By: Andy H. Chan, Reg. No. 56,893
`Pepper Hamilton LLP
`333 Twin Dolphin Drive
`Suite 400
`Redwood City, CA 94065
`(650) 802-3600 (telephone)
`(650) 802-3650 (facsimile)
`chana@pepperlaw.com
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`___________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`___________________
`
`GOOGLE INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`IXI IP, LLC
`Patent Owner
`
`___________________
`
`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
`___________________
`
`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
`PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.107
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`Page 1 of 48
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page(s)
`
`Table of Authorities .................................................................................................. ii
`Table of Exhibits ...................................................................................................... iii
`I.
`Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1
`II. Alleged Grounds ............................................................................................. 1
`III. Technical Overview Of The ’124 Patent ........................................................ 2
`IV. Claim Construction And Ordinary Skill In The Art ....................................... 4
`A.
`Person Having Ordinary Skill In The Art ............................................ 5
`B.
`Claim Construction .............................................................................. 5
`1.
`“operative language” .................................................................. 5
`2.
`“means-plus-function” elements ................................................ 6
`Petition Procedural Deficiencies .................................................................... 7
`V.
`VI. The Challenged Claims Are Not Obvious Over Maes In View Of
`Preston .......................................................................................................... 12
`Summary Of Maes.............................................................................. 12
`A.
`Summary Of Preston .......................................................................... 14
`B.
`C.
`There Is No Reasonable Likelihood That Claims 1-10 Are
`Rendered Obvious By The Combination Of Maes And Preston ....... 16
`1. Maes fails to disclose “parsing the high-level code for the
`keywords” as alleged by Petitioner. ......................................... 17
`2. Maes fails to disclose “determining level of complexity
`and implementation of the high-level code” as alleged by
`Petitioner. ................................................................................. 20
`VII. The Challenged Claims Are Not Obvious Pazandak In View Of White
`And Manson .................................................................................................. 23
`Summary Of Pazandak ...................................................................... 23
`A.
`Summary Of White ............................................................................. 26
`B.
`Summary Of Manson ......................................................................... 27
`C.
`
`i
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
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`2.
`
`3.
`
`D.
`
`There Is No Reasonable Likelihood That Claims 1-10 Are
`Rendered Obvious By The Combination Of Pazandak, White,
`And Manson ....................................................................................... 28
`Pazandak fails to disclose “receiving a high-level code
`1.
`comprising one or more keywords, wherein the high-
`level code is provided by a user … without having to
`select from menu items …” as alleged by Petitioner. .............. 29
`Pazandak fails to disclose “parsing the high-level code
`for the keywords” as alleged by Petitioner. ............................. 32
`Pazandak fails to disclose “determining whether high-
`level code comprises keywords defining one or more
`relationships and conditions corresponding to the
`operative language” as alleged by Petitioner. .......................... 34
`4. White fails to disclose “determining level of complexity
`and implementation of the high-level code” as alleged by
`Petitioner. ................................................................................. 35
`A person of ordinary skill in the art would not have
`combined Pazandak, White, and Manson as alleged by
`Petitioner. ................................................................................. 37
`VIII. Conclusion .................................................................................................... 40
`
`
`5.
