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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`STINGRAY DIGITAL GROUP INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`MUSIC CHOICE,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2017-00888 (Patent 7,320,025 B1)
`Case IPR2017-01191 (Patent 9,351,045 B1)
`____________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held: June 19, 2018
`____________
`
`
`
`
`Before MITCHELL G. WEATHERLY, GREGG I. ANDERSON, and
`JOHN F. HORVATH, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00888 (Patent 7,320,025 B1)
`Case IPR2017-01191 (Patent 9,351,045 B1)
`
`
`
`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`
`
`JOSHUA A. RASKIN, ESQUIRE
`ALLAN A. KASSENOFF, ESQUIRE
`Greenberg Traurig
`MetLife Building
`200 Park Avenue
`New York, NY 10166
`
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
`
`
`ROBERT W. ASHBROOK, JR., ESQUIRE
`MARTIN J. BLACK, ESQUIRE
`Dechert LLP
`Cira Centre
`2929 Arch Street
`Philadelphia, PA 19104
`
`
`
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Tuesday, June 19,
`2018, commencing at 1:30 p.m., at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
`600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
`
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`Case IPR2017-00888 (Patent 7,320,025 B1)
`Case IPR2017-01191 (Patent 9,351,045 B1)
`
`
`P R O C E E D I N G S
`- - - - -
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: So this is a hearing for two
`proceedings, IPR 2017-00888, relating to U.S. Patent 7,320,025, and IPR
`2017-01191, which is relating to U.S. Patent 9,351,045.
`The Petitioner is Stingray Digital Group Inc. and the Patent
`Owner is Music Choice.
`I am Judge Weatherly and I’m joined today by my colleagues
`Judges Anderson and Horvath remotely, joined remotely that is. The camera
`that they see you through is above my head. So it might make them feel a
`little more warm and fuzzy if you look at the camera when you are speaking
`to one of them. Also, during the hearing if you are using your slides it really
`helps them, the remote judges in particular, follow the presentation if you
`tell us what slide you are on. That also makes the record much easier for us
`to use later. So I would ask that you do that.
`Pursuant to our Hearing Order, each party is going to have one
`hour to present its argument today for the two proceedings combined. The
`Petitioner will go first, since it has the burden of persuasion, and the Patent
`Owner will go second. Petitioner, you may reserve time if you wish to rebut
`arguments that the Patent Owner advances in their presentation. I’m not
`sure how, if the parties have discussed it or whether they have any
`preferences about whether we address both cases serially or I should say all
`at one time, or we split it up and kind of divide the hearing. Has there been
`any discussion about that?
`MR. RASKIN: There hasn’t, Your Honor, only to the extent
`that we both assumed that we would address both IPRs first.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Then that’s fine.
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`Case IPR2017-00888 (Patent 7,320,025 B1)
`Case IPR2017-01191 (Patent 9,351,045 B1)
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`MR. RASKIN: And we’re happy to do it that way.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: No, I don’t have any preferences.
`MR. ASHBROOK: We’re fine with that, Your Honor.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: All right, great. However the parties
`want to do it is fine with me. So I understand, Petitioner, that you’ll present
`the case for both IPRs at one time. There will be a response, and then a
`rebuttal for both cases, yes?
`MR. RASKIN: Yes.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Okay. Fantastic. So before we start,
`I’d like each side to introduce themselves. We’ll begin with Petitioner. And
`please introduce people who you’ve brought with you also.
`MR. RASKIN: Sure. My name is Josh Raskin from the law
`firm of Greenberg Traurig. I represent the Petitioner Stingray Digital. And
`with me today are Allan Kassenoff, he will be speaking on the second IPR;
`and --
`
`JUDGE ANDERSON: Yeah, counsel, you might check your
`microphone. I’m not getting any noise here.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Sometimes the power button on the
`base of the microphone, it should be glowing green.
`MR. RASKIN: Is this better?
`JUDGE ANDERSON: Much.
