
`actually required based on the plain language.
` MR. KNIERIM: So I would -- if we could look to the next
`slide, I would point you to the wherein clause after that. So
`"wherein the magnetic regarding medium is" and then "a magnetic
`recording medium comprising" -- in fact, the remainder of this
`claim is about the magnetic recording medium itself.
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: That's just the -- that's talking about
`what the head needs to be configured to produce a signal on.
`The second reference to the magnetic recording
`medium is referring back what the head needs to be configured to
`record and reproduce a signal on. I still don't see the link back
`to that medium being part of the actual system.
` MR. KNIERIM: So the way I read this claim, Your Honor,
`is that the magnetic recording medium -- or just a magnetic
`recording medium is positively recited as an element of
`the system. So the claim does not just claim the head, configured
`(indiscernible), it claims the head and the medium.
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` And if I could briefly just touch on the issue of how
`these amendments respond (indiscernible). If we could put up
`slide 40. Petitioner argues that Fujifilm's amendment to read
`head width is an attempt to cure indefiniteness in the original
`term "track width." And they cite a case, Veeam Software vs.
`Veritas, and say that this is improper. But that's not actually
`what that case says. In fact, that case says that it's perfectly
`fine to address indefiniteness issues as long as you have an
`amendment that responds to a ground. And, Your Honor, we believe
`we do here, and, in fact, this particular amendment that they call
`out is not responding to a ground does, in fact, respond to a
`ground. If we could flip to the next slide.
` The -- as I said, the original -- the broadest
`reasonable interpretation of the original term "track width"
`included the inverse of track density. Yamazaki discloses track
`density. No other reference discloses anything else related to
`track width.
` So if the broadest reasonable interpretation, the
`original term "the inverse of track density," Yamazaki is more
`important. So at the very least, by limiting us to read head
`width, we're responding to all the grounds of Yamazaki's
`(indiscernible), just all of them.
` If we could turn to slide 44, actually. So the second
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`argument Petitioner raises here is that the requirement of one or
`more clusters doesn't respond to a ground, and Your Honor, we
`submit that it does. And Petitioner is likely going to argue that
`every -- everybody agrees that clustering always happens. That's
`not actually the case. This isn't cited on the slide here, but,
`you know, Endo -- actually, this slide is the slide here. Endo
`does teach eliminating clustering and that clustering -- clusters
`do not form. And I'll point out that they're actually embodiments
`or examples -- comparative examples in the '106 patent itself that
`show that clusters do not form, and I'd point the Board to Table 1
`of Exhibit 1001, where the primary particle size is .15 microns,
`and there are samples where the cluster size was (indiscernible)
`microns.
` I'd like to --
` JUDGE ANKENBRAND: Did your expert agree that
`clusters -- or that particles would always form clusters on a
`magnetic layer surface?
` MR. KNIERIM: I believe what he said specifically was
`that he's never seen a tape that did not have clusters, which is
`not necessarily an agreement that clusters would always form.
` JUDGE ANKENBRAND: So you're saying there's a
`disagreement -- that you have raised a disagreement with
`Petitioner's argument that clusters will always form? Or do you
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`not make that argument?
` So Petitioner has argued that everyone agrees in this
`case that clusters will always form. And now, you're standing up
`there and saying, well, we don't agree to that. I'm just asking
`you, did you make that argument in your reply to the motion to
`amend?
` MR. KNIERIM: Yeah, I think we did. And thank you for
`clarifying that.
` So I believe in our paper that -- it's at page 5 to 6 --
`and this is where we refer or we discuss Endo's teaching. So the
`institution decision -- we acknowledge that Endo teaches
`eliminating clustering and that clusters do not form.
` And I'll point out also, Your Honor, that there's a
`related issue here and that the broadest reasonable
`interpretation -- the plain and ordinary meaning as applied by the
`Board, the average longer size term in the original claims would
`allow for the measurement of individual particles. And so by
`clarifying that that's not the case, that you have to measure
`clusters at the present, this amendment also responds to the
`grounds on that basis as well.
` JUDGE ANKENBRAND: You keep saying you have to measure
`clusters to the extent they exist, but my understanding of this claim is
`that you have to have at least one cluster. Is that --
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` MR. KNIERIM: That's correct. And thank you. Thank you
`for clarifying that. So the claims now actually possibly recite
`that there is at least one cluster.
` JUDGE ANKENBRAND: I just wanted to know if I was
`missing something, because I saw it on some of the slides as well,
`that you have to measure clusters if they exist, and I was
`thinking, well, I think, according to the amended claims, you have
`to have at least one cluster.
` MR. KNIERIM: Yes, that's correct, Your Honor.
` And with that, I'd like to reserve the balance of my
`time, unless there are any other questions.
` JUDGE ABRAHAM: Any questions?
` Okay. Thank you.
` Petitioner, whenever you're ready. 30 minutes on the
`clock.
` MR. GIUNTA: Yes, that's perfect. Thank you, Your
`Honor.
` So we oppose Fujifilm's Motion to Amend for three
`independent reasons. The motion seeks to aggressively
`enlarge the scope of the patent, fails to respond to a ground in
`the trial, and fails to distinguish the prior art. I'm going to
`address the improper enlargement of the scope of the patent, and then Dr.
`Hunt will
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`address the other issues.
` So if we take a look at slide 3, statute, specifically
`316(b)(3), it's explicit. A motion to amend, quote, "May not
`enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent," end quote.
` Take a look at slide 11. The Federal Circuit made
`clear in Cuozzo that a substitute claim that is broader in any
`respect enlarges the scope of the claims under 360(d)(3), even if
`it's narrower in other respects.
` I'm returning to slide 3. The Federal Circuit also made
`clear in Aqua Products that the Patent Owner has the burden to
`show that its Motion to Amend each statutory requirement in
`360(d)(3).
` JUDGE ANKENBRAND: Is that an actual holding of -- I
`take a little issue with that because I think there's a bunch of
`different opinions in that decision, and I take Judge O'Malley's
`majority opinion that the holding is very narrow and limited,
`not to address the specific -- where the burden is on -- under
`316(d).
` MR. GIUNTA: My assessment of the case, Your Honor --
`sorry -- is that there was no dispute about 316(d)(3) in
`particular, and we can take a look at --
` JUDGE ANKENBRAND: No, no, that's fine.
` MR. GIUNTA: -- (indiscernible) if you'd like.
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` JUDGE ANKENBRAND: No, that's fine. I just -- I was
`just looking at the very narrow holding of Aqua Products, which
`was limited to two sentences, I think, in the entire decision.
` MR. GIUNTA: I mean, I read Aqua Products again last
`night, and my take on it was that it's sort of a two-phased
`process where the Patent Owner, if they're going to file a motion
`to amend, must meet this statutory burden to show that its motion
`is proper and that, if they can meet that burden, then the claims
`get entered into the proceeding. They usually leave it something
`along those lines.
` And then once the claims are in the proceeding, the
`burden remains on the Petitioner to demonstrate that they aren't
`patentable.
` JUDGE ANKENBRAND: Okay. Thank you.
` MR. GIUNTA: Okay. So it's Fujifilm
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