`
`ii
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`CASES
`CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG,
`224 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000) .................................................................... 21, 36
`
`Page(s)
`
`CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ....................... 16
`
`Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. v. Int’l Securities Exchange, LLC,
`677 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .................................................................... 20, 36
`
`Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Depomed, Inc., IPR2014-00652,
`Paper 12 (PTAB Sep. 29, 2014) ............................................................. 16, 28, 29
`
`Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Depomed, Inc., IPR2014-00656,
`Paper 12 (PTAB Sep. 29, 2014) ........................................................................... 4
`
`Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
`93 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ...................................................................... 21, 36
`
`In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .............................................................. 39
`
`Kinetic Techs., Inc. v. Skywork Solutions, Inc., IPR2014-00529,
`Paper 8 (PTAB Sep. 23, 2014) ........................................................................... 11
`
`Kinetic Techs., Inc. v. Skywork Solutions, Inc., IPR2014-00530,
`Paper 8 (PTAB Sep. 29, 2014) ........................................................................... 11
`
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) ...................................... 29, 39
`
`LG Display, Ltd. v. Innovative Display Technologies LLC, IPR2014-01094,
`Paper 10 (PTAB Jan. 13, 2015) ............................................................................ 8
`
`LG Display, Ltd. v. Innovative Display Technologies LLC, IPR2014-01094,
`Paper 18 (PTAB April 9, 2015) ............................................................................ 8
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., IPR2012-00026,
`Paper 17 (PTAB Dec. 21, 2012) ................................................................... 17, 28
`
`In re Royka, 490 F.2d 981 (CCPA 1974) ................................................................ 16
`
`iii
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
`
`In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................... 5
`
`TRW Automotive U.S., LLC v. Magna Electronics, Inc., IPR2015-00949,
`Paper 7 (PTAB Sep. 17, 2015) ............................................................................. 5
`
`Wowza Media Sys, LLC and Coffee Cup Partners, Inc. v. Adobe Sys. Inc.,
`IPR2013-00054, Paper 12 (PTAB Apr. 8, 2013) ............................................... 12
`
`
`
`STATUTES
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ...................................................................................................... 6, 7
`
`35 U.S.C. § 312 .................................................................................................... 8, 12
`
`35 U.S.C. § 313 .......................................................................................................... 1
`
`
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.22 ..................................................................................................... 12
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100 ..................................................................................................... 4
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104 ......................................................................................... 8-10, 12
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.107 ..................................................................................................... 1
`
`Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756 (Aug. 14, 2012) ..... 4, 8, 10
`
`iv
`
`
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
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`PATENT OWNER’S TABLE OF EXHIBITS
`
`Exhibit Description
`
`Exhibit No.
`
`2001
`
`Declaration of Lin Chase, Ph.D.
`
`
`
`v
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`Page 6 of 48
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`

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`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.107, the Patent Owner, IXI IP, LLC (“IXI”)
`
`IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
`
`
`hereby submits the following Preliminary Response to the Petition seeking inter
`
`partes review of U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124 (“the ’124 Patent”). This filing is
`
`timely under 35 U.S.C. § 313 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.107, as it is being filed within
`
`three months of the mailing date of the Notice of Filing Date Accorded to the
`
`Petition (Paper 3), mailed September 9, 2016.
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`The Petition fails to show a reasonable likelihood of demonstrating
`
`invalidity of any of the challenged claims of the ’124 Patent. Accordingly, Patent
`
`Owner respectfully requests that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“the Board”)
`
`deny institution of inter partes review as to all grounds set forth in the Petition.
`
`II. ALLEGED GROUNDS
`The Petition challenges claims 1-10 of the ’124 Patent on the following
`
`alleged grounds:
`
`1.
`
`Claims 1-10 are allegedly obvious over U.S. Patent No. 7,003,463 of
`
`Maes et al. (Ex. 1005, “Maes”) in view of U.S. Pub. No. 2003/0046061 of Preston
`
`et al. (Ex. 1006, “Preston”); and
`
`2.
`
`Claims 1-10 are allegedly obvious over U.S. Patent No. 7,027,975 of
`
`Pazandak et al. (Ex. 1007, “Pazandak”) in view of U.S. Pub. No. 2002/0072918 of
`
`1
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`White et al. (Ex. 1008, “White”) and U.S. Patent No. 7,085,708 of Manson (Ex.
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
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`1009, “Manson”).
`
`III. TECHNICAL OVERVIEW OF THE ’124 PATENT
`The ’124 Patent, entitled “Natural Language for Programming a Specialized
`
`Computing System,” is generally directed to methods and systems for
`
`“programming a mobile communication device based on a high-level code
`
`comprising operative language [].” (Ex. 1001, Title, Abstract; Ex. 2001 at ¶ 26).