`MR. RASKIN: Okay, great. I’ll start again.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: And Judge Anderson, we can’t really
`see you. We can only see your left shoulder. Maybe that’s intentional.
`JUDGE ANDERSON: Well, I don’t know, let’s see. My left
`
`shoulder --
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`Case IPR2017-00888 (Patent 7,320,025 B1)
`Case IPR2017-01191 (Patent 9,351,045 B1)
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`
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: At least I think --
`JUDGE ANDERSON: You can’t see my --
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Now we can.
`MR. RASKIN: We can see you now.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: We’ve got you now.
`JUDGE ANDERSON: Okay.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: All right.
`MR. RASKIN: Okay. I’ll start again. Good afternoon. My
`name is Josh Raskin from Greenberg Traurig and I represent the Petitioner
`Stingray. I’ll be speaking as to the first IPR, the one ending in 088. With
`me are my colleagues Allan Kassenoff, he will speaking as to the other IPR;
`and then also with us is (indiscernible).
`MR. ASHBROOK: Your Honors, my name is Robert Ashbrook
`from the Dechert Law Firm. I’m representing the Patent Owner Music
`Choice. With me is my colleague Martin Black and I’m very pleased to say
`that from Music Choice is Paula Calhoun and Karen Raybrook (phonetic).
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: All right. Great. Thank you very
`much for the introductions. Mr. Ashbrook, who is going to be making the
`presentation for the Patent Owner?
`MR. ASHBROOK: Your Honor, I will primarily speak. There
`may be a few points where Mr. Black may want to speak as well.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: All right. Fantastic. Okay. So all
`right. So Petitioner, whenever you are ready. How much time would you
`like to reserve?
`MR. RASKIN: We’d like to reserve a total of 20 minutes.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: All right.
`
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`Case IPR2017-00888 (Patent 7,320,025 B1)
`Case IPR2017-01191 (Patent 9,351,045 B1)
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`
`MR. RASKIN: And our intention is for myself, for me to speak
`for 20 and for my colleague to speak for 20. Should I assume it’s up to me
`to keep track of --
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: I can set it for 20 and just to give you
`a heads up, the light will start blinking as you get under a minute, green.
`And then at 15 seconds or so the yellow light will come on and the red light
`will indicate that your time is up.
`MR. RASKIN: Okay. And that is going to be set to 20 minutes
`as opposed to --
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Yes.
`MR. RASKIN: Okay. That’s very helpful. Thank you.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: And I’m just turning around to verify
`that we don’t have a clock above my head. I can’t ever remember. Is there
`one in --
`
`MR. RASKIN: No, I don’t see one.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: No? Okay. Just the lights then.
`MR. RASKIN: And Judge Weatherly, I understand that Judges
`Anderson and Horvath have copies of our slides. Would you like a set as
`well?
`
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: I have copies on my screen but if you
`have a paper copy for me that will mean that I can use my screen real estate
`for something else. Thank you. And if you at any point have a question
`about how much time is left, by the way, I’ll be happy to --
`MR. RASKIN: Oh, thank you. That’s helpful.
`MR. ASHBROOK: Your Honor, would you like a paper copy
`from Music Choice?
`
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`Case IPR2017-00888 (Patent 7,320,025 B1)
`Case IPR2017-01191 (Patent 9,351,045 B1)
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`
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Sure. Sure. Thank you. Okay. So
`we’re ready to go whenever you are ready.
`MR. RASKIN: Okay. Great. All right. I am going to jump
`past the first couple of slides that we have in our deck that go towards the
`background of this IPR. If there’s any questions regarding the prior art, I’m
`happy to address those. But I believe our briefs are pretty comprehensive as
`it relates to the prior art. And jump straight to the disputes.
`So there are two grounds on which this IPR were instituted.
`The first ground relates to Claims 1, 3, and 4, and the Mackintosh and
`Hallier references. Ground 2 relates to Claim 8 of the 025 patent and to the
`Hudson reference. And I will begin with the Ground 1 disputes.