`
`The ’124 Patent allows a user to control a mobile communication device (e.g., a
`
`cell phone) by providing high level inputs in a natural human language. (Ex. 1001
`
`at Abstract, 1:55-58; Ex. 2001 at ¶ 26).
`
`The natural language input is processed, and as a result, is automatically
`
`turned into low level executable code that can be run on the mobile communication
`
`device, thereby eliminating the need for the user to interact with menu items
`
`available at the operating system level of the mobile communication device. (Ex.
`
`1001 at Abstract, 2:1-13, 5:5-10, FIG. 2; Ex. 2001 at ¶ 27). The approach
`
`described in the ’124 Patent makes it possible for users to control or program the
`
`device using high level natural human language, as opposed to low level technical
`
`controls or code. (Ex. 2001 at ¶ 27).
`
`In particular, a user provides “high-level code 150 [which] may comprise
`
`one or more sentences, wherein each sentence comprises at least one operative
`
`2
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`language (i.e. keyword) defining an instruction for a function or an operation to be
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
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`performed.” (Ex. 1001 at 4:17-23; Ex. 2001 at ¶ 28). The ’124 Patent thus enables
`
`a user to provide high level inputs in a natural human language without limiting the
`
`content of the high-level code so as to support an unlimited range of user inputs.
`
`(Ex. 2001 at ¶ 28).
`
`To process the possible range of natural language inputs, the ’124 Patent
`
`relies, in part, upon the automated determination of the level of complexity and
`
`implementation of the high level input as it arrives, and also upon the designation
`
`of which application software will be used to process the input. (Ex. 1001 at 4:58-
`
`5:4, 9:14-17, 10:18-21; Ex. 2001 at ¶ 29). Given the wide range of words and user
`
`intentions in the high level inputs, the processing required to respond appropriately
`
`might need to take place in a specific fashion available in a specific place in the
`
`network. (Ex. 2001 at ¶ 29). The ’124 Patent thus relies upon looking at the high-
`
`level code itself for its complexity and implementation in order to best complete its
`
`processing. (Ex. 1001 at 4:58-5:4, 9:14-17, 10:18-21; Ex. 2001 at ¶ 29).
`
`To process the high-level code, the ’124 Patent initially parses the input
`
`utilizing a parsing technique commonly referred to as “keyword spotting” or
`
`“keyword searching,” which scans through the input for particular keywords
`
`indicative of “operative language” in the input corresponding to operations of the
`
`mobile communication device as well as keywords indicative of “relationships and
`
`3
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`conditions corresponding to the operative language.” (Ex. 1001 at Abstract, 2:1-9,
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
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`5:31-61, 9:1-9, 10:5-13; Ex. 2001 at ¶ 30).
`
`The ’124 Patent also describes that the high-level code input by the user is
`
`further processed to ultimately generate executable code for execution by a
`
`microcontroller of the mobile communication device. (Ex. 1001 at Abstract, 2:8-9,
`
`FIG. 2; Ex. 2001 at ¶ 31). Not all of the computation for the processing of the
`
`high-level code is required to happen on the mobile communication device, but
`
`rather depending on the determined complexity and implementation of the input
`
`high-level code, processes the input high-level code on the mobile communication
`
`device, a server networked with the mobile communication device, or a
`
`combination of both. (See Ex. 1001 at 1:55-2:55, 4:49-5:4, FIGS. 1 and 2; Ex.
`
`2001 at ¶ 31).
`
`IV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are interpreted
`
`according to the “broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification in
`
`which [they] appear.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide,
`
`77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,766 (Aug. 14, 2012). “Under that standard, and absent
`
`any special definitions, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning,
`
`as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
`
`invention.” Endo Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Depomed, Inc., IPR2014-00656, Paper
`
`4
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`12 at 6 (Sep. 29, 2014) (citing In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
`
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`(Fed. Cir. 2007)); see also TRW Automotive U.S., LLC v. Magna Electronics, Inc.,
`
`IPR2015-00949, Paper 7 at 9 (Sep. 17, 2015).