`The first dispute I’ll speak to is whether a person of skill in the
`art would modify Mackintosh to automatically cease the playing of
`broadcast music. And this is Element 1D of Claim 1 of the ’025 patent.
`And you’ll recall from our briefs, what Mackintosh teaches is a system
`where the user is listening to broadcast music and then at the same time the
`listener is given the opportunity to activate hyperlinks or buttons that then
`take the user to supplemental materials, which can be videos. And the issue
`here is whether Mackintosh would be modified to cease playing the
`broadcast music after supplemental materials are activated.
`It’s the Patent Owner’s contention that Mackintosh teaches the
`exact opposite, namely that the system will continue playing the broadcast
`music every time a supplemental material is activated. And what they rely
`primarily on to support that contention is this section of the specification --
`I’m sorry, which is Slide 15, I apologize. Slide 15 shows the portion of the
`specification that they rely on.
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`Case IPR2017-00888 (Patent 7,320,025 B1)
`Case IPR2017-01191 (Patent 9,351,045 B1)
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`
`But as you can see, nowhere in this portion of the specification
`or anywhere in the specification is there a requirement that the broadcast
`materials or the broadcast music continue playing after the user selects the
`supplemental materials. And instead, as you can see in the second
`highlighted portion on Slide 15, what the specification repeatedly says is that
`the supplemental materials can be coordinated. And that’s the term that’s
`used. And I have another slide, Slide 16, which shows another portion of the
`specification. And as you can see here, it refers to this coordinated fashion
`by which the supplemental materials are presented to the user with the
`broadcast music. And there’s nothing about the term coordinated that
`requires that the broadcast music continue playing when supplemental
`material is presented.
`Now we recognize that there are certain circumstances where
`the broadcast music might continue playing. And this is a section or an
`excerpt from -- this is Slide 17, the Reply Declaration of our expert Dr.
`Shamos where he acknowledges that in certain situations, such as where the
`supplemental materials are song lyrics, for example, where the user might
`want to continue hearing a song while the song lyrics are being played.
`But Mackintosh discloses several instances where one of skill
`in the art clearly would not want to continue hearing the broadcast music.
`And I’m referring to Slide 19, where Mackintosh talks about the
`supplemental materials being sample tracks, sample music tracks of the
`same artist that the user is already listening to. And as Dr. Shamos explains
`in his Reply Declaration at Paragraph 14, and I’m looking at Slide 18, in that
`instance one of skill in the art would not want to hear two tracks being
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`Case IPR2017-00888 (Patent 7,320,025 B1)
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`played at the same time. Logic tell us that that would be annoying, to hear
`two songs playing at the same time.
`Another example in Mackintosh is when supplemental
`materials are advertising. Advertisers would not want their advertisements,
`for example a video that contains audio and audio track, for their
`advertisement to be drowned out by the broadcast music that’s being played.
`And this is what Dr. Shamos, our expert, says in his Reply Declaration as
`shown on Slide 20.
`Now Patent Owner argues that it would be impractical to
`modify Mackintosh to automatically cease the broadcast music. However,
`as Dr. Shamos explains both in his Original Declaration and in his Reply
`Declaration, it would be simple matter or a trivial process to modify
`Mackintosh to do that. He provides some ways that that can be done. For
`example, one way to make the distinction is to examine the file name
`extension of the media asset. So if a supplemental materials has audio, an
`audio component, the system can analyze the extension and if the extension
`is one that indicates that audio is present, automatically cease the broadcast
`music. And also Dr. Shamos testifies that you could do this using common
`tools.
`
`So that’s what I have on the first dispute. If there aren’t any
`questions, I’ll move on to the second.
`The second dispute is whether a person of skill in the art would
`have been motivated to combine Mackintosh and Hallier to transmit
`application data with the broadcast music. That’s a requirement of Element
`1B of the ’025 Patent. And you’ll recall from our briefs, the combination
`that Petitioner proposes is to modify Mackintosh to deliver URLs from the
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`Case IPR2017-00888 (Patent 7,320,025 B1)
`Case IPR2017-01191 (Patent 9,351,045 B1)
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`radio station down to the user’s computer, along with the broadcast music.
`And then those URLs are accessed by the user if the user so desires to then
`retrieve the supplemental materials from Server 216.
`Patent Owner first argues that Petitioner doesn’t make the
`argument that I just enunciated to you. And we respectfully disagree and so
`did the Board in its decision. And what the Board said was Patent Owner’s
`argument is unpersuasive because it relies on a single statement in the
`Petition taken out of context and ignores critical other portions of our
`argument and evidence. And nothing has changed from the time of this
`decision until today. Patent Owner hasn’t cited to anything else to support
`its position. It still relies on this single statement. And I have slides
`showing all the times that both Petitioner and our expert have said in no
`uncertain terms that the modification we’re proposing is to include URLs
`that identify videos along with the broadcast music. And I’ll move through
`these slides fairly quickly since they are all in our briefs. And for the benefit
`of Judges Horvath and Anderson, these are Slides 29, 30, and 31. Slides 32
`and slide 32 demonstrates that even Patent Owner recognizes that URLs are
`going to be transmitted along with the broadcast audio.
`Now another argument that Patent Owner makes with regard to
`this dispute is that the Petitioner ignores Mackintosh’s own solutions to a
`potential data overload problem. Mackintosh mentions that there is a
`potential problem where there will be an overload on Server 214 and
`provides effuse potential solutions to that problem. But we have not ignored
`that. We have recognized that those solutions exist and as shown on Slide
`34 in our Petition at page 14 we’ve said that the solution that we have
`proposed, which is the combined Hallier and Mackintosh, is an even better
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`Case IPR2017-00888 (Patent 7,320,025 B1)
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`solution. And Dr. Shamos in his first Declaration submitted with the
`Petition testified that combining Hallier with Mackintosh to submit the
`URLs directly to the user and bypass Server 14 would eliminate this
`overload issue. So we do not ignore this solution but instead address it head
`on and take the position that our solution would be even better.
`Patent Owner also argues that while the server overload
`problem at Server 14 would be eliminated, that’s not a contested issue. And
`they agree that that problem would be eliminated. They say that that
`problem would just be shifted from 214 to 216. But we respectfully
`disagree.
`
`First off, I think it’s important to note that according to the
`relevant case law any solution to a problem can provide a motivation to
`combine. So if we have a solution to the overload problem at 214 which is
`not contested completely solves that problem and completely eliminates it,
`that alone should be enough to provide a motivation to combine.
`But turning to Patent Owner’s argument, according to our
`Reply and to Dr. Shamos, that problem, that supposed shifting of the
`overload problem from Server 214 to Server 216 simply doesn’t exist. The
`number of URLs that are received at the client computer, at Computer 212,
`is the same regardless of whether those URLs are transmitted along with the
`broadcast music or whether they are retrieved from Server 214. The same
`number of URLs are going to eventually make their way to Client Computer
`212. And so there is no shifting of any overload problem to --
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Help me understand what, I had
`trouble understanding your response in the reply on this particular point.
`MR. RASKIN: Okay.
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`Case IPR2017-00888 (Patent 7,320,025 B1)
`Case IPR2017-01191 (Patent 9,351,045 B1)
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`
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Why is the number of URLs being
`received at terminals relevant to whether servers are being overloaded?
`MR. RASKIN: Okay. So I’ll turn to my Slide 38, which is
`actually figures taken from the Patent Owner’s Response at page 33. You
`can see on the left side Mackintosh prior to its modification with Hallier.
`And in Figure 5 you can see that the broadcast music, the first step is to
`deliver to broadcast audio down to User Terminal 212. And that broadcast
`audio contains program data. That program data is then sent to Data Server
`214 and URLs are returned from 214 down to Terminal 212. And then
`Terminal 212 uses those URLs to fetch the supplemental material from
`Supplemental Server 216.