`
`Person Having Ordinary Skill In The Art
`
`A.
`Petitioner alleges that a hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the field of
`
`the ’124 Patent at the time of the invention “would have had a Bachelor’s degree or
`
`equivalent in computer science, electrical engineering, or a similar related field, as
`
`well as 1-2 years of experience working with natural language programming.”
`
`(Petition at 4). For the purposes of this paper, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s
`
`proposed standard without prejudice. Should a trial be instituted, Patent Owner
`
`reserves the right to present evidence and arguments as to the above definition or
`
`an alternative definition as to the level of ordinary skill in the art.
`
`B. Claim Construction
`Petitioner has proposed construction of the following terms:
`
`“operative language”
`
`1.
`Claims 1 and 6 similarly recite “high-level code comprising operative
`
`language.” Petitioner alleges that the term “operative language” should be
`
`construed to mean, “language associated with one or more operations to be
`
`performed.” (Petition at 7).
`
`5
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`For purposes of this paper, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s proposed
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
`
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`construction without prejudice, but reserves its rights to present evidence and
`
`arguments in this or any other proceeding as to the proper construction of the term
`
`“operative language” within the meaning of the ’124 Patent.
`
`“means-plus-function” elements
`
`2.
`Petitioner alleges that the following terms of claim 6 should be construed as
`
`means-plus-function elements pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (Petition at 9-10):
`
`• “means for receiving a high-level code comprising one or more
`
`keywords”;
`
`• “means for parsing the high-level code for the keywords to recognize
`
`the operative language associated with controlling one or more
`
`operations of the mobile communication device”;
`
`• “means for determining at least one operation associated with the
`
`operative language”;
`
`• “means for determining whether high-level code comprises keywords
`
`defining one or more relationships and conditions corresponding to
`
`the operative language”;
`
`• “means for producing an executable code”;
`
`• “means for determining level of complexity and implementation of
`
`the high-level code”; and
`
`6
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`• “means for designation an application software to process the high-
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
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`level code.”
`
`Petitioner additionally identifies the purported function of each of the above-
`
`identified elements, as well as the corresponding structure for the “means for
`
`receiving a high-level code comprising one or more keywords.” (See Petition at 9-
`
`11). With respect to the remaining alleged “means-plus-function” elements,
`
`Petitioner alleges that the corresponding structure “should be software running on a
`
`processor configured to perform the identified functions or equivalents thereof.”
`
`(Id. at 13).
`
`For purposes of this paper, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s proposed
`
`constructions without prejudice. Patent Owner does not, however, assent to
`
`Petitioner’s indication that each of these terms should be construed pursuant to 35
`
`U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, or to the structure and function identified by Petitioner, and
`
`reserves its rights to present evidence and arguments in this or any other
`
`proceeding as to the proper construction of the alleged “means-plus-function”
`
`terms within the meaning of the ’124 Patent.
`
`V.
`
`PETITION PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES
`
`The Board may initially dispose of the Petition on procedural grounds for
`
`failure to comply with statutory and regulatory requirements governing these
`
`proceedings. The Petition fails to “identif[y], in writing and with particularity,
`
`7
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`each claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based,
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
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`and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim” (35
`
`U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)), fails to “specify where each element of the claim is found in
`
`the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon” (37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.104(b)(4)), and fails to “identify[] specific portions of the evidence that support
`
`the challenge” (37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5)). If the Board is unwilling to deny the
`
`Petition outright, then it should give no weight to the unsupported and conclusory
`
`arguments that are presented in the Petition’s accompanying Declaration of Dr.
`
`Jason Flinn (Ex. 1002).