`In our proposed modification, those URLs, the first step is for
`the program data to be sent down to 214, retrieve the URLs in Step 2, and
`then deliver those URLs in Step 3 along with the broadcast audio as taught
`by Hallier. And then Server 212 in Step 4, which is the same Step 4 in the
`original Mackintosh solution on the left, sends those URLs to servers --
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: I think I understand better now. So in
`the proposed modification, Data Server 214 still serves the URLs but it only
`does so essentially once.
`MR. RASKIN: Exactly. As opposed to receiving requests from
`all of the user terminals.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: From lots of clients.
`MR. RASKIN: That’s exactly right.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: So that reduces the load, the load in
`responding to URLs, requests for URLs.
`MR. RASKIN: And in fact it totally eliminates it.
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`Case IPR2017-00888 (Patent 7,320,025 B1)
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`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Essentially.
`MR. RASKIN: Yeah.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Right.
`MR. RASKIN: And as you can see here, the number of URLs
`that are sent to supplemental server remains the same. So the position they
`are taking that there is a shift of that overload problem from Server 214 to
`216 is respectfully incorrect.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Okay. So in other words, the universe
`of client machines, its relationship to Supplemental Server 216 doesn’t
`change at all.
`MR. RASKIN: That’s our position, yes.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: There’s still a lot of machines sending
`a lot of URLs to the supplemental server. And to the extent the
`supplemental server was configured from the beginning to be able to handle
`that --
`
`MR. RASKIN: It should still be configured --
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: -- it should still be able to handle it.
`MR. RASKIN: Right. And I expect that we’ll hear argument
`from Patent Owner responding to this, where they are going to come up with
`some hypothetical situation as to when there might be more of an overload
`in the combination as in the original but --
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: So overall you’re saying that the
`system that you, the modified system, the combined load on Data Server 214
`and Supplemental Server 216 is reduced but not necessarily in any way on
`the Supplemental Server 216?
`MR. RASKIN: That’s correct.
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`Case IPR2017-00888 (Patent 7,320,025 B1)
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`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Okay. All right.
`MR. RASKIN: Okay I’ll move now -- well, the third dispute
`I’m actually going to move past and address this dispute if necessary on
`rebuttal.
`
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: The third dispute being --
`MR. RASKIN: The third dispute is whether the proposed
`combination of Mackintosh and Hallier received the transmitted video after.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Okay.
`MR. RASKIN: And the reason why I’m skipping through this is
`this argument depends on our, depends on Patent Owner convincing you that
`we are not arguing that the URLs are transmitted with the broadcast music.
`And I’m not sure if they still are making this argument --
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Okay. All right.
`MR. RASKIN: -- based on their expert’s deposition testimony.
`So I’m going to go past these in the interests of time and turn to the Ground
`2. Now Ground 2 again is Hudson and relates to Claim 8. And the first
`dispute here is whether Hudson discloses creating a playlist. And this is one
`of the elements of the Claim Element 8B. And Patent Owner’s argument on
`this point relies on its construction of playlist. And Slide 47 has the
`construction side by side. Both parties, you can see, agree that a playlist is a
`list of media assets. But the Patent Owner proposes to build in an additional
`limitation, which is that those media assets are going to automatically play
`one after another.
`Now Dr. Shamos in his Reply Declaration testifies that the
`ordinary meaning of a playlist is a list of things to be played. In other words,
`a list of media assets. And he bases that opinion on several things, including
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`Case IPR2017-00888 (Patent 7,320,025 B1)
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`dictionary definitions where the term playlist has been defined to be a short
`list of musical records, recordings, or videos, again consistent with a list of
`media assets.
`Dr. Russ, Patent Owner’s expert, was asked during his
`deposition whether he relied on dictionary definitions and he said he says
`some but he didn’t cite them. He also testified that he has in the past cited
`dictionary definitions in support of claim construction issues. So --
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Let me ask you something. I mean,
`the approach that you’ve taken first here is to give us some evidence from
`experts.
`
`MR. RASKIN: Mm-hmm.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: But you’ve couched it as evidence
`regarding the plain meaning. When I think of the plain meaning, I don’t
`know that I think of having to ask an expert on those meanings. And then
`normally I like to see parties focus on the intrinsic evidence. So --
`MR. RASKIN: Well I’ll move to that right now.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Sure.