`
`The Office Patent Trial Practice Guide suggests that parties requesting inter
`
`partes review should “avoid submitting a repository of all the information that a
`
`judge could possibly consider, and instead focus on concise, well-organized, easy-
`
`to-follow arguments supported by readily identifiable evidence of record.” 77 Fed.
`
`Reg. 48,756, 48,763 (Aug. 14, 2012). Moreover, the Board is empowered to
`
`exclude or give no weight to the evidence where a party has failed to state its
`
`relevance or to identify specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge.
`
`LG Display, Ltd. v. Innovative Display Technologies LLC, IPR2014-01094, Paper
`
`10 at 9 (Jan. 13, 2015) and Paper 18 at 3-4 (April 9, 2015).
`
`With reference to the challenged claims’ various considerations involving
`
`the high-level code’s “complexity” and “implementation,” Petitioner’s analysis
`
`8
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`consists almost entirely of scattershot quotes and vague paraphrasing that does not
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
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`attempt to equate those quotes to the claims’ use of those terms or the
`
`interrelationships between the various elements that plainly rely on the
`
`determination of the level of complexity and implementation of the high-level
`
`code. By way of example, Petitioner’s application of Maes with respect to the
`
`recitations of claims 1 and 6 of “[means for] determining level of complexity and
`
`implementation of the high-level code” (identified by Petitioner as elements 1(g)
`
`and 6(g)1) wholly consists of two brief paragraphs that fail to indicate how Maes
`
`teaches determining the level of both complexity and implementation of the high-
`
`level code. (See Petition at 31-32). To the contrary, Petitioner merely emphasizes
`
`Maes’s teachings as to the simplicity or complexity of the tasks requested of the
`
`conversational service, but neglects to identify any particular significance of
`
`Maes’s cited teachings with respect to the claims’ explicit requirement for
`
`determining the “implementation” of the high-level code. Petitioner neglects its
`
`charge of “specify[ing] where each element of the claim is found in the prior art
`
`patents or printed publications relied upon.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4).2
`
`1 For purposes of this paper, Patent Owner has utilized Petitioner’s convention for
`
`identifying various recitations of claims 1 and 6 as elements 1(a)-(l) and 6(a)-(l).
`
`2 Similarly, with respect to the ground based on the combination of Pazandak,
`
`White, and Manson, Petitioner’s analysis of elements 1(g) and 6(g) merely string
`
`9
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`Importantly, claim elements 1(g)/6(g) are not the only claim elements
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
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`referencing the determined level of “complexity” and “implementation,” either
`
`alone or in combination. That the ’124 Patent considers these terms distinct is
`
`made clear in that elements 1(j)/6(j) refer to both the determined complexity and
`
`implementation of the high-level code, while elements 1(k)/6(k) refer solely to
`
`implementation and elements 1(l)/6(l) refer solely to the level of complexity. (See
`
`Ex. 1001 at 9:20-38, 10:24-42). Without any analysis as to the distinction between
`
`the terms “complexity” and “implementation” and any indication as to which
`
`portions of Maes particularly corresponds to each term in elements 1(g)/6(g),
`
`Petitioner’s analysis of claim elements 1(k)/6(k) that explicitly rely on the
`
`implementation determination should also fail. In sum, Petitioner fails to
`
`sufficiently link the teachings of the relied upon passages of the cited references to
`
`the various, interrelated elements of claims 1 and 6, but instead merely presents
`
`conclusory statements vaguely based on “a repository of all the information that a
`
`judge could possibly consider.” 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,763 (Aug. 14, 2012).
`
`Nor does Petitioner “identify [] specific portions of the evidence that support
`
`the challenge.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5). Though Petitioner’s analysis with
`
`respect to Maes and elements 1(g)/6(g) is done under the imprimatur of Dr. Flinn’s
`
`cites to a variety of passages of White without any indication as to how these
`
`passages represent determining “implementation.” (See Petition at 58-61).