`JUDGE HORVATH: Before you do, let me ask you this.
`Looking at your Slide 49, for example the first definition says a short list of
`musical records that may be broadcast by a radio station. Your second
`definition from the New World College Dictionary says a limited list of
`musical recordings or videos that may be played. What is your
`understanding of the term may be?
`MR. RASKIN: Well that actually supports our position and I’m
`glad you asked that, Judge Horvath. What this indicates to one skilled in the
`art is that the playlist is the actual list and the list may or may not be played.
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`Case IPR2017-00888 (Patent 7,320,025 B1)
`Case IPR2017-01191 (Patent 9,351,045 B1)
`
`But the playlist itself is the list of media assets. So that goes contrary to the
`proposed limitation that Patent Owner wants to include in this construction,
`which is that the media assets must automatically play one after the other. If
`a radio broadcaster, for example, has his or her playlist in front of him or
`her, that radio broadcast can play one song, can then go to a different song in
`that playlist. It’s simply a list of the songs that that radio broadcaster might
`play. It doesn’t require that he hit the button to play the first song and sit
`back and do nothing for the next hour and let the songs play one after the
`other.
`
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: You’ve got about 2 ½ minutes left --
`MR. RASKIN: Okay.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: -- in your 20-minute allotment.
`MR. RASKIN: Does that answer your question, Judge
`
`Horvath?
`
`JUDGE HORVATH: Yes, thank you.
`MR. RASKIN: Okay. So the claim, and I know you wanted to
`see, Judge Weatherly, intrinsic evidence, the claim is consistent. And the
`claim says that a playlist includes a plurality of media assets. And none of
`the other intrinsic evidence includes any disavowal or disclaimer of what we
`believe to be the plain meaning of playlist. And once we apply the correct
`construction of playlist, a list of media assets, there’s no dispute that the
`story boards in Hudson are a list of media assets. Dr. Shamos says they are.
`Dr. Russ, Patent Owner’s expert, says yeah, the non-linear story boards of
`Hudson contain a list of media assets.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: So there’s a little bit of a dispute
`going on about whether Hudson describes non-linear story boards and linear
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`Case IPR2017-00888 (Patent 7,320,025 B1)
`Case IPR2017-01191 (Patent 9,351,045 B1)
`
`story boards. My suspicion is that you want to argue that it doesn’t matter
`whether it discloses linear story boards even though your expert says,
`characterizes Hudson as describing linear story boards.
`MR. RASKIN: Yes. And you’re correct --
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: But I’m not sure I found it there in
`Hudson. So besides your expert’s testimony, which doesn’t, I don’t know
`that it’s really supported by the record, is there any other evidence that I’m
`missing about that point?
`MR. RASKIN: Yes. Well, I don’t want to say you’re missing
`anything. But --
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Well I might, I think I am missing it.
`Because I don’t know if it -- so that’s why I’m asking about it.
`MR. RASKIN: In Paragraph 24 of Hudson, this is what our
`expert -- and this is, Slide 64 is an excerpt of the Shamos Reply Declaration.
`And here’s where he describes what a linear story board is. And he says that
`a person of skill in the art would have this understanding from Paragraph 24
`of Hudson. Let me just read Paragraph 24 of Hudson, too.
`Paragraph 24 says in the first sentence that Figure 3 shows a
`preferred method for creating interactive video content and Step 300 a
`preferably non-linear story board is created. So there’s a statement here that
`tells one of skill in the art that while it’s preferred that the story board be
`non-linear, it can be linear. And then if you look to the last sentence of
`Paragraph 24, it says by being non-linear a user may be presented with a
`plurality of choices at each level of selection. So from that statement, Dr.
`Shamos concluded that a linear story board, on the other hand, is one where
`the user is not presented with any choices requiring interaction. So that’s the
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`Case IPR2017-00888 (Patent 7,320,025 B1)
`Case IPR2017-01191 (Patent 9,351,045 B1)
`
`conclusion that our expert reached in coming to the conclusion that one of
`skill in the art would know that there is a linear story board.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Okay.