`
`10
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`declaration (see Petition at 31-32 (citing Ex. 1002 at ¶ 64)), a review of Dr. Flinn’s
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
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`cited testimony reveals that paragraph 64 of Exhibit 1002 is an almost verbatim
`
`recitation of pages 14 through 40 of the Petition, modified to be in the form of a
`
`claim chart, but without any further substantive analysis or detailed explanation as
`
`to the significance of the quotations and citations relied upon in the Petition as to
`
`claims 1 and 6.3 Indeed, a comparison of Dr. Flinn’s claim chart for elements
`
`1(g)/6(g) at pages 68-70 of Exhibit 1002 with the Petition’s analysis of these
`
`elements on pages 31-32 reveals that the expert declaration is nearly
`
`indistinguishable from that of the Petition, and is thus entitled to little, if any,
`
`weight. See e.g., LG Display, Paper 18 at 4 (denying institution and according the
`
`petition and supporting declaration minimal weight for failing to discuss the
`
`relevance of the evidence to the challenge raised or include a detailed explanation
`
`of the significance of the quotations and citations from the applied references);
`
`Kinetic Techs., Inc. v. Skywork Solutions, Inc., IPR2014-00529, Paper 8 at 15 (Sep.
`
`23, 2014) (“Merely repeating an argument from the Petition in the declaration of a
`
`proposed expert does not give that argument enhanced probative value.”); Kinetic
`
`Techs., Inc. v. Skywork Solutions, Inc., IPR2014-00530, Paper 8 at 13 (Sep. 29,
`
`3 Similarly, with respect to the combination of Pazandak, White, and Manson,
`
`paragraph 69 of Dr. Flinn’s Declaration consists of a chart for claims 1 and 6 that
`
`substantively is nearly indistinguishable from pages 46-69 of the Petition.
`
`11
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`2014) (affording little to no weight to a declaration that is merely a copy of the
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
`
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`petition); Wowza Media Sys, LLC and Coffee Cup Partners, Inc. v. Adobe Sys. Inc.,
`
`IPR2013-00054, Paper 12 at 12 (Apr. 8, 2013) (finding a declaration that simply
`
`tracks and repeats the Petition unhelpful).
`
`In view of the threshold requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3), 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.104(b)(4),(5), and 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2), the limited “analysis” presented in
`
`the Petition and the accompanying declaration cannot demonstrate a reasonable
`
`likelihood that any of the challenged claims are rendered obvious by the cited art.
`
`VI. THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS ARE NOT OBVIOUS OVER MAES
`IN VIEW OF PRESTON
`The Petition alleges that claims 1-10 are obvious over Maes in view of
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`Preston. As discussed in detail below, the Petitioner’s proffered combination of
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`Maes and Preston fails to disclose or suggest all material limitations recited in
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`independent claims 1 and 6. Petitioner has therefore failed to demonstrate a
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`reasonable likelihood that Maes and Preston, alone or in combination, render
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`obvious any of the challenged claims.
`
`A.
`Summary Of Maes
`Maes, entitled “System and Method for Providing Network Coordinated
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`Conversational Services,” is generally directed to a “system and method for
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`providing automatic and coordinated sharing of conversational resources, e.g.,
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`functions and arguments, between network-connected servers and devices and their
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`corresponding applications.” (Ex. 1005 at Abstract; Ex. 2001 at ¶ 38). Maes
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`provides a computing system architecture (including both software and hardware)
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`that automates control of load assignment and load distribution for computational
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`tasks performed in response to requests from third party applications to provide
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`conversational services. (Ex. 2001 at ¶ 38). Maes explains that “with the
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`emergence of pervasive computing, it is expected that billions of low resource
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`client devices (e.g., PDAs, smartphones, etc.) will be networked together.” (Ex.
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`1005 at 1:36-38; Ex. 2001 at ¶ 40). Maes further provides that these low resource
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`client devices may not be able to perform complex conversational tasks. (Ex. 1005
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`at 1:50-60; Ex. 2001 at ¶ 40). Maes therefore expresses the need for “a system and
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`method that allows a network device with limited resources to perform complex
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`specific conversational tasks automatically using networked resources in a manner
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`which is automatic and transparent to a user.” (Ex. 1005 at 2:27-31; Ex. 2001 at ¶
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`40).