`MR. RASKIN: But as you prefaced your question, we believe it
`doesn’t matter. Because under the proper construction of playlist, a list of
`media assets --
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Need not be linear.
`MR. RASKIN: Right. The non-linear story boards are
`indisputably, they indisputably contain a list of media assets.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Yes.
`MR. RASKIN: All right. So I’ll stop now.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Okay.
`MR. RASKIN: And address any other issues on rebuttal.
`Thank you, Your Honors.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: All right. Thanks.
`MR. KASSENOFF: Good afternoon, Your Honor. My name is
`Allan Kassenoff and I’m a colleague of Mr. Raskin’s, and I’ll be addressing
`the ’045 patent on behalf of the Petitioner.
`There are three disputed issues here today that we’re going to
`address. The first one is the motivation to combine --
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Slide 4?
`MR. KASSENOFF: Slide, I’m sorry, I apologize, Your Honors.
`
`It’s Slide 4.
`
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: That’s okay.
`MR. KASSENOFF: The first issue is going to be the motivation
`to combine the Hudson and Dwek prior art references and Mr. Raskin
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`Case IPR2017-00888 (Patent 7,320,025 B1)
`Case IPR2017-01191 (Patent 9,351,045 B1)
`
`addressed Hudson briefly and I’m going to go into a little more detail with
`that. Part B of that first issue is the motivation to combine Hudson and
`Dwek specifically with respect to Claims 11 and 16, which deal with a
`music genre channel. The second and third issues are with respect to the two
`claim limitations that appear on Slide 4.
`Here’s a cover of Hudson. I’m going to talk a little bit about
`Hudson just to elaborate on certain points that are important to our
`motivation to combine argument. And this is on Slide 6.
`So the key for Hudson is it’s a method for delivering interactive
`video. And what that means is there’s a thing called primary content, which
`is when the user would choose what video to watch, and in number 400 you
`can see at the top that’s when the user would receive that primary content.
`And embedded within the primary content is this concept of interface links,
`where the user could click the interface link and thereby receive ancillary
`content.
`
`Once the user receives the ancillary content, which Dr. Shamos
`explained is an HTTP GET request of that content, two things happen. The
`primary content video stream is paused and the server will then access that
`ancillary content for delivery to the user.
`This is an issue that is common, which Mr. Raskin addressed,
`which is the concept of a non-linear story board. And as, I don’t want to
`repeat what Mr. Raskin my colleague said, but Hudson explains that
`preferably, and this is Slide 7, preferably a non-linear story board is created
`and to one of skill in the art, they would read that, the alternative would be a
`linear story board. And you heard from Mr. Raskin what a linear story
`board would be. And Dr. Shamos in this IPR, at Paragraph 32 of his first
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`Case IPR2017-00888 (Patent 7,320,025 B1)
`Case IPR2017-01191 (Patent 9,351,045 B1)
`
`Declaration, explains that these story boards are linear, i.e. sequential, or
`non-linear, i.e. (Indiscernible).
`It’s Petitioner’s contention that one of skill in the art would
`combine Hudson with Dwek. Dwek’s disclosure on Slide 10, listeners
`desire the freedom and flexibility to choose exactly what they want to hear.
`And what that’s talking about is creating a customized playlist. Unlike in
`Hudson where you get what the story board author presents, in Dwek you
`have the option. You can search the online repository and choose what you
`want to see and customize your playlist.
`This is on Slide 11, which is Figure 3A of Dwek, and a couple
`of things that are important. The left panel is where the search panel, and
`you can search the online repository. The second panel next to that is the
`library, which is just another way to search. The third panel is the playlist,
`where you actually build your playlist by adding what you found via a
`search or in the library. And then the panel all the way on the right is the
`channels playlist. And this is Slide 12, which is an excerpt from Dwek’s
`disclosure explaining wh

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