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`The third party applications referred to in Maes as the source of requests for
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`conversational services would have been understood to be software applications
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`that allow a human to interact with an artificial system using his or her own natural
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`language. (Ex. 2001 at ¶ 39). Maes provides these applications access to
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`conversational services that are, in general, complex, resource-intensive, and
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`expensive to operate (e.g., speech recognition, natural language understanding,
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`text-to-speech generation, natural language generation, and speaker identification).
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`(See, e.g., Ex. 1005 at 1:49-60, 4:24-29, 4:57-62, 8:13-16; see also Ex. 2001 at ¶
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`39). Maes does not particularly describe how these conversational services are
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`designed or function, but focuses instead on the sharing of these conversational
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`services among networked devices. (Ex. 2001 at ¶ 39).
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`Maes describes how various conversational services (e.g., speech
`
`recognition, natural language understanding, text-to-speech, etc.) offered by
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`networked devices can be catalogued and deployed in a distributed fashion, and
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`how automated location and execution of these services can be accomplished
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`whenever a request arrives for the specific use of one of the available services.
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`(Ex. 2001 at ¶ 41). In particular, Maes describes a system in which networked
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`devices are made “conversationally aware” of each other by using conversational
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`network protocols to transmit messages, processed by dialog managers, to
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`automatically share conversational resources and functions among the networked
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`devices, and the method of operating such a system. (Ex. 1005 at 2:35-48, 5:19-
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`25; Ex. 2001 at ¶ 42).
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`B.
`Summary Of Preston
`Preston, entitled “Apparatus for Automatically Generating Source Code,”
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`provides “[a] method of automatically generating software from one or more
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`predefined functions in accordance with an input statement entered in natural
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`language.” (Ex. 1006 at Abstract). Preston further “relates to apparatus for
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`automatically generating source code, and is particularly, but not exclusively,
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`suitable for generating source code for communication services.” (Ex. 1006 at
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`[0001]; Ex. 2001 at ¶ 43).
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`Generally, Preston attempts to replace human computer programmers to
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`perform simple or well understood programming tasks. (Ex. 2001 at ¶ 44).
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`Preston explains that a non-programmer should be able to program a system
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`without the need to learn a particular programming language and identifies that
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`there are “many situations where it is desirable for a non-programmer to be able to
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`program a system so that it can subsequently act on his or her behalf without
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`further interaction.” (Ex. 1006 at [0007], [0008]; Ex. 2001 at ¶ 44).
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`Preston therefore describes a method to allow a user (e.g., a non-
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`programmer) to input a natural language instruction and have it analyzed to
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`generate source code customized for carrying out the user’s wishes. (Ex. 1006 at
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`[0049]; Ex. 2001 at ¶ 45). In Preston, a user inputting a natural language
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`instruction to create source code is only allowed to draw upon a fixed, limited
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`library of pre-defined and pre-existing functions. (Ex. 2001 at ¶ 45). In particular,
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`Preston provides that certain natural language descriptions are associated with pre-
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`defined functions and their relationships are stored in data storage. (Ex. 1006 at
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`[0057]; Ex. 2001 at ¶ 46). After a user inputs natural language, it is determined
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`whether the input natural language is associated with any of the pre-defined
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`functions in the data storage. (Ex. 1006 at [0061]; Ex. 2001 at ¶ 46). If the user’s
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`input is associated with a function contained in the data storage, a code generator
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`generates source code corresponding to the pre-defined function. (Id.)
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`C. There Is No Reasonable Likelihood That Claims 1-10 Are
`Rendered Obvious By The Combination Of Maes And Preston
`
`The Petition fails to demonstrate the obviousness of the challenged claims as
`
